Date: April 29, 2024 Mon

Time: 9:07 pm

Results for radical groups

230 results found

Author: Bartlett, Jamie Title: The Edge of Violence: A Radical Approach to Extremism Summary: The path into terrorism in the name of Islam is often described as a process of radicalization. But to be radical is not necessarily to be violent. Violent radicals are clearly enemies of liberal democracies, but non-violent radicals might sometimes be powerful allies. This report is a summary of two years research examining the difference between violent and non-violent radicals in Europe and Canada. It represents a step toward a more nuanced understanding of behavior across radicalized individuals, the appeal of the al-Qaeda narrative, and the role of governments and communities in responding. Details: London: Demos, 2010. 70p. Source: Online Resource Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 118329 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Cook, David Title: Rehabilitation of Radicals Summary: In the past 10 years, the rehabilitation of Muslim radicals has become a pressing issue. Great numbers of radicals have passed in and out of various incarcerating institutions and are returned to their societies where they frequently rejoin radical groups, sometimes more radicalized and technically proficient than they were prior to their incarceration. Both Muslim and non-Muslim governments have sought different methods to rehabilitate radicals, ranging from arranging debates between radicals and mainstream Muslim religious elite to confronting them with betrayals and denunciations by relatives, friends, and associates. There are also full-scale “reeducation” camps. This policy paper will seek to evaluate these methodologies and propose for the United States a workable policy for re-integrating radicals into society, thus defusing the power of recidivism. Details: Houston, TX: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 2010. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 2, 2010 at: http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/BI-pub-CookRadicalRehab-100710.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://bakerinstitute.org/publications/BI-pub-CookRadicalRehab-100710.pdf Shelf Number: 120345 Keywords: Muslims Radical Groups Terrorists

Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: Criminal Proceedings: A Timeline of U.S. Terror Cases Summary: The following is a timeline of criminal proceedings related to the terror activities of American Muslim extremists and other Americans involved in activities with terrorist organizations whose ideologies are rooted in radical interpretations of Islam. In addition to planning terrorist plots, Americans have also been convicted of raising funds and providing material goods to foreign terrorist organizations, including Hamas, Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. The equally disturbing terror-related activities of Americans who subscribe to anti-government, white supremacist and other extremist ideologies are not reflected in the timeline. Similarly, the list does not include the activities and plots against targets in the U.S. conceived by non-Americans motivated by radical interpretations of Islam. In May 2010, for example, Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, a Jordanian citizen living in the U.S. illegally, pleaded guilty to attempting to detonate explosives at a Dallas skyscraper the previous September in order to “bring down the building”. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2011. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 19, 2011 at: http://www.adl.org/terrorism/Criminal_Proceedings.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/terrorism/Criminal_Proceedings.pdf Shelf Number: 121766 Keywords: Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist Terrorism in the United States Since 9/11 Summary: Since September 11, 2001, so-called "homegrown terrorists," working alone or with others, have planned and in some cases implemented terrorist activities, contributed financial or other material support to others' terrorist activities, or become radicalized in the United States and then traveled to other countries to conduct terrorist activities directed against those countries or against the United States. This paper examines the cases of homegrown terrorism from 9/11 through 2010, highlights lessons learned from those cases that suggest actions for the future, and includes a chronology of numbers and case descriptions of terrorist events in the United States during that period. Most of the individuals involved are Muslim, but the numbers are small. A total of 176 Americans have been indicted, arrested, or otherwise identified as jihadist terrorists or supporters since 9/11. They were involved in 82 cases, a majority of which involve the actions of a single individual. Al Qaeda has increasingly used the Internet to build an army of followers. Many of the terrorists identified in this study began their journey online. However, al Qaeda has not yet managed to inspire its online followers to action. Few of the 32 locally hatched jihadist plots to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States since 9/11 got much beyond the discussion stage. Nevertheless, al Qaeda remains a threat. More terrorist attempts will occur. Traditional law enforcement, in which authorities attempt to identify and apprehend a perpetrator after a crime has been committed, is inadequate to deal with terrorists who are determined to cause many deaths and great destruction and who may not care whether they themselves survive. Public safety demands a preventive approach — intervention before an attack occurs. In addition to law enforcement, intelligence collection, and community policing, public reaction is an essential component of such preventive defense. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 8, 2011 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP343.html Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP343.html Shelf Number: 122679 Keywords: Radical Groups Terrorism (U.S.) Terrorists

Author: Vargas, Alejandro, Jr. Title: Applying Psychosocial Theories of Terrorism to the Radicalization Process: A Mapping of De La Corte‘s Seven Principles to Homegrown Radicals Summary: This study contains an application of psychosocial theories to the process of radicalization among Muslim militants (jihadis) with a history of activity in the United States. Drawing extensively from De la Corte‘s seven psychosocial principles of terrorism, the study codes each principle into a corresponding example from case studies of American jihadism. The end result is the use of theory to create a new empirical and psychosocial perspective into homegrown jihadism. The application of De la Corte‘s theory is also used as a framework to suggest frameworks for detection, intervention, and interdiction when it comes to homegrown jihadi activity. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Master's Thesis: Accessed September 19, 2011 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=683351 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=683351 Shelf Number: 122777 Keywords: Homeland Security Muslims Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism (U.S.) Terrorists

Author: Neumann, Peter Title: Preventing Violent Radicalization in America Summary: In December 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder told journalists that the terrorist threat had changed from “foreigners coming here to… people in the United States, American citizens.” A number of independent studies have confirmed this assessment. One of the most recent – published by the New America Foundation and Syracuse University – showed that “nearly half” of the 175 cases of al Qaeda-related homegrown terrorism since September 11, 2001 occurred in 2009 and 2010. The threat is sufficiently serious to ask whether the U.S. government is fully prepared to confront this new challenge. “Hard” counterterrorism efforts – both at home and abroad – have become sophisticated and successful, yet there still is no domestic equivalent of the State Department’s “Countering Violent Extremism” policy seeking to prevent young Americans from being radicalized at home. Last September’s report by the Bipartisan Policy Center’s (BPC) National Security Preparedness Group, Assessing the Terrorist Threat, concluded that the lack of a coherent approach towards domestic counter-radicalization has left America “vulnerable to a threat that is not only diversifying, but arguably intensifying.” The purpose of this report is to provide guidance on ongoing efforts aimed at developing such an approach. Details: Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 27, 2011 at: http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf Shelf Number: 122909 Keywords: Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism (U.S.) Terrorists

Author: Bouhana, Noemie Title: Al Qa'ida-Influenced Radicalisation: A Rapid Evidence Assessment Guided by Situational Action Theory: Scientific Report Summary: This paper presents findings from research into the causes of Al Qa'ida-influenced radicalisation. It looks to understand vulnerability and resilience to Al Qa‘ida influenced violent extremism; and distinguishes between indicators and causal factors of criminal and violent behaviour. It also explores what transferable knowledge can be applied from youth gangs, new religious movements and violent radical activism. Details: London: Home Office, 2011. 113p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper 97: Accessed November 9, 2011 at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ97?view=Binary Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ97?view=Binary Shelf Number: 123274 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violence

Author: Munton, Tony Title: Understanding Vulnerability and Resilience in Individuals to the Influence of Al Qa’ida Violent Extremism Summary: In the absence of a mature empirical evidence base it explores what transferrable knowledge can be taken from the more developed literature on other types of violent activity e.g. other terrorist activity, gangs, cults, etc. This report presents the findings of a Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) of open source empirical studies that seek to answer two key questions: • What factors, social, psychological and physical, make a person more vulnerable to participation in Al Qa’ida (AQ)-influenced violent extremism? • What factors enable vulnerable individuals to resist the influence of AQ-influenced violent extremism? This report also presents the findings from a second targeted REA on other relevant types of violent activity, including: • other (non-AQ-influenced) types of terrorist activity; • animal rights activism; • cults; • gangs; • right-wing extremism; and • youth crime. The report discusses learning from these other areas and how far lessons learned can be applied to the study of AQ-influenced violent extremism. Both REAs involved systematic searches of relevant electronic databases and hand searches of academic journals and websites. Additional relevant literature was identified by topic experts, peer reviewers, specific websites, and through backward and forward citation chasing. Studies were included if they were based on empirical research, were relevant to the REAs’ questions and were assessed to be of high scientific quality. The empirical evidence base on what factors make an individual more vulnerable to AQ-influenced violent extremism is weak. Even less is known about why certain individuals resort to violence, when other individuals from the same community, with similar experiences, do not become involved in violent activity. The following conclusions are based on the limited empirical evidence base identified by the two REAs. Details: London: Home Office, 2011. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper 98: Accessed November 9, 2011 at: Year: 2011 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 123275 Keywords: Extremist Groups Gang Violence Radical Groups Terrorism Violence Violent Crime

Author: Disley, Emma Title: Individual Disengagement from Al Qa'ida-Influenced Terrorist Groups. A Rapid Evidence Assessment to Inform Policy and Practice in Preventing Terrorism Summary: This paper looks at why and how individuals stop being violent and whether there are intervention practices to learn from. It also explores transferable knowledge from the literature on street gangs, religious cults, right-wing groups and organised crime groups. Details: London: Home Office, 2011. 137p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper No. 99: Accessed November 9, 2011 at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ99?view=Binary Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ99?view=Binary Shelf Number: 123276 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Desistance Extremist Groups Gangs Organized Crime Radical Groups Terrorism Violence

Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Home Affairs Committee Title: Roots of Violence Radicalisation. Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence. Summary: On 7 July 2005, 52 people were killed and more than 770 others injured in attacks on the London transport network carried out by four men from West Yorkshire who had been radicalised by the ideology and rhetoric of Al Qa’ida. The nature of the current, deadly threat facing the UK from home-grown terrorism was fully exposed for the first time. This was only one of a number of terrorist plots which caused the British authorities to shift their attention over the past decade from external threats to national security to those lying within the UK borders. Radicalisation is one of four strategic factors identified in the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST, that have enabled terrorist groups to grow and flourish. Yet four years after 7/7, the reasons why some British-born and raised individuals are vulnerable to violent radicalisation remain unclear. On taking office in 2010, the Coalition Government announced a wholesale review of the Prevent Strategy (often referred to simply as “Prevent”), which was drawn up to tackle violent radicalisation in the UK in the wake of the 7/7 bombings. The original strategy had attracted criticism for its alleged exclusive focus on Muslim communities, spying, and unhealthy conflation of law enforcement with integration policy. The outcome of the Prevent Review was published in June 2011. In anticipation of this, we decided in May 2011 to launch an inquiry that would test the evidence base for the Prevent Review and explore issues regarding its implementation. We undertook to examine the root causes of violent radicalisation in the UK, the individuals and groups particularly vulnerable to radicalisation and the locations where this radicalisation tends to take place, in relation to the primary terrorist threats facing the UK. Specifically, we intended to: • determine the major drivers of, and risk factors for recruitment to, terrorist movements linked to (a) Islamic fundamentalism (b) Irish dissident republicanism and (c) domestic extremism; • examine the relative importance of prisons and criminal networks, religious premises, universities and the internet as fora for violent radicalisation; • examine the operation and impact of the current process for proscribing terrorist groups; • consider the appropriateness of current preventative approaches to violent radicalisation, in light of these findings, including the roles of different organisations at national and local level; and • make recommendations to inform implementation of the Government’s forthcoming revised Prevent strategy. Details: London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2012. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Nineteenth Report of Session 2010-12; Accessed March 21, 2012 at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/1446/1446.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/1446/1446.pdf Shelf Number: 124124 Keywords: Radical Groups Terrorism (U.K.) Terrorists

Author: Deardorff, Robert B. Title: Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity Summary: It is crucial for the United States to confront the increasing incidence of Americans who turn to violence against their fellow citizens in support of Islamist terrorists. This thesis explores the application of “soft power,” the government’s ability to mitigate the recruitment and radicalization of new terrorists by attraction rather than coercion, in order to prevent “homegrown” terrorism. Methods include a comparative policy analysis of counterterrorism models in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, a survey of conservative Muslim leaders in the Houston area, and an extensive literature review. Recent arrests portend an increasing threat if the United States continues along its “hard power” path exclusively. Potential solutions require active engagement by government leaders, coordinated messaging, and continuing contact between government agencies and vulnerable communities. A broad national strategy, refined and implemented at a regional level, is required. Strategies that balance hard and soft power separate radicalizing influences from their recruiting pool, alter the social context of potential recruits in favor of democratic process, and make partners of potential antagonists. Regional Outreach and Operational Coordination Centers (ROOCC) offer a mechanism to develop and support strategies that combine government, nongovernment, and community leaders to combat terrorism at the ideological level. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 166p. Source: Internet Resource: Master's Thesis: Accessed April 12, 2012 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11538 Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11538 Shelf Number: 124942 Keywords: Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism (U.S.) Violent Extremism

Author: Fekete, Liz Title: Pedlars of hate: the violent impact of the European far Right Summary: his report brings together over one hundred cases from the beginning of 2010 until April 2012. Many aspects of far-right violence are discussed – from online death threats to arson and murder. While some of the cases suggest that small underground groups are stockpiling weapons and preparing for ‘race war’, with the organisations and individuals attempting to articulate how serious the situation is, now at serious risk themselves from the far Right, it would be wrong to see the situation in terms of one single and coherent far-right movement taking root across Europe. On the contrary, each far-right movement builds on its country’s particular extremist tradition. Details: London: The Institute for Race Relations, 2012. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 20, 2012 at http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/PedlarsofHate.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/PedlarsofHate.pdf Shelf Number: 125384 Keywords: Extremist Groups Hate Crimes Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Brister, Paul D. Title: Ku Klux Rising: Toward an Understanding of American Right Wing Terrorist Campaigns Summary: Since 1866, the Ku Klux Klan has been able to muster three distinctive and sustained campaigns of terrorism, commonly referred to as the three “waves” of Klan violence. The first occurred between 1866 and 1871, the second between 1915 and 1928, and the third from roughly 1954 to the mid-1960s. Subsequent to the third wave, the Klan unsuccessfully attempted another resurgence in the mid-1970s/early 1980s but was snuffed out before a campaign could be triggered. By studying the three most successful Klan campaigns of the past (granting that each varied in scope, intensity and outcome) alongside the failed campaign attempt of the 1970–1980s, this dissertation will investigate which commonly cited factors and conditions were, in fact, associated with the rise of the KKK’s campaigns of terrorism. Ultimately, the dissertation finds that four factors—the presence of a safe haven, organizational structure, leadership, and recruitment techniques—are necessary and jointly sufficient to explain Klan campaign emergence. By combining these factors in a manner which better reflects their interplay, a model offering greater explanatory value emerges. The first significant set of correlates is the presence or absence of safe havens and their relation to the organizational structure chosen by Klan leadership. The second set of correlates is the ability of the Klan to downplay its core ideology and effectively frame a recruitment message which resonates with a pre-existing dominant social narrative—a narrative usually based on mythologized history or an unfalsifiable belief system. As will be explained in concluding chapters, the probabilistic model that emerges when these factors combine proves more effective in explaining and predicting campaigns of Klan terrorism than simply listing these factors as if they are not consciously combined for effect. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 292p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 2, 2012 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=691628 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=691628 Shelf Number: 125447 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Ku Klux Klan (U.S.) Radical Groups Right Wing Groups

Author: Title: How Indonesian Extremists Regroup Summary: Almost ten years after the Bali bombing that brought terrorism in Indonesia to international attention, the country’s violent extremists are weak and divided but still active. In the face of strong police pressure, they are finding ways to regroup on the run, in prison and through internet forums, military training camps and arranged marriages. In many cases, the same individuals keep reappearing, using old networks to build new alliances. The fact that they have been singularly inept in their operations in recent years does not mean that the danger of attacks is over. There are signs that at least some are learning lessons from past failures and becoming more sophisticated in recruitment and fundraising. Better understanding of how extremists regroup could lead to more effective counter-radicalisa­tion programs. The biggest blow to terrorist capacity in recent years was the break-up in early 2010 of a training camp in Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra, where an alliance of almost all major jihadi groups in the country had planned to establish a base. Many senior leaders were captured or killed and a wealth of information discovered that led to the arrest, trial and imprisonment of some 200 individuals. Instead of cowing the jihadis into submission, however, police operations inspired a new wave of activity motivated by the desire for revenge, with new partnerships and training centres established and new plans set in motion. Activity has been particularly noticeable in Medan, North Sumatra; Poso, Central Sulawesi; Solo, Central Java; Bima, West Nusa Tenggara; and parts of East Kalimantan. Underground activity has been directly or indirectly assisted by radical preachers whose meetings provide inspiration and meeting grounds for jihadis and sympathisers. Some pro-Sharia (Islamic law) advocacy groups that do not use violence themselves but whose teachings are in line with jihadi views play a similar role. Almost all the plots since 2010, and there have been more than a dozen, are connected directly or indirectly to the fugitives from Aceh. The ease with which wanted men can move around, communicate with friends in prison, share information and skills, disseminate ideology, purchase arms, conduct training and recruit new followers shows how much basic preventive work still needs to be done. Many of the jihadi groups operating today have links to Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), a group set up by radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 2008 that has replaced Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as the country’s largest and most active jihadi organisation. JI, responsible for the 2002 Bali attack, is now the object of scorn from more militant groups, accused of abandoning jihad. It continues to exert an influence through its schools, however, and many disaffected former members remain active through other organisations. Several smaller groups have emerged as well, often composed of inexperienced young amateurs who lack the skills, discipline and strategic vision of the generation that trained on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border between 1985 and 1994 and produced the Bali bombers. Materials posted on radical websites suggest that the more educated extremists have learned important lessons from the Aceh experience, especially in terms of awareness of the extent to which their ranks have been infiltrated by the “enemy” – the Indonesian state. They conclude that they must be much more careful about vetting members, protecting communications and guarding secrets. If jihadis were to heed these lessons, the task of the police could become much harder. There has been less introspection within the government about why recruitment continues to take place or why there are so many more terrorist plots – even if most have been poorly conceived. Indonesia’s counter-terrorism successes have all been due to good law enforcement. The police have become skilled at identifying and arresting those responsible for violent crimes and interdicting plots as long as there is evidence, such as illegal possession of guns or explosives, on which to act. But virtually no effective programs are in place to address the environment in which jihadi ideology continues to flourish. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 228: Accessed July 16, 2012 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/228-how-indonesian-extremists-regroup Year: 2012 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/228-how-indonesian-extremists-regroup Shelf Number: 125628 Keywords: Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists (Indonesia) Violent Extremism

Author: Southern Poverty Law Center Title: The Second Wave: Return of the Militias Summary: The 1990s saw the rise and fall of the virulently antigovernment "Patriot" movement, made up of paramilitary militias, tax defiers and so-called "sovereign citizens." Sparked by a combination of anger at the federal government and the deaths of political dissenters at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and Waco, Texas, the movement took off in the middle of the decade and continued to grow even after 168 people were left dead by the 1995 bombing of Oklahoma City's federal building — an attack, the deadliest ever by domestic U.S. terrorists, carried out by men steeped in the rhetoric and conspiracy theories of the militias. In the years that followed, a truly remarkable number of criminal plots came out of the movement. But by early this century, the Patriots had largely faded, weakened by systematic prosecutions, aversion to growing violence, and a new, highly conservative president. They're back. Almost a decade after largely disappearing from public view, right-wing militias, ideologically driven tax defiers and sovereign citizens are appearing in large numbers around the country. "Paper terrorism" — the use of property liens and citizens' "courts" to harass enemies — is on the rise. And once-popular militia conspiracy theories are making the rounds again, this time accompanied by nativist theories about secret Mexican plans to "reconquer" the American Southwest. One law enforcement agency has found 50 new militia training groups — one of them made up of present and former police officers and soldiers. Authorities around the country are reporting a worrying uptick in Patriot activities and propaganda. "This is the most significant growth we've seen in 10 to 12 years," says one. "All it's lacking is a spark. I think it's only a matter of time before you see threats and violence." A key difference this time is that the federal government — the entity that almost the entire radical right views as its primary enemy — is headed by a black man. That, coupled with high levels of non-white immigration and a decline in the percentage of whites overall in America, has helped to racialize the Patriot movement, which in the past was not primarily motivated by race hate. One result has been a remarkable rash of domestic terror incidents since the presidential campaign, most of them related to anger over the election of Barack Obama. At the same time, ostensibly mainstream politicians and media pundits have helped to spread Patriot and related propaganda, from conspiracy theories about a secret network of U.S. concentration camps to wholly unsubstantiated claims about the president's country of birth. Details: Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty Law Center, 2009. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 16, 2012 at: http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/The_Second_Wave.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/The_Second_Wave.pdf Shelf Number: 116189 Keywords: Hate Crimes Homegrown Terrorists Militias (U.S.) Radical Groups

Author: Lindekilde, Lassee Title: Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: Denmark Background Report Summary: This report provides background information for understanding and assessing the impact and effectiveness of Danish counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies on minority ethno-cultural communities, in particular Muslim ones. The report contextualises questions of impact – positive as well as negative – in Denmark in terms of the demographic/socio-economic profile of immigrants; general perceptions of threats from terrorism and perceptions of discrimination experienced by minorities; the legal framework of counter-terrorism; policies of radicalisation prevention and their implementation in practice; key institutional structures of counter-terrorism and division of labour; high profile terrorist court-cases; and developments in the general political climate and public discourse regarding issues of ‘integration’ and security. Part 1 of this report focuses on the demographic and socio-economic profile of minority communities in Denmark and on their perceptions of discrimination. It shows that immigrants from non-Western countries and their descendants, most of whom are of Muslim origin, currently make up 6.8% of the Danish population, a proportion which is expected to increase to around 10% by 2050. These communities are of relatively recent origin: nearly all came after 1967, and 67% arrived in, or were born in, Denmark after 1980. Their socio-economic profile indicates relative disadvantage. Even allowing for the fact that they are younger than the general population, they are disproportionately absent from the labour market: only 50% of those of working age are employed, against 74% of ethnic Danes. 75% of ethnic Danes but only 49% of descendants from non-Western countries complete some form of further or vocational education. Those immigrants and descendants from non-Western countries who are employed are generally found at the lowest levels of the labour market. With regard to discrimination, one regular survey shows perceptions of discrimination on grounds of ethnicity/religion declining from 40% in 2000 to 31% in 2011, with discrimination encountered primarily in the workplace. Official figures for hate crimes report only a handful each year, but these figures are probably not reliable, and one survey reported a suspected racial motive in 10% of cases of violence and vandalism. Part 2 introduces the legal context of counter-terrorism in Denmark. It shows how Danish counterterrorism legislation was introduced in two main packages, one in 2002 and one in 2006, and looks at checks on counter-terrorism powers, both formal and in the shape of reactions in the public debate. In general, the 2002 and 2006 packages simply implement Council of the European Union, Council of Europe and United Nations resolutions, while the definition of terrorism employed is taken almost wordfor- word from the Council of the European Union resolution. Where Danish legislation has gone beyond these international models is primarily in regard to electronic surveillance and data collection, most notably in increasing access by the internal security service to the wealth of centrally linked, very detailed and generally accurate data concerning all individuals resident in Denmark that is held by various government departments and agencies. The use of secret evidence is also permitted in terrorism cases. Police gained stop-and-search powers in specified areas of Denmark in 2004, but in response to gang violence rather than terrorism. These powers are perceived to have been used especially against minority youths. Checks on all these powers consist primarily of international human rights law, which has occasionally been invoked in Danish courts, sometimes with success. There has been much public criticism surrounding the use of secret evidence to land convictions, and notably concern that in at least one case, a police informant may have been acting as an agent provocateur. Part 3 deals with Danish counter-radicalisation policies, while providing an overview of how these are perceived by the general public and by minority communities. This part shows how comprehensive counter-radicalisation measures were implemented in Denmark by one government in 2009 and then tacitly revised by another in 2011-12. The 2009 policy defined extremism very widely to include intolerant ideas and attitudes, and its counter-radicalisation measures included spreading information concerning democracy and citizenship. These and other measures were implemented by a range of local government bodies, building on existing practices, and coordinated and reinforced by a central government body. They included targeted interventions, initially by local government and mentors and ultimately by the internal security service. Of these measures, only the targeted interventions have been retained since the change of government in 2011. Part 3 also covers arrangements for oversight of both the internal security and foreign intelligence services, which are currently being revised following a number of controversial events, only one of which was connected to terrorism. Looking at the level of general trust and experiences of discrimination by the police among ethnic minority groups, it can be concluded that although trust is relatively high in comparative terms, there are groups of predominantly young male immigrant descendants living in urban areas who socialise little with ethnic Danes, who in general have lower average trust in the police and who experience a high level of police discrimination, notably in connection with ‘inspection zones’ in which stop-and-search powers can be used. Part 4 focuses on security threats and cases of terrorism in Denmark. There has been no successful terrorist attack in Denmark since 2001, but there have been thirteen high-profile terrorist cases. Two of these involved the extreme left, while extreme right-wing violence has not so far been prosecuted as terrorism in Denmark, though there are signs of changes in attitudes since the Breivik attacks. Two cases involved attempted attacks on Kurt Westergaard, the cartoonist responsible for the best-known cartoon published during the Cartoon Crisis (the one of the prophet Muhammad with a bomb in his turban), and four cases involved attempted attacks from outside Denmark against the offices of Jyllands-Posten, the newspaper that printed the cartoons. Other cases involved assistance to, or preparation for, terrorism; no targets were actually established. Part 5 offers a brief account of the development of the political climate in Denmark with regard to counter-terrorism and minority communities from 2001 until today. It shows that three events have had a significant impact on majority-minority relations in Denmark since 2001. One was the 2001 election campaign, which focused on ‘new politics’ issues of immigration, identity, and security. The second was the Cartoon Crisis of 2005-06, which took place against the background of the ‘new politics’ issues that had emerged in 2001, and caused a division in the public mind between ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’, as well as playing a part in the development of the original counter-radicalisation policies considered in part 3 of this report. The third was the election of 2011, which marked a turn away from the identity questions that had dominated the political agenda over the previous decade, and led to subsequent modifications in counter-radicalisation policies. Whether this last change will prove temporary or permanent remains to be seen. Part 6 of this report presents and discusses existing academic and official literature dealing with the impact and effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures and of radicalisation prevention policies on minority groups in Denmark. Counter-terrorism measures might be considered a success in the sense that there has been no successful terrorist attack in Denmark, but less so in terms of the possible contribution to the construction of Danish Muslims as a ‘suspect community’. Radicalisation prevention policies may be judged a success in terms of output, but outcomes are harder to assess. Some interventions may have worked, but certain academic studies, notably that of Lindekilde, indicate that counter-radicalisation discourses may have had an opposite impact from that intended, whether through frustrations generated by role-model campaigns or through the exclusion from the public debate of voices that fear accusations of radicalism, leaving the field open to those who have may have less to lose from such accusations. Three methodological challenges are identified: the case-based and anecdotal nature of the available data, which makes generalisation of impacts and valid conclusions on causality difficult; the difficulty of excluding alternative explanations of observed impact; and the often multiple, layered and abstract policy objectives, that create major problems in designing clear indicators of success. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 2, 2012 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Country_report_Denmark_AD_15_Oct_forwebsite.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Denmark URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Country_report_Denmark_AD_15_Oct_forwebsite.pdf Shelf Number: 126852 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism (Denmark) Minorities Racial Discrimination Radical Groups Radicalization Right-Wing Violence Socio-Economic Conditions Terrorists

Author: Eijkman, Quirine Title: Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: Netherlands Background Report Summary: This country report sets the context for research on the impact of counter-terrorism legislation and policies on racial, ethnic and religious minority communities in the Netherlands. Despite the fact that over the last decade various security measures have been assessed, there are few studies on their context-specific effect. This report discusses the Dutch population and community situation, the counter-terrorism legal framework, its policy and policing background as well as security and political perspectives. It concludes that, in the years since 9/11, the Madrid and London terror attacks, and the murder of filmmaker and Islam-critic Theo van Gogh, fear of terrorism has decreased. Furthermore, the general public appears more concerned about the effect that security measures have on their civil rights and liberties. Public security and crime-prevention remain high on the political agenda and various trends, including the emergence of anticipatory criminal justice, the use and availability of ethnic data and the strength of populist parties mobilising around (cr)immigration and integration, have made the risk of side-effects of security measures for minority communities more pertinent. The apparently decreased political and public support for the anti-discrimination framework and the weak socio-economic position and institutional representation of ethnic minorities and migrants, contribute to the necessity of sound empirical research on the impact of security measures on minority, especially Muslim, communities in the Netherlands. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 5, 2012 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Netherlands_FINAL.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Netherlands URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Netherlands_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 126880 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism (Netherlands) Minorities Muslims Racial Discrimination Radical Groups Socio-Economic Conditions Terrorists

Author: Ramalingam, Vidhya Title: Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: Sweden Background Report Summary: This report provides an overview of the development of counter-terrorism policies and policing in Sweden, and the impact these have had on minority communities in Sweden, particularly Muslim communities. The report presents existing research and information on demographics and socio-economic contexts of ethnic minority communities, the development of a legal framework to address terrorism, the history of policy and policing with regard to counter-terrorism, the security context and attitudes towards counter-terrorism, and the political context surrounding migration, citizenship and terrorism. Part One outlines the history and current context of immigration and settlement of ethnic minority groups in Sweden, and provides a background on Sweden’s demographics. In recent years, ethnic minorities, and Muslim communities in particular, have been a major focus of counter-terrorism measures and discourse in Sweden. This section provides an overview of Muslim migration to and settlement in Sweden, and the mixed and unfavourable outcomes for Muslims and other minority groups in the labour market, education and housing. It sets out recent data on ethnic and religious discrimination in Sweden, particularly towards Muslims after 9/11. Finally, this section outlines levels of cooperation between the government and Muslim civil society organisations, and notes that there have been high levels of cooperation; Muslim civil society organisations have also received generous funding from the state and Swedish foundations. Part Two details the key legislation used in relation to counter-terrorism in Sweden. Sweden was first confronted with acts of terrorism in the early 1970s, and the government introduced the first anti-terrorist legislation in 1973. It sets out the criminalisation of terrorist attacks, legal definitions of terrorism, and the institution of special laws on criminal responsibility for financing terrorism. This section furthermore discusses the legal framework for investigatory measures and surveillance, including the controversial FRA law which had allowed the National Defence Radio Establishment to monitor all phone and email communications to and within Sweden without warrant, and, after heavy criticism, was amended in 2009 to improve privacy. Part Two ends with a discussion of checks and balances on counter-terrorism measures and laws. Part Three covers the policy context for counter-terrorism, providing an overview of the key policies in place to counter terrorism and violent extremism in Sweden. These include the ‘Action plan to safeguard democracy against violence-promoting extremism’, presented in December 2011, and ‘Sweden’s national counter-terrorism strategy’, presented by the government in February 2012. This section presents the key institutional structures, including the structure of the Swedish Police Service, and roles and responsibilities in countering terrorism in Sweden. It then outlines mechanisms for accountability within for these structures, detailing parliamentary committees and consultations set up to scrutinise the work of the police and other institutions. The section ends with a discussion of police behaviour and incidences of police misconduct and discrimination in Sweden. Several key incidents have drawn attention to the problem of racial profiling by the police in Sweden. Part Four discusses Swedish experiences with terrorism, providing an account of terrorist incidents in Sweden since the early 1970s, when cases of Croatian separatist terrorism brought terrorism onto the political agenda. This section includes the numbers of arrests, trials and convictions for terrorism offences in Sweden, and details several key events in recent years that have contributed to increased concerns about terrorism. This includes the 2007 publication of a series of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad, which sparked protests and violent threats towards Sweden and the cartoonist himself. The most recent significant terrorist attack on Swedish soil was the December 2010 suicide bombing in Stockholm, perpetrated by a Swedish citizen of Iraqi descent. This section also discusses perceptions of the threat of terrorism among the Swedish public. Part Five explains the political climate surrounding minority communities and counter-terrorism in Sweden, and how political parties have addressed issues concerning migration, citizenship, security and terrorism. Though Swedish politics has historically been characterised by consensus across party lines on the subject of immigration, and such issues have not been politicised, recent years have seen the perceived importance of immigration and terrorism as political issues grow. The emergence of the Sweden Democrats -an anti-immigrant party arguing for increased political attention to Islamist extremism and the ‘threat’ posed by Muslim communities- in Parliament has not wavered the positions of mainstream parties on these issues. However, this section notes that the climate has become much harsher and the ‘tough on crime’ card is more often played in election campaigns, and immigrants and Muslim communities in particular are often presented as ‘problem’ communities in this respect. This shift in climate has significantly impacted ethnic and religious minorities in Sweden, and has had a particularly negative impact on Muslim communities, who have increasingly become the victims of suspicion and hatred, manifested in discrimination and violence. This report draws upon existing research on the Swedish population, the development of migrant and minority communities, and in particular Muslim communities. It refers to official government communications and external analyses to paint a picture of the legal and policy approaches to counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism in Sweden. Though there are Ombudsman statistics available on mistreatment by the police, and there has been some recent research to better understand attitudes and discriminatory behaviour within the police, more work must be done to assess the relationship between minority communities and the police. There has been little research directly on the impacts of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities in Sweden, and this report lays the groundwork for future inquiries on this issue. Given the existing state of research, it is, however, clear that through a combination of persistent socio-economic disadvantage, shifts in the political climate on security and migrant communities, the occurrence of Sweden’s first suicide bombing by an Islamist extremist, and increased government attention paid to Islamist extremism in Sweden, Muslim communities in Sweden have increasingly been subject both to suspicion and discrimination. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 5, 2012 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Sweden_paper_SF_FINAL.docx.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Sweden URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Sweden_paper_SF_FINAL.docx.pdf Shelf Number: 126884 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism (Sweden) Minorities Racial Discrimination Radical Groups Radicalization Right-Wing Violence Socio-Economic Conditions Terrorists

Author: Rollins, John Title: Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress Summary: This report provides an overview of transnational security issues related to patterns of interaction among international terrorist and crime groups. In addition, the report discusses the U.S. government’s perception of and response to the threat. It concludes with an analysis of foreign policy options. In recent years, the U.S. government has asserted that terrorism, insurgency, and crime interact in varied and significant ways, to the detriment of U.S. national security interests. Although unclassified anecdotal evidence largely serves as the basis for the current understanding of criminal-terrorist connections, observers often focus on several common patterns. • Partnership Motivations and Disincentives: Collaboration can serve as a force multiplier for both criminal and terrorist groups, as well as a strategic weakness. Conditions that may affect the likelihood of confluence include demand for special skills unavailable within an organization, greed, opportunity for and proclivity toward joint ventures, and changes in ideological motivations. • Appropriation of Tactics: Although ideologies and motivations of an organization may remain consistent, criminals and terrorists have shared similar tactics to reach their separate operational objectives. Such tactics include acts of violence; involvement in criminal activity for profit; money laundering; undetected cross-border movements; illegal weapons acquisition; and exploitation of corrupt government officials. • Organizational Evolution and Variation: A criminal group may transform over time to adopt political goals and ideological motivations. Conversely, terrorist groups may shift toward criminality. For some terrorist groups, criminal activity remains secondary to ideological ambitions. For others, profit-making may surpass political aspirations as the dominant operating rationale. Frequently cited terrorist organizations involved in criminal activity include Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Al Qaeda’s affiliates, D-Company, Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Haqqani Network, and Hezbollah. To combat these apparent criminal-terrorist connections, Congress has maintained a role in formulating U.S. policy responses. Moreover, recent Administrations have issued several strategic documents to guide U.S. national security, counterterrorism, anti-crime, and intelligence activities. In July 2011, for example, the Obama Administration issued the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, which emphasized, among other issues, the confluence of crime and terrorism as a major factor in threatening the U.S. global security interests. While the U.S. government has maintained substantial long-standing efforts to combat terrorism and transnational crime separately, Congress has been challenged to evaluate whether the existing array of authorities, programs, and resources sufficiently respond to the combined crimeterrorism threat. Common foreign policy options have centered on diplomacy, foreign assistance, financial actions, intelligence, military action, and investigations. At issue for Congress is how to conceptualize this complex crime-terrorism phenomenon and oversee the implementation of cross-cutting activities that span geographic regions, functional disciplines, and a multitude of policy tools that are largely dependent on effective interagency coordination and international cooperation. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: R41004: Accessed November 9, 2012 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf Shelf Number: 126913 Keywords: Organized Crime Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Transnational Crime

Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: The Lawless Ones: The Resurgence of the Sovereign Citizen Movement. 2nd edition Summary: The sovereign citizen movement is an extreme anti-government movement whose members believe the government has no authority over them. It began a resurgence of activity, including criminal activity, in 2009 that has shown no signs of stopping. In 2012, the sovereign citizen movement is currently one of the most problematic domestic extremist movements in the United States. Sovereign citizen criminal activity includes violent acts, exemplified recently by the brutal murder of two West Memphis police officers at the hands of a father and son pair of sovereign citizens in May 2010. More violent encounters have occurred between police and sovereign citizens since then. Spontaneous sovereign citizen violence, especially during traffic stops and visits to residences, poses a significant risk to law enforcement officers and public officials. More widespread than violence is a set of tactics known as "paper terrorism," in which sovereign citizens use legal filings to harass, intimidate, and retaliate against public officials, law enforcement officers, and others. Most common is the filing of bogus liens on the property of perceived enemies. Though a number of laws were passed in the 1990s to deal with this problem, sovereign citizens remain undeterred and continue to file such harassing liens in large numbers. Self-appointed "gurus" in the sovereign citizen movement have actively been exploiting the foreclosure crisis, crisscrossing the country promoting schemes and scams to desperate homeowners, while falsely claiming that such schemes can save people's homes. Other sovereign citizens are even brazenly seizing homes left empty because of foreclosures and claiming the homes for their own. As a result of imprisoned sovereign citizens continuing to recruit and teach their ideology while behind bars, a growing number of federal and state prisoners are becoming sovereign citizens or using the "paper terrorism" tactics of the movement to retaliate against judges, prosecutors and others involved in their case. Prison officials have so far had little luck in stemming the growth of this movement in prisons. Though the sovereign citizen movement is still largely white (and contains some white supremacist members), in recent years a growing African- American offshoot of the sovereign citizen movement, often called the "Moorish" movement, has been gaining strength, teaching sovereign citizen ideas and tactics to a new pool of potential recruits. Details: Atlanta, GA: ADL, 2012. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2012 at: http://www.adl.org/learn/sovereign_movement/sovereign_citizens_movement_report_2012_edition.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/learn/sovereign_movement/sovereign_citizens_movement_report_2012_edition.pdf Shelf Number: 127019 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Hate Crimes (U.S.) Radical Groups Sovereign Citizen Movement Terrorism

Author: Camilleri, Raphaelle Title: Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: France Background Report Summary: This report aims to provide an overview of French counter-terrorist and counter-radicalisation policies, and assess their potential impact on the Muslim community in France. Part One focuses on the demographic composition and socioeconomic profile of the French Muslim community; the largest such community in the European Union. It finds that the Muslim community has generally tended to be marginalised in socioeconomic terms in relation to the mainstream French population, and that Muslims frequently report higher rates of discrimination than other immigrant communities in France. This broad finding helps inform subsequent sections, which look specifically at perceived discrimination by French police and security services on the basis of racial or ethnic origin. Part Two focuses on the legal framework within which French counter-terrorism policy is anchored. It reviews the development of counter-terrorist legislation since the mid-1980s, and explains how French legislation has evolved in recent years to tackle the new challenges posed by novel forms of terrorism. This section of the report also outlines the key pieces of legislation governing the operation of law enforcement and intelligence agencies involved in the fight against terrorism in France. It concludes by providing an overview of the main constitutional and institutional mechanisms which place checks and balances on the operation of the police agencies responsible for implementing counter-terrorist policies. Part Three of the report focuses on the law-enforcement agencies responsible for enacting counterterrorist policies ‘on the ground’. It provides a comprehensive list of the key government departments, as well as policing and intelligence agencies, involved in the fight against terrorism, and assesses the nature of their (often troubled) relationship with affected communities. Although more research is needed in this area, initial findings seem to suggest that Muslim communities generally perceive themselves to be unfairly targeted by the police on the basis of their ethnic or religious background. In light of these circumstances, In light of these circumstances, this section of the report also outlines official guidelines on non-discrimination and lists the various governmental and non-governmental institutions charged with protecting the rights of citizens. Part Four of the report looks at the broader security context within which counter-terrorist policies and legislation have been formulated in France. It critically assesses the extent of the terrorist threat in France, both in real and perceived terms. Two significant findings emerge. Firstly, despite the focus on religiouslymotivated Islamist terrorism since 2001, separatism terrorism carried out by Basque and Corsican nationalist groups continues to be the most pressing threat posed to the French state. Secondly, despite the initial trauma caused by Mohammed Merah’s killing spree, French public opinion nevertheless deems the terrorist threat to be quite low, suggesting that the French public does not regard terrorism as a pressing threat. Part Five builds on these initial observations by focusing on the way in which French political parties have framed the terrorist threat (particularly that emanating from suspected Islamists) especially in the aftermath of the Toulouse and Montauban shootings. It examines the impact of the shootings on the presidential race, but finds little evidence that they had any bearing on the final outcome of the election. Nevertheless, the strong performance of the far-right movement of Marine Le Pen (Front National) at the polls is underlined, but it is balanced against the conciliatory tone recently adopted by the left-wing government of François Hollande on security issues. Throughout this report, existing research by academic institutions, think tanks and government bodies on the impact of counter-terrorism policies on the Muslim community is referenced when relevant. Notable gaps in the literature are also highlighted, along with recommendations for further research. A full bibliography is provided for reference at the end of the document, as is an exhaustive list of academics, researchers, policymakers and civil society organisations, which may make a substantial contribution to future research in this area. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 29, 2012 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Country_report_France_SF_FINAL.pdf Year: 2012 Country: France URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Country_report_France_SF_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 127033 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism (France) Minorities Muslims Racial Discrimination Radical Groups Radicalization Right-Wing Violence Socio-Economic Conditions Terrorism

Author: U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management Title: A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border. A Majority Report Summary: The first edition of A Line in the Sand, released in 2006, (hereafter “first edition”) exposed the rising threat of Mexican drug cartels and the vulnerabilities of our porous Southwest border. The horrific violence perpetrated by Mexican drug cartels continues to grow and, in many cases documented in this report, spills into the United States. The cartels now have a presence in more than 1,000 U.S. cities and dominate the wholesale illicit drug trade by controlling the movement of most of the foreign-produced drug supply across the Southwest border. This report documents the increased operational control of the cartels inside the United States, their strategy to move illegal drugs, and the bloody turf wars that have taken place between rival cartels, as they struggle to control valuable trafficking corridors. Collectively, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) maintain firm control of drug and human smuggling routes across the U.S.- Mexico border creating safe entry for anyone willing to pay the price. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in its most recent assessment, asserts it can control only 44 percent of our border with Mexico. Terrorism remains a serious threat to the security of the United States. The Congressional Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. Of growing concern and potentially a more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected. This second edition emphasizes America’s ever-present threat from Middle East terrorist networks, their increasing presence in Latin America, and the growing relationship with Mexican DTOs to exploit paths into the United States. During the period of May 2009 through July 2011, federal law enforcement made 29 arrests for violent terrorist plots against the United States, most with ties to terror networks or Muslim extremist groups in the Middle East. The vast majority of the suspects had either connections to special interest countries, including those deemed as state sponsors of terrorism or were radicalized by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. American-born al Qaeda Imam Anwar al Awlaki, killed in 2011, was personally responsible for radicalizing scores of Muslim extremists around the world. The list includes American-born U.S. Army Major Nidal Hassan, the accused Fort Hood gunman; “underwear bomber” Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab; and Barry Bujol of Hempstead, TX, convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In several documented cases, al Awlaki moved his followers to commit “jihad” against the United States. These instances, combined with recent events involving the Qods Forces, the terrorist arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Hezbollah, serve as a stark reminder the United States remains in the crosshairs of terrorist organizations and their associates. In May of 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported that intelligence gleaned from the 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound indicated the world’s most wanted terrorist sought to use operatives with valid Mexican passports who could illegally cross into the United States to conduct terror operations. The story elaborated that bin Laden recognized the importance of al Qaeda operatives blending in with American society but felt that those with U.S. citizenship who then attacked the United States would be violating Islamic law. Of equal concern is the possibility to smuggle materials, including uranium, which can be safely assembled on U.S. soil into a weapon of mass destruction. Further, the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and the uncertainty of whether Israel might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, only heightens concern that Iran or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation. Confronting the threat at the Southwest border has a broader meaning today than it did six years ago. As this report explains, the United States tightened security at airports and land ports of entry in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, but the U.S.-Mexico border is an obvious weak link in the chain. Criminal elements could migrate down this path of least resistance, and with them the terrorists who continue to seek our destruction. The federal government must meet the challenge to secure America’s unlocked back door from the dual threat of drug cartels and terrorist organizations who are lined up, and working together, to enter. One of the central criticisms made by the 9/11 Commission regarding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks was a failure of imagination in piecing together the threat picture from al-Qaeda before it was too late. Recognizing and proactively confronting threats has presented a perennial challenge to our country. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, we failed to deal with the Soviet threat before it resulted in a full-blown crisis that threatened nuclear war. Now we are faced with a new threat in Latin America that comes from the growing collaborations between Iran, Venezuela, Hezbollah and transnational criminal organizations. Similar to the Cuban missile crisis, the evidence to compel action exists; the only question is whether we possess the imagination to connect the dots before another disaster strikes. The intent of this report is to present that evidence, not to incite anxiety, but rather to reinvigorate vigilance towards our Southwest border and beyond to the threats we face in Latin America. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 2012. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 3, 2012 at: http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf Shelf Number: 127109 Keywords: Border Security Domestic Terrorism Drug Cartels Drug Trafficking (Mexico-U.S) Homeland Security Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Countering Radicalization in Europe Summary: Since the mid-2000s, European countries have developed counter-radicalisation strategies, seeking to de-radicalize committed militants and preventing the radicalization of vulnerable populations. What do these strategies entail? Where do they differ, and what do they have in common? How successful have they been? Based on extensive fieldwork in Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, ICSR's latest report - Countering Radicalization in Europe - describes the genesis, main characteristics, aims, underlying philosophies and challenges experienced by counter-radicalization policies in Europe. Details: London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), King's College London, 2012. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 25, 2013 at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ICSR-Report-Countering-Radicalization-in-Europe.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ICSR-Report-Countering-Radicalization-in-Europe.pdf Shelf Number: 127400 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization Programs Extremist Groups Radical Groups

Author: SpearIt Title: Facts and Fictions About Islam in Prison: Assessing Prisoner Radicalization in Post-9/11 America Summary: This report assesses the radicalization of Muslim prisoners in post-9/11 America. In the last decade, Muslim prisoners have been scrutinized for ties to terrorist and other extremist organizations, not to mention characterized as both a “threat” and a “danger” to national security, due to the influence of foreign jihadist movements. However, closer scrutiny shows that these fears have failed to materialize — indeed, despite the existence of an estimated 350,000 Muslim prisoners, there is little evidence of widespread radicalization or successful foreign recruitment, and only one documented case of prison-based terrorist activity. Nonetheless, some prison systems have implemented an aggressive posture toward these inmates and have made suppressive tactics their bedrock policy. This approach unfortunately overlooks Islam’s long history of positive influence on prisoners, including supporting inmate rehabilitation for decades. Moreover, Muslim inmates have a long history of using the court system to establish and expand their rights to worship and improve their conditions of confinement. Hence, a closer look at “life on the ground” turns the prevailing discourse on its head by demonstrating that Islam generally brings peace to inmates and that the greatest “threat” posed by Muslim inmates is not violence, but lawsuits. Details: Saint, Louis, MO: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2013. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, January 2013 Saint Louis U. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013-5: Accessed February 11, 2013 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2206583 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2206583 Shelf Number: 127565 Keywords: Islam Prisons Radical Groups Radicalization Re-entry Rehabilitation

Author: Markedonov, Sergey Title: The Rise of Radical and Nonofficial Islamic Groups in Russia’s Volga Region Summary: In the two decades since the dissolution of the USSR, Russian and Western experts, human rights activists, and journalists have become accustomed to the political violence of the North Caucasus. Terrorist bombings and acts of sabotage in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Chechnya are perceived as somehow intrinsic to the region. But a recent tragedy in the Volga region suggests that this sort of violence—and the Islamist terrorists who perpetrate it—may not be confined to the Caucasus. On the morning of July 19, 2012, simultaneous terrorist attacks wounded the Tatarstan chief mufti, Ildis Faizov, and killed Valiulla Yakupov, the former deputy chairman of the Tatarstan Spiritual Board of Muslims (TSBM), a well-known Islamic theologian and public figure and one of the most consistent opponents of what Russian politicians and media refer to as Wahhabism. For the first time, official Islamic religious leaders from outside the North Caucasus became victims of Islamist terrorism. Three months later, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announced it had prevented a large-scale terrorist attack in Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, planned for the eve of the celebration of the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha. Two people killed in the counterterrorist operation had been suspected of the attacks on Faizov and Yakupov as well as other illegal activity. With these attacks and counterattacks, the problem of inter-Islamic tensions in the Volga region suddenly became real. To examine this increasingly serious situation, this report sheds light on the ideological sources and resources of radicalism in the Volga region, nonofficial Islamic movements’ support among the regional population, and opportunities for the potential growth of different forms of Islamist activities. It describes the origins of different nonofficial Islamic movements, as well as their post-Soviet development, ideology, and relationship with the authorities and official Muslim clergy. The report also offers practical approaches both for Russian domestic policy and for the U.S.-Russia security cooperation agenda. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 13, 2013 at: http://csis.org/files/publication/130122_Markedonov_RiseRadicalIslamicVolga_Web.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Russia URL: http://csis.org/files/publication/130122_Markedonov_RiseRadicalIslamicVolga_Web.pdf Shelf Number: 127603 Keywords: Extremist Groups (Russia) Islam Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Summary: This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. For this report, “homegrown” describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity. The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism and describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. Appendix A provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: R41416: Accessed February 22, 2013 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf Shelf Number: 127702 Keywords: Extremist Groups Homegrown Terrorists Homeland Security Jihadist Terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism (U.S.) Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Spalek, Basia Title: Key Evaluation Findings of the West Midlands (WM) 1-2-1 Mentoring Scheme Summary: This report presents key findings from an evaluation of the West Midlands One-to-One (WM 1-2-1) mentoring project. The project arose from a concern that there is a shortage of easily accessible and quality assured, accredited and vetted mentors who can provide one-to-one support to people assessed to be at risk of violent extremism (Al Qaeda influenced, extreme Right Wing and Animal Rights). The initial focus of the project was to design a structure for selection and recruitment of a suitable pool of mentors, with agreed professional daily rates; as well as to develop a governance plan to sustain the process after the first phase of recruitment. Dr Basia Spalek, Professor Lynn Davies and Dr Laura Zahra McDonald from the University of Birmingham were commissioned to undertake an evaluation study of the scheme. This focussed on examining whether the WM 1-2-1 mentoring project was addressing its key objectives and whether it had a sustainable business model. It therefore looked at the managerial structure, the concept of mentoring, the support and training needs of mentors, risk, the measurement of success and how the project would enhance understanding of radicalisation and de-radicalisation. The methodology comprised interviewing in depth 16 people across the different management components of the scheme (Project Board, Steering Group, Mentor Selection Panel), observing meetings of these Boards and analysing documentation. The evaluation is qualitative, presenting the views of participants, seeking patterns of agreement as well as debate, and relating to existing literature and research. Details: Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, Institute of Applied Social Studies, 2010. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2013 at: http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/social-policy/IASS/news-events/west-midlands-1-2-1-evaluation-findings.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/social-policy/IASS/news-events/west-midlands-1-2-1-evaluation-findings.pdf Shelf Number: 127815 Keywords: Mentoring (U.K.) Radical Groups Radicalization

Author: Chana, Rajinder Title: The Prevent Initiative: A Review of Local and National Prevent Work. What Can Yorkshire and Humberside Probation Region Learn? Summary: Yorkshire and Humberside Probation Region has been responsible for supervising offenders convicted under the Terrorism Act (TACT) or for terrorist related offences. It is predicted that these numbers will potentially increase as will the number of offenders on the Trust’s caseload that may be at risk of radicalisation. A recent evaluation (Harris, 2010) looked at the training, consultancy, and support work developed and offered to assist Offender Managers at West Yorkshire Probation Trust (WYPT). Staff feedback from the evaluation found that they felt more confident in such work. The purpose of the current research is to assess what work is being developed and undertaken, both locally and nationally, with radicalised offenders on probation and those identified as susceptible to radicalisation. The key research questions are: 1. What work is currently undertaken nationally and locally with radicalised offenders on probation and those susceptible to radicalisation? Does this differ across areas? 2. What does the literature suggest as to what makes an individual become radicalised or susceptible to radicalisation? 3. What interventions have been or are being developed for such individuals locally and nationally? Does this differ across areas? 4. Are there any emerging trends or evidence since the initiative began of what can be applied to such individuals for what we can prescribe as an intervention? 5. Are there any issues relating to the new risk assessment tool1 that is being piloted by NOMS? The research will be used to inform the development of interventions within Yorkshire and Humberside Probation Region. Details: Wakefield, UK: West Yorkshire Probation Trust, 2010. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2013 at: www.westyorksprobation.org.uk Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 127817 Keywords: Probation Probationers Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism (U.K.)

Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations Summary: Terrorism has always been a battle of ideas, reflecting a desire for violent and immediate political transformation. The technologies available in a globalized world today, however, have expanded the theater of conflict into a broader swath of spaces—governed, less governed, virtual—than ever. Groups such as al-Qaida understand that they can now wield influence as effectively with a video camera and an Internet connection as with an improvised explosive device. Such groups also invest heavily in their marketing capabilities. They have articulated a clear mission statement and excelled at this form of strategic communication, crafting messages based on audience perceptions and including actions as well as words. Al-Qaida’s call to arms, for example, is a globally resonant expression of its outlook, grievances, agenda, and demands and has a proven ability to turn passive observers into active participants in violent extremism. Yet, extremists do not constitute a monopoly in the marketplace of ideas. States and international organizations provide their own narratives that shape identities, relationships, and interactions among peoples and states, but they have often struggled to challenge extremist messages and draw on their own compelling stories. This should not be the case. The United Nations is the only international organization to boast universal membership and has spent more than six decades promoting sustainable development, promoting human rights and the rule of law, strengthening governance, and supporting representative government. Member states have worked together to mitigate violent conflict, support humanitarian assistance, and address threats to human security. The organization has a good story to tell, a powerful counternarrative to that proclaimed by extremist groups. Yet, does the story get out and reach key audiences outside and inside the United Nations? This report is the result of a study, undertaken as part of a broader effort on the part of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation to enhance multilateral capacities to prevent terrorism and violent extremism, that aims to examine how this message has been perceived and received by three key stakeholder communities around the United Nations: its own staff (at headquarters, in specialized agencies, and in the field); member states; and the broader public, collectively considered the “UN community.” Three main objectives underpin this project. 1. To identify the core message of the United Nations on countering terrorism and violent extremism and how this message shapes counterterrorism policy and practice 2. To examine whether and how this message informs and impacts three key audiences: (a) the UN system, including field missions and specialized agencies; (b) UN member states; and (c) the broader public 3. To explore how strategic communication can be used to enhance UN efforts to prevent terrorism and violent extremism and contribute to national and regional efforts to address terrorism and diminish radicalization and recruitment that bolster extremist groups This report presents a qualitative analysis of how strategic communication tools can amplify and enhance UN efforts to prevent terrorism and violent extremism, through the United Nations’ own initiatives as well as by supporting member states. The first two sections offer an overview of counterterrorism practice and the shift toward prevention, as well as the parallel shift at the United Nations, where the focus on preventive diplomacy, mediation, and conflict prevention has increased over the past decade. Section three examines the evaluation of strategic communication in practice and how it has been adopted by governments, civil society, and extremist groups. Sections four and five offer an analysis of UN counterterrorism communication and how it is perceived by internal and external audiences. Section six sets out some key lessons learned regarding the practice of strategic communication; although this study focuses on the United Nations, these principles may also be applicable to national and civil society actors. The last section offers a set of practical recommendations for consideration by UN actors, ranging from the macro to the micro level, in many instances considering how these ideas may be initiated within the existing counterterrorism architecture at the United Nations. Details: Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC), 2013. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/Feb2013_CT_StratComm.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/Feb2013_CT_StratComm.pdf Shelf Number: 127841 Keywords: Counterrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Berkebile, Richard E. Title: Causes of Domestic Terrorism: 1970-2010 Summary: Contrary to conventional wisdom, the structural determinants of transnational and domestic terrorism are not necessarily synonymous. A domestic terrorism event population was derived by applying definitional criteria to the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database. Economic, political, systemic, and social structural determinants were tested with a negative binomial regression on 194 states between 1970 and 2010. Results suggested an inverse U relationship between wealth and the incidence of terrorism. Interestingly, short term economic growth had the opposite effect. It depressed terrorism. Political regimes were categorized into three different types - autocracies, anocracies, or democracies. Autocracies were the least susceptible to terrorism. Anocracy was the regime type most conducive to terrorism. Democratic regimes occupied the middle space. They suffered more terrorism than dictatorships but less than anocratic regimes. Cold War bipolarity systemically encouraged terrorism compared to the unipolarity of the post-Cold War era, suggesting superpower rivalry manifested in more terrorist violence. Social tension effects varied depending on type. Linguistic fractionalization increased the incidence of violence. Paradoxically, ethnic fractionalization impeded terrorism. Religious fractionalization had little impact on terrorism. Among control variables, population and a history of terrorism were directly related to terrorism. Mountain terrain and urbanization were not significantly related to it. Details: Columbia, MO: University of Missouri-Columbia, 2012. 191p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed March 5, 2013 at: https://mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10355/16521/research.pdf?sequence=2 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10355/16521/research.pdf?sequence=2 Shelf Number: 127851 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism (U.S.) Homeland Security Radical Groups Radicalization Socioeconomic Variables

Author: Goodwin, Matthew Title: The Roots of Extremism: The English Defence League and the Counter-Jihad Challenge Summary: While right-wing extremism and populist extremist parties have been the subject of growing attention in Europe and North America, the emergence of ‘counter- Jihad’ groups has been relatively neglected. Campaigning amid fiscal austerity and ongoing public concerns over immigration, these groups are more confrontational, chaotic and unpredictable than established populist extremist political parties, yet not enough is known about who supports them – and why. Widely held assumptions about their supporters – which often stress economic austerity, political protest and Islamophobia as the key drivers – are challenged by new survey data on public attitudes towards the ideas of one leading counter- Jihad group, the English Defence League. The data indicate that supporters of such groups are not necessarily young, uneducated, economically insecure or politically apathetic. They are not simply anti-Muslim or overtly racist, but xenophobic and profoundly hostile towards immigration. They are more likely than others in society to expect inter-communal conflict and to believe that violence is justifiable. And their beliefs about the threatening nature of Islam have wider public support. Few mainstream voices in Europe are actively challenging counter-Jihad narratives, or the surrounding reservoir of anti-Muslim prejudice among the general public, but this is an essential part of any successful counter-strategy. Details: London: Chatham House, 2013. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper: Accessed March 12, 2013 at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0313bp_goodwin.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0313bp_goodwin.pdf Shelf Number: 127923 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism English Defence League Extremism (U.K.) Extremist Groups Muslims Radical Groups

Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: The Roles of Women in Terrorism, Conflict, and Violent Extremism Lessons for the United Nations and International Actors Summary: This policy brief explores the conceptual and operational challenges in integrating a gender dimension into counterterrorism policy and programming and offers a set of recommendations for the United Nations and other actors to consider when developing effective and sustainable counterterrorism efforts. Details: Goshen, IN: Center on Global Counterterrorism Coooperation, 2013. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed April 18, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/NCF_RB_LS_policybrief_1320.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/NCF_RB_LS_policybrief_1320.pdf Shelf Number: 128409 Keywords: Extremist Groups Female Terrorists Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Painter, Anthony Title: Democratic Stress, the Populist Signal and Extremist Threat: A call for a new mainstream statecraft and contact democracy Summary: The rise of populism seen across Europe and the US is exposing old and hidden fault-lines in democratic systems. Mainstream parties seem powerless to respond to basic popular anxieties. Many appear blind to the reality that elite political projects have run their course. Democracy is under considerable stress – and fissures are opening up out of which new forms of populism and extremism have emerged. And yet populists are routinely dismissed as ‘protest’ parties, ‘clowns’ and ‘flashes in the pan’. In fact, real demand exists for Europe’s populists – of different kinds – and they must be seen as serious challenger movements that the established parties ignore at their peril. Today, Policy Network launches a significant new report entitled “Democratic stress, the populist signal and extremist threat”. The report is based on a substantial European research project which has over the past 8 months investigated campaigns, policies and political approaches targeted at populism and extremism at the national, local and neighbourhood levels. Working with a wide range of politicians, experts, campaigners, academics and public officials, it has considered how parties – of the left and right – have responded to their different manifestations in countries across Europe. The final report identifies where mainstream politics has failed to date and sets out a strategic evaluation of how the antagonistic and corrosive aspects of populist impulses and identity politics can be resisted and defeated. The conclusion sets forward an approach blending 'statecraft' and 'contact democracy', with case-study examples. Details: London: Policy Network/ Barrow Cadbury Trust, 2013. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 22, 2013 at: http://www.policy-network.net/ Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.policy-network.net/ Shelf Number: 128430 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Botha, Anneli Title: Assessing the Vulnerability of Kenyan Youths to Radicalisation and Extremism Summary: Following the intervention of the Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia in October 2011 in reaction to the increase in kidnappings on the Kenyan coast, the threat of terrorism in Kenya increased considerably. Initially the perception was that the threat originated from Somalia and that Somali nationals or Somali-Kenyans consequently committed attacks in Kenya. As arrests were made, Kenya was confronted with the reality that Kenyan nationals were responsible for the majority of these attacks. This sparked introspection and the need to understand where this threat originated. This paper aims to provide an overview of the threat of terrorism in Kenya; to consider the drivers of radicalisation, especially among the youth; and to propose counter-strategies that policymakers and security officials might adopt to prevent and counter radicalisation. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 245: Accessed May 3, 2013 at: Year: 2013 Country: Kenya URL: Shelf Number: 128615 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Youthful Offenders (Kenya)

Author: Mullins, Samuel J. Title: Australian Jihad: Radicalisation and Counter-Terrorism Summary: This ARI summarises the findings from an-depth empirical study of all publicly-confirmed cases of Islamist terrorism involving Australians. The domestic situation of Australian Muslims is briefly described, followed by an overview of Islamist terrorism cases to date, including the number and location of cases and the level of threat they have presented, both domestically and internationally. The background characteristics of offenders and details of radicalisation are discussed, followed by an examination of the national counter-terrorism (CT) strategy, with a focus upon counter-radicalisation initiatives. Current CT tactics appear to be appropriate to the nature of the threat; however, it will be important to closely monitor preventive measures in order to avoid a potential backlash similar to that in the UK, and to make sure that they are appropriately targeted. Details: Analisis of the Real Instituto Elcano, 2011. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: http://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers/148/ Year: 2011 Country: Australia URL: http://ro.uow.edu.au/lawpapers/148/ Shelf Number: 128888 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Islamists Radical Groups Terrorism Violence (Australia) Violent Extremism

Author: Helfstein, Scott Title: Edges of Radicalization: Ideas, Individuals and Networks in Violent Extremism Summary: This paper examines radicalization as a social phenomenon through the behavior of individuals and networks. Violent extremists, individuals pursuing political change through violence, remain committed to striking the U.S. homeland and its interests abroad. It is important to understand how radical ideas spread to counter or contain this immediate and persistent threat. This study argues that the spread of violent extremism cannot be fully understood as an ideological or social phenomenon, but must be viewed as a process that integrates the two forces in a coevolutionary manner. The same forces that make an ideology appealing to some aggrieved group of people are not necessarily the same factors that promote its transfer through social networks of self-interested human beings. This means that there is value in differentiating why radical ideologies resonate among individuals, and how individuals come to adopt and advocate those ideas. This report helps contextualize the current terrorist threat, the role of technology in radicalization, and next steps in decoding radicalization. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2012. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2013 at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/edges-of-radicalization-ideas-individuals-and-networks-in-violent-extremism Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/edges-of-radicalization-ideas-individuals-and-networks-in-violent-extremism Shelf Number: 129585 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Perliger, Arie Title: Challengers from the Sidelines: Understanding America’s Violent Far-Right Summary: In the last few years, and especially since 2007, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of attacks and violent plots originating from individuals and groups who self-identify with the far-right of American politics. These incidents cause many to wonder whether these are isolated attacks, an increasing trend, part of increasing societal violence, or attributable to some other condition. To date, however, there has been limited systematic documentation and analysis of incidents of American domestic violence. This study provides a conceptual foundation for understanding different far-right groups and then presents the empirical analysis of violent incidents to identify those perpetrating attacks and their associated trends. Through a comprehensive look at the data, this study addresses three core questions: (1) What are the main current characteristics of the violence produced by the far right? (2) What type of far-right groups are more prone than others to engage in violence? How are characteristics of particular far-right groups correlated with their tendency to engage in violence? (3) What are the social and political factors associated with the level of far-right violence? Are there political or social conditions that foster or discourage violence? It is important to note that this study concentrates on those individuals and groups who have actually perpetuated violence and is not a comprehensive analysis of the political causes with which some far-right extremists identify. While the ability to hold and appropriately articulate diverse political views is an American strength, extremists committing acts of violence in the name of those causes undermine the freedoms that they purport to espouse. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2013. 147p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2013 at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/challengers-from-the-sidelines-understanding-americas-violent-far-right Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/challengers-from-the-sidelines-understanding-americas-violent-far-right Shelf Number: 129588 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Homeland Security Radical Groups Terrorism (U.S.) Terrorist Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Southern Poverty Law Center Title: Terror From the Right: Plots, Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since Oklahoma City Summary: At 9:02 a.m. on April 19, 1995, a 7,000-pound truck bomb, constructed of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and nitromethane racing fuel and packed into 13 plastic barrels, ripped through the heart of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The explosion wrecked much of downtown Oklahoma City and killed 168 people, including 19 children in a day-care center. Another 500 were injured. Although many Americans initially suspected an attack by Middle Eastern radicals, it quickly became clear that the mass murder had actually been carried out by domestic, right-wing terrorists. The slaughter engineered by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, men steeped in the conspiracy theories and white-hot fury of the American radical right, marked the opening shot in a new kind of domestic political extremism — a revolutionary ideology whose practitioners do not hesitate to carry out attacks directed at entirely innocent victims, people selected essentially at random to make a political point. After Oklahoma, it was no longer sufficient for many American right-wing terrorists to strike at a target of political significance — instead, they reached for higher and higher body counts, reasoning that they had to eclipse McVeigh’s attack to win attention. What follows is a detailed listing of major terrorist plots and racist rampages that have emerged from the American radical right in the years since Oklahoma City. These have included plans to bomb government buildings, banks, refineries, utilities, clinics, synagogues, mosques, memorials and bridges; to assassinate police officers, judges, politicians, civil rights figures and others; to rob banks, armored cars and other criminals; and to amass illegal machine guns, missiles, explosives and biological and chemical weapons. Each of these plots aimed to make changes in America through the use of political violence. Most contemplated the deaths of large numbers of people — in one case, as many as 30,000, or 10 times the number murdered on Sept. 11, 2001. Details: Montgomery AL: Southern Poverty Law Center, 2012. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2013 at: http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/terror_from_the_right_2012_web_0.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/terror_from_the_right_2012_web_0.pdf Shelf Number: 129598 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism (U.S.) Extremist Groups Homeland Security Radical Groups Terrorists

Author: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation Title: Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Community Engagement in West Africa and the Sahel: An Action Agenda Summary: On 18–19 April 2013, the governments of Burkina Faso and Denmark hosted a workshop in Ouagadougou on the subject of countering violent extremism in West Africa and the Sahel. The workshop was hosted under the auspices of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and its Sahel Region Capacity Building Working Group, which focuses on community engagement as one of its five workstreams. Convened by the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC), the workshop brought together 141 participants from 27 countries, four regional and international organizations, and 28 civil society organizations, providing a forum for discussions that highlighted the drivers of violent extremism in the region and explored practical ways of addressing their impact on regional stability, security, and development. As the workshop participants noted, violent extremism in West Africa and the Sahel is fueled by a combination of complex circumstances, including societal conflicts, intercommunal tensions, an underdeveloped sense of citizenship and national loyalty and identity, organized crime, illiteracy, and other challenges related to weak governance, inadequate justice systems, and insufficient service delivery. Violent extremists are exploiting these circumstances and creating what members of the UN Security Council have called an “arc of instability” spanning the Sahara and Sahel. In May 2013, the UN Security Council issued a statement on terrorism in the Sahel that recognized that “terrorism will not be defeated by military force or security forces, law enforcement measures, and intelligence operations alone” and underlined “the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, including, but not limited to, strengthening efforts for the successful prevention and peaceful resolution of prolonged conflicts, and also promoting the rule of law, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, tolerance and inclusiveness.” That statement highlights the need for concerted action from states, civil society, and international partners to work together to build trust with local communities and help them to counter violent extremism. There is no agreed definition of countering violent extremism (CVE) programming although it has been described as efforts to “prevent non-radicalized populations from becoming radicalized. The objective is to create individual and communal resilience against cognitive and/or violent radicalization through a variety of non-coercive means.” CVE programming can also focus on the need to reduce support for or active participation in violent extremist actions through noncoercive means. Therefore, the range of CVE and terrorism prevention programming and the practitioners involved is quite broad. Numerous actors, including bilateral donors, regional and international bodies, states in the region, and civil society organizations, are pursuing a wide range of activities that contribute to countering violent extremism in West Africa and the Sahel. In many cases, CVE measures build on existing initiatives and policies to address violence and insecurity and promote good governance and development. By addressing conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism, these measures can be understood as relevant to countering violent extremism without the need to explicitly label them as CVE measures. In the co-chair’s summary at the workshop’s conclusion, Danish Ambassador to Burkina Faso Bo Jensen highlighted four recurring themes that capture the range of CVE and CVE-relevant programming. 1. Empower local community, government, and traditional leaders to work on conflict prevention and resolution in a region that has been plagued by several prolonged conflicts. 2. Strengthen law enforcement, criminal justice, and security sector actors through training and technical assistance focusing on community engagement, the rule of law, and human rights. 3. Actively engage and support civil society at the regional and international level. 4. Identify and prevent violent extremism by addressing its structural and ideological drivers.5 Building on those four themes and other inputs collected from participants during the meeting, this Action Agenda outlines a range of proposed activities to enhance existing CVE-relevant efforts. Details: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2013. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2013 at: http://www.thegctf.org/documents/10299/44331/Action+Agenda+ENG.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.thegctf.org/documents/10299/44331/Action+Agenda+ENG.pdf Shelf Number: 129607 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Violent Extremism (Africa)

Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Evaluating Countering Violent Extremism Programming: Practice and Progress Summary: As the threat from terrorism becomes more diffuse, networked, and transnational, with newly emerging lone terrorists or small groups, so too have the tools of counterterrorism continued to evolve. Policymakers and practitioners are focusing more on preventing and countering radicalization and recruitment and improving the resilience of individuals and communities against the appeal of violent extremism. Reflective of these trends, efforts on countering violent extremism (CVE)1 have emerged in a relatively short period as an increasingly important instrument in the counterterrorism tool kit as an integral part of their wider strategic objectives on countering terrorism. States are more attentive to the development of CVE strategies and are supporting initiatives that move beyond policy development and into implementation. Additionally, multilateral counterterrorism actors, such as the European Union and United Nations, have expanded their interest in CVE activities. Of particular note in this regard is the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), an informal, multilateral counterterrorism body comprising 29 countries plus the European Union that was launched in September 2011.2 The GCTF serves as a platform for identifying critical civilian counterterrorism needs and mobilizing the necessary expertise and resources to address such needs and enhance global cooperation. In December 2012, the Hedayah International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism was launched as an initiative of the GCTF in Abu Dhabi to assist governments and stakeholders in their efforts.3 Furthermore, regional organizations and civil society actors are becoming increasingly engaged in the development and implementation of CVE programming. This shift toward a more proactive approach to terrorism and the resulting proliferation of CVE programming have raised questions and concerns about its effectiveness. Challenges exist not only in designing preventive programs but also in developing tools for measuring and evaluating their impact. For example, developing a CVE intervention requires that a number of questions be addressed: How does radicalization occur, and at what stage in the radicalization process is an intervention warranted? Should CVE programs target all who are sympathetic to the causes espoused by militant groups or only those who have provided active support? Do programs that address some of the grievances often associated with violent extremism, such as underdevelopment, inequality, or sociopolitical marginalization, merit being tagged with a CVE label? What kind of added value can be provided by CVE programs that are not included within development, education, or conflict mitigation and peace-building efforts? The responses to these questions are important for establishing the scope and parameters of the program and in contributing to the development of indicators against which success can be measured, which should ideally be embedded in program design from the outset. Once the intervention has been designed, however, a number of obstacles remain in measuring its impact. These challenges include (1) determining the scope of the evaluation; (2) attributing causality where the desired outcome is a nonevent, i.e., “measuring the negative”; and (3) obtaining resources and technical expertise to conduct an evaluation.4 To a large extent, the answers to these questions will vary across regions and contexts and be determined by lessons learned from past practices. Reflecting the prevalence of CVE programs, there is now greater acceptance of the need to invest in program evaluation in order to address the questions and concerns about preventive interventions. It is no longer a question of whether, but how to conduct these evaluations. Details: Goshen, IN: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2013. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Fink_Romaniuk_Barakat_EVALUATING-CVE-PROGRAMMING_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Fink_Romaniuk_Barakat_EVALUATING-CVE-PROGRAMMING_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 129612 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremists Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism ( International)

Author: Hunt, Alice E. Title: Beyond Bullets: Strategies for Countering Violent Extremism Summary: To guide future American efforts to counter violent Islamist extremism, the Center for a New American Security launched a strategy development process modeled after President Eisenhower’s Project Solarium. CNAS asked five experts to recast the effort in sustainable terms and in a manner consistent with American values. The result was a series of essays that recommended new counterterrorism tools and strategies for the Obama administration. Kristin Lord, John Nagl, and Seth Rosen present a comprehensive strategy to combat violent Islamist extremism. David Kilcullen recommends a “balanced • response” that disaggregates disparate Islamist groups and recalibrates the civilian and military tools of U.S. power. Larry Diamond focuses on democratization in • the Arab world as a means to staunch the supply of violent extremists and the grievances that inspire them. Camille Pecastaing suggests that the U.S. government dismantle the “war on terror,” relegate counterterrorism to the jurisdiction of technical government agencies, and educate the American public about the true nature of the threat. Harvey Sapolsky proposes a reduction of U.S. • military deployments in order to undercut extremist propaganda and conserve limited resources. Finally, Daniel Benjamin presents a counter• terrorism strategy that would recommit the United States to international legal standards and to expand civilian tools of government, while continuing to track down al Qaeda. CNAS researchers James Miller and Alice Hunt then convened the authors, along with leading experts and stakeholders from the U.S. government, to debate the merits and challenges of each approach. From these discussions, CNAS researchers crafted a draft strategy and presented it to the authors and outside experts at a second conference. The feedback from that session, along with a series of expert reviews, resulted in the final documents presented in this volume. Details: Washington, EC: Center for a New American Security, 2009. 127p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 19, 2013 at: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/LordNaglRosen_Beyond%20Bullets%20Edited%20Volume_June09_0.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/LordNaglRosen_Beyond%20Bullets%20Edited%20Volume_June09_0.pdf Shelf Number: 129647 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Islamist Terrorism Radical Groups Violent Extremism (International)

Author: Christmann, Kris Title: Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: A Systematic Review of the Research Evidence Summary: The purpose of this systematic review is to examine the scholarly literature on the process(es) of radicalisation, particularly among young people, and the availability of interventions to prevent extremism. The review was undertaken to inform the national evaluation of the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales' (YJB) preventing violent extremism programmes within the youth justice system, and as such, represents one of the research outputs from that study. The full evaluation report, Process Evaluation of Preventing Violent Extremism Programmes for Young People, is to be published by the YJB alongside this review. The review found that the evidence base for effective preventing violent extremism interventions is very limited. Despite a prolific output of research, few studies contained empirical data or systematic data analysis. Furthermore, although a growing body of literature investigating the radicalisation process is emerging, the weight of that literature is focused upon terrorism rather than radicalisation. As such, the evidence is concerned with that smaller cohort of individuals who, once radicalised, go on to commit acts of violence in the pursuit of political or religious aims and objectives. This introduces a systematic bias in the literature, away from the radicalisation process that preceeds terrorism, including radicalisation that does not lead to violence. Despite these limitations, the systematic review found that Islamic radicalisation and terrorism emanate from a very heterogeneous population that varies markedly in terms of education, family background, socio-economic status and income. Several studies have identified potential risk factors for radicalisation, and, among these, political grievances (notably reaction to Western foreign policy) have a prominent role. The review found only two evaluated UK programmes that explicitly aimed to address Islamic radicalisation in the UK. These were outreach and engagement projects running in London: the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) and the 'Street' Project. In addition, the review drew heavily upon the Department for Communities and Local Government's (DCLG) rapid evidence assessment, Preventing Support for Violent Extremism through Community Interventions: A Review of the Evidence (Pratchett et al, 2010). This advocated the adoption of capacity building and empowering young people, and interventions that "challenge ideology that focus on theology and use education/training". The Netherlands-based Slotervaart Project was identified as an exemplar of the outreach/community-based approach recommended by the DCLG review. The review also considered a number of de-radicalisation programmes operating in several Islamic countries and programmes tackling right-wing radicalisation. These programmes provide some potential learning points for future UK programmes, chiefly around the need for those engaging with radicalised individuals to carry authority and legitimacy, and to be equipped with profound ideological knowledge. Details: London: Youth Justice Board for England and Wales, 2012. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 17, 2014 at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-analysis/yjb/preventing-violent-extremism-systematic-review.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-analysis/yjb/preventing-violent-extremism-systematic-review.pdf Shelf Number: 131942 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Interventions Muslims Radical Groups Radicalization Religion Violent Extremism

Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: Countering Violent Extremism in the United States Summary: In August 2011, the Obama Administration announced its counter-radicalization strategy. It is devised to address the forces that influence some people living in the United States to acquire and hold radical or extremist beliefs that may eventually compel them to commit terrorism. This is the first such strategy for the federal government, which calls this effort "combating violent extremism" (CVE). Since the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has prosecuted hundreds of individuals on terrorism charges. Unlike the necessarily secretive law enforcement and intelligence efforts driving these investigations, the CVE strategy includes sizeable government activity within the open marketplace of ideas, where private citizens are free to weigh competing ideologies and engage in constitutionally protected speech and expression. Some of the key challenges in the implementation of the CVE strategy likely spring from the interplay between the marketplace of ideas and the secretive realm encompassing law enforcement investigations and terrorist plotting. The strategy addresses the radicalization of all types of potential terrorists in the United States but focuses on those inspired by Al Qaeda. To further elaborate this strategy, in December 2011 the Administration released its "Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States" (SIP). The SIP is a large-scale planning document with three major objectives and numerous future activities and efforts. The SIP's three objectives involve (1) enhancing federal community engagement efforts related to CVE, (2) developing greater government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism, and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: R42553: Accessed March 17, 2014 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42553.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42553.pdf Shelf Number: 131948 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Violent Extremism

Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland Summary: Even though over the last twenty years some of its citizens have been killed or kidnapped by various jihadist groups abroad, internally Switzerland has not witnessed jihadist activities on a significant scale. Unlike most Western European countries, in fact, no successful terrorist attack of jihadist inspiration has ever been perpetrated on its territory and there is no publicly available information indicating that concrete plans for an attack in Switzerland were ever made. Less than a dozen individuals have been tried for terrorism-related crimes, all of them involving non-violent activities of material support and propaganda. The number of Swiss residents who have traveled abroad to join jihadist groups is also estimated to be lower than in most other European countries. Yet Swiss authorities are not complacent and argue that "Switzerland is not an island." Counterterrorism officials have consistently claimed that there is ample evidence suggesting that some of the same radicalization trends that have long characterized other Western European countries also exist in Switzerland, albeit on a smaller scale. This report seeks to assess the size and dynamics of jihadist radicalization in the country. Its main findings are as follows: - While it is impossible to provide anything even close to an exact number, it can be argued that radicalization of jihadist inspiration involves a negligible cross-section of the Swiss Muslim community. There are probably only a couple of dozens of individuals in Switzerland who are actively involved in jihadist activities. Similarly, it can be argued that the number of those fully embracing jihadist ideology is somewhere in the hundreds, and of those with varying degrees sympathizing with it is somewhere in the lower thousands. - Basing the analysis on the admittedly limited number of Swiss-based individuals who are known to have embraced jihadist ideology, it is evident that jihadist enthusiasts, as elsewhere in Europe, do not have a common profile. In the 1990s and early 2000s most of them were first generation immigrants who had arrived in Switzerland already radicalized. An example is the case of Moez Garsallaoui and Malika el Aroud, the Fribourg-based administrators of prominent jihadist forums who had contacts with the upper echelons of al Qaeda, or members of various cells providing support to North African-based al Qaeda affiliates. Following a pattern common throughout Europe, over the last few years an increasing number of jihadist sympathizers have had homegrown characteristics: born (or at least raised) in Switzerland, they radicalized independently in the country and operated largely outside of the framework of established groups. Occasionally some Swiss-based radicalized individuals manage to link up with al Qaeda-affiliated groups outside of Europe and train or fight with them. - Militants are not born in a vacuum. Rather, radicalization takes place "at the intersection of an enabling environment and a personal trajectory." This report identifies militant Salafism as the ideological milieu from which jihadists, in Switzerland as elsewhere, can come from. An automatic identification of Salafism with terrorism is a gross analytical mistake. Moreover, even among those who interact with the most radical fringes of the Salafist movement, only a marginal fraction will make the leap into violent radicalism. But militant Salafism is the larger sea in which the fish swim. - The report analyzes various factors that, often operating concurrently, contribute to radicalization: 1. The internet: the report finds evidence of a small, loose-knit community of Swiss-based jihad enthusiasts who interact among themselves and with likeminded individuals abroad on jihadist forums and online social networks. 2. Mosques: the overwhelming majority of Swiss mosques reject extremism, but small groups of jihad enthusiasts congregate at the margins of some of Switzerland's most conservative mosques or in private prayer rooms. 3. Gateway organizations: there are a handful of organizations in Switzerland which do not advocate violence themselves, but spread ideas that may lead others to do so. 4. Links abroad: Swiss militants regularly interact with like-minded individuals from countries where the Salafist scene is more developed. It is common for Swiss residents to travel abroad to participate in seminars and for foreign speakers to come to Switzerland. This interaction is particularly strong with the Salafist scenes in Germany and in the Balkans. - Patterns of linkage are very difficult to assess, but there are indications pointing to the presence of "gatekeepers" operating on Swiss territory that channel aspiring jihadists in the direction of established groups operating in Africa, the Middle East or South Asia. - As in any other European country, radicalization of jihadist inspiration seems to affect only a statistically marginal segment of the Swiss Muslim population. But radicalization in Switzerland appears to be a limited phenomenon also when compared to other European countries. Four factors can explain this difference: 1. Lack of an "infecting cluster": Switzerland never hosted an openly jihadist mosque or high profile jihadists, elements that in other countries have been crucial in spreading jihadist ideology. 2. Good degree of social, economic and cultural integration of most Muslims living in Switzerland, rendering them more resilient to extremist narratives. 3. Demographic characteristics of the Swiss Muslim population: some 80% to 90% of Swiss Muslims trace their origins to the Balkans or Turkey, where the vast majority of Muslims traditionally espouses forms of Islam that are tolerant and apolitical. 4. Switzerland's foreign policy, whose largely neutral stance does not provide a source of grievances. - While these concurrently operating factors can potentially explain the low levels of jihadist radicalization in Switzerland, none of them is a guarantee. Each, in fact, presents weaknesses and exceptions. Many of the dynamics present throughout Europe are visible also in Switzerland, albeit on a much smaller scale. There are loosely knit milieus in Switzerland, both in the virtual and physical world, that sympathize with jihadist ideology. And occasionally individuals who belong to these milieus do make the leap from words to action. Details: Zurich: Center for Security Studies (CSS) ETH Zurich, 2013. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2014 at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CH_radicalization_report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Switzerland URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CH_radicalization_report.pdf Shelf Number: 132180 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization Programs Extremist Groups Jihadism Muslims Radical Groups Terrorists

Author: Richardson, Roslyn Title: Fighting Fire with Fire: Target audience responses to online anti-violence campaigns Summary: This report documents young Muslim Sydneysiders' responses to a variety of online campaigns that promote non-violent political activism or aim to 'counter violent extremism' (CVE). In undertaking this study, which involved interviews with Muslim communities in Western Sydney - communities that have been targeted by both violent propaganda and government communication campaigns - two things became apparent. First, there's a pool of highly educated, discerning and media-savvy young people in these communities. Second, rather than merely being an audience for government-sponsored communication campaigns, they're creating their own websites, YouTube clips, radio programs and Facebook groups. - Some of these websites and other initiatives directly challenge violent narratives while others provide avenues for non‑violent political protest and expression. The popularity and reach of this entirely community-generated web content significantly outshines the reach of any government-sponsored internet-based CVE strategies developed to date. - The young people responsible for these initiatives, some of whom are communication professionals, understand and to some extent share their target audiences' needs and wants. As journalism and marketing graduates, they also have the professional know-how to produce high quality and attention-grabbing campaigns. Furthermore, when they take the lead in creating these initiatives they generate more interest and praise from their target audiences than when they merely support government‑sponsored programs. - Outside of the online space, young people from across Sydney's Muslim communities engage in a range of activities that directly assist others to move away from violent and criminal paths. A number of the respondents in this study, for example, are volunteer youth mentors who assist young people identified by their schools, the justice system or both as 'vulnerable' (to criminalisation). These interventions in real life are augmented by their efforts through online forums to reach out to young people they identify as at risk. - The efforts of these young volunteers both inside and outside the online space seem largely unknown beyond their immediate communities. Nevertheless their contribution in creating communities that are empowered and resilient to violent messaging may be considerable. The core recommendation of this report is: Where possible, government agencies should support existing popular community-driven anti-violence online campaigns rather than prioritising the development of new websites to counter violent narratives. Government agencies should directly engage with the young people involved in these popular initiatives and investigate ways to support them and their campaigns where possible. - While this study offers many findings that government agencies and communities might view with optimism, it also reveals that there are significant barriers that undermine young Muslim Sydneysiders' engagement with CVE communication campaigns and government agencies. These barriers are also likely to undermine government agencies' engagement with the young communication professionals who are currently producing a range of popular anti-violence campaigns. The report identifies and discusses these barriers. However, it is anticipated that from the large amount of data collected there will be subsequent publications describing some in greater detail. - The most significant barrier identified in this study relates to the pervasive prejudice young Muslims report experiencing as a result of being Muslim and/or of Arab background. Many of the study's respondents rejected government-produced CVE websites because they felt such strategies perpetuate the stereotyping of Muslim communities as potentially threatening and deviant. From their perspective, Australia's CVE agenda fuels Islamophobia, making them more vulnerable to discrimination including verbal and physical attacks. - The respondents also rejected the government's CVE agenda because they perceived government agencies as doing little to address social issues of greater importance to them. This includes the violent crime and socioeconomic disadvantage experienced by those living in their Western Sydney suburbs. In this respect, they believed that government agencies' engagement with them on CVE issues is largely self-serving and does little to address the 'real' violence they see afflicting their communities. - Another significant barrier undermining young Muslim Sydneysiders' engagement with Australia's CVE agenda is their lack of trust in government agencies. Some perceive an irony when the Australian Government asks them to support campaigns denouncing violence when it is waging violent wars in other countries. Government CVE interventions in Muslim communities have also fuelled community paranoia and young Muslims' belief that they are under constant surveillance. As a result of a variety of issues affecting Muslim communities inside and outside Australia, the respondents perceived the Australian Government as not being 'on their side' and not representing their interests. - While some respondents displayed a deep cynicism about the Australian Government and its CVE agenda, for moral and religious reasons many were devoted to assisting 'at risk' youth in their communities. The ASPI research team also found that even self-described 'radicals', 'conservatives' and those who decry Australia's counterterrorism policies, want to engage better with police and other government agencies. This report offers 13 recommendations to facilitate this engagement and enhance communication campaigns that challenge violence. - However, this report also offers a warning that online communication strategies are unlikely to provide a solution for those at greatest risk of becoming involved in violent extremism. The respondents of this study, who included sheikhs involved in deradicalisation work, argued that one-on-one intervention strategies are a far more effective way to reach and influence vulnerable individuals. - This study shows that it's difficult to motivate young people to view government-sponsored CVE websites; it's undoubtedly much more of a challenge to entice 'at risk' youth to visit such sites. - By focusing on Muslim youth this report potentially supports discourses that position Muslim Australians as a 'problem community' and security threat. The research team doesn't support such views and sees them as counterproductive to our aim of enhancing government agencies' interaction with young Muslims. In fact, this study shows that the securitisation of Muslim communities directly causes young Muslim Sydneysiders to reject CVE websites and shun interaction with government agencies. - Nevertheless, some of our respondents expressed deep concern about groups and individuals in their communities sympathetic to using violence to achieve political-religious aims. Some believed it was important for their communities to develop online strategies to challenge violent narratives and provide more avenues for young people to express their views in a non-violent manner. In addition, some felt it was the correct role of government agencies to support communities in these endeavours. - On the whole this report challenges approaches that only discuss Muslim youth as being highly vulnerable and in dire need of empowerment to resist violent propaganda. Instead, it shows that some have taken a lead role in challenging violent narratives and are empowering themselves. This report is intended for use by government agencies and communities to inform their future work in this area. - Included as an appendix to this report is a separate ASPI study examining the online CVE strategies developed by five countries: UK, US, the Netherlands, Canada and Denmark. Details: Barton, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2013. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 26, 2014 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/fighting-fire-with-fire-target-audience-responses-to-online-anti-violence-campaigns/Fight_fire_long_paper_web.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/fighting-fire-with-fire-target-audience-responses-to-online-anti-violence-campaigns/Fight_fire_long_paper_web.pdf Shelf Number: 132545 Keywords: At-Risk Youth Media Campaigns Muslims Online Communication Radical Groups Violence Prevention Violent Extremism Youth Violence

Author: Southern Poverty Law Center Title: War in the West: The Bundy Ranch Standoff and the American Radical Right Summary: As officers of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department withdrew from Cliven Bundy�s Bunkerville, Nev., ranch on April 12, the question had to be asked: How could a scofflaw like Bundy, who owes more than $1 million in grazing fees but was backed up by hundreds of armed antigovernment zealots, manage to run off federal officials who clearly were in the right for seizing Bundy�s cows as payment for what he owes? The standoff very nearly ended in bloodshed, as large numbers of Bundy supporters pointed their weapons at law enforcement officials, a felony that is now under investigation by the FBI. The BLM wisely withdrew, avoiding possible violence. The Bundy standoff has invigorated an extremist movement that exploded when President Obama was elected, going from some 150 groups in 2008 to more than 1,000 last year. Though the movement has waxed and waned over the last three decades, antigovernment extremists have long pushed, most fiercely during Democratic administrations, rabid conspiracy theories about a nefarious New World Order, a socialist, gun-grabbing federal government and the evils of federal law enforcement. Today�s disputes with federal authority, many long simmering, are an extension of the earlier right-wing Sagebrush Rebellion, Wise Use and �county supremacy� movements. Details: Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty Law Center, 2014. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2014 at: http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/war_in_the_west_report.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/war_in_the_west_report.pdf Shelf Number: 132651 Keywords: Extremist Groups (U.S.) Radical Groups

Author: Walker, Andrew Title: What Is Boko Haram? Summary: The group Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad, known the world over as Boko Haram, is an extremist Islamic sect in Nigeria that has created havoc across the north of the country and in the capital, Abuja. Its violent attacks on government offices, the United Nations, and churches threaten to destabilize the country. A range of conflicting narratives has grown up around Boko Haram, and the group's origins, motivations, and future plans remain a matter of debate. This report addresses the questions stemming from these narratives and suggests how the group can be contained. The report is based on the author's extensive research and reporting on Boko Haram. In March 2011, he conducted an interview with a senior member of the group in the city of Maiduguri, Nigeria, the center of Boko Haram's area of influence. The report also draws on interviews with Nigerian journalists who have covered the group (and who asked to remain anonymous in this report) and on information provided to the author by other researchers working on Boko Haram. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2012. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 308: Accessed July 14, 2014 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf Shelf Number: 132605 Keywords: Boko Haram (Nigeria) Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Radical Groups Terrorist Organizations Terrorists (Nigeria)

Author: Olojo, Akinola Title: Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram Summary: Over the past decade, the northern region of Nigeria has experienced a surge in terrorist violence instigated by the sectarian group known as Boko Haram. Several analysts have advanced the view that poverty, longstanding economic disparities within Nigeria, and structural violence, are key factors underlying the crisis. However, the complex nature of the situation in Nigeria has at the same time caused some observers to characterise Boko Haram's aggression as violent extremism beyond a domestic agenda. The group's use of suicide attacks particularly presents a dreadful trait typical of international terrorist violence; a style of brutality hitherto alien to the Nigerian state. Nevertheless, Boko Haram has been able to draw upon a considerable base of local sympathy and support largely from the ranks of uneducated, unemployed and impoverished youths in northern Nigeria. In addition, the group's ability to manoeuvre and stage-manage the force of religion in achieving its objectives appears to be dangerously reinforced by the influence of political interests and elites. These multi-dimensional challenges continue to confound the Nigerian government, leaving it struggling to clearly define the problem and to devise a comprehensive strategy to prevent and counter it. This paper argues that the effective formulation and implementation of such a strategy requires an incisive understanding of the political, socio-economic and religious/ideological drivers of public support for Boko Haram. Enhanced knowledge of the recruitment dynamics that feed and sustain the group could particularly inform a more proactive counter-terrorism framework for the Nigerian state. This paper therefore presents the case for a thorough examination of the factors that have inspired public support for Boko Haram and the trajectory of the group's mobilisation of various forms of support in northern Nigeria. This study draws upon a considerable number of open sources and it acknowledges the general difficulty which research in the field of (counter-)terrorism encounters while trying to gather primary source data. In the case of Nigeria, this challenge is more apparent due to the manifold (and on-going) security risks involved in acquiring such data in the north-eastern zones of conflict. Nevertheless, the author of this paper has attempted to complement secondary sources with a modest blend of data obtained through interviews and research reports. Two central questions at the core of this study include: To what extent do socio-economic issues such as poverty and underdevelopment among youths, the role of religion, and political interests explain the motivations for public support for Boko Haram? Second, how can the existing leadership in Nigeria address the escalating crisis; and what role can institutional leadership at the local, national and regional levels play in addressing the problem? One of the theoretical considerations in this paper relates to the structural violence paradigm. Its suggestion of how economic deprivation, class discrimination and societal injustice prevent citizens from reaching their full potential helps to place in context the influence which socio-economic drivers exert on public support for Boko Haram. The awareness that a lack of economic, social and/or political development feeds into the structural factors conducive to terrorism is not new; it already played a prominent role in the first ever resolution adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) on counter-terrorism in 1972 (GA Resolution 3034). In fact, the logic of the structural violence paradigm, as advocated by its chief proponent Johan Galtung, underscores how socio-cultural systems, political structures and state institutions act as indirect instigators of violence. Individual and group grievances, such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalisation, can be used as mobilising instruments by sinister groups to find support and recruits for terrorist violence. The relevance of this can also be understood in terms of societal challenges that are increasingly being conceptualised within the framework of human security. As already noted, these issues collectively inform one of the central questions of this study primarily because of its causal link with the crisis context of northern Nigeria. While this is the case, the structural violence approach may very well lose some of its potency when evaluated based on the accounts of other country/conflict settings. Even in the Nigerian situation, and as this paper will further highlight, while structural violence helps to explain the motivations for public support for Boko Haram, it nonetheless remains inadequate as a single factor instigating the crisis. Indeed, not every Boko Haram member that has engaged in violence is socio-economically deprived. At the same time, not every socio-economically deprived individual will be motivated to lend support to acts of terror perpetrated by the group. Therefore, this study acknowledges that there will always be nuances reflected in varying contexts both within and outside the Nigerian case study. After briefly tracing the course of Boko Haram's emergence as a group, this paper will shed light on the bearing which political and elite interests may have exerted on public support for Boko Haram. Subsequently, the socio-economic context of the crisis will be examined with a view to determining the degree to which it incites public support for Boko Haram. Beyond these issues are other intervening variables that are frequently at play within the Nigerian state. The fifth section will focus on the most important among these, probing the catalytic role of religion and how this has been exploited by the group in generating mass appeal in the north. The sixth part will explore the often assumed external dimension of Boko Haram's activities within the context of weapons, terrorist funding and foreign fighters. The concluding sections will underscore what is instructive about the lessons emerging from the undercurrents of public support for the group, while also reflecting on implications for the development of more robust and concerted counter-terrorism policies. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013. 20 p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed July 14, 2014 at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Olojo-Nigerias-Troubled-North-October-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Olojo-Nigerias-Troubled-North-October-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 132671 Keywords: Boko Haram Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Socioeconomic Conditions Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment

Author: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) Title: Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Need for a Rethink Summary: The IPAC report, Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Need for a Rethink, says that prevention programs of the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional untuk Penanggulangan Terorisme) have not been as effective as hoped. At the same time, many local communities, some of them inspired by an anti-salafi backlash, are taking action themselves against extremist preachers and radical media, while some prisoners are deciding on their own to move away from violence. "The trick is to understand when, why and how individuals and communities decide to resist extremism and then to design interventions that can replicate the process," says Sidney Jones, IPAC director. BNPT's prevention programs could usefully benefit from more research on how radicalisation takes place and how local communities fight back. For example, it is planning to train administrators and imams of some 90 mosques across thirteen provinces and provide funding to strengthen their capacity to resist extremist donors. But the case dossiers of the hundreds of convicted terrorists, which contained detailed information on the mosques where they became radicalised in the first place, do not appear to have been used to compile a list of mosques to be targeted. The IPAC report contains a case study of one such mosque, Mesjid Muhammad Ramadhan in South Bekasi, just outside Jakarta, where dozens of men later convicted of terrorism took part in radical discussion groups. In April 2014, the local government, working with community leaders, expelled the extremists, exploiting an internal rift in the mosque administration; the fact that the city owned the land on which the mosque was built; and resentment of influential local religious leaders over chararacterisation of their traditional practices as incorrect or idolatrous. The Bekasi takeover benefited from a particularly good local police chief and subdistrict head (camat), but it is only one of many such incidents across the country. If BNPT could collect such cases and analyse what tactics have been successful, it could make the proposed training of mosque administrators far more effective. The report also examines government programs aimed at prisons and at the media and concludes that much more could be done to target them more effectively. It suggests that a new government taking office later this year might consider a restructuring of BNPT to ensure that the prevention division is better integrated with the division responsible for intelligence and operations. Details: Jakarta: IPAC, 2014. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: IPAC Report No. 11: Accessed July 19, 2014 at: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/06/IPAC_11_Rethinking_Countering_Extremism.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Indonesia URL: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/06/IPAC_11_Rethinking_Countering_Extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 132717 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Onuoha, Freedom C. Title: Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram? Summary: Summary - Since Nigeria's return to democracy in May 1999, armed nonstate groups have significantly undermined the country's internal security environment, largely using young men as foot soldiers. Among these groups, Boko Haram has grown to become a serious national, regional, and international concern. Estimates of the death toll from Boko Haram attacks since 2009 range as high as ten thousand fatalities. With Boko Haram and other groups seemingly gaining in strength, questions arise as to why young men join them in the first place and what the government and other actors can do to prevent it. - Surveys, interviews, and focus groups conducted in Nigeria in 2013 suggest that poverty,unemployment, illiteracy, and weak family structures make or contribute to making young men vulnerable to radicalization. Itinerant preachers capitalize on the situation by preaching an extreme version of religious teachings and conveying a narrative of the government as weak and corrupt. Armed groups such as Boko Haram can then recruit and train youth for activities ranging from errand running to suicide bombings. - To weaken the armed groups' abilities to radicalize and recruit young men, the Nigerian government at all levels, perhaps with support from interested international actors, could institute monitoring and regulation of religious preaching; strengthen education, job training, and job creation programs; design robust programs to aid destitute children; promote peace education; and embark on an anticorruption campaign. Addressing the conditions that make it possible for insurgents to recruit young men in Nigeria can significantly diminish the strength of the insurgency, if not eliminate it altogether. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 348: Accessed July 28, 2014 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR348-Why_do_Youth_Join_Boko_Haram.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR348-Why_do_Youth_Join_Boko_Haram.pdf Shelf Number: 132797 Keywords: At-Risk Youth Boko Haram (Nigeria) Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorist Organizations Terrorist Recruitment Terrorists (Nigeria)

Author: CLEEN Foundation Title: Youths, Radicalisation and Affiliation with Insurgent Groups in Northern Nigeria Summary: The violent activities of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria, which draws its members largely from the youth, have underpinned growing concern over youth radicalization and religious extremism in Northern Nigeria. Radicalisation as it is understood here entails the process by which an individual or group transits from a state of passive reception of revolutionary, militant or extremist views, ideas and beliefs to active pursuit of the ideals of such views, ideas and beliefs, especially through supporting, promoting or adopting violence as a means to achieving such intentions. It is such transition that underlies violent extremism or terrorism. Against this backdrop, this study examined the reason young Nigerians are inclined to being part of insurgent groups, particularly Boko Haram. The aim of the study was to provide a better understanding of the underlying drivers of radicalisation in Northern Nigeria, and proffer alternative approaches to addressing the crisis. The specific objectives of the study were to: Provide an empirical understanding and assessment of the push and pull factors between youth, radicalisation and affiliation with insurgent groups in the northern part of Nigeria; Identify the patterns, prevalence and potential threats of youth radicalization to the security situation in Northern Nigeria; and Proffer actionable recommendations on how to tackle the root causes of the crisis. The study gathered evidence of the drivers of radicalisation in Northern Nigeria through a combination of desk review of secondary materials such as media reports, databases, policy reports, and academic literature, and primary research involving the conduct of key informant interviews, administration of questionnaires and focus group discussions. Commissioned consultants and researchers conducted the field study in two towns in six states in Northern Nigeria - Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto, and Yobe - selected for the study. It found that ignorance of the true teachings of the religion (Islam) provides the most important source through which youths acquire radical or distorted views of religion, often propagated by roaming (independent) preachers. Furthermore, economic (poverty and unemployment) as well as socio-cultural factors (poor parental upbringing or neglect of children) underpin young people's vulnerability to recruitment and radicalisation by extremist or terrorist groups. The study also found that the excesses of security forces are not a 'major' factor in youth radicalisation, contrary to the popular assumption in some quarters. However, obvious shortcomings of security forces deployed in counter Boko Haram operations need to be urgently addressed by the appropriate authorities. In order to effectively respond to the problem of youth radicalisation and extremism in Northern Nigeria, the study recommended, among others, better monitoring and regulation of religious preaching in Nigeria; creation of job opportunities for the youth; delivery of robust rehabilitation programmes for destitute children; expansion of access to quality education; and promotion of peace education. In view of some limitations encountered, the study concluded that there was still much to be done in unpacking the intricacies of youth radicalisation, particularly in relation to the specificities of each state where the phenomenon of radicalisation has and is taking place in Northern Nigeria. Notwithstanding, the utility of the study lies in the fact that it has taken the very important first step towards understanding the key drivers of youth radicalisation and extremism in Northern Nigeria through an empirical research. The distance it has not covered should inform further action on the part of government, civil society groups and academics in the quest to find the drivers of, and sustainable solutions to, growing radicalisation and extremism in Nigeria. Details: Lagos: CLEEN Foundation, 2014. 117p. Source: Internet Resource: Monograph Series, No. 20: Accessed July 28, 2014 at: http://cleen.org/Youths,%20Radicalisation%20and%20Affiliation%20with%20Insurgent%20Groups%20in%20Northern%20Nigeria.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria URL: http://cleen.org/Youths,%20Radicalisation%20and%20Affiliation%20with%20Insurgent%20Groups%20in%20Northern%20Nigeria.pdf Shelf Number: 132802 Keywords: At-Risk Youth Boko Haram (Nigeria) Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Religion Terrorist Organizations Terrorists (Nigeria)

Author: Couture, Krista London Title: A Gendered Approach To Countering Violent Extremism. Lessons Learned From Women In Peacebuilding And Conflict Prevention Applied Successfully In Bangladesh And Morocco Summary: As the United States and world transition from a reflexive and hard approach in counterterrorism to a more reflective and soft one for the prevention of terrorism, the search for best practices and lessons learned is more critical than ever. While programming related to countering violent extremism (CVE) continues to grapple with the adoption of official definitions, priorities, evaluation methodologies, and qualitative and quantitative metrics, there is a growing awareness of the importance of harnessing female actors as positive, operational agents of change. Women continue to be an underutilized and under-tapped resource in the fight against extremism. This research identifies best practices through lessons learned from efforts that utilize women to encouragingly affect catalysts and circumstances that drive individuals to engage in terrorism. The empowerment of women not only makes practical sense, but also is a good investment in economics, business, and counterterrorism. In micro lending, for every $1US a woman earns, she reinvests 90 percent back into her family and/or community; men re-invest only 40 percent. When a woman has an education, she marries on average four years later, enters into non-abusive relationships, and has 2.2 children who are healthier and better educated. Extremism is most effectively countered through increased education, better critical thinking, and enhanced opportunities. These empowerment scenarios and positive outcomes become manifest in the impact a woman has within her family and community. In the words of former Secretary to the United Nations Kofi Annan, "There is no development strategy more beneficial to society as a whole - women and men alike - than the one which involves women as central players." While originally intended to only bring awareness of the role of women in preventing terrorism, this research reveals several additional important findings. Most notably, as is the case with their impact on peace and stability, women play a critical role in the security realm, and CVE is no exception. Empowering women in culturally and country-specific ways enables them to be valuable players in the extremism paradigm. Details: Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2014. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper: Accessed August 4, 2014 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/07/30%20gender%20conflict%20prevention%20countering%20violent%20extremism%20couture/women%20cve%20formatted%2072914%20couture%20final2.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Bangladesh URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/07/30%20gender%20conflict%20prevention%20countering%20violent%20extremism%20couture/women%20cve%20formatted%2072914%20couture%20final2.pdf Shelf Number: 132873 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorists Violence Prevention Violent Extremism (Bangladesh, Morocco)

Author: Winkler, Carol K., ed. Title: Visual Propaganda and Extremism in the Online Environment Summary: Visual images have been a central component of propaganda for as long as propaganda has been produced. But recent developments in communication and information technologies have given terrorist and extremist groups options and abilities they never would have been able to come close to even 5 or 10 years ago. There are terrorist groups who, with very little initial investment, are making videos that are coming so close to the quality of BBC or CNN broadcasts that the difference is meaningless, and with access to the web they have instantaneous access to a global audience. Given the broad social science consensus on the power of visual images relative to that of words, the strategic implications of these groups' sophistication in the use of images in the online environment is carefully considered in a variety of contexts by the authors in this collection. Details: Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2014. 256p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 12, 2014 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1213 Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1213 Shelf Number: 133295 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Online Communication Online Victimization Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Briggs, Rachel Title: Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism: What Works and What are the Implications for Government? Summary: It is now recognised that violent extremists have made effective use of the Internet and social media to advance their aims, whether through engagement, propaganda, radicalisation or recruitment. While the quality of their output varies, a growing proportion is professional, well produced, contains compelling messages and is delivered by charismatic individuals. In short, it appeals to the new YouTube generation, which expects high-end products that are well-timed and effective. These extremist groups and networks are also transitioning from their own standalone websites and forums towards social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, to take their messages to a much wider audience. Governments are interested in understanding what can be done to counter this content, both illegal and legal, which can incite or glamorise the use of violence. Much of the emphasis to date has been placed on restrictive measures, such as takedowns and filtering. While it is important for governments to enforce the law - and be seen to be doing so - there are severe limitations on the effectiveness of this response, given the speed with which new data is uploaded and the limited capacity of law enforcement agencies. More recently, there has been growing interest in alternative approaches to the problem. One such potential solution is provided by 'counter-narratives'; attempts to challenge extremist and violent extremist messages, whether directly or indirectly, through a range of online and offline means. Counter-narrative has become a catch-all term for a wide range of activities with different aims and tactics, everything from public diplomacy and strategic communications by government, to targeted campaigns to discredit the ideologies and actions of violent extremists. In order to make sense of the complex range of actions and initiatives described as 'counter-narratives', the report sets out a 'counter-messaging spectrum', which is comprised of three main types of activities: government strategic communications, alternative narratives and counter-narratives. The counter-messaging spectrum is summarised in the table overleaf. This report was commissioned by Public Safety Canada. It aims to review the state of knowledge about efforts to counter narratives of violent extremism and make recommendations for governments, such as the Canadian government, to guide their emerging work in this sensitive area of policy. It is important to stress that counter-narrative work as an area of public policy is in its infancy. While community and civil society groups have been conducting this work for many years, governments are new to the issue and the private sector is feeling its way with extreme caution. This means that there are only a small number of case studies to draw upon. For this reason, as well as the limited scope of the project, the recommendations for government are tentative. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2013. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 15, 2014 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/CounterNarrativesFN2011.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/CounterNarrativesFN2011.pdf Shelf Number: 133316 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violence Prevention Violent Extremism

Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin? Summary: In this Research Paper, ICCT Visiting Research Fellow Dr. Alex P. Schmid seeks to clarify some conceptual issues that tend to obscure the debate about how best to counter violent extremism. The main focus of this Research Paper is on obtaining a clearer understanding of what "Islamist extremism" entails in the context of the ongoing debate on allegedly "acceptable" non-violent extremists and "unacceptable" violent extremists. The author discusses a number of conceptualisations of religious extremism in the context of liberal democracies and also distinguishes, inter alia, between merely "not (yet) violent" militancy and principled non-violent political activism in the Gandhian tradition. The author argues that the distinction between "non-violent extremism" and "violent extremism" is not a valid one. The paper provides a set of twenty indicators of extremism that can be used as an instrument for monitoring extremist statements and actions, with an eye to challenging and countering such non-democratic manifestations. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2014. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper, 2014: Accessed September 2, 2014 at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Violent-Non-Violent-Extremism-May-2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Violent-Non-Violent-Extremism-May-2014.pdf Shelf Number: 133388 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Religious Extremism Violent Extremism

Author: Feakin, Tobias Title: The new frontiers of Islamist extremism: Understanding the threat that al-Qaeda affiliates pose to African security Summary: Over the past decade various groups that had been operating with a predominantly nationalistic agenda have increasingly become aligned with al-Qaeda in name, ideology, methodologies of attack and tactics. A new jihadism is spreading across Africa. This paper examines three groups- Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. All of these groups are separate from the al-Qaeda core. They haven't taken up the al-Qaeda model because they've been told to, but they're emulating it. They're all looking to become dispersed, decentralised movements that frame local grievances in the language of the global jihad. For the international community, the danger lies not so much in the immediate threat to Western targets from African Islamists, but in the potential future creation of a failed state that would provide a base for training and radicalising large numbers of Islamists. The proven capacity of AQIM, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab to train and share fighting and bombmaking skills with new recruits, and then deliver those recruits into intensive front-line fighting roles in areas such as Syria and Iraq, will be the groups' most immediate international impact. There are no clear solutions for African states combating the Islamist groups but any solution will necessarily be complex. Unfortunately, if the situation's allowed to continue, there is danger that we'll see a rise in instability in the regions where the groups operate, and in their growth and ambition. Details: Barton, ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2014. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report: Accessed September 25, 2014 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-new-frontiers-of-islamist-extremism-understanding-the-threat-that-al-qaeda-affiliates-pose-to-african-security/SR71_AQ_in_Africa.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-new-frontiers-of-islamist-extremism-understanding-the-threat-that-al-qaeda-affiliates-pose-to-african-security/SR71_AQ_in_Africa.pdf Shelf Number: 133413 Keywords: Extremist Groups (Africa) Radical Groups Radicalization Violent Extremists

Author: Holmer, Georgia Title: Inclusive Approaches to Community Policing and CVE Summary: Summary - Accountable and effective policing institutions are key to stability in volatile environments, especially societies transitioning from conflict or authoritarian rule. From a development or peacebuilding perspective, community policing can aid in reform of security institutions and give civil society an active role in the process. - Community policing-simultaneously an ethos, a strategy, and a collaboration-helps promote democratic policing ideals and advance a human security paradigm. - Challenges to implementing such programs in transitional societies are considerable and tied to demographic and cultural variations in both communities and security actors. Developing trust, a key to success in all community policing, can be particularly difficult. - Challenges are also unique when dealing with marginalized communities and members of society. Neither a police service nor a given community are monolithic. How police interact with one segment of a community might be - might need to be- completely different than how they approach another. - Community policing programs designed to prevent violent extremism require a common and nuanced understanding between the community and the police as to what constitutes violent extremism and what is an effective response. When they agree, they can develop effective joint solutions to mitigate the threat. - Key competencies can be grouped into four categories: those important to success for any community policing programs, those relevant to efforts to reform the security sector, to promote women's inclusion in security, or to prevent violent extremism. These objectives often overlap. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 352: Accessed September 25, 2014 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR352_Inclusive-Approaches-to-Community-Policing-and-CVE.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR352_Inclusive-Approaches-to-Community-Policing-and-CVE.pdf Shelf Number: 133414 Keywords: Community Policing (Africa) Extremist Groups Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Botha, Anneli Title: Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia Summary: Effective counter-radicalisation strategies should be based on an empirical understanding of why people join terrorist organisations. Researchers interviewed former al-Shabaab fighters and identified a complex array of reasons for why they joined the organisation. Interviewers developed a profile of typical al-Shabaab recruits and identified factors facilitating their recruitment, including religious identity, socioeconomic circumstances (education, unemployment), political circumstances and the need for a collective identity and a sense of belonging. The reasons for al-Shabaab's rise are discussed and recommendations are made to the Somali government, countries in the region and international organisations and donors on how to counter radicalisation and recruitment to al-Shabaab. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2014. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 266: Accessed October 6, 2014 at: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper266.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper266.pdf Shelf Number: 133566 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism (Africa)

Author: Zenn, Jacob Title: Preventing Violent Extremism in Kyrgyzstan Summary: - Kyrgyzstan, having twice overthrown autocratic leaders in violent uprisings, in 2005 and again in 2010, is the most politically open and democratic country in Central Asia. - Many Kyrgyz observers remain concerned about the country's future. They fear that underlying socioeconomic conditions and lack of public services-combined with other factors, such as drug trafficking from Afghanistan, political manipulation, regional instability in former Soviet Union countries and Afghanistan, and foreign-imported religious ideologies-create an environment in which violent extremism can flourish. - One of the fault lines occurring among its population of 5.7 million is between those who value the Soviet legacy of secularism, svetski in Russian, and an emerging generation that sees Islam as a core part of its identity. The mistrust between these two constituencies prevents them from addressing a mutually recognized problem: the grassroots radicalization of young men and women, especially in Fergana Valley. - The polarizing influences of hyper-ethnic nationalists and uneducated and often unaccredited religious leaders is particularly worrisome for women, whose status has become marginalized over the past two decades. Extremist notions with regard to limited women's rights are a bellwether for instability down the road. - A long-term strategy to counter violent extremism in Kyrgyzstan requires finding common ground between leaders and influential members of the secular and religious constituencies. Together they can develop strategies to foster a national identity inclusive of diverse religious creeds and ethnic backgrounds and to challenge extremist ideas on religious, moral, and cultural grounds. - To offset pressures from Russia and China, its larger neighbors to the north and east, more coherent efforts are needed to find effective practices in countering violent extremism between Kyrgyzstan and its immediate neighbors, such as Kazakhstan, that involve other regional actors and institutions, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2014. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 355: Accessed November 3, 2014 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR355_Preventing-Violent-Extremism-in-Kyrgyzstan.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Kyrgyzstan URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR355_Preventing-Violent-Extremism-in-Kyrgyzstan.pdf Shelf Number: 133945 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Socioeconomics Conditions and Crime Violent Extremism (Kyrgyzstan)

Author: Saifudeen, Omer Ali Title: The Cyber Extremism Orbital Pathways Model Summary: The starting premise of this study is that internet-based communications possess unique characteristics that warrant the need to have a discrete pathway model to explain online radicalisation. This online radicalisation pathway model would especially apply to the growing communities of young netizens whose socio-psychological makeup is shaping a "new normal" in the way we exchange information and interact. The proposed Cyber Extremism Orbital Pathways Model (CEOP) describes how online cognitive radicalisation can move towards real-world violent extremism. The model also elucidates the multitude of competing forces in cyberspace that promote or impede such radicalization and what this means for online counter-radicalisation strategies. The CEOP model is based on inferences made from content and discourse analysis of extremist narratives on the internet and current studies about internet-based communications. The research took into account distinctive factors that made internet-based messaging more persuasive and this includes the effects of crowdsourcing. Finally, the CEOP model suggests how the same persuasive communication strategies used on the internet by extremists can be conversely used to counter online radicalisation. Details: Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2014. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: RSIS Working Paper No. 283: Accessed November 20, 2014 at: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/WP283.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/WP283.pdf Shelf Number: 134170 Keywords: Cybercrime Extremism Extremist Groups Internet Radical Groups Radicalization

Author: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Title: Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach Summary: Terrorism is a denial of democracy and of human rights, which are at the very core of the OSCE. The OSCE participating States are determined to combat all acts of terrorism, without exception, as most serious crimes. States, through their police agencies in particular, have a duty to protect all individuals within their jurisdictions from terrorism, as part of their human rights obligations to guarantee the right to life, the right to security and other human rights and fundamental freedoms. This requires that they adopt a comprehensive approach to countering terrorism, with a particular focus on preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT), while upholding human rights and the rule of law. The effectiveness and legitimacy of the state's actions against terrorism will be undermined if the state, through any of its agencies, uses its power in violation of international human rights standards. As the police play a central role in countering terrorism, it is particularly crucial that the police be held accountable for their actions in order to ensure legitimacy, confidence, trust and support from the public. Radicalization is not a threat to society if it is not connected to violence or other unlawful acts, such as incitement to hatred, as legally defined in compliance with international human rights law. Radicalization can actually be a force for beneficial change. For instance, people advocating the abolition of slavery or who championed universal suffrage were at one time considered to be radical as they stood in opposition to the prevailing views in their societies. Terrorist radicalization is a dynamic process whereby an individual comes to accept terrorist violence as a possible, perhaps even legitimate, course of action. There is no single profile that encompasses all terrorists, nor is there a clear-cut pathway that leads individuals to terrorism. Possible drivers of terrorist radicalization are varied and complex and combine in a unique way in each case. Profiles built on stereotypical assumptions based on religion, race, ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status, etc. are not only discriminatory but are also ineffective. OSCE participating States firmly reject the identification of terrorism with any nationality, religion or ethnicity. Countering VERLT requires a sophisticated, comprehensive response. This should include both effective criminal-justice action, in compliance with international human rights standards and the rule of law, against those who incite others to terrorism and seek to recruit others for terrorism, and multidisciplinary efforts to address conditions that are conducive to terrorism. There are many issues, relevant but not specific to terrorism that need to be genuinely addressed, in their own right and without undue security bias. The police have a key role in the criminal-justice response to VERLT, but their role should be limited in proactive prevention efforts. The state has the obligation and primary responsibility to prevent and combat terrorism, as well as to respect and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, the state needs to draw on the support of society in general, including civil society and businesses, to successfully counter this phenomenon. OSCE participating States have acknowledged the usefulness of such joint efforts in the form of public-private partnerships in countering terrorism. There has been a growing recognition that the broader public and individual communities are stakeholders and partners in countering terrorism, rather than simply the passive object of law enforcement activities. Some OSCE participating States are developing community-oriented approaches to countering terrorism that emphasize public support and participation in order to increase accountability and effectiveness. These approaches consist of locally tailored and locally driven initiatives that draw on partnerships among a wide range of actors, beyond traditional security practitioners, to include other public authorities, as well as civil society organizations, businesses and/or the media. Details: Vienna: OSCE, 2014. 200p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2015 at: http://www.osce.org/atu/111438?download=true Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.osce.org/atu/111438?download=true Shelf Number: 134917 Keywords: Community-Policing Counter-terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists (Europe) Violent Extremism

Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Thinking Outside the Box: Exploring the Critical Roles of Sports, Arts, and Culture in Preventing Violent Extremism Summary: Unlike traditional law-enforcement and military responses to terrorism and conflict, countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts take a preventive approach aimed at reducing the appeal and recruiting potential of extremist groups. Recent attacks across the world, such as those in Ottawa and Sydney, for example, have highlighted concerns about smaller groups and individuals who may be acting with little or no formal association with a terrorist group. Consequently, preventive approaches that serve to enhance early identification and response capacities have gained greater traction. The relative youth of foreign fighters traveling from both Western and non-Western countries to Iraq and Syria has also highlighted the need for creative and innovative interventions. However, despite the increased emphasis on countering violent extremism by governments and international actors like the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), preventive approaches have continued to focus on measures associated with criminal justice, law enforcement, and legal responses. The use of sports, arts, and culture is sometimes considered by policymakers and practitioners as too peripheral to security issues and yet extremist groups effectively utilize them in their narratives and recruitment strategies. Efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism have sought increasingly to engage youth, communities, and marginalized groups, including women, and sports, arts, and culture offer much underutilized platforms to address the ideologies and root causes of violent extremism. As the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy notes, in the long term, such efforts "will be more important than our capacity to remove terrorists from the battlefield." To foster a more inclusive discourse on multidimensional approaches to preventing and addressing violent extremism, the Global Center on Cooperative Security and Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, have partnered on a series of workshops to bring together governments, practitioners, and experts to share lessons learned and best practices, as well as to inform the development and implementation of CVE policies and programs. One of these workshops, held at Hedayah in Abu Dhabi in May 2014, focused on the role of sports, arts, and culture in CVE efforts, particularly on the ways they might enhance educational initiatives to directly or indirectly contribute to CVE objectives. The workshop drew on, and complemented, other discussions that focused on the role of education and the roles of families and communities in countering violent extremism and enhancing community resilience, and projects focused on counternarratives and strategic communication, among others. This brief explores the history of cultural diplomacy and use of sports in conflict situations and draws on discussions at the May 2014 workshop, as well as desk research, to examine relevant lessons learned and good practices for integrating sports, arts, and culture into CVE efforts. It concludes with some practical policy and programming recommendations for policymakers and practitioners focusing on countering violent extremism. It is important to note that sports, arts, and cultural interventions for CVE purposes should take into consideration the local push and pull factors leading to radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism as well as the local context where these policies and programs will be carried out. That is, sports, arts, and cultural programming do not necessarily have to be specifically related to countering violent extremism, but this policy brief outlines ways in which sports, arts, and culture could be effectively integrated into CVE programming. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2015. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed April 25, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/15Feb17_SAC_Brief_Hedayah_GlobalCenter.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/15Feb17_SAC_Brief_Hedayah_GlobalCenter.pdf Shelf Number: 135391 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Sports Violence Preventions Violent Extremism

Author: Hamm, Mark Title: Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using Knowledge of Radicalization Pathways To Forge Prevention Strategies Summary: This research offers the largest and most comprehensive database ever created on lone wolf terrorism, along with a theory-informed case study component based on direct contact with imprisoned lone wolf terrorists, and a comparative analysis distinguishing lone wolves from those who undergo radicalization in a group setting. Strictly in terms of lethality, the data indicate that lone wolf terrorism in America is not on the rise. Although lone wolf terrorism may not be increasing, it is undergoing two important changes in modus operandi. First, uniformed police and military personnel have become the primary target of lone wolf terrorists. Second, consistent with the relaxation of U.S. gun laws since the 1990s and the recent trend in mass shootings, the lone wolf's preferred weaponry is now a staggering range of high-velocity firearms. While there is no standard profile of the lone wolf terrorist, most of them are unemployed, single white males with a criminal record. Compared to members of terrorist groups, lone wolves are older, less educated and more prone to mental illness. The study validates a series of commonalities associated with pathways to radicalization for lone wolf terrorists. The radicalization model indicates that lone wolf terrorism begins with a combination of personal and political grievances which form the basis for an affinity with online sympathizers. This is followed by the identification of an enabler, followed by the broadcasting of terrorist intent. The final commonality is a triggering event, or the catalyst for terrorism. The ability of law enforcement and intelligence communities to detect and prevent lone wolf terrorism demands a clear understanding of these radicalization processes. Such insight may provide investigators with a sort of detection system, or "signatures" - as minimal as they may appear-that an individual with a terrorist intent will demonstrate in preparing for an attack. Crucial to this understanding is the broadcasting of intent. While lone wolves physically isolate from society, at the same time they seek recognition for their causes through spoken statements and threats, manifestos, e-mail messages, texting and videotaped proclamations. Focusing on this kind of immediate objective of radicalization among lone wolves, rather than on their underlying grievances, may sharpen our focus on the dangers posed by lone wolf terrorism. Details: Terre Haute, IN: Indiana State University, 2015. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2015 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248691.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248691.pdf Shelf Number: 135540 Keywords: Homeland Security Lone Wolf Terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Euer, Katrin Title: Strengthening Resilience against Violent Radicalization (STRESAVIORA) Part I: Literature analysis Summary: Radicalization is a complex process. Former research pointed to the importance of multiple factors covering the social-, demographic- and psychological spheres. Furthermore, triggers like the deceasing of a family member or drastic events that circulate on (social) media, play an important part in the development of radical ideas. Especially youngsters and adolescents who are in the process of developing a social identity, are vulnerable to influences from charismatic role models or peers. In this report the results of the research on the process of violent radicalization are presented. During this research, our focus evolved from paying attention to deradicalization interventions and risk factors to prevent radicalization, to a mind set in which we became conscious that the focus should be on positive experiences, instead of fighting against situations we do not want to happen. An overview is given of risk factors as well as protective factors on several levels and related to different spheres in the process of violent radicalization. In the consulted literature, little has been written about protective factors, therefore our aim was to uncover these during the qualitative interviews. Instead of only focussing on aspects which should be banished, attention should be paid to hopes, wishes and dreams. Further, in this report an overview of promising practices concerning trainings for the enlargement of resilience among youths is presented. This research aims to prevent certain (radical) attitudes to develop. Although the process of involvement in radical movements or developing radical attitudes is difficult to grasp, some preventive strategies could be identified. Also, indicators to take into account for the design and evaluation of trainings are discussed, in order to hand out guidelines for the development of tools. There is no univocal answer to the question: which measure or intervention is the most effective and efficient. Yet, we state that a comprehensive, integrated approach is useful if combined with a focus on positive factors, in order to increase youngsters� resilience to prevent involvement in violent radicalization. Details: Brussels: Belgian Ministry of the Interior, 2015. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2015 at: http://www.bounce-resilience-tools.eu/sites/5092/files/content/download/files/stresaviora_research_report_part_1.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.bounce-resilience-tools.eu/sites/5092/files/content/download/files/stresaviora_research_report_part_1.pdf Shelf Number: 135542 Keywords: Radical Groups Radical Groups (Europe) Radicalization Terrorists Violence

Author: Hoffman, Bruce Title: (U) The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century Summary: (U) The FBI 9/11 Review Commission was established in January 2014 pursuant to a congressional mandate. The United States Congress directed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, or the "Bureau") to create a commission with the expertise and scope to conduct a "comprehensive external review of the implementation of the recommendations related to the FBI that were proposed by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (commonly known as the 9/11 Commission)." The Review Commission was tasked specifically to report on: 1. An assessment of the progress made, and challenges in implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission that are related to the FBI. 2. An analysis of the FBI's response to trends of domestic terror attacks since September 11, 2001, including the influence of domestic radicalization. 3. An assessment of any evidence not known to the FBI that was not considered by the 9/11 Commission related to any factors that contributed in any manner to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 4. Any additional recommendations with regard to FBI intelligence sharing and counterterrorism policy. (U) The Review Commission was funded Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2015. 128p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2015 at: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/protecting-the-homeland-in-the-21st-century Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/protecting-the-homeland-in-the-21st-century Shelf Number: 135549 Keywords: Domestic Terrrorism Federal Bureau of Investigation Homeland Security Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe Summary: In response to the recent surge in the number of American Muslims involved in terrorist activities, several agencies in the U.S. government have begun devising a comprehensive counter-radicalization strategy. In doing so, they are following the lead of certain European countries that have invested significant human, financial, and political capital in counter-radicalization programs. The challenges European authorities have had to face are similar to those their U.S. counterparts are expected to confront, and several lessons are at hand from the European experience. Summary The recent surge in the number of American Muslims involved in terrorism has led U.S. - authorities to question the long-held assumption that American Muslims are immune to radicalization, and to follow the example of other Western democracies in devising a comprehensive counter-radicalization strategy. Radicalization is a highly individualized process determined by the complex interaction of - various personal and structural factors. Because no one theory can exhaustively explain it, policymakers must understand the many paths to radicalization and adopt flexible approaches when trying to combat it. The role of religion in the radicalization process is debated, but theories that set aside - ideology and religion as factors in the radicalization of Western jihadists are not convincing. Policymakers who choose to tackle religious aspects should do so cautiously, however, cognizant of the many implications of dealing with such a sensitive issue. Policymakers need to determine whether a counter-radicalization strategy aims to tackle violent radicalism alone or, more ambitiously, cognitive radicalism. The relation between the two forms is contested. Challenging cognitive radicalism, though possibly useful for both security and social cohesion purposes, is extremely difficult for any Western democracy. Finding partners in the Muslim community is vital to any counter-radicalization program. - In light of the fragmentation of that community, a diverse array of partners appears to be the best solution. There is the risk, however, that counter-radicalization efforts could be perceived by Muslims as unfairly targeting them. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report: Accessed May 14, 2015 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR262%20-%20Countering_Radicalization_in_America.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR262%20-%20Countering_Radicalization_in_America.pdf Shelf Number: 135633 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization Programs Extremist Groups Homeland Security Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Briggs, Rachel Title: Policy Briefing: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online Summary: This report was commissioned by the Danish government and has been written by The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD). It draws on discussions and conclusions from three days of meetings in Copenhagen in June 2013 with a range of relevant stakeholders to discuss ways of tackling online extremism. Co-organised by the Danish government and ISD, these international meetings involved academics, practitioners, central and local government policy makers, intelligence agencies and representatives from the private technology sector. The purpose of this paper is not to summarise those discussions, but drawing on them to offer a framework and series of recommendations for the ways that governments should structure and resource their responses to online extremism. The report offers the following findings and recommendations for governments: Extremists and violent extremists are using the Internet and social media to inspire, radicalise and recruit young people to their cause, whether as passive supporters, active enthusiasts or those willing to become operational. Not enough has been done to date to tackle the use of the Internet and social media by extremists and violent extremists. Most effort has been focused on negative measures, such as take-downs and filtering. While this is important, more focus and resources need to be invested to enable the silent majority to be better equipped to see through extremist propaganda, take control of online spaces, and actively push back on extremist messages. There are three areas where government should focus its efforts: Strengthening digital literacy and critical consumption among young people i. Governments should support mainstream digital literacy and critical consumption programmes through state schools and also support provision through youth and community organisations; ii. Governments should support at arm's length projects working with at risk youth to deconstruct extremist messages Increasing counter-messaging, counter-narrative and alternative narrative activity: i. Government strategic communications need to be centralised and coordinated, either through a dedicated unit or by assigning lead status to a single unit or department ii. Governments need to be realistic about the challenges that limit their ability to play an active 'messenger' role in counter-narrative, apart from in limited circumstances. iii. Governments should make significant investments in funding non-governmental organisations able to offer credible alternatives. Building the capacity of credible messengers: i. Governments should make significant investments in building the skills and expertise of the most effective counter-messengers to build their capacity in technology, production, communications, and campaigning. ii. Governments should use their convening power to bring the private tech sector to the table as their expertise can help the voices of credible messengers. iii. Governments should fund centralised information gathering to provide economies of scale and ensure that effective counter-messengers have the information they need to work, such as analytics, audience profiling, and the sharing of good practice in alternative and counter-narratives. iv. Government must work multilaterally to pool resources in this area, taking an active role in streamlining the cross-border exchange of expertise and lessons learned in capacity building. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 14, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Inspire_Radicalize_Recruit.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Inspire_Radicalize_Recruit.pdf Shelf Number: 135638 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization Extremist Groups Online Extremism Radical Groups Radicalization Social Networks

Author: Ramalingam, Vidhya Title: Far-Right Extremism: Trends and Methods for Response and Prevention Summary: Far-right extremism is a diverse phenomenon. It is composed of movements and parties with different ideological tendencies, mobilising against different conceptions of 'the enemy', and using different methods to achieve their goals. For some, this involves the use of violence. A key challenge facing many European countries is one of definition. Across Europe, there is no consensus on what constitutes far-right extremism, and security agencies record violence from the extreme right in different ways. This has inhibited our ability to assess threat levels and compare trends across countries. Meanwhile, the media and public debate on the threat posed by the 'rise of the far right' remains confused in many ways. Only through a proper understanding of both violent and non-violent far-right movements and parties can policy makers work out where the problem lies, and therefore what to do about it. In other words, should we draw the line at the use of violence, or the spreading of intolerance? Are we concerned about the proliferation of radical right ideologies and narratives in mainstream politics and their impact on wider community relations, or about the potential for violence? And in terms of responses, can we separate the two? Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Policy_Briefing_-_Far_Right_Extremism_FINAL.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Policy_Briefing_-_Far_Right_Extremism_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 135684 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Butt, Riazat Title: European Counter-Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation: A Comparative Evaluation of Approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany Summary: This report is a comparative assessment of approaches to counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation within four countries from the European Policy Planners' Network (EPPN). It begins by setting out the definitions of key terms. It then provides an overview of the recent history of extremist violence and the approaches taken in tackling radicalisation and facilitating de-radicalisation in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany in order to contextualise the environment in which the programmes examined in the report operate. The report will then identify some of the key challenges and lessons that can be learned from the outcomes of policies and initiatives in this area. It is part of a larger project funded by the European Commission and is based on research and interviews conducted during visits to countries in question. Although this paper focuses primarily on four EPPN countries, the appendix contains case studies from elsewhere in Europe that offer valuable insights into other successful initiatives and programs in the field of counter-radicalisation. Although the countries focused on in this report are not diverse in terms of their geographical location, their approaches to the challenges presented by radicalisation vary considerably as do the security and socio-cultural environments that inform them. For example, the problems faced by Germany, a large federal state with a history of far-right and far-left terrorism, are quite different to those faced by its smaller neighbour the Netherlands. In addition to this the evidence base within these countries is strong, allowing for effective and in-depth comparisons. The way in which countries have been affected by extremism has a tangible impact on the formulation of policies and programmes designed to prevent or reduce the impact of radicalisation. Before evaluating the approaches to these issues taken in the four selected European countries, it is important to note that counter- and de-radicalisation policies and programmes cannot "simply be transplanted from one country to another, even within the same region. They have to develop organically in a specific country and culture." Despite this, by evaluating the strategies and initiatives in their various national contexts it is possible to identify certain elements of good practice that could potentially inform policy and practice elsewhere. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/De-radicalisation_final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/De-radicalisation_final.pdf Shelf Number: 135685 Keywords: De-radicalization Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Ramalingam, Vidhya Title: Old Threat, New Approach: Tackling the Far Right Across Europe. Guide for policy makers Summary: Several recent events have focused attention on the growing dangers posed by the far right in Europe. In October 2013, Ukrainian born Pavlo Lapshyn was convicted of racially-motivated murder and for plotting a campaign of terror against mosques in the UK. In May 2013 commenced the trial of Beate Zschape, the only surviving member of the National Socialist Underground (NSU), a far-right terrorist group which has been linked to a series of murders of immigrants, the murder of a policewoman and the attempted murder of her colleague, the 2001 and 2004 Cologne bombings and 14 bank robberies. In August 2012, Anders Behring Breivik was convicted for the murder of 77 people in twin terrorist attacks in Norway. Security agencies such as Europol have documented heightened levels of right-wing extremist activity across a number of countries in Europe. While such high-profile and high impact events hit the headlines, the bulk of the threat posed by the far right is felt through smaller-scale localised harassment, intimidation and bullying by extremists targeting minority communities. The dichotomy between national security and community safety means that, as a result, far-right extremism tends to be relegated to a second tier security threat, even though its impact is felt on a daily basis by individuals and communities across Europe. Far-right extremism takes a number of forms. There are four main types of agents: youth gangs, white power and skinhead groups; terrorist cells and lone actors; political movements and paramilitary groups; and nativist, identitarian and anti-Islam movements. They engage in a wide range of activities: spontaneous hate crime, vandalism and hooliganism; street demonstrations; shock tactics; hate speech and incitement; and planned hate crime and terrorism. Though often rooted in its local context, far-right extremism has impacts across borders. Groups and methods in one country are often mirrored elsewhere, and online connectivity is making this more common. There is also evidence of cooperation between national groups and the pooling of knowledge and expertise. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISD_New_Approach_Far_Right_Report.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISD_New_Approach_Far_Right_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 135686 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Ramalingam, Vidhya Title: On the Front Line. A guide to countering far-right extremism Summary: Far-right extremism remains a worrying problem across Europe. The most visible cases are those that hit the headlines, such as the discovery of the National Socialist Underground in Germany or Anders Behring Breivik's attacks in Norway. In the past decade, both Hungary and Sweden were hit by a string of serial murders of Roma and ethnic minorities. Though attacks of this magnitude and scale remain rare, they are not unheard of. In some cases, those personally touched by these violent attacks are still fighting for justice. While high-profile and high-impact events hit the headlines, the bulk of the threat posed by the far right is felt through smaller-scale localised harassment, bullying and hate crime by extremists targeting minority communities. These kinds of incidences often go undetected, and indeed they are hard to quantify. They manifest in the sectioning off of some local areas as no-go zones for ethnic minorities, graffiti of far-right symbols on mosques and synagogues, or threats received by individual members of the community. Those carrying out these actions - far-right extremists - are a broad group, ranging from less ideological youth street gangs to neo-Nazi terrorist cells, anti-Islam activists and registered political parties. Though they differ in their aims and methods, there are some defining features: racism, xenophobia, ultra-nationalism and authoritarianism. The actions they take aim to intimidate and assert power over particular communities and undermine democracy. In some countries, the capacity for violence within the far right is on the rise, and it remains challenging to ascertain at what point ideology can turn to violence. With the proliferation of extremist content online, and the ease with which anyone can access communities advocating violence across the web, this challenge has only grown. There are thousands of front-line professionals across Europe who come face-to-face with this issue on a regular basis, whether it is those working specifically on countering violent extremism, or those who encounter the far right as part of their daily responsibilities policing communities or educating young people. Though European countries differ on the particular problems they face and the ways in which they address them, there are more commonalities than differences when it comes to specific challenges posed by the far right. Front-line professionals and local communities often develop innovative solutions to these challenges, though these rarely make headlines or send ripples beyond the community immediately affected. This project aims to change this. This is one of the first projects aiming to enhance understanding of what works in prevention, intervention and response to far-right extremism across Europe. It has developed a package of resources which include ISD's report Old Threat, New Approach: Tackling the Far Right Across Europe which sets out government approaches to far-right extremism and provides guidance to policymakers, as well as an online platform called The FREE Initiative - Far-Right Extremism in Europe (www.theFREEinitative.com), which aims to inspire and connect those tackling the far right and showcase best practices. This is a practical guide for front-line professionals and activists. It is based on the collective experiences of over 120 individuals tackling far-right extremism across 10 countries (Sweden, UK, the Netherlands, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Slovak Republic). This includes both governmental and non-governmental professionals coming into contact with far-right individuals or those who are impacted by them, on a daily basis. These professionals are thus in a unique position to influence those within or vulnerable to far-right extremism, and limit their impact. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/On_The_Front_Line_Far_RightHANDBOOK.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/On_The_Front_Line_Far_RightHANDBOOK.pdf Shelf Number: 135709 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Radicalization Extremist Groups Radical Groups Violent Extremists

Author: Global Center on Cooperative Security Title: Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Community Resilience in the Greater Horn of Africa Summary: This report outlines ideas for strategies, programs, and initiatives that can be implemented to prevent and counter violent extremism in the Greater Horn of Africa and increase human security and community resilience. Suggestions include training officials and frontline practitioners to enhance their engagement with communities, improving service delivery and reform of the security and criminal justice sectors, introducing disengagement and reintegration programs, promoting subregional cooperation and information sharing, fostering youth leadership, engaging the media and the private sector, and strengthening the capacity of and engagement with civil society actors. The recommendations are targeted towards (1) states in the subregion; (2) subregional, regional, and international actors, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union, the East African Community, the European Union, the United Nations, and the Global Counterterrorism Forum; and (3) civil society actors, the private sector, and the media. The Action Agenda stresses the importance of holistic and inclusive approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism that involve a range of actors, including states in the subregion, partner governments, and international and multilateral actors, as well as regional, subregional, and nongovernmental organizations. With an eye toward increasing the sustainability and impact of programs aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism, it advises to build on initiatives that are already in place in the Greater Horn of Africa and ensure that current and future activities are embedded in ongoing efforts that aim to build capacity across the criminal justice, security, and development sectors. The ideas proposed in this Action Agenda were developed by the Global Center, based on existing experiences and practices in the Greater Horn of Africa as well as consultations with various stakeholders. An earlier draft of the Action Agenda was circulated at the Global Counterterrorism Forum's Horn of Africa Working Group in March 2015. This report has been made possible by the generous support of the governments of Norway and Turkey. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security , 2015. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/HoA_Action_Agenda_Low_Res.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/HoA_Action_Agenda_Low_Res.pdf Shelf Number: 135838 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Violent Extremism Violent Groups

Author: Global Center on Cooperative Security Title: Strengthening Rule of Law Responses to Counter Violent Extremism: What Role for Civil Society in South Asia? Summary: Across South Asia, civil society has made important contributions to enhancing rule of law based efforts to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism. Their roles as advocates, monitors, technical experts, trainers, service providers, and information hubs complement the efforts of law enforcement and security actors, and many opportunities exist for partnerships. Civil society actors have also played an important role in promoting development, improved governance and human rights in the region, and in promoting a resilient social contract between citizens and the state. This policy brief reflects on these contributions and explores opportunities for civil society to support cooperative regional efforts to respond to terrorism and violent extremism in the region. It draws largely from a workshop on "Strengthening Rule of Law-Based Responses to Terrorism and Violent Extremism in South Asia: What Role for Civil Society?" organized by the Global Center, in partnership with the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) at the National University of Singapore and The Institute for Inclusive Security. Following an overview of the limitations and challenges faced by civil society actors in the region, it offers a set of recommendations for policymakers and practitioners with a view to informing the design and implementation of programming to prevent violent extremism and terrorism in South Asia. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2015. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed June 1, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/May-2015_Strengthening-Rule-of-Law-Responses-to-Counter-Violent-Extremism3.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Asia URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/May-2015_Strengthening-Rule-of-Law-Responses-to-Counter-Violent-Extremism3.pdf Shelf Number: 135839 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Tabib, Rafaa Title: Stealing the revolution: violence and predation in Libya Summary: The success of Libya's 2011 revolution has given way to political disarray, an institutional vacuum, and an extraordinary proliferation of non-state and quasi-state armed groups operating across the country. However, rather than pursuing political or ideological objectives, these groups increasingly focus on resource predation. Through an empirical study of various axes of violence in contemporary Libya, this report highlights the critical role played by criminal accumulation, land grabs, and protection rackets in the actions of tribal militias and jihadist groups, and in the fighting that has blighted one major urban hub. Whereas conventional representations of Libya's post-revolutionary period dwell on the political battle between Islamists and secular forces, the report suggests that the cause of the country�s increasing levels of armed violence can be found in the absence of a functional state and the fragmentation of local, tribal, ethnic and ideological forces, which together make the violent acquisition of material resources essential to group survival. Details: Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center, 2014. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 3, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Tabib_Clingendael_NOREF_Stealing%20the%20revoulution_Violence%20and%20predation%20in%20Libya_October%202014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Libya URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Tabib_Clingendael_NOREF_Stealing%20the%20revoulution_Violence%20and%20predation%20in%20Libya_October%202014.pdf Shelf Number: 135869 Keywords: Crime Criminal Violence Natural Resource Offenses Against the Environment Radical Groups

Author: Cheong, Damien Title: Western Muslim Converts and Violent Extremism: Issues and Strategies Summary: This commentary discusses Muslim converts in the West who are becoming involved in violent extremism and contends that community intervention and supportive counseling for converts could help prevent radicalism among such individuals. Islam, like many other religions, is not monolithic; "its form and expression vary from one Muslim to another and from group to group". For example, Indonesian Islam, while sharing similar tenets with say Pakistani Islam, is still different in many fundamental ways. This plurality can cause confusion in the convert, and in some cases, alienation, if the convert, while Muslim, is still excluded because he/she belongs to a different ethnic group. In fact a 2013 Oxford Analytica report identified feelings of personal emptiness and social isolation as a major causal factor of radicalization among Muslim converts. The study also argued that the resentment of "modernity, globalization and secular society"; the absence of formal education and training in Islamic doctrine and theology; and the interpretation of "Islamic ideology as a form of protest" were key push factors toward radicalization. The study found that "radicalization is usually the result of social interaction; it is less common for converts to self-radicalize in isolation. The process, which involves the convert developing a more extreme interpretation of his/her faith to legitimize or justify violence, generally takes months or years". It is for these reasons that increased psychological and community support for converts is necessary as it can enable them to become more knowledgeable about their new faith, more confident about their place in the world, and most importantly, more discerning about alternative interpretations of religious doctrine. Details: Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), 2014. 3p. Source: Internet Resource: RSIS Commentary: Accessed June 4, 2015 at: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cens/co14242-western-muslim-converts-and-violent-extremism-issues-and-strategies/#.VXChWU9FDcs Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cens/co14242-western-muslim-converts-and-violent-extremism-issues-and-strategies/#.VXChWU9FDcs Shelf Number: 135911 Keywords: Extremist Groups Muslims Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Behr, Ines von Title: Radicalisation in the digital era: the use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism Summary: This paper presents the results from exploratory primary research into the role of the internet in the radicalisation of 15 terrorists and extremists in the UK. In recent years, policymakers, practitioners and the academic community have begun to examine how the internet influences the process of radicalisation: how a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism associated with terrorism. This study advances the evidence base in the field by drawing on primary data from a variety of sources: evidence presented at trial, computer registries of convicted terrorists, interviews with convicted terrorists and extremists, as well as police senior investigative officers responsible for terrorist investigations. The 15 cases were identified by the research team together with the UK Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and UK Counter Terrorism Units (CTU). The research team gathered primary data relating to five extremist cases (the individuals were part of the Channel programme, a UK government intervention aimed at individuals identified by the police as vulnerable to violent extremism), and ten terrorist cases (convicted in the UK), all of which were anonymised. Our research supports the suggestion that the internet may enhance opportunities to become radicalised and provide a greater opportunity than offline interactions to confirm existing beliefs. However, our evidence does not necessarily support the suggestion that the internet accelerates radicalisation or replaces the need for individuals to meet in person during their radicalisation process. Finally, we didn't find any supporting evidence for the concept of self-radicalisation through the internet. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf Shelf Number: 136018 Keywords: Extremist Groups Internet Crime Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Combating Terrorism: State Should Evaluate Its Countering Violent Extremism Program and Set Time Frames for Addressing Evaluation Recommendations Summary: Terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a global threat, and combating them remains a top priority for the U.S. government. State leads and coordinates U.S. efforts to counter terrorism abroad. State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism was elevated to bureau status in 2012 with the aim of enhancing State's ability to counter violent extremism, build partner counterterrorism capacity, and improve coordination. GAO was asked to review the effects of this change and the new bureau's efforts. This report examines (1) how the bureau's staffing resources have changed since 2011, (2) the extent to which the bureau has assessed its performance since 2011, and (3) the extent to which the bureau's coordination with U.S. government entities on selected programs is in line with key collaboration practices. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed and analyzed State and other U.S. government agency information and interviewed U.S. government officials in Washington, D.C. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of State take steps to (1) ensure that CVE program efforts abroad are evaluated and (2) establish time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. State concurred with both of GAO's recommendations. State indicated that it was currently assessing which programs would benefit from a third-party evaluation and that it would commit to setting a timetable for reviewing each recommendation by a third-party evaluator. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2015. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-15-684: Accessed July 29, 2015 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671557.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671557.pdf Shelf Number: 136242 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Pantucci, Raffaello Title: From Boko Haram to Ansaru: The Evolution of Nigerian Jihad Summary: Its orchestration of several major incidents - including the kidnapping of nearly 300 girls from their school in Chibok in Borno State - has sparked national, regional and international responses. The character of these counter-operations, however, has relied overwhelmingly on a military approach unable to defeat a resilient Boko Haram. Nigeria's forceful approach reflects rash decision-making founded neither on a considered strategy nor a thorough understanding of the target group. Drawing on the wide-ranging body of existing literature, this report examines the evolution of Boko Haram from its inception to its modern iteration, deconstructing its supposed cohesive ideology and chain of command. Rather than a single unit, Boko Haram is best considered as falling along a spectrum, with an ideology as fluid and flexible as its relationships with similar jihadist groups, including Ansaru - a breakaway faction with perhaps a close relationship to the core. The report examines how the ideological narratives championed by the key leaders of Boko Haram have shaped the group's present-day structure and tactics and a military approach alone is insufficient to defeat the group. With a newly-elected government, Nigeria has the opportunity to address the Boko Haram threat effectively, but true success will rely on a solid understanding and appreciation of this elusive and resilient opponent. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201504_OP_From_Boko_Haram_to_Ansaru_web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: Shelf Number: 136368 Keywords: Boko Haram Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Exxtremism

Author: Edwards, Charlie Title: Out of Reach? The Role of Community Policing in Preventing Terrorism in Canada Summary: When the Kanishka project was being designed in 2010, there was a widespread perception both within Canada and internationally that the country had largely managed to avoid the threat from Al-Qa'ida-inspired terrorism. While there had been one or two isolated cases, these were rare exceptions. Canadian government officials rightly described the threat picture in Canada as 'limited' in comparison with European states and the country's next door neighbour, the US, where attacks directed by Al-Qa'ida had been successful or had reached a mature stage in planning. In contrast, the domestic threat picture in Canada was relatively benign. During the fieldwork phase the authors found this view to be largely still accepted by politicians, law-enforcement practitioners and the public at large. What was interesting to the authors, however, was that this view - influenced by events in Canada and overseas - was changing. A few cases of predominantly Islamist terrorism with links to Canada had appeared over the years. These cases involved, for example, Ahmed Ressam and Momin Khawaja, two individuals with Canadian passports (indeed, Khawaja is Canadian-born). They had connected with elements close to Al-Qaiida and had been involved in planning attacks at the international level, but neither had planned to launch terrorist attacks within Canada itself. A more 'home-grown' threat appeared to emerge in 2006, when Canada's security and intelligence agencies uncovered the so-called 'Toronto 18' cell; their ambitious plans were the first expression of a maturing and purely domestic threat, seeking connections through a network of young radicals across Europe and North America. The plot was successfully disrupted before it reached fruition. Shortly before the publication of this report, the situation changed dramatically as Canada experienced two significant incidents of domestic lone-actor terrorism. On 22 October 2014, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed a soldier at the Canadian National War Memorial in Ottawa; police exchanged fire and eventually shot dead the gunman inside the parliament building. Two days earlier, Martin Couture-Rouleau had deliberately driven a car into a group of Canadian soldiers in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, killing one and injuring others. Both individuals are thought to have been recent converts to Islam who had become radicalised. Prior to these events, the last major attack that had directly involved Canadian citizens with links to the homeland was the bombing on 23 June 1985 of Air India Flight 182 when Sikh extremists killed 329 people - the majority of whom were Canadian citizens flying from Toronto. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201502_op_out_of_reach.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Canada URL: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201502https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201502_op_out_of_reach.pdf Shelf Number: 136369 Keywords: Community Policing Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Homeland Security Radical Groups Radicalization

Author: Ahmadi, Belquis Title: Afghan Youth and Extremists: Why Are Extremists' Narratives So Appealing? Summary: Four decades of political instability, violent conflict, and socioeconomic crisis has had a devastating impact on Afghanistan and its citizens. As this Peace Brief explains, understanding the process of radicalization and the drivers of violent extremism is vital to designing effective counterstrategies. Summary - Afghanistan's population is among the world's youngest and fastest growing: half its population is under eighteen and more than three-quarters under forty. - The need is dire for strategies and policies to respond to the largest and fastest-growing segment of the population and to enable these citizens to meaningfully engage in their country's affairs. - Many young men are frustrated with real and perceived injustice, regular and observable impunity and corruption, and lack of basic infrastructure and community support facilities. - All those who want to learn more about radical and violent extremist ideologies do not necessarily become violent extremists. - Violent extremist groups such as the Taliban use traditional and modern media tools and platforms to lure youth into jihad. - Being proactively opposed to extremism not only undermines the appeal of such messages but also offers alternative narratives. - To address grievances appropriately, the international community must continue to provide assistance to the Afghan state on fundamental issues, such as corruption and rule of law. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2015. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief No. 188: Accessed August 19, 2015 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB188-Afghan-Youth-and-Extremists.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB188-Afghan-Youth-and-Extremists.pdf Shelf Number: 136458 Keywords: Extremism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremists

Author: Ginkel, Bibi T. van Title: Responding to cyber jihad: towards an effective counter narrative Summary: "Who is in control of the narrative?" is the mantra that now echoes in the hallways of the EU's headquarters in Brussels. Spurred in part by large-scale jihadist propaganda, approximately 20,000 people from 50 countries have joined the fight in Iraq and Syria. So far, authorities in their countries of origin have not been able to address the jihadist radicalisation messages transmitted via the internet and social media. Many new initiatives were recently announced, however, including the establishment of a European counter-narrative centre in Brussels. In this research paper, ICCT Research Fellow Dr. Bibi van Ginkel analyses the role of the internet and social media in processes of radicalisation. It offers an outline of the various aspects of the jihadist narrative, in order better to understand what message needs to be countered. The counter-actions against this cyber jihad can take different forms. Parallel to the way in which advertisement campaigns are tailored to sell products to a certain target group, strategic communication should take into account how a number of recurring elements play a role in the counter-messaging. The understanding of who the target group is, what jihadist narrative is used and how that message can be countered, who the credible messenger should be, and what medium can best be used to deliver the message are all relevant questions that can only be answered in a context-specific manner. The report concludes with several recommendations on how the recently announced new European counter-narrative centre can effectively contribute to the already diverse landscape of counter-narrative initiatives. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2015. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed August 19, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Responding_to_Cyber_Jihad_2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Responding_to_Cyber_Jihad_2015.pdf Shelf Number: 136490 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Keen, David Title: Dilemmas of counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding. A discussion paper Summary: Security threats defined as stemming from 'terrorism' or 'rogue regimes' have significant public profile, and have led to responses from different branches of government. In tackling these threats - through counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding - a 'mainstream' approach has evolved, which involves defining conflicts in a way that designates some actors as 'spoiler(s)' (i.e. 'terrorists', 'radicalised groups', etc.) and proceeds to address such conflicts by opposing 'spoilers' in partnership with whatever allies can be found. The paper begins from the assumption that counter-terrorism, stabilisation and statebuilding approaches - while distinct from each other, and different in different contexts - are linked in important ways, and have followed a discernible pattern in recent decades as part of what we describe here as the 'mainstream' approach. This typically involves use of military force, generally combined with - or followed by - some kind of 'stabilisation' or 'statebuilding' effort. This can involve negotiating a pragmatic 'deal' with influential actors (with a willingness to overlook the limitations of allies), which reinforces those actors included in the deal while continuing to use force against 'spoilers'. However, as the recent past illustrates, this approach has not proven to have had sustainable success; here we examine the drawbacks of this position and propose alternatives to the mainstream. In this paper, David Keen and Larry Attree discuss how the international community has tried to counter terror, achieve stability, build states and foster peace around the world. It examines whether these objectives and approaches are being pursued effectively and coherently and whether there are contradictions between them. It is based on a review of relevant literature, is not exhaustive in scope, and is intended to stimulate debate among the policy actors and practitioners engaged in these approaches. Details: London: Saferworld, 2015. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 20, 2015 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/875-dilemmas-of-counter-terror-stabilisation-and-statebuilding Year: 2015 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 136504 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Great Britain. Prime Minister's Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism Title: Tackling Extremism in the UK Summary: The UK deplores and will fight terrorism of every kind, whether based on Islamist, extreme right-wing or any other extremist ideology. We will not tolerate extremist activity of any sort, which creates an environment for radicalising individuals and could lead them on a pathway towards terrorism. The killing of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich was the impetus to look closely at whether the government was doing all it could to confront extremism and radicalisation. We know that the international terrorist threat to the UK comes primarily from those people who are inspired by Al Qa'ida's distorted interpretation of Islam and use that as justification for killing innocent people. But we must tackle extremism of all kinds, including the Islamophobia and neo-Nazism espoused by the murderer of Mohammed Saleem to justify his terrorist attacks against mosques in the West Midlands. The Prime Minister set up the Extremism Task Force to identify any areas where our current approach was lacking and to agree practical steps to fight against all forms of extremism. We have made progress since this government came to power. We have removed over 18,000 items of online terrorist propaganda and intervened more often than ever before to limit the opportunities for hate preachers to spread their messages. But we recognise that we can and should do more. This response is broader than dealing only with those who espouse violence - we must confront the poisonous extremist ideology that can lead people to violence; which divides communities and which extremists use to recruit individuals to their cause; which runs counter to fundamental British values such as freedom of speech, democracy and equal rights; which says that 'the West' is at war with Islam and that it is not possible to be a true Muslim and to live an integrated life in the UK. Details: London: HM Government, 2013. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 28, 2015 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263181/ETF_FINAL.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263181/ETF_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 136617 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization

Author: International Crisis Group Title: Revisiting Counter-terrorism Strategies in Pakistan: Opportunities and Pitfalls Summary: The 16 December 2014 attack on an army-run school in Peshawar, which killed 150, mainly children, claimed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan-TTP), was ostensibly a game changer. A week later, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) government unveiled a new counter-terrorism strategy, the twenty-point National Action Plan (NAP), with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief Raheel Sharif vowing to target all terror groups without distinction. Six months later, amid continued terror attacks, the NAP looks far more like a hastily-conceived wish-list devised for public consumption during a moment of crisis than a coherent strategy. Reliance on blunt instruments and lethal force to counter terrorism risks doing more harm than good when they undermine constitutionalism, democratic governance and the rule of law and provide grist to the jihadis' propaganda mill. A reformed and strengthened criminal justice system is pivotal to countering terror threats and containing violent extremism. The militarisation of counter-terrorism policy puts at risk Pakistan's evolution toward greater civilian rule, which is itself a necessary but not sufficient condition to stabilise the democratic transition. While the report addresses the coercive side of a counter-terrorism policy and how to make it more efficient, without structural and governance reform, the root causes of terrorism and extremism will remain unaddressed, and violent jihadis will continue to exploit the absence of rule of law. The military's continual undermining of civilian authority since democracy's restoration in 2008 will remain a major challenge to meaningful and sustained reform. Yet, the political leadership also bears responsibility for failing to push back and, as a result, undermining its credibility and authority. After inaugurating the NAP on 24 December, the Sharif government implemented two major demands of the military without delay: lifting the predecessor government's 2008 moratorium on the death penalty; and passing on 6 January 2015 the 21st constitutional amendment, empowering special military courts to try all terrorism suspects, including civilians. Yet, the vast majority of the 176 executions since late December have been for crimes unrelated to terrorism, and the military courts weaken constitutional protections and due process. Other newly-created parallel structures, including provincial "apex committees", enable the military to bypass representative institutions and play a more direct role in governance. Armed with new legal tools, the military has further marginalised civilian institutions in devising and implementing counterterrorism policy. Despite claims to the contrary, the military, which has almost complete control over national security and counter-terrorism policy, also still distinguishes between "bad" jihadi groups, those targeting the security forces, and "good" jihadi groups, those perceived to promote its strategic objectives in India and Afghanistan. Anti-India outfits such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD), the renamed version of the banned Lashkare- Tayyaba (LeT), have even expanded their activities through so-called charity fronts. Military-backed Afghan insurgents, such as the Haqqani Network, have not been targeted in ongoing operations in the North Waziristan agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Instead, the Haqqanis, like the LeT/JD, have been kept off Pakistan's list of terrorist groups. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2015. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 271: Accessed August 31, 2015 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf Shelf Number: 136632 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Tahiri, Hussein Title: Community and Radicalisation: An examination of perceptions, ideas, beliefs and solutions throughout Australia Summary: Community and Radicalisation: an Examination of Perceptions, Ideas, Beliefs and Solutions throughout Australia was a year-long national study designed and conducted as a qualitative research project through a partnership between Victoria Police, Victoria University and the Australian Multicultural Foundation. The key aims of the study were: - To identify how communities understand the meanings of and relationship between radicalisation and extremism. - To explore community perceptions of the underlying drivers for radicalization and extremism. - To explore perceptions of the impact of radicalization and extremism on sense of community and social harmony and cohesion. - To solicit community views about effective approaches to and solutions for eliminating or reducing the threat of violent extremism in Australia. - To provide an evidence base for community views and perceptions that can inform and support the development of effective policies and strategies to counter radicalisation and extremism in Australia. Details: Melbourne: Victoria University and Victoria Police, 2013. 140p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 5, 2015 at: http://www.vu.edu.au/sites/default/files/ccdw/pdfs/community-and-radicalisation.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Australia URL: http://www.vu.edu.au/sites/default/files/ccdw/pdfs/community-and-radicalisation.pdf Shelf Number: 136689 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Stys, Yvonne Title: Violent Extremists in Federal Institutions: Estimating Radicalization and Susceptibility to Radicalization in the Federal Offender Population Summary: There is a growing recognition of the need to understand and address violent extremist threats in Western countries. Given that the majority of research in this area has been conducted on nonoffender populations outside of Canada, there is a need to better understand the scope, nature, and process of radicalization in Canada. In recognition of the fact that the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) is in a position to contribute to addressing this gap, Public Safety Canada entered into a Letter of Agreement with the CSC to produce a report focused on CSC's data holdings on and estimation of violent extremism. This report summarizes the data holdings and gaps in the area, as well as the results of three studies focused on the examination and estimation of radicalization and susceptibility to radicalization of offenders under CSC's jurisdiction. The first study was a qualitative examination of the unique characteristics of offenders who are radicalized and who are susceptible to radicalization, from the perspective of operational staff. Based on data collected at a total of 10 focus groups involving institutional and community security and front-line staff from each of CSC's five regions, a number of themes emerged. Participants recognized the complex, multi-faceted nature of radicalization, and identified a wide range of behaviours indicative of radicalization or susceptibility to radicalization. In most cases, responses (e.g., vocalization of shared grievance, changes in religion) were consistent with the literature, though staff also suggested unique responses. Staff also drew attention to areas of possible improvement. The second study was a quantitative examination of differences between radicalized and nonradicalized offenders. Informed by literature and by the results of study 1, radicalized and nonradicalized offenders were compared on a wide variety of variables which could be measured using administrative data. There were many areas where radicalized offenders were found to differ from other offenders, including ethnicity and citizenship, education and employment, substance abuse history, previous contact with the criminal justice system, and characteristics of their offence(s). The data suggested that, in some ways, radicalized offenders may be more similar to radicalized individuals in the community than to other offenders. The third study involved a theory-drive attempt to identify constructs associated with susceptibility to radicalization. Based on a literature and data review, frequency analysis of variables, and principle component analysis, nine constructs were identified and explored. Though considerable additional work is required to confirm the role and nature of these constructs in influencing susceptibility, this study represents an important first step in this endeavour. Together, the three studies have allowed the CSC to contribute to the evidence base surrounding violent extremism in Canada. The results of these studies may also inform institutional operations and policies at CSC. They consistently demonstrate the need for additional research focused on population management for radicalized offenders, with a particular need for research focused on effective interventions for this group. Details: Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada, 2015. 130p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. R-313: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cn34475-eng.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cn34475-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 136785 Keywords: Extremist Groups Inmates Prisoners Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremists

Author: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) Title: Prison Problems: Planned and Unplanned Releases of Convicted Extremists in Indonesia Summary: Many convicted Indonesian terrorists will be released over the next several years after serving time in prison. he Indonesian government has little capacity at present to provide adequate post-release monitoring, although it is taking some steps to remedy this. Under the circumstances, how much of a security risk do these releases pose? he answer is probably not as much as some people fear; the recidivism rate for convicted extremists remains low. he problem is that systems are not yet in place to keep track of individuals who are considered potential problems. Any evaluation of risk must take several factors into account. One is the numbers involved. In early 2013, articles appeared in the regional media suggesting that 300 prisoners were due for release by the end of 2014. he National Anti-Terror Agency (Badan Nasional Penganggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) later stated the real figure was only 39. A more reasonable estimate is about 80 releases in 2013-2014, some of which have already taken place, with over 100 more in 2015-2016. No one has exact data, however, and accurate predictions are close to impossible. A second factor is the prison experience of those scheduled for release. It is simply not possible to assess risk on the basis of the activities that led to their convictions. Some of the men that might have been judged most dangerous appear to have modified their views and behavior; others who might have seemed low risk have grown more militant because of associations made in prison. Which way an individual turns may depend less on government "deradicalisation" programs -- although interventions that provide status and income can help -- than on the nature and influence of fellow inmates and connections maintained on the outside. In general, senior JI leaders tend to exert a moderating influence, whereas those who follow radical preacher Aman Abdurrahman are likely to keep the level of militancy high. Other factors can also come into play, including the degree to which inmates can mix with ordinary criminal offenders. he problem of released prisoners does not relate just to those charged with terrorism but also to others they may have recruited. he largest cluster of repeat offenders among convicted extremists consists of men whose first offense had nothing to do with terrorism. The riot in Tanjung Gusta prison, Medan, on 11 July 2013 was a reminder that in thinking about scheduled releases, one should think of unscheduled ones, too, even if the number of terrorist escapes over the last decade has been remarkably low. Overcrowding, understaffing and the poor physical condition of many Indonesian prisons combine to produce escapes of ordinary criminals so frequently that it is a wonder that not more extremists make the attempt. To address these risks, improving the capacity of the Indonesian corrections system to analyse and respond to developments in prison is essential. It is also important for the government as a whole to recognize the need for improved post-release monitoring and allocate the necessary resources to put a better system in place. Managing convicted extremists goes to two much larger issues, however. One is overall prison reform: the government acknowledges that the prison system as a whole is in a state of crisis and the Corrections Directorate with the Law and Human Rights Ministry has been receptive to donor assistance in trying to address it. The second is the spread of extremist teachings in a way that generates new groups of young radicals convinced that violence is the way to address injustice, religious deviance and vice. Until the government does more to address this much more sensitive problem, the best monitoring program in the world will be of limited value. Details: Indonesia: IPAC, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: IPAC Report No. 2: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/Indonesia_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/Indonesia_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 129777 Keywords: Deradicalization Prisoners Radical Groups Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Haque, Raheem Ul Title: Youth Radicalization in Pakistan Summary: Amid the serious threat of extremism within Pakistan's large young adult population, author Raheem ul Haque explores the process of youth radicalization and recommends how policymakers can best confront the growing challenge. Summary -- - Pakistani leaders face serious domestic extremism challenges; more than 47,000 thousand lives have been lost in terrorism-related violence in Pakistan over the past decade. - Effective counter-radicalization processes must take into account Pakistan's large young adult population (ages 15-29), which collectively accounts for at least 30 percent of the overall population. - Youth radicalization in Pakistan can be understood as the product of an exclusively Islamic identity - meaning a majority of youth identify primarily through their religion over nationality - combined with a broader reactive movement comprised of militant, political and missionary organizations. - A variety of religious, political and militant organizations operating within Pakistan, some with the tacit or active support of the state, have fostered an enabling environment for radicalization and at times violent action. Some groups provide forums for interaction and connections with more militant actors, while others carry out the whole range of social, political and violent activity. - When radical groups can popularize an exclusive Islamic or sectarian identity, even nonviolent organizations can become connected or aligned with more radical organizations and concepts. - Confronting youth radicalization in Pakistan requires a holistic approach that supports political, social and educational alternatives to exclusionary Islamic identities, reducing the space for groups that espouse violence in the name of an exclusive Islamic identity. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014. 5p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief 167: Accessed September 21, 2015 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB%20167_Youth_Radicalization_in_Pakistan.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB%20167_Youth_Radicalization_in_Pakistan.pdf Shelf Number: 136849 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Youth Violence

Author: Zeiger, Sara Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Developing an evidence-base for policy and practice Summary: This volume reports on the range of papers presented at the Annual Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Research Conference 2014 from 7-8 December 2014 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. The Conference was organized and hosted by Hedayah (the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism), Curtin University, People Against Violent Extremism (PaVE), and the Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). The Conference was also sponsored in part by the European Commission and the United States Department of State. The event was attended by approximately 100 academics, practitioners and policymakers from over 25 countries. The 2014 CVE Research Conference follows from the inaugural CVE Symposium hosted by Curtin University, PaVE, Macquarie University and Hedayah in Perth, Australia in 2013. As the first of its kind in the region, the 2013 Symposium brought together national and international scholars, practitioners, policymakers and former extremists to discuss and debate the current state and future directions for CVE. The intention for the CVE Research Conference is to be an annual event at which the yearly highlights of cutting-edge CVE research and innovation can be presented to academics, researchers, practitioners and policymakers on a global scale. Details: Perth, WA, AUS: Curtin University, 2015. 159p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 24, 2015 at: http://www.hedayah.ae/pdf/cve-edited-volume.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: http://www.hedayah.ae/pdf/cve-edited-volume.pdf Shelf Number: 136857 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremists Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Cragin, Kim Title: What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West Bank Summary: Continued terrorist attacks and the involvement of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq have prompted a surge of interest among policymakers, law enforcement, journalists, and academics on both sides of the Atlantic on the topic of terrorist radicalization. Many of the factors that push or pull individuals toward radicalization are in dispute within the expert community. Instead of examining the factors that lead to radicalization and the commission of terrorist acts, this report takes a new approach. What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West Bank empirically addresses the topic of why youth reject violent extremism. To do this, the authors focus on the Palestinian West Bank. The report begins with a theoretical model and then tests this model with data gathered through structured interviews and a survey. For this study, ten semistructured interviews were conducted with politicians from Hamas and Fatah in 2012. Along with these interviews, the authors conducted a survey among 600 youth (ages 18-30) who lived in Hebron, Jenin, and Ramallah. The overarching findings from this effort demonstrate that (1) rejecting violent extremism, for residents of the West Bank, is a process with multiple stages and choices within each stage; (2) family plays a greater role than friends in shaping attitudes toward nonviolence; (3) demographics do not have a significant impact on attitudes toward nonviolence; and (4) opposing violence in theory is distinct from choosing not to engage in violence. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 5, 2015 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1118/RAND_RR1118.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Palestine URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1118/RAND_RR1118.pdf Shelf Number: 136954 Keywords: Counterterrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Vurmo, Gjergji Title: Religious Radicalism and Violent Extremism in Albania Summary: This study has collected, generated, and analyzed data on the phenomenon of religious radicalization and violent extremism with the aim of informing policymaking and stakeholders involved in addressing this phenomenon and the challenges interrelated with it. The research methodology approaches the identification and comprehensive analysis of the context by employing a variety of sources to understand the extent and relevance of several factors that enable or fuel religious radicalization and forms of violent extremism. These factors and 'drivers' are often combined with one another and interact with the context through various forms. However, the list of drivers analyzed in this study is not exhaustive, because in different contexts and times the phenomenon of religious radicalization and violent extremism may be fueled by other factors. During the research period (September 2014 - May 2015), a wide range of official, academic and other reliable sources of data was examined. In addition, a considerable number of actors have been involved in the preparatory phase of the study as well as in the fieldwork to generate data and to conduct the survey and interviews with key informants and focus groups. The entire framework of the research methodology, the findings, the conclusions, and the recommendations drawn in this study have been subjected to validation process to ensure quality, objectivity, compliance with the Albanian context, and inclusive approach based on the data. The IDM study finds that, while religious radicalization in Albania is in its early phase, lack of attention and inclusion in addressing 'push' or enabling factors may serve to aggravate the phenomenon. The study sheds light on the inactivity of most state institutions, particularly those outside the security domain, and of non-state actors in addressing and preventing religious radicalization. The phenomenon of religious radicalization may be further developed due to the lack of contextual cooperation between non-security state authorities and leaders of religious communities on the prevention of the phenomenon. The religious radical groups' agenda may be facilitated and favored by the inexistence of civil society in remote rural areas creating a big gap with regard to "safeguarding" activities on religious radicalization and violent extremism. The broad support of the communities of religious believers to the liberal tradition of faith, religious institutions, and to the values of religious harmony should not serve as an excuse for state and non-state actors' inactivity. On the other hand, misinterpretation of the phenomenon and minimization of its relevance or its identification with consequences (mainly in the security aspect) lead to the wrong approach and eventual counter-productivity of the effects of institutional response. Religious radicalization (as a process) and violent extremism (as a result) are enabled, fueled and/or shaped by a rich array of factors and drivers, which operate in a particular country context at both macro (societal) and micro (individual / group) level. Details: Tirana: Institute for Democracy and Mediation, 2015. 246p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2015 at: http://pasos.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Religious-Radicalism-Albania-web-final.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Albania URL: http://pasos.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Religious-Radicalism-Albania-web-final.pdf Shelf Number: 137021 Keywords: Radical Groups Radicalization Religious Violence Violent Extremism Violent Extremists

Author: Nielsen, Thomas Galasz Title: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism: Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan Summary: The era launched by the declaration of the Global War on Terror by America and its allies saw great instability and turmoil in the Central and South Asian regions due to increases in militant and insurgent activities. Consequently, all the regional actors had to develop new strategies to deal with uprisings, unrest, and instability. An elusive and unpredictable enemy, difficult geographical terrain, politico-diplomatic upheavals, and public resentment over governments' decisions to engage in asymmetric warfare - counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) - haunted the states with bleak prospects of everlasting military engagement at home or abroad. When the Danish parliament chose to join the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, it was greatly motivated by NATO's core principle of coming to the aid of an alliance partner under attack; in this case, one that had suffered an attack by the terrorist network al-Qaeda, which hijacked four planes and used them as weapons on U.S. soil in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 (9/11). Logically, both the strategic and the operational planning were left to the United States, which relied on a classic Clausewitzian centre-of-gravity approach and engaged itself and its allies in the so-called War on Terror. This resulted in large-scale military operations against the enemy's strongholds - primarily the city of Kabul. At this point, the primary objective for the military operation was to overthrow a regime that sheltered the al-Qaeda terrorist leader responsible for 9/11. The secondary objective was to prevent future terrorist networks from training and operating on Afghan soil. Though capacity building of both civilian and military institutions was carried out concurrently, the offensive operations against the insurgent groups remained a core element in the strategy throughout the entire International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) campaign in Afghanistan. Prior to, and alongside with, the development in Afghanistan, Pakistan faced similar problems with religious extremism and militant groups. Given its status as a key regional actor, the development in Afghanistan created a new situation for Pakistan's security matrix. Afghanistan and its population faced its third big war in four decades. Previous wars, the Soviet Union's 1979-89 intervention, and the 1992-96 civil war, had had a devastating effects in terms of refugees and spill-over to the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, with Pakistan experiencing the greatest impact by far. This has had massive negative consequences for Pakistani society, especially in relation to its economy and domestic security. While the country has struggled with these consequences, it is important to remember that positive and stable development in Afghanistan will, conversely, have a massive positive effect on all levels of Pakistani society. It has been argued from many NATO countries that the Afghan insurgency groups have been, and still are being, sustained through their connections into Pakistan and their ability to cross the border and obtain safe havens on Pakistani soil. Adding to the problem is, of course, the continued external funding for religious madrassas in the remote areas of the country where government outreach in relation to education, health care, and other civil services is sparse. The lack of governmental outreach presents an opportune environment for establishing and developing insurgencies and terrorist groups. However, a new turn has seemed to take root in Pakistan, and since June 2014 the Pakistani army has been very active in the Federal Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) in counter-militancy, including CT operations. This turn was underlined by the tragic events in December 2014, when terrorists affiliated with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)6 killed 132 school children and 9 teachers in an attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar. While claiming responsibility for the dastardly act, the terrorists afterwards stated that the attack was a reaction to the operations conducted by the Pakistani Military in FATA. Details: Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House, 2015. 376p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2015 at: http://www.fak.dk/publikationer/Documents/Sharing%20Experiences%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.fak.dk/publikationer/Documents/Sharing%20Experiences%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan.pdf Shelf Number: 137893 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Institute for Economics and Peace Title: Global Terrorism Index: 2015. Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism Summary: This report provides a detailed analysis of the changing trends in terrorism since 2000, for 162 countries. It investigates the changing patterns of terrorism by geographic activity, methods of attack, organisations involved and the national economic and political context. The GTI has also been compared to a range of socioeconomic indicators to determine the key underlying factors that have the closest statistical relationship to terrorism. In 2014 the total number of deaths from terrorism increased by 80 per cent when compared to the prior year. This is the largest yearly increase in the last 15 years. Since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been over a nine-fold increase in the number of deaths from terrorism, rising from 3,329 in 2000 to 32,685 in 2014. Terrorism remains highly concentrated with most of the activity occurring in just five countries - Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria. These countries accounted for 78 per cent of the lives lost in 2014. Although highly concentrated, terrorism is spreading to more countries, with the number of countries experiencing more than 500 deaths increasing from five to 11, a 120 per cent increase from the previous year. The six new countries with over 500 deaths are Somalia, Ukraine, Yemen, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Cameroon. While the majority of countries in the world did not have a death from terrorism, the total number of countries which experienced at least one death increased by eight, raising the total to 67 countries in 2014. This includes OECD countries such as Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada and France which experienced high profile terrorist attacks last year. Also notable over the past year is the major intensification of the terrorist threat in Nigeria. The country witnessed the largest increase in terrorist deaths ever recorded by any country, increasing by over 300 per cent to 7,512 fatalities. Boko Haram, which operates mainly in Nigeria, has become the most deadly terrorist group in the world. Boko Haram pledged its allegiance to ISIL (also known as the Islamic State)as the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) in March 2015. There was also a shift in the distribution of targets during 2014, with an 11 per cent decrease in the number of deaths of religious figures and worshipers. This was offset by a 172 per cent increase in the deaths of private citizens. The majority of deaths from terrorism do not occur in the West. Excluding September 11, only 0.5 per cent of all deaths have occurred in Western countries in the last 15 years. The West is designated as the countries where ISIL has advocated for attacks. They include the United States, Canada, Australia, and European countries. The report highlights the striking prevalence of lone wolf attacks in the West. Lone wolf attacks account for 70 per cent of all terrorist deaths in the West since 2006. Additionally, Islamic fundamentalism was not the primary driver of lone wolf attacks, with 80 per cent of deaths in the West from lone wolf attacks being attributed to a mixture of right wing extremists, nationalists, anti-government elements, other types of political extremism and supremacism. Details: New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 24, 2015 at: http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 137333 Keywords: Extremist Groups Lone Wolf Terrorists Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Berger, J.M. Title: The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and describing the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter Summary: The Islamic State, known as ISIS or ISIL, has exploited social media, most notoriously Twitter, to send its propaganda and messaging out to the world and to draw in people vulnerable to radicalization. By virtue of its large number of supporters and highly organized tactics, ISIS has been able to exert an outsized impact on how the world perceives it, by disseminating images of graphic violence (including the beheading of Western journalists and aid workers and more recently, the immolation of a Jordanian air force pilot), while using social media to attract new recruits and inspire lone actor attacks. Although much ink has been spilled on the topic of ISIS activity on Twitter, very basic questions remain unanswered, including such fundamental issues as how many Twitter users support ISIS, who they are, and how many of those supporters take part in its highly organized online activities. Previous efforts to answer these questions have relied on very small segments of the overall ISIS social network. Because of the small, cellular nature of that network, the examination of particular subsets such as foreign fighters in relatively small numbers, may create misleading conclusions. The information vacuum extends to - and is particularly acute within - the sometimes heated discussion of how the West should respond to this online campaign. While there are legitimate debates about the bounds of free speech and the complex relationship between private companies and the public interest, some have argued against suspending terrorist social media accounts on the basis that suspensions are not effective at impeding extremist activity online. These arguments that are usually predicated on very small samples of potentially misleading data, when data is proffered at all. We set out to answer some of these important questions using innovative techniques to create a large, representative sample of accounts that can be clearly defined as ISIS supporters, and to attempt to define the boundaries of ISIS's online social network. The goals of the project included: - Create a demographic snapshot of ISIS supporters on Twitter using a very large and accurate sample of accounts (addressed in sections 1 and 2 of this paper). - Outline a methodology for discovering and defining relevant accounts, to serve as a basis for future research using consistent comparison data (section 3). - Create preliminary data and a path to further investigate ISIS-supporting accounts suspended by Twitter and the effects of suspensions (section 2.5). Our findings, based on a sample of 20,000 ISIS supporter accounts, include: - From September through December 2014, we estimate that at least 46,000 Twitter accounts were used by ISIS supporters, although not all of them were active at the same time. - The 46,000 figure is our most conservative estimate for this time frame. Our maximum estimate is in the neighborhood of 70,000 accounts; however, we believe the truth is closer to the low end of the range (sections 1.1, 3.5, 3.6, 3.8). - Typical ISIS supporters were located within the organization's territories in Syria and Iraq, as well as in regions contested by ISIS. Hundreds of ISIS-supporting accounts sent tweets with location metadata embedded (section 1.4). - Almost one in five ISIS supporters selected English as their primary language when using Twitter. Three quarters selected Arabic (section 1.5). - ISIS-supporting accounts had an average of about 1,000 followers each, considerably higher than an ordinary Twitter user. ISIS-supporting accounts were also considerably more active than non-supporting users (section 2). - Much of ISIS's social media success can be attributed to a relatively small group of hyperactive users, numbering between 500 and 2,000 accounts, which tweet in concentrated bursts of high volume (section 2.1). - A minimum of 1,000 ISIS-supporting accounts were suspended between September and December 2014, and we saw evidence of potentially thousands more. Accounts that tweeted most often and had the most followers were most likely to be suspended (section 2.5.1). - At the time our data collection launched in September 2014, Twitter began to suspend large numbers of ISIS-supporting accounts. While this prevented us from creating a pre-suspension dataset, we were able to gather information on how the removal of accounts affected the overall network (section 2.5.4). - Account suspensions do have concrete effects in limiting the reach and scope of ISIS activities on social media. They do not, at the current level of implementation, eliminate those activities, and cannot be expected to do this. Some critics argue suspensions are ineffective because ISIS propaganda is still available on Twitter. Any balanced evaluation of current levels of suspension activity clearly demonstrates that total interdiction is not the goal. The qualitative debate is over how suspensions affect the performance of the network and whether a different level of pressure might produce a different result (sections 2.5, 4.2). While it is possible to target suspensions in a manner that would be far more devastating to ISIS networks, we do not advise such an approach for several reasons (sections 4.1 and 4.3). - The process of suspension does create certain new risks. Most importantly, while suspensions appear to have created obstacles to supporters joining ISIS's social network, they also isolate ISIS supporters online. This could increase the speed and intensity of radicalization for those who do manage to enter the network, and hinder organic social pressures that could lead to deradicalization (section 4.3). - Further study is required to evaluate the unintended consequences of suspension campaigns and their attendant trade-offs. Fundamentally, tampering with social networks is a form of social engineering, and acknowledging this fact raises many new, difficult questions (section 4.3). - Social media companies and the U.S government must work together to devise appropriate responses to extremism on social media. Although discussions of this issue often frame government intervention as an infringement on free speech, in reality, social media companies currently regulate speech on their platforms without oversight or disclosures of how suspensions are applied (section 4.4). Approaches to the problem of extremist use of social media are most likely to succeed when they are mainstreamed into wider dialogues among the wide range of community, private, and public stakeholders. Details: Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, Center for Middle East Policy, 2015. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Analysis Paper No. 20: Accessed November 27, 2015 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf Shelf Number: 137342 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Islamic State (ISIS) Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Gill, Paul Title: What are the roles of the internet in terrorism? Measuring Online Behaviours of Convicted UK Terrorists Summary: Using a unique dataset of 227 convicted UK-based terrorists, this report fills a large gap in the existing literature. Using descriptive statistics, we first outline the degree to which various online activities related to radicalisation were present within the sample. The results illustrate the variance in behaviours often attributed to 'online radicalisation'. Second, we conduct a smallest-space analysis to illustrate two clusters of commonly co-occurring behaviours that delineate behaviours from those directly associated with attack planning. Third, we conduct a series of bivariate and multivariate analyses to question whether those who interact virtually with like-minded individuals or learn online, exhibit markedly different experiences (e.g. radicalisation, event preparation, attack outcomes) than those who do not. Details: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2015. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2015 at: http://voxpol.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/DCUJ3518_VOX_Lone_Actors_report_02.11.15_WEB.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://voxpol.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/DCUJ3518_VOX_Lone_Actors_report_02.11.15_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 137352 Keywords: Extremist Groups Internet Online Communications Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: With Hate in their Hearts: The State of White Supremacy in the United States Summary: The recent tragic shooting spree in June 2015 that took nine lives at Emanuel AME Church, a predominantly African-American church in Charleston, South Carolina, starkly revealed the pain and suffering that someone motivated by hate can cause. The suspect in the shootings, Dylann Storm Roof, is a suspected white supremacist. The horrific incident-following earlier deadly shooting sprees by white supremacists in Kansas, Wisconsin, and elsewhere-makes understanding white supremacy in the United States a necessity. - White supremacist ideology in the United States today is dominated by the belief that whites are doomed to extinction by a rising tide of non-whites who are controlled and manipulated by the Jews-unless action is taken now. This core belief is exemplified by slogans such as the so-called Fourteen Words: "We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children." - During the recent surge of right-wing extremist activity in the United States that began in 2009, white supremacists did not grow appreciably in numbers, as anti-government extremists did, but existing white supremacists did become more angry and agitated, with a consequent rise of serious white supremacist violence. - Most white supremacists do not belong to organized hate groups, but rather participate in the white supremacist movement as unaffiliated individuals. Thus the size of the white supremacist movement is considerably greater than just the members of hate groups. Among white supremacist groups, gangs are becoming increasingly important. - The white supremacist movement has a number of different components, including 1) neo-Nazis; 2) racist skinheads; 3) "traditional" white supremacists; 4) Christian Identity adherents; and 5) white supremacist prison gangs. The prison gangs are growing in size, while the other four sub-movements are stagnant or in decline. In addition, there are a growing number of Odinists, or white supremacist Norse pagans. There are also "intellectual" white supremacists who seek to provide an intellectual veneer or justification for white supremacist concepts. - White supremacists engage in a wide variety of activities to promote their ideas and causes or to cause fear in their enemies. They also engage in an array of social activities in which white supremacists gather for food and festivities. - Among domestic extremist movements active in the United States, white supremacists are by far the most violent, committing about 83% of the extremist-related murders in the United States in the past 10 years and being involved in about 52% of the shootouts between extremists and police. White supremacists also regularly engage in a variety of terrorist plots, acts and conspiracies. However, white supremacists also have a high degree of involvement with traditional forms of criminal activity as well as ideologically-based criminal activity. Most of the murders committed by white supremacists are done for non-ideological reasons. However, even if such murders are ignored, white supremacists still commit the most lethal violence of any domestic extremist movement in the United States. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2015. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/state-of-white-supremacy-united-states-2015.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/state-of-white-supremacy-united-states-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 137446 Keywords: Extremist Groups Hate Crimes Homeland Security Racism Radical Groups White Supremacists

Author: Bergin, Anthony Title: Gen Y Jihadists: Preventing Radicalisation in Australia Summary: In September 2014 the terrorism threat level was raised from 'medium' to 'high' - the first change in 13 years. This year, the government estimated that the number of high risk terrorist threats being monitored by security agencies had doubled and that more than 100 Australians were fighting for groups in Syria and Iraq. A team of ASPI analysts has examined the scope and nature of terrorism motivated by violent Islamist extremism in Australia through a comprehensive database of the high-profile Australians identified as foreign fighters and those that have come to the attention of authorities in Australia. Based on the findings from this research, the paper assesses the policy responses by the government to date and offers recommendations. Details: Barton, ACT, AUS: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2015. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/gen-y-jihadists-preventing-radicalisation-in-australia/GenY_jihadists.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/gen-y-jihadists-preventing-radicalisation-in-australia/GenY_jihadists.pdf Shelf Number: 137449 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Chalk, Peter Title: Black Flag Rising: ISIL in Southeast Asia and Australia Summary: Although the prime focus of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has been on establishing a state - a caliphate - in the Middle East, it has also sought to gain a presence beyond that area. Southeast Asia is one region that's now receiving increased attention as a potential beachhead for the group. Most concern has focused on Malaysia, Indonesia, the southern Philippines and the Malay Muslim provinces of Thailand. The paper considers how these nations are responding to the threat. Beyond Southeast Asia, ISIL is showing a growing influence in Australia. The measures the Australian Government are taking have been generally well received. However, a number of concerns have been raised about the pace and nature of Australia's emergent counterterrorist strategy and their implications for the nation's democratic character. The paper puts forward national priorities and suggests that regionally greater emphasis needs to be given to formalising genuine counterterrorist cooperation. Details: Barton, ACT, AUS: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2015. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/black-flag-rising-isil-in-southeast-asia-and-australia/Black-flag-rising_ISIL.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/black-flag-rising-isil-in-southeast-asia-and-australia/Black-flag-rising_ISIL.pdf Shelf Number: 137451 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2015 Summary: When it came to domestic terrorism and extremism, the year 2015 was a grisly one for the United States. In the past twelve months, the names of a number of American cities became unwelcome shorthand for the carnage that extremist killers wreaked in them: Charleston, Chattanooga, Colorado Springs, San Bernardino. Each of these cities became scenes of tragedy and death, thanks to the cold-hearted ideological motivations of angry killers. It is thus no surprise that these and other domestic extremist killers have collectively amassed a higher number of victims in 2015 than in any previous year since 1995, the year of the Oklahoma City bombing. Preliminary tallies by the Anti-Defamation League's Center on Extremism indicate that a minimum of 52 people in the United States were killed by adherents of domestic extremist movement in the past 12 months. This number is bound to grow further still, as extremist connections to some murders often take years to be revealed - and there are likely still other murders whose extremist connections may never see the light of day. Still, the 52 people known to have died at the hands of domestic extremists are disturbing enough, more than the numbers killed in 2013 and 2014 put together. The victims included police officers, government workers, service members, and civilians from all walks of life. Key Findings of Report - In 2015, the 52 deaths came at the hands of adherents of four domestic extremist movements: white supremacists, anti-government extremists, domestic Islamic extremists, and anti-abortion extremists. - As has been the case every year since 1995, white supremacists have been responsible for the largest number of deaths, at 20. One incident, the June 17 mass shooting at the Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, South Carolina, which killed nine, was responsible for almost half of these deaths. - Usually, right-wing anti-government extremists account for the next highest number of murders each year, but in 2015, in a disturbing development, domestic Islamic extremists were responsible for 19 deaths, virtually the same as white supremacists. All of these deaths stemmed from two shooting rampages: the July 16 attacks by Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez on military targets in Chattanooga and the December 2 rampage by Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California. - The 52 murders occurred in 17 separate incidents, with nine of the incidents involving multiple murders. This is unusual, in that most extremist-related examples of murder involve a single victim. - Ideology played a primary or substantial role in 10 of the 17 incidents in 2015, accounting for 34 of the 52 victims. Non-ideological killings by extremists, which accounted for the remainder, tend to involve group-related killings (such as killing a suspected informant or a rival gang member) or traditional criminal violent activity (in which extremists also often engage). - Overwhelmingly the extremist weapon of choice in 2015 - as in virtually every year - was firearms. In fact, 48 of the 52 victims were killed by firearms. The other four victims were killed by a variety of means, including two stabbings, a blunt instrument killing, and a motor vehicle incident. All of the multiple murder incidents involved the use of one or more firearms. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2015. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/Murder-and-Extremism-in-the-United-States-in-2015-web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/Murder-and-Extremism-in-the-United-States-in-2015-web.pdf Shelf Number: 137452 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Gun Violence Homicides Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Crime

Author: Schanzer, David Title: The Challenge and Promise of Using Community Policing Strategies to Prevent Violent Extremism: A Call for Community Partnerships with Law Enforcement to Enhance Public Safety Summary: More than four years ago, the White House issued a national strategy calling for the development of partnerships between police and communities to counter violent extremism. This report contains the results of a comprehensive assessment of the challenges and promise of this strategic approach to preventing violent extremism. It is based on a nationwide survey of law enforcement agencies and hundreds of hours of interviews and site visits with police departments and community members around the country. Based on this research, we reached two fundamental conclusions. First, policing agencies face multiple obstacles to creating community partnerships focused on preventing acts of violent extremism. But, second, some policing agencies are following a set of promising practices which, if applied effectively, can result in increasing trust between the police and the communities they serve. These trusting relationships can serve as a platform for addressing many public safety threats, including, but not limited to, violent extremism. Policing agencies are unlikely to be successful in creating partnerships to address violent extremism until they establish trusting relationships with the communities they serve. This is especially true with respect to Muslim American communities, which have experienced significant trauma since 9/11 and have deep concerns about how they are treated by the government. Police outreach and engagement efforts are viewed with some suspicion by Muslim Americans for a number of reasons. First, Muslim Americans perceive they are being unfairly assigned a collective responsibility to attempt to curb violent extremism inspired by al Qaeda, ISIS, and other likeminded groups, but other communities are not being asked to address anti-government, racist, and other forms of extremism. Our research confirmed that while many policing agencies have robust efforts to conduct outreach with Muslim Americans, they do not have organized, overt efforts to reach out to non-Muslim communities that may be targeted for recruitment by anti-government, racist, or other extremist movements. Second, some Muslim Americans believe that policing outreach and engagement initiatives may be linked with efforts to conduct surveillance on Muslim American individuals and organizations. Third, even though most Muslim Americans have favorable impressions of local law enforcement, they see outreach and engagement efforts as part of a federal counter-terrorism program. Their unpleasant experiences with federal agencies, especially with respect to airport security and immigration control, taint their support for partnerships with policing agencies. We also found that willingness to develop partnerships with the police depends on how effectively the police address other, non-terrorism related, public safety concerns of the community. Some Muslim American communities believe that their public safety concerns are not being fully addressed by the police and therefore are not interested in engaging on other issues. Finally, developing effective community outreach and engagement programs is also difficult for the police because the programs absorb significant resources and may detract from other police priorities. Community policing programs require staffing, specialized training, and interpreters or intensive language classes for officers - all at a time when many police departments around the country are experiencing budgetary stress. Furthermore, we found that preventing violent extremism, while a pressing national issue, is not a top priority for local police that must address violent crime, drugs, gangs, and a host of other public safety concerns. Details: Durham, NC: Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University, 2016. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 27, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249674.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249674.pdf Shelf Number: 137690 Keywords: Community Participation Community Policing Extremist Groups Muslims Police-Community Partnerships Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Macdonald, Geoffrey Title: Preventing Violent Extremism through Inclusive Politics in Bangladesh Summary: Bangladesh has a long history of political and electoral violence that has shaped its political culture. Since the early 2000s, it has experienced a renewal of violent extremism and an increasingly polarized political climate. By addressing the relationship between radicalization and institutional dysfunctions, this Peace Brief examines how Bangladesh can help undermine the issues that bolster radicalization efforts by strengthening political and social institutions and making them more inclusive. Summary - The role of Islam in Bangladeshi politics is highly contested and presents a focal point of past and current violence. - The polarized political climate and institutionalized repression of Islamic parties appear to enhance radicalization dynamics. - The current environment in Bangladesh presents an opportunity to prevent violent extremism before it fully manifests itself. - Measures to improve democratic governance and inclusive politics could help mitigate the risk of violent extremism in Bangladesh, while also reducing political violence levels. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 5p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief 200: Accessed January 28, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB200-Preventing-Violent-Extremism-through-Inclusive-Politics-in-Bangladesh.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Bangladesh URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB200-Preventing-Violent-Extremism-through-Inclusive-Politics-in-Bangladesh.pdf Shelf Number: 137697 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islam Political Violence Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Angus, Christopher Title: Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Causes and Responses Summary: The radicalisation of Australian citizens, and the decision by a small number to commit acts of extremist violence, has led to considerable community concern in recent years. In NSW, there was the tragic December 2014 Martin Place Lindt Cafe siege1 and the October 2015 murder of a police civilian finance worker outside the NSW Police Force headquarters. On a global scale, radicalisation and extremism have led Australians to travel to conflict zones to fight in foreign wars. A recent report in the Australian Police Journal estimated that up to 250 Australian jihadis took part in the conflict in Syria in 2014. This number is both numerically and proportionally greater than the number of foreign fighters from other nations, including the United States, the Netherlands and several Scandinavian countries. This e-brief does not purport to be a comprehensive account of all the literature in this expanding area of study. Rather, it seeks only to offer an introduction to this complex subject. One focus is on government counter-radicalisation programs and commentaries on these. The e-brief begins by defining radicalisation and violent extremism, which share certain common elements but are also different in important respects. Details: Sydney: NSW Parliamentary Research Service, 2016. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: e-brief: Accessed February 3, 2016 at: https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/parlment/publications.nsf/0/72ABFCEDB075A6A1CA257F4C0011969F/$File/Radicalisation+eBrief.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: .https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/researchpapers/Documents/radicalisation-and-violent-extremism-causes-and-/Radicalisation%20eBrief.pdf Shelf Number: 137747 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Stys, Yvonne Title: Examining the Needs and Motivations of Canada's Federally Incarcerated Radicalized Offenders Summary: This study allowed for an enhanced understanding of the motivations and needs of radicalized offenders, while providing the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) with further evidence that can be used in its considerations of how to intervene and case manage this population of offenders in the future. This research underscores the need for increased attention to offender motivation and how it impacts case management, supervision, and intervention strategies for radicalized offenders. What we found Results indicated that 30% of radicalized offenders had purely ideological motives for their actions, 17% were purely motivated by criminal (non-ideological) drivers, and 53% held both ideological and non-ideological motivations for their crimes. The most common ideological motivations included a desire for political change, and a desire to respond to a group grievance. Non-ideological motivations were most frequently identified as the desire for material gain and the desire for friendship. Those radicalized offenders who committed the more serious acts (as per the definition of radicalized offender) and those who were seen as leaders of the group were more frequently identified as having purely ideological motivations. Assessment of criminogenic needs via the Dynamic Factor Identification and Analysis instrument revealed that a large proportion of radicalized offenders had needs in the associates, attitudes, and personal/emotional domains and a small proportion had needs in the areas of substance abuse and community functioning. These differences were more pronounced when ideologically-motivated offenders were examined separately, indicating that perhaps the needs of non-ideologically motivated radicalized offenders are more similar to those found in the non-radicalized, general offender population. Similarly, ideologically motivated offenders held many more of the other violent-extremist needs than did non-ideologically motivated radicalized offenders. Why we did this study CSC strives to contribute to the safety and security of society through identifying and addressing the criminogenic needs and criminal motivations of the federally incarcerated offender population. While much is known about the needs of the general offender population, there exists significantly less empirical evidence concerning the needs of those federally-sentenced individuals motivated by ideology: radicalized offenders. This research sought to examine and understand the specific motivations and needs of federally incarcerated radicalized offenders, with the ultimate goal of contributing to an evidence-based approach to effective correctional interventions and case management for these offenders. What we did Using data from the Offender Management System (OMS) as well as information coded from various sources, the motivations (ideological Details: Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada, 2014. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2016 at: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/005/008/092/005008-r344-eng.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/005/008/092/005008-r344-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 137811 Keywords: Extremist Groups Prison Administration Prisoners Radical Groups Radicalization Radicalized Offenders

Author: Denmark. Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs Title: The Challenge of Extremism: Examples of Deradicalisation and Disengagement Programmes in the EU Summary: In January 2010 a survey on deradicalisation and disengagement was initiated. In this survey five respondent countries have described specific deradicalisation and/or disengagement programmes targeted towards individuals. These five countries are Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden. This report focuses on these intervention programmes, because the main objective of the survey is to map such programmes. The main objectives of the survey were: - To map the practical experiences in EU member states with policies and programmes on deradicalisation and disengagement, focusing on how to intervene when individuals have been attracted to extremism. - To support the exchange of experience and good practice among the EU member states in the further efforts to address the challenges of extremism and radicalisation. The questionnaire was sent to all 27 EU member states. 18 EU member states replied extensively by giving descriptions of their overall strategies on prevention of extremism. All but one of the 18 countries have developed, or are developing, strategies to prevent radicalisation and extremism. Accordingly most of the strategies are broad initiatives on early prevention of radicalisation and extremism. The implementing partners in the strategies are often a mix of different authorities and organisations on a national, regional and local level. Out of 18 countries, 13 countries have experienced problems with right-wing extremism, 12 countries have experienced problems with left-wing extremism, 10 countries have experienced problems with militant Islamism, and seven countries have experienced problems with separatist movements, animal right groups and/or other groups. In most countries right-wing extremism and militant Islamism are assessed as the biggest threats. Details: Copenhagen: The Ministry, 2010. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2016 at: http://www.youthpolicy.org/library/wp-content/uploads/library/2010_Challenge_Extremisme_Deradicalisation_EU_Eng.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://www.youthpolicy.org/library/wp-content/uploads/library/2010_Challenge_Extremisme_Deradicalisation_EU_Eng.pdf Shelf Number: 137813 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Saltman, Erin Marie Title: The Role of Prevent in Countering Online Extremism Summary: The following White Paper addresses the role of the UK government and social media companies and Internet service providers (ISP) in monitoring and policing the Internet for extremist and/or terrorism-related content. This paper seeks to analyse the effectiveness of the UK government's Prevent strategy and provide recommendations for its improvement in line with the current nature of the threat. Currently, the two biggest challenges for UK counter-terrorism are the radicalisation and recruitment of individuals by the jihadist organisation Islamic State (IS) and the use of the Internet by IS and other extremist organisations to spread unwanted and potentially dangerous ideologies and narratives internationally. This subject is of great importance, especially as government debates how best to tackle extremism and adequately implement counter-extremism measures both in real terms and online. Sections 2 and 3 discuss the framework of the government's Prevent strategy, while sections 4 through 9 detail the challenges extremism and terrorism-related content online pose. Section 10 addresses the role of Prevent in countering online extremism in the UK. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2014. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: White Paper: Accessed February 12, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/white-paper-the-role-of-prevent-in-countering-online-extremism.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/white-paper-the-role-of-prevent-in-countering-online-extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 137849 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Extremism Extremist Groups Online Communications Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media

Author: Stuart, Hannah Title: Community Policing and Preventing Extremism: Lessons from Bradford Summary: Since the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London, police forces nationally have implemented successive counter-radicalisation policies. Community Policing and Preventing Extremism, based on a series of interviews with senior police officers from the West Yorkshire Police and the North East Counter-Terrorism Unit, provides a practical perspective on the challenges of delivering preventative work at grassroots level as well as on policy debates about the remit of counter-extremism in a free society. Key findings include: ◾The police advocate building sustainable relationships with communities based on mutual trust and confidence; and recognise the need to be representative and to respond to changing community dynamics; ◾A focus on successful community policing and "quality of life issues" allows the police to proactively create resilient partnerships rather than attempting to force a relationship in response to a counter-radicalisation-related issue; ◾A strategic mechanism for supporting the ideological challenge against extremism is promoting critical thinking skills and credible voices, which builds resilience against extremism; helps isolate extremists; and promotes dialogue around other controversial issues, such as grooming; ◾Promoting safe giving is a key response to the religious injunction for charity within Muslim communities, which can increase vulnerability to fundraising for criminal or terrorist intent and to intimidating styles of fundraising that take advantage of a generous and permissive cultural attitude towards giving; ◾Police forces are well-placed to identify grievances and negative perceptions within communities. Successful work around education, internet safety and grooming demonstrates the value of promoting counter-radicalisation as a safeguarding issue rather than simply as a counter-terrorism tool; ◾Among the biggest challenges anticipated for 2015 is ensuring consistency in relation to freedom of speech and the thresholds used to measure extremism, particularly as it manifests either online or in public situations, for example at universities and during political protests. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2015. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper No. 4: Accessed February 12, 2016 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Community-Policing-and-Preventing-Extremism.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Community-Policing-and-Preventing-Extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 137850 Keywords: Community Policing Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Hussain, Ghaffar Title: Jihad Trending: A Comprehensive Analysis of Online Extremism and How to Counter it Summary: Online extremism and the role the Internet plays in the radicalisation process is currently being debated and discussed by journalists, academics, technologists and government officials alike. This report demystifies the topic of extremist content online and exposes the manner in which online tools are being used by Islamist extremist organisations and individuals to recruit and propagandise. Current measures to tackle online extremism are also assessed and critiqued, after which the report details a practical strategy for countering extremism online and making the Internet a less hospitable domain for extremists. The research conducted for this report focuses on 30 Islamist extremist groups operating in the UK and France, mapping their use of the Internet and what they hope to achieve through their online activities. Popular online platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter as well as chat rooms, discussion forums and static websites are analysed with a view to assessing the role online extremist messaging plays in the radicalisation process. The report also addresses the issue of censorship, assessing the effectiveness of current filtering methods available and their overall efficacy. Research for this report was based on original data collection and analyses as well as interviews with a range of experts, mentors and target audiences. Key findings in this report: - With the Internet often being accused of producing radicalisation in isolation of other factors, this report found that the vast majority of radicalised individuals come into contact with extremist ideology through offline socialisation prior to being indoctrinated online. In other words, the Internet does not radicalise in isolation of other factors and should not be targeted as the 'cause' of radicalisation. As such, the Internet's role is less about initiating the radicalisation process; rather it acts as a facilitator and catalyst for the radicalisation process by 1) indoctrinating, 2) educating and 3) socialising individuals. - Although governments are increasingly relying on censorship and filtering methods to counter online extremism, this report found that negative measures, or censorship in general, was not only ineffective and costly but also potentially counter-productive. - Positive measures, such as developing counter-extremist efforts through online counter-speech content and popularising online initiatives that fight against extremism are much more effective in challenging extremist ideologies. However, there are currently not enough materials that counter extremist content online, allowing extremists to monopolise certain issues. - We found that results from search engines rarely, if ever, provide links to content that supported Islamist extremism. It was equally rare to find content countering extremist narratives. - Research also found that available Islamist extremist content websites were most successful if they provided more subtle, non-illegal information platforms with links to active social media platforms for users. Available static websites served primarily to 1) propagate the Islamist narrative through specific interpretations of scriptures, 2) promote martyrdom and 3) solidify a 'self versus other' allegiance to Muslims, rejecting non-Muslims. This report seeks to differentiate itself from previous reports on online extremism in two ways; firstly the research itself is much more in-depth and diverse, combining qualitative and quantitative data to reach conclusions. Secondly, this report offers a comprehensive and practical list of recommendations which, if implemented fully, could unleash a new wave of online activism that will take the fight to extremists online, breaking the current monopoly they hold over certain socio-political issues. Recommendations to public, private and third party sectors based on our findings: - Establishing a forum that deals with online extremism and brings stakeholders from key sectors together in order to do so. - Improving digital literacy and critical consumption skills in schools and communities. - Encouraging the establishment of a social media outlet that clarifies government policies and debunks propaganda. - A mapping exercise that explores current efforts to tackle extremism online and identifies partners that could be given support to develop an effective online presence. - Establishing a central body that offers seed funding and training for grassroots online counter-extremism initiatives. - More research into how the far right is using the Internet to propagandise giving a broader view of 'extremism online'. The findings and recommendations of this report suggest a clearer understanding of the role the Internet plays in radicalisation process and an appreciation of the dangers of relying on illiberal censorship can contribute towards the development of a more holistic approach to tackling extremism online. Relying on the cultivation of grassroots initiatives to develop and promote counter-speech online, as opposed to censorship, could help turn the tide against current extremist efforts. However, co-operation and regular communication between stakeholders from key sectors is vital in order for the above vision to be realised and, thus, the establishment of a forum that allows this to take place is also important. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2014. 132p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 12, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jihad-trending-quilliam-report.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jihad-trending-quilliam-report.pdf Shelf Number: 137854 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Internet Islamists Online Communications Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Blanchard, Christopher M. Title: The Islamic State and U.S. Policy Summary: The Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh) is a transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that controls large areas of Iraq and Syria, has adherents in several other countries, and disrupts regional and international security with violence and terrorism. A series of terrorist attacks attributed to the group outside of Iraq and Syria has demonstrated IS supporters' ability to threaten societies in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the United States, including in countries with sophisticated and capable intelligence and security forces. The U.S.-led campaign to degrade and ultimately destroy the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria (IS, aka ISIL/ISIS or the Arabic acronym Da'esh) appears to be entering a new phase in early 2016, as Administration officials implement planned changes in military strategy and tactics, pursue new diplomatic and coalition building initiatives, and consider alternative proposals. The conflicts in Iraq and Syria remain focal points in this regard, but a series of terrorist attacks inspired or directed by the Islamic State have claimed hundreds of lives on four continents since November 2015, creating a more global sense of urgency about combatting the group and reversing its spread. The group has stated its intent to attack inside the United States, and the December 2015 shootings in San Bernardino, California, have been attributed to IS supporters who did not have apparent links to the organization but were praised by the group. Debate continues over whether IS elements overseas have the capability to direct, support, and/or carry out further attacks in the United States. The group's statements suggest it seeks to provoke reactions from targeted populations and spur confrontations between various Muslim sects and between Muslims and non-Muslims. The interdependent nature of the conflicts and political crises in Iraq, Syria, and other countries where IS fighters operate complicate efforts to address and eliminate the IS threat. President Obama has stated that the goals of U.S. strategy are to "degrade and ultimately defeat" the Islamic State using various means including U.S. direct military action and support for local partner forces. U.S. military operations against the group and its adherents in several countries, as well as U.S. diplomatic efforts to reconcile Syrian and Iraqi factions, are ongoing. Parallel U.S. political and security efforts in North Africa, West Africa, and South Asia also seek to mitigate local IS-related threats. This report provides background on the Islamic State organization, discussing its goals, operations, and affiliates, as well as analyzing related U.S. legislative and policy debates. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2016. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS R43612: Accessed February 17, 2016 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf Shelf Number: 137859 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Southern Poverty Law Center Title: Age of the Wolf: A Study of the Rise of Lone Wolf and Leaderless Resistance Terrorism Summary: The study, which covers the period between April 1, 2009, and Feb. 1, 2015, and includes violence from both the radical right and homegrown jihadists, finds that a domestic terrorist attack or foiled attack occurred, on average, every 34 days. It also shows that fully 74% of the more than 60 incidents examined were carried out, or planned, by a lone wolf, a single person operating entirely alone. A total of 90% of the incidents were the work of just one or two persons, the study found. The long-term trend away from violence planned and committed by groups and toward lone wolf terrorism is a worrying one. Authorities have had far more success penetrating plots concocted by several people than individuals who act on their own. Indeed, the lone wolf's chief asset is the fact that no one else knows of his plans for violence and they are therefore exceedingly difficult to disrupt. Next week's summit, to be hosted by President Obama, is meant to "better understand, identify, and prevent the cycle of radicalization to violence at home in the United States and abroad," the White House said. Although the meeting is ostensibly devoted to all forms of terrorism, there is a danger, in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris, that Islamist terror will be the primary focus. That would be a serious mistake. There's no question that the jihadist threat is a tremendous one. Close to 3,000 Americans were murdered by Al Qaeda on Sept. 11, 2001, far more than the number killed by any other form of terrorism. And officials are now warning that the Islamic State, known for its barbaric beheadings and the burning alive of a Jordanian pilot, may be plotting to kidnap Americans abroad in a slew of other countries. But that is not the only terrorist threat facing Americans today. A large number of independent studies have agreed that since the 9/11 mass murder, more people have been killed in America by non-Islamic domestic terrorists than jihadists. That fact is also apparent in the new SPLC study of the 2009-2015 period. Since 9/11, however, the government has focused very heavily on jihadists, sometimes to the exclusion of violence from various forms of domestic extremists. That was first apparent in the immediate aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks, when almost all government resources were channeled toward battling foreign jihadists. A stark example of that is the way the Justice Department has allowed its Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee to go into hibernation since that day. But it is also reflected in the way that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is charged with providing law enforcement information and analysis of all kinds of violent extremism, let its team devoted to non-Islamic domestic terrorism fall apart in the aftermath of a controversial leaked report. The 2009 report, which detailed the resurgence of the radical right in the aftermath of Obama's 2008 election, was pilloried by pundits and politicians who wrongly saw it as an attack on all conservatives. As a result, then-DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano apologized for it, and the DHS intelligence team that wrote it has since virtually disbanded. The temptation to focus on horrific groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State is wholly understandable. And the federal government recently has taken steps to address the terrorist threat more comprehensively, with Attorney General Eric Holder announcing the coming reconstitution of the Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee. There has been a recent increase in funding for studies of terrorism and radicalization, and the FBI has produced a number of informative reports. And Holder seems to understand clearly that lone wolves and small cells are an increasing threat. "It's something that frankly keeps me up at night, worrying about the lone wolf or a group of people, a very small group of people, who decide to get arms on their own and do what we saw in France," he said recently. But it's critical that Wednesday's gathering at the White House takes on terrorism in all its forms, Islamic and non-Islamic, foreign and domestic. Federal agencies must reinvigorate their work in studying and analyzing the radical right, helping law enforcement agencies around the country understand and counter the very real threat of domestic terrorism from the milieu that produced mass murderer Timothy McVeigh. It's not a question of focusing on one or another type of terror. No matter the source, we simply cannot afford to ignore the ongoing carnage. Details: Montgomery, AL: SPLC, 2015. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 19, 2016 at: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/lone-wolf-splc.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/lone-wolf-splc.pdf Shelf Number: 137895 Keywords: Extremists Homeland Security Islamic State Islamists Jihad Lone Wolf Terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Hemmingsen, Ann-Sophie Title: An Introduction to the Danish Approach to Countering and Preventing Extremism and Radicalization Summary: Preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization is increasingly gaining momentum as a supplement to more traditional counterterrorism activities in the efforts to protect societies against terrorism. The Danish approach has attracted attention not least because of its gentler approach to returnees from Syria and Iraq and the fact that it has been developing for nearly a decade. In this report, Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen provides an introduction to the approach and pinpoints the challenges and dilemmas with which it is faced. The Danish approach to preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization is based on extensive multi-agency collaboration between various social-service providers, the educational system, the health-care system, the police, municipalities, and the intelligence and security services. It benefits greatly from four decades' experience with such collaboration in relation to crime-prevention and from existing structures. As could be expected, the approach is faced with dilemmas, challenges and criticisms. The biggest challenge remains the lack of clear definitions of radicalization and extremism, which leads to a lack of consensus on criteria, standards and procedures. The inherent difficulty of cooperation and the substantial task of coordinating the efforts also continue to represent practical challenges. The Danish approach focuses on the individual and many of the initiatives developed revolve around help to self-help through, for example, mentoring, counselling and exit programmes. The prevalent focus on the individual represents a risk of overlooking social and political aspects that might require and inspire other types of responses than those already included. To meet contemporary challenges, the approach is continuously being developed, both top-down and bottom-up, but it rests on a set of fundamental premises ranging from understandings of the welfare state to understandings of crime and of how behavior can be changed. In order for other countries to determine whether there are lessons to be learned from the Danish approach, knowledge is required about these understandings and the existing structures into which the efforts are incorporated. Details: Copenhagen: DIIS - Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: DIIS Report 2015: 15: Accessed February 25, 2016 at: http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/369882/DIIS_Report_2015_15.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Denmark URL: http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/369882/DIIS_Report_2015_15.pdf Shelf Number: 137977 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Ellis, Clare Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism: Analysis Paper Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This fourth paper of the series conducts a detailed examination of the lone-actor terrorist database. The findings reaffirm a key assertion from the earlier literature review: there is no consistent profile for a lone-actor terrorist. However, systematic analysis of cases from across Europe has provided valuable insights into the scale of the threat, the ways in which it is most likely to manifest, and the activities of lone-actor terrorists in the time leading up to the attack. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 4: Accessed march 2, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_analysis_paper.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_analysis_paper.pdf Shelf Number: 138012 Keywords: Homeland Security Lone Wolf Terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) Title: Online Activism and Social Media Usage among Indonesian Extremists Summary: Indonesian extremists have a long history of online activism, but links to the Islamic State (still better known in Indonesia by its former acronym ISIS) have raised questions about whether social media usage is significantly changing patterns of radicalisation and recruitment. The answer seems to be a qualified no, but ISIS propaganda seems nevertheless to be having an impact, persuading some Indonesians that the "caliphate" in Syria and Iraq is a well-run state where devout Muslim families can find fulfilment. Where social media has made a difference is in its ability to turn anyone with a Twitter account into a potential propagandist, meaning that the ISIS message may start with friends and family linked into online networks but quickly reaches a much broader public. Despite the heavy reliance of Indonesian extremists at home and abroad on Facebook, Twitter a"d WhatsApp and similar services, "self-radicalization" and "lone wolf " actions have been extremely rare. Personal contacts and direct face-to-face engagement in religious discussion groups (pengajian) remain important, with friendships reinforced through Internet messaging and mobile phone communication. As one analyst notes, individuals do not become supporters of ISIS by simply by being exposed to propaganda, but the propaganda can help transform them from passive supporters into active members. Social media may play a more important role in recruitment in countries like Malaysia with a very strict legal regime, where police monitoring of suspected extremists is so strict that the only relatively "safe" means of interaction is online - and then only with some form of encryption. In Indonesia, however, it is easy for extremists to hold meetings and discussions, and this is where recruitment generally begins. The very few Indonesian groups that have identified potential members through Facebook have been among the least competent, in part because they have not been able to vet potential members properly. Details: Jakarta: IPAC, 2015. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: IPAC Report No. 24: Accessed March 4, 2016 at: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2015/10/IPAC_24_Online_Activism_Social_Media.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Indonesia URL: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2015/10/IPAC_24_Online_Activism_Social_Media.pdf Shelf Number: 138034 Keywords: Extremism Extremists Lone Wolf Terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media

Author: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) Title: Disunity Among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence Summary: Disunity among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), looks at the Jakarta attack on 14 January 2016 in the context of rivalry among Indonesian ISIS leaders in Syria and different pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia. The bombing and shooting in Indonesia's capital killed four civilians and four terrorists. The Jakarta attack is now known to have been locally organised - not directed from Syria as originally thought - but it almost instantly resulted in instructions from a Syria-based leader to his followers to do one better," says Sidney Jones, IPAC director. "Leaders of Indonesia's tiny pro-ISIS camp are competing to prove their fighting credentials." The report examines how these rivalries emerged. The Jakarta attack appears to have been carried out by members of a group known as Partisans of the Caliphate (Jamaah Anshar Khilafah, JAK), whose ideological leader is detained cleric Aman Abdurrahman. Aman has fallen out with the top Indonesian in Syria, Bahrumsyah, who commands Katibah Nusantara, the main Indonesian-Malaysian military unit in ISIS. He is close to Bahrumsyah's rival, Abu Jandal, who heads a dissident unit. Bahrumsyah is the Indonesian with best access to central ISIS leaders and funds, but the fact that official ISIS media claimed credit for the Jakarta attacks may have boosted Abu Jandal's position. Details: Jakarta: IPAC, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: IPAC Report No.25: Accessed march 4, 2016 at: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2016/02/IPAC_25.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Indonesia URL: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2016/02/IPAC_25.pdf Shelf Number: 138035 Keywords: Extremists ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorists

Author: Williams, Lauren Title: Islamic State propaganda and the mainstream media Summary: Islamic State's use of social media to disseminate its propaganda is generally well understood. What receives far less attention is how the group also uses the Western mainstream media to spread its key messages. Islamic State tailors the production and release of its material to the needs of mainstream media outlets and to the media cycle. The danger involved in sending Western journalists to Syria and Iraq has made the media more reliant on material produced by Islamic State. The group's propaganda is often unwittingly used by the mainstream media in ways that serve Islamic State's objectives. Islamic State's propaganda effort is central to its ability to recruit new members, intimidate its opponents, and promote its legitimacy as a state. Countering that effort means more than just combatting it online and cancelling Twitter accounts. Counter-messaging efforts need to take place through the mainstream media as well as social media. The mainstream media also has a responsibility to treat Islamic State's material more critically, including by providing more contextual coverage of the conflict in Syria and Iraq, and using less sensationalist or polarising rhetoric when it discusses terrorism. The adoption of better standards and practices can help the mainstream media to limit the appeal of Islamic State propaganda in ways that do not detract from media independence and the public-s right to know. Details: Sydney: Lowry Institute for International Policy, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 5, 2016 at: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/islamic-state-propaganda-western-media_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/islamic-state-propaganda-western-media_0.pdf Shelf Number: 138119 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamic State Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Russell, Jonathan Title: Countering Islamist Extremist Narratives: A Strategic Briefing Summary: The majority of this report was written as part of Quilliam's evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee's (HASC) inquiry on Countering Extremism. In addition to the analysis of the Islamist narrative and the strategic framework required to counter it, this strategic briefing includes three case studies of counter-narratives put together by Quilliam (not included in the HASC submission), and recommendations based on experience, expertise and these case studies for future counter-narrative approaches. Details: London: Quilliam, 2016. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 8, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/countering-islamist-extremist-narratives.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/countering-islamist-extremist-narratives.pdf Shelf Number: 138130 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Challenging the Narrative of the "Islamic State" Summary: ISIS has brought terrorist propaganda to a new level, targeting its main audiences in nearly two dozen languages with up to 90,000 tweets every day. Governments have generally been at a loss as how to counter the ISIS narrative with persuasive counter-arguments to reduce its attraction for rebellious Muslim youths in Western diasporas and Muslim-majority countries. At the core of ISIS' narrative are themes familiar to most Muslims. ISIS has appropriated and instrumentalised them for its main purpose: to expand the Caliphate proclaimed in mid-2014. In this Research Paper, Dr. Alex Schmid identifies a dozen narrative themes of ISIS and discusses them from theological, historical and other angles in an attempt to show vulnerabilities and point the way towards developing convincing counter-arguments. While the potential of this approach is demonstrated, Dr. Schmid argues that a concerted and systematic approach, based on synergetic, inter-disciplinary teamwork, is required to develop successful counter-narratives and that these need to be tested on audiences with a cultural affinity to ISIS main target groups before being utilised by credible Muslim voices who wish to engage terrorist ideologues and their potential followers with rational and faith-based arguments. The Research Paper concludes with the observation that developing counter-narratives, while necessary, is not enough. It is even more necessary to develop credible alternative narratives - narratives that can give a new sense of purpose, meaning and hope to those who feel that they have no future in their and our societies. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2015. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ICCT-Schmid-Challenging-the-Narrative-of-the-Islamic-State-June2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ICCT-Schmid-Challenging-the-Narrative-of-the-Islamic-State-June2015.pdf Shelf Number: 138159 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Islamic State Online Communications Radical Groups Religious Extremism Social Media Violent Extremism

Author: Winter, Charlie Title: Documenting the Virtual 'Caliphate' Summary: This report illuminates the strategic thinking behind Islamic State's propaganda machine. Building on the theoretical framework established in 'The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy', the following analysis is based upon an exhaustive 30-day survey of Islamic State's media output. At 24 hour intervals from 17 July to 15 August 2015, the Islamic month of Shawwal, all media output from Islamic State's official outlets, from the provincial offices to the central foundations, was compiled for aggregated analysis. A total of 1146 separate events - discrete batches of propaganda - were recorded in the data collection period: a mixture of photo essays, videos, audio statements, news bulletins, posters, theological essays, and so on. After the data collection period had ended, the archive was translated and refined, as events were grouped according to their primary narrative and, if applicable, sub-narratives. Following this, the data was rigorously tested against a number of variables to determine inconsistencies and anomalies. Then, the archive was broken down into its various narrative groupings, which were qualitatively assessed both in isolation of, and respect to, each other. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf Shelf Number: 138172 Keywords: Caliphate Islamic State Media Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Rafiq, Haras Title: Caliphettes: Women and the Appeal of Islamic State Summary: The following report discusses the appeal of the Islamic Sate 'caliphate' to women. To do this, the authors have embarked upon a close analysis of Islamic State's official propaganda and unofficial proselytisers. In the process, four promises "empowerment, deliverance, participation and piety" are identified as the organisation's key pull factors. -The promise of empowerment conveyed by Islamic State's official and unofficial propaganda encourages women to understand joining the organisation as a means to reverse the ills that they face in life outside the 'caliphate'. By joining Islamic State, the line goes, women can defiantly take charge of their lives in the same way that men can: through living in Islamic State's "caliphate" and supporting its jihad by marrying a fighter, women are led to believe that they can emancipate themselves from kufr (disbelief). - The deliverance promise focuses on the idea that, by joining Islamic State, grievances that women suffer in the West are immediately resolved. Women can be freed from daily degradations and disbelief, and are instead assimilated into a tight-knit collective sisterhood that will provide them with a network of support and friendship. Reflective of this, the ideas of redemption and deliverance tend to be directed to females by females. - The participation promise incentivizes women to join Islamic State even though their role is strictly non-military. It conveys a sense that there is more to the 'caliphate's' jihad than fighting and that, for women, there is a specific state-building role. A constant theme in Islamic State propaganda is that supporting the 'caliphate', making it grow and flourish, is the job of everyone. For women, this takes the role of providing, maintaining and educating its 'cubs', the next generation of fighters, as well as supporting their soldier spouses. - The last promise of Islamic State's women-orientated propaganda is piety, something built up the theological imperative to join the group. The alleged pristine nature of an 'Islamic existence' in the "caliphate" is a means of justifying each stress and sacrifice and also acts as a means for recruiters to exert peer pressure to push others to make hijra (migrating). - These four themes alone do not cause female supporters of Islamic State in the West to make hijra. However, when combined with the group's copious amounts of audio-visual propaganda, they play a crucial role in the rhetorical armoury of the 'caliphate's' recruiters. �-The discussion on the radicalisation of women is overly gendered and, all too often, predicated on misconceptions. In reality, when it comes to joining violent extremist causes, women are susceptible to the very same processes as men: narratives, ideology, grievances, and various push and pull factors. Reflecting this, the last part of this report delivers policy recommendations on how we must reappraise our attempts to counter the twin processes of female radicalisation and recruitment, in line with general counter-radicalisation, but using women as specific entry points. The four promises used in Islamic State propaganda, and cited in this report, are not exhaustive. There are a multitude of factors that contribute to an individual's radicalisation, of which propaganda can play an important part. As such, research into the key narratives employed by the 'caliphate' can shine an important individual's journey to jihad. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/caliphettes-women-and-the-appeal-of-is.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/caliphettes-women-and-the-appeal-of-is.pdf Shelf Number: 138173 Keywords: Caliphate Islamic State Jihad Media Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Russell, Jonathan Title: Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7 Summary: The following report seeks to present to the recently elected government a series of policy recommendations to be implemented in the new counter-extremism strategy. Essentially, it posits that a change in structure is needed to complement the fresh strategic direction of the new government. Since 2011, government has identified the need to tackle the ideology of Islamism to prevent extremism, both violent and non-violent, in order to safeguard human rights and liberal principles. However, the domestic tools at the government's disposal with which to implement this vision have proved lacking. The Prevent strategy, after its amendments in 2011, failed to offer enough to successfully challenge non-violent extremism and proffer a convincing counter-narrative around which to rally. The rapid rise of ISIL and the evolution of global jihadism, the virulence of which has accelerated the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals, has made clear the shortcomings of our current policy efforts. Put simply, a new strategy is patently overdue. The key thrust of this report is the need to create a new body within government between the hard-approach to counter-terrorism and the soft-approach of community cohesion that can act as the foundation for a clear, consistent, and comprehensive strategy for tackling extremism of all kinds. It is the space in which people sympathise with extremist ideology but do not escalate to violent activism that has been so unchallenged. This body should focus on tackling the basis of the problem at hand, engaging at the grassroots of society to tackle ideology and extremist narratives, while also using this to conduct nuanced primary prevention, targeted prevention and deradicalisation programmes. All this should be grounded on an understanding of the radicalisation process' four constituent parts: ideology; narratives; grievances; and identity crisis. The opening sections of the report deal with the debate surrounding fundamental and contentious issues in extremism and radicalisation. They attempt to clarify issues of disagreement that have long proved problematic, and evince workable solutions that can be instrumentalised within the government's newest strategic direction. The report offers a human rights-based definition and approach to extremism, as opposed to the currently ambiguous and contentious one put forward by the government that focuses on British values. It highlights the contradictions and dead-ends that arise through defining extremism in political terms but maintaining a position of protection for liberty and belief, and advocates a universal standard with which to challenge extremism openly. Moreover, it urges an approach that does not define extremism according to current threats to national security, and instead allows for all forms of extremism (Islamist, far-right , far-left or animal rights, for example) - which beyond superficial differences, is a homogeneous social malaise - to be incorporated in a strategy that is inclusive and fair. There is a strong focus placed on targeted prevention, and for those entrenched deeper in the mire of radicalisation, deradicalisation procedures. The report recommends the following: - Base all counter-extremism work around tackling extremist ideology and undermining extremist narrative to reduce the appeal of extremism, and address grievances and build resilience against identity crisis to reduce the vulnerability of individuals to radicalisation. - Define extremism in opposition to universal human rights, and apply this consistently in all counter-extremism work, including when recruiting and choosing national or local partners. - Run the counter-extremism strategy out of the Cabinet office as an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body, in turn run by a politically neutral advisory board with counter-extremism expertise. The existing Extremism Analysis Unit, along with the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) could sit within this body, which should include centralised due diligence, training, funding and evaluation capabilities. - Build relationships with a broad spectrum of community partners, prioritizing underrepresented demographics and hard-to-reach minorities. - Deliver comprehensive in-house training for all relevant public sector staff to ensure effective counter-extremism efforts. - Upskill counter-extremism partners, including frontline workers and other government departments, to develop online projects to catch up with the current nature of the threat, and train computer specialists in counter-extremism. - Engage civil society to tackle all extremisms as a social ill, and to do so online as well. One way of doing this can be through building public-private-third sector partnerships. - Treat the police like any other frontline workers in this field. This desecuritisation will unburden them, allowing a concentration of resources on sharp-end counter-terrorism measures. - Train frontline workers such as teachers, university staff, police officers, prison staff, healthcare workers and leaders of religious and community organisations, to carry out primary prevention work, predicated on promoting human rights and raising awareness of radicalisation. They can be trained to spot the signs of radicalisation and made aware of the best courses of action to carry out targeted prevention. - Build resilience in vulnerable institutions and sectors such as schools, universities, prisons and charities to prevent extremist entryism, through clearer whistleblowing procedures, tougher requirements to be met for prospective staff, and raised awareness among those who work in these sectors about the dangers of extremism. - Work with universities to prevent extremist speakers being given unchallenged platforms and access to potentially vulnerable students. This can be done through clearer due diligence procedures, specific counter-extremism guidance, and increased engagement of third sector counter-extremism organizations. - Develop a clearer prison-based strategy for ideological assessment, targeted deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of terrorism-related offenders, particular in regard to returnee foreign terrorist fighters. The partners used in this regard must uphold universal human rights standards and be adequately equipped to enact this deradicalisation effectively. - Implement prison-specific primary prevention programmes to avert radicalisation of those vulnerable in prisons to stop these institutions being net exporters of extremism. - Ensure that national counter-extremism strategy trickles down to local government level, and that regional and local counter-extremism partners receive adequate training to fulfill their role. - Foster relations with a broad range of community partners to promote this strategy and understand the likelihood of any work in this area being targeted by extremists. Increase the transparency of counter-extremism efforts to ensure that Muslim communities do not feel targeted, and non-Muslims do not feel that Muslims are receiving preferential treatment by the state. - Develop the notion that Muslim communities are an important element of a wider civil society response to extremism, and have a voice and, further than this, a say in the development of counter-narratives, community-based projects, and efforts to aid vulnerable members of their communities. - Promote counter-extremism best practice, at the level of structure, strategy and delivery, to international partners, with the aim of coordinating efforts on an EU- or UN-wide scale. Likewise, we must be willing to learn from successful counter-extremism models in other countries. - Prioritise counter-extremism work overseas in Muslim-majority countries through improving primary prevention, countering ideology, and promoting human rights. Build bridges with foreign partners to build a global alliance against extremism of all kinds. While lacunae in our collective knowledge of the radicalisation process persist, this report offers a conceptual framework, and more importantly - at this critical time - practical recommendations to strengthen the UK's counter-extremism efforts. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/counter-extremism-a-decade-on-from-7-7.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/counter-extremism-a-decade-on-from-7-7.pdf Shelf Number: 138174 Keywords: Caliphate Counter-Terrorism De-radicalization Islamic State Media Muslims Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Winter, Charlie Title: The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy Summary: The following report sheds light on the strategic motivations of, and implications to, Islamic State's media operation. By analysing the organisation's propaganda output over the twelve months that followed its 'caliphate' declaration in June 2014, it has been possible to dismantle the brand into its constituent narratives and the various target audiences into their composite parts. In doing so, the report demystifies the Islamic State propaganda machine and cuts through much of the unhelpful rhetoric surrounding it. By applying Jacques Ellul's theoretical framework to Islamic State's official messaging, this paper unambiguously demonstrates that, with all its complexity and gloss, the organisation's propaganda is not singularly responsible for radicalising individuals, let alone their joining the jihadist cause abroad or carrying out attacks at home. That being said, it does catalyse the Islamist extremist's passage from tacit supporter to active member. However, this is just one of the many functions of Islamic State's propaganda - as the following report demonstrates, it is much more than a matter of inciting and intimidating. From the following pages, ten key conclusions emerge: 1. For the international audience, the use of brutality by Islamic State is a red herring. While, it serves to warn against local dissent and gratify sympathisers, on an international level, its prevalence has fatally derailed mainstream understanding of the organisation and its appeal to its many thousands of foreign recruits. 2. Islamic State's propaganda has generated a comprehensive brand, one that offers an alternate way of living. Like any mass movement, it captures the imaginations of its potential recruits by offering both immediate change and the ability to transform their future in the long term. 3. This brand is composed of six non-discrete narratives - brutality, mercy, victimhood, war, belonging and utopianism - each of which is analysed in detail separately, and relation to, each other. 4. While brutality is easily the most prominent of these narratives in the West, utopianism is by far the most important narrative for Islamic State's propagandists; it is the organisation's utopian offer that is most alluring to new recruits. Unless we understand what makes up this 'utopia', any attempt to challenge the ideas is doomed to failure. 5. By outsourcing its propaganda dissemination, Islamic State has insulated itself from government-led schemes to censor its content. Its disseminators are, most of the time, self-appointed and have no official position in the organisation, virtual or otherwise. They receive no reward for their activism other than gratification from within the Islamic State echo chamber. 6. It is not just dissemination that Islamic State has outsourced. By saturating the online jihadist marketplace of ideas with official content, it also provides an abundance of raw material for 'jihobbyists' to produce their own unofficial propaganda. In doing so, the organisation is able to constantly direct the trajectory of its online narrative from afar and without direct involvement. 7. Islamic State's propagandists constantly create bespoke propagandistic material for a range of audiences. They are not just seeking to attract new supporters and intimidate enemies, but are also working to polarise international publics, sustain their organisation's global relevance (in jihadist and non-jihadist spheres) and present their enlisters with 'evidence' to convince potential recruits to become active members. 8. There is no such thing as a 'recruiter', in the traditional sense of the word. Recruitment to the Islamic State organisation involves a range of different actors and processes. First, one must be recruited to the cause. It is only then that an individual is actually enlisted. The 'recruiter to the cause' is not the same individual as the 'enlister to the organisation'. 9. Social media has emerged as this decade's 'radical mosqu'. While radicalisation, for the most part begins offline, Islamic State, along with other groups, has nurtured a situation in which the curious are able to have direct contact with former or current fighters, hear first-hand accounts from the battlefield and swap logistical advice. In decades gone by, this was a function served by so-called 'radical mosques'. In the digital era, social media platforms are the space where this happens. Crucially, social media platforms are not the reason for radicalisation or recruitment, just as 'radical' mosques and bookshops were never the reason. 10. People are not radicalised by propaganda, nor are they recruited by it. There must always be an external human influencer to spark and sustain the radicalisation process. This could be a friend, family-member or stranger. Whatever the case, exposure to Islamic State�s propaganda alone is not the reason that someone becomes a supporter. What propaganda does do, though, is catalyse the individual's radicalisation and concentrate their already-held sympathies. If we are to effectively counter Islamic State's media strategy - something which, at the time of writing, we are certainly failing at - we must first understand it. The propaganda behemoth can and must be broken down into its constituent parts; doing so facilitates a more nuanced, considered approach to the information war on Islamic State. Unless we understand the strategy behind the organisation's media machine, misconceptions about what drives its supporters - be they potential migrants or potential domestic terrorists - will continue to flourish. It is imperative that the coalition formed to degrade and destroy Islamic State recognises that there is no 'Golden Fleece' solution to this problem. There is no one counter narrative, nor is there any one audience that needs targeting. The coalition's information war machine, though better funded and potentially more numerous, is dwarfed by that of Islamic State. Unless its information architecture is revolutionised, the international coalition will always lose the battle for ideas. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf Shelf Number: 138175 Keywords: Caliphate Islamic State Jihad Media Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Malik, Nikita Title: South Asian Militant Groups and Global Jihad in 2015 Summary: This report is designed as a field guide to the most significant militant groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. It illustrates regional and international trends, and it explains the strategies that have been used by various global jihadist actors at a turning point in South Asian geopolitics. Due to a combination of military operations against them, internal fractionalisation, and the shifting influence of "global jihad", terrorist groups in South Asia are far from structured, cohesive units. As such, Quilliam advocates a new approach in policy. It is now crucial to revisit and re-emphasise the potential for counter-radicalization strategies, as well as mental health policy to reduce the risk of radicalisation. Moreover, we maintain that by coupling civil society initiatives with local, regional, and international policies, the affected Governments will be able to counter these violent ideologies. Based on our findings, Quilliam has developed the following set of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism recommendations: To the International Community: - Make counter-extremism and human rights principles the cornerstone of all related aid that is provided to Pakistan and Afghanistan. - Continue to focus on human rights as a core aim. Strongly insist on greater transparency during counter-terror operations such as Zarb-e-Azb in FATA. If human rights abuses against civilians go unchecked, then defeating one wave of militancy is a temporary victory, as another will be created in the process in response to perceived injustices. - Support grassroots reconciliation efforts and civil society initiatives which offer positive, sensitive, and sustainable forms of post-conflict solutions. - Better engage with Muslim communities in India, Pakistan, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and Afghanistan to decrease the appeal of an Islamic caliphate by promoting democratic cultures and addressing grievances to prevent militant ideologies exploiting them. - Help foster stronger micro-finance charity relationships, banking systems, and schemes in South Asia in order to provide conduits to micro-credit for smaller villages and communities that will facilitate economic and social development, and reduce the risks of radicalisation within the relevant communities. The informal 'value transfer' system that is known as the hawala system, tends to thrive when the banking sector is weak. We recommend requirements on hawaladar, such as licensing and registration. - Support economic policies that will reduce income inequality in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, and avoid the implementation of financial measures that disproportionately impact the poor in the way that structural adjustment schemes have done so in the past. - Critically review the legal, moral, and military arguments for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in operations over Pakistan and Afghanistan. Associated grievances can be exploited by extremists to radicalize or recruit local populations. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Asia URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/south-asian-militant-groups-and-global-jihad-in-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 138176 Keywords: Caliphate Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism De-Radicalization Islamic State Jihad Media Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Ochsner, Christian Title: Migrating Extremists Summary: We show that migrating extremists shape political landscapes toward their ideology in the long run. We exploit the unexpected division of the state of Upper Austria into a US and a Soviet occupation zone after WWII. Zoning prompts large-scale Nazi migration to US occupied regions. Regions that witnessed a Nazi influx exhibit significantly higher voting shares for the right-wing Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) throughout the entire post-WWII period, but not before WWII. We can exclude other channels that may have affected post-war elections, including differences in US and Soviet denazification and occupation policies, bomb attacks, Volksdeutsche refugees and suppression by other political parties. We show that extremism is transmitted through family ties and local party branches. We find that the surnames of FPO local election candidates in 2015 in the former US zone are more prevalent in 1942 phonebook data (Reichstelefonbuch) of the former Soviet zone compared to other parties. Details: Dresden, Germany: Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, 2016. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: CESifo Working Paper No. 5799: Accessed march 16, 2016 at: https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19190307 Year: 2016 Country: Austria URL: https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19190307 Shelf Number: 138259 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Ubaydi, Muhammad Title: The group that calls itself a state : understanding the evolution and challenges of the Islamic State Summary: In an attempt to paint a more complete picture of the Islamic State (IS), this report identifies key areas where the IS has shown strength, learning, and adaptation. This report also highlights key areas of weakness, mistake, and failure. In doing so, the reader should be well aware that this product provides such an overview with the explicit understanding that there is more to learn in each of these areas. The report proceeds as follows. The first section traces the historical evolution of the group, with emphasis on the fact that well executed design and an ability to take advantage of accidents led to the creation of the IS. The second section provides a very brief and preliminary comparison of the IS to other prominent militant organizations against which the United States has fought: al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. This section is followed by a third that outlines and explores the strengths and weaknesses of the IS as a whole, noting that the IS's success comes from its ability to leverage all parts of its organization to achieve maximum gain. This section also points out that, despite this success, the fact that the IS is attempting to operate across multiple functional areas will test the group's ability to adapt over time and will ultimately expose the group's shortcomings. The fourth and final section steps back to examine, at the strategic level, some of the challenges faced and opportunities available to those combating the IS. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2014. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 16, 2016 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CTC-The-Group-That-Calls-Itself-A-State-December20141.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CTC-The-Group-That-Calls-Itself-A-State-December20141.pdf Shelf Number: 138260 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Shatz, Howard J. Title: The Islamic State We Knew: Insights Before the Resurgence and Their Implications Summary: The group calling itself the Islamic State poses a grave threat, not just to Iraq and Syria but to the region more broadly and to the United States and its global coalition partners. A deadly and adaptive foe, the Islamic State seemed to come out of nowhere in June 2014, when it conquered Mosul. However, the Islamic State of today is the direct descendant of a group that Iraq, the United States, and their partners once fought as al-Qa'ida in Iraq and then as the Islamic State of Iraq. The wealth of publicly available information about the group indicates that the Islamic State's reemergence in 2014, and especially its methods and goals, should not have come as a surprise, although the strength and scope of that reemergence were rightfully shocking. The history considered in this report provides information known by the end of 2011 about the group's origins, finances, organization, methods of establishing control over territory, and response to airpower. Now that the Islamic State has reemerged, countering it can rely, in part, on the great deal of accumulated knowledge available. Because Iraqis and coalition forces routed the group once, the group's history can inform four components of a successful strategy against the Islamic State: degrading the group's finances, eliminating its leadership and potential leadership, creating a better strategy to hold recaptured territory, and making use of airpower. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 16, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1267/RAND_RR1267.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1267/RAND_RR1267.pdf Shelf Number: 138326 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: International Crisis Group Title: Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State Summary: The Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda-linked groups, Boko Haram and other extremist movements are protagonists in today's deadliest crises, complicating efforts to end them. They have exploited wars, state collapse and geopolitical upheaval in the Middle East, gained new footholds in Africa and pose an evolving threat elsewhere. Reversing their gains requires avoiding the mistakes that enabled their rise. This means distinguishing between groups with different goals; using force more judiciously; ousting militants only with a viable plan for what comes next; and looking to open lines of communication, even with hardliners. Vital, too, is to de-escalate the crises they feed off and prevent others erupting, by nudging leaders toward dialogue, inclusion and reform and reacting sensibly to terrorist attacks. Most important is that action against "violent extremism" not distract from or deepen graver threats, notably escalating major- and regional-power rivalries. The reach of "jihadists" (a term Crisis Group uses reluctantly but that groups this report covers self-identify with; a fuller explanation for its use is on page 2) has expanded dramatically over the past few years. Some movements are now powerful insurgent forces, controlling territory, supplanting the state and ruling with a calibrated mix of coercion and co-option. Little suggests they can be defeated by military means alone. Yet, they espouse, to varying degrees, goals incompatible with the nation-state system, rejected by most people in areas affected and hard to accommodate in negotiated settlements. Most appear resilient, able to adapt to shifting dynamics. The geography of crisis today means similar groups will blight many of tomorrow's wars. IS has reshaped the jihadist landscape: its strategy bloodier than that of al-Qaeda, from which it split in 2013; its declared caliphate across much of Iraq and Syria and grip on a Libyan coastal strip; thousands of foreigners and dozens of movements enlisted; its attacks in the Muslim world and the West. Fighting on multiple fronts - against Iran's allies, Sunni Arab regimes and the West - it has woven together sectarian, revolutionary and anti-imperialist threads of jihadist thought. Its leadership is mostly Iraqi but the movement is protean: millenarian and local insurgent; to some a source of protection, to others of social mobility and yet others of purpose; with strands aiming to consolidate the caliphate, take Baghdad or even Mecca, or lure the West into an apocalyptic battle. Primarily, though, its rise reflects recent Iraqi and Syrian history: Sunni exclusion and anomie after the disastrous U.S invasion; harsh treatment under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki; and the brutality of President Bashar al-Assad's regime and its allies. Any response must factor in IS's many faces. But mostly it needs to address Sunni suffering in the Levant and the dangerous sense of victimisation that has helped spawn across the Sunni Arab world. In part obscured by IS's rise, al-Qaeda has evolved. Its affiliates in the Maghreb, Somalia, Syria and Yemen remain potent, some stronger than ever. Some have grafted themselves onto local insurrections, displaying a degree of pragmatism, caution about killing Muslims and sensitivity to local norms. Around the Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram, the latest in a string of revivalist movements rooted in the marginalised political economy and structural violence of northern Nigeria, has morphed from isolated sect to regional menace, though formally joining IS has changed little about it. Movements of different stripes - the largely nationalist Afghan Taliban, resurgent as foreign troops draw down from Afghanistan, and Pakistani groups including sectarian movements, tribal militants fighting the central state and Kashmir- or Afghanistan-focused elements aligned to its military establishment - comprise an evolving South Asian jihadist scene. The roots of this expansion defy generic description. Patterns of radicalisation vary from country to country, village to village, individual to individual. Autocrats, political exclusion, flawed Western interventions, failing governance, closing avenues for peaceful political expression, the distrust of the state in neglected peripheries, traditional elites' declining authority and the lack of opportunity for growing youth populations have all played their part. So, too, has the dwindling appeal of other ideologies, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood's peaceful political Islam - jihadists' main ideological competitor - diminished by President Muhammed Morsi's ouster and the subsequent crackdown in Egypt. Proselytising of intolerant strands of Islam has, in places, helped prepare the ground. The sectarian currents coursing through much of the Muslim world both are aggravated by IS and give it succour. But if roots are complex, the catalyst is clear enough. The descent of most of the 2011 Arab revolutions into chaos has opened enormous opportunity for extremists. Movements have gathered force as crises have festered and evolved, as money, weapons and fighters flow in, as violence escalates. Mounting enmity between states means regional powers worry less about extremists than about traditional rivals, leverage the fight against IS against other enemies or quietly indulge jihadists as proxies. Especially in the Middle East, jihadists' expansion is more a product of instability than its primary driver; is due more to radicalisation during crises than beforehand; and owes more to fighting between their enemies than to their own strengths. Rarely can such a movement gather force or seize territory outside a war zone or collapsed state. Geopolitics hinders a coherent response. The starting point should be to dial back the Saudi-Iranian rivalry that drives Sunni and Shia extremism, deepens crises across the region and is among the gravest threats to international peace and security today. Easing other tensions - between Turkey and Kurdish militants, for example, Turkey and Russia, conservative Arab regimes and the Muslim Brotherhood, Pakistan and India, even Russia and the West - is also essential. In Libya, Syria and Yemen, tackling jihadists requires forging new orders attractive enough to deplete their ranks and unite other forces. Of course, none of this is easy. But redoubling efforts to narrow other fault lines would be wiser than papering them over in an illusion of consensus against "violent extremism". Vital, too, is to learn from mistakes since the 9/11 (2001) attacks. Each movement, notwithstanding the links between and transnational ties of some, is distinct and locally rooted; each requires a response tailored to context. They can, however, pose similar dilemmas and provoke similar blunders. Major and regional powers and governments in areas affected should: - Disaggregate not conflate: Making enemies of non-violent Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, prepared to accept political and religious pluralism and engage in politics is self-defeating. Also important is to distinguish movements seeking a place within the international order from those wanting to upend it. Even IS, its local branches and al-Qaeda affiliates, despite belonging to the latter category, are not monolithic. They have dedicated cores with transnational goals, but rank-and-files with diverse, mostly local motives whose loyalty can shift, and perhaps be shifted, with changing conditions. Governments should disaggregate even radical movements with an eye to ending violence, not lump others in with them looking for a fight. - Contain if no better option exists: Foreign powers should always have a viable plan for what comes next if they undertake to oust militants; the same applies to governments in their hinterlands. Today's strategy in Iraq - razing towns to defeat IS in the hope Sunni leaders in Baghdad can regain lost legitimacy through reconstruction - is unlikely either to meet Sunnis' grievances or create conditions in which they can forge a new political identity. In Libya a heavy bombardment or deployment of Western troops against IS without a wider political settlement would be a mistake, likely to deepen the chaos. In both cases, slowing military operations also carries grave risks but, without a workable alternative, is the safer option - for those contemplating going in and those in areas affected alike. - Use force more judiciously: Although force usually must be part of the response, governments have been too quick to go to war. Movements with roots in communities, tapping genuine grievances and sometimes with foreign backing are hard to extirpate, however unappealing their ideology. Wars in Somalia and Afghanistan show the shortfalls of defining enemies as terrorists or violent extremists and of combining efforts to build centralised state institutions with military action against them absent a wider political strategy that includes reconciliation. Nor can Russia's scorched-earth approach in Chechnya - even leaving aside the human cost - be replicated in areas affected today, given porous borders, collapsed states and proxy warfare. - Respect rules: Too often military action against extremists helps them recruit or leaves communities caught between their harsh rule and indiscriminate operations against them. Jihadists' ability to offer protection against predation by regimes, other militias or foreign powers is among their greatest assets, usually more central to their success than ideology. While often guilty of atrocities, they fight in conflicts in which all sides violate international humanitarian law. Recovering the rulebook must be a priority. - Curb targeted killings: Drone strikes can, in places, hinder groups' operations and ability to hit Western interests and their leaders' movements. But they feed resentment against local governments and the West. Movements weather the deaths of leaders, and the replacements that emerge are often harder-line. Foreseeing the impact of killings is hard in a reasonably stable order; doing so amid urban warfare and jihadist infighting - with al-Qaeda and others confronting IS - is impossible. Even leaving aside questions of secrecy, legality and accountability, targeted killings will not end the wars jihadists fight in or decisively weaken most movements. - Open lines of communication: Notwithstanding the difficulties, governments should be more willing to talk, even with radicals. Opportunities to engage in ways that might have de-escalated violence - with some Taliban and al-Shabaab leaders, Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, for example - have been lost. The decision whether a group is irreconcilable rests with its leaders not governments. Although policy-makers can entertain no illusions about the nature of the IS and al-Qaeda top commands, opportunities to open unofficial, discreet lines of communication, through community leaders, non-state mediators or others, are usually worth pursuing, particularly on issues of humanitarian concern, where there may be shared interest. - Narrow the "countering violent extremism" (CVE) agenda: As a corrective to post-9/11 securitised policies, the CVE agenda, pioneered mostly by development actors, is valuable; so, too, are recognising the underlying conditions that can, in places, enable extremists' recruitment and shifting funds from military spending to development aid. But re-hatting as CVE activities to address "root causes", particularly those related to states' basic obligations to citizens - like education, employment or services to marginalised communities - may prove short-sighted. Casting "violent extremism", a term often ill-defined and open to misuse, as a main threat to stability risks downplaying other sources of fragility, delegitimising political grievances and stigmatising communities as potential extremists. Governments and donors must think carefully what to label CVE, further research paths of radicalisation and consult widely across the spectrum of those most affected. - Invest in conflict prevention: IS's and al-Qaeda's recent expansion injects new urgency into prevention, both during crises, to halt their radicalisation, and upstream. Any further breakdown in the belt running from West Africa to South Asia is likely to attract an extremist element - whether these movements provoke crises themselves or, more likely, profit from their escalation. Although generic prescriptions are of limited value, nudging leaders toward more inclusive and representative politics, addressing communities' grievances and measured responses to terrorist attacks usually make sense. Overall, in other words, preventing crises will do more to contain violent extremists than countering violent extremism will do to prevent crises. The past quarter-century has seen waves of jihadist violence: a first in the early 1990s, when volunteers from the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan joined insurrections elsewhere; a second pioneered by al-Qaeda culminating in the 9/11 attacks; and a third sparked by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Today's fourth wave is the most perilous yet. Partly this is thanks to IS's territorial control and ideological innovation - its tapping of both local Sunni and wider anti-establishment discontent. Mostly, though, it is dangerous because of the currents propelling it, particularly the Middle East's upheaval and fraying state-society relations there and elsewhere. World leaders' concern is well-founded: IS's attacks kill their citizens and threaten their societies' cohesion. They face enormous pressure to act. But they must do so prudently. Missteps - whether careless military action abroad; crackdowns at home; subordinating aid to counter-radicalisation; casting the net too wide; or ignoring severer threats in a rush to fight "violent extremism" - risk aggravating those deeper currents and again playing into jihadists' hands. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 22, 2016 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state.pdf Shelf Number: 138368 Keywords: al-Qaeda Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Jihadists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism Violent Extremists

Author: Kessels, Eelco Title: Countering Violent Extremism and Development Assistance: Identifying Synergies, Obstacles, and Opportunities Summary: A consensus is building that violent extremism and terrorism are both international security and development issues. It is well documented that economic and social development are better attained in the absence of violent conflict. Furthermore, although poverty does not have a direct causal relationship with violent extremism and terrorism, poorer countries are the most affected by terrorism. Beyond socioeconomic challenges, a lack of hope and future prospects, real or perceived marginalization and sociopolitical exclusion, and weak governance and rule of law are considered conducive to the spread of terrorism and challenging to sustainable development. Indeed, Sustainable Development Goal (SDG)16, one of the United Nations - supported set of targets related to international development, focuses on the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision of access to justice for all, and the building of effective, accountable, and representative institutions at all levels. Moreover, violent extremism and terrorism are direct threats to development as they impact economic stability, tourism, and the human security and freedom of citizens, including their freedom from physical threat, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression. Lastly, violent extremism is increasingly part of the context in which development organizations operate, with violent extremist groups impeding, endangering, and diverting the delivery of development assistance and aid services. In certain cases, terrorism and violent extremism are the primary factors contributing to the need for continued assistance. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 17p. Source: Internet Resource; Policy Brief: Accessed March 24, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Feb-2016-CVE-and-Development-policy-brief.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Feb-2016-CVE-and-Development-policy-brief.pdf Shelf Number: 138408 Keywords: Development Assistance Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremists

Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: The ISIS Impact on the Domestic Islamic Extremist Threat: Homegrown Islamic Extremism 2009-2015 Summary: In 2015, 80 U.S. residents were linked to terror plots and other activity motivated by Islamic extremist ideology. They were either arrested, charged or otherwise publicly identified for their involvement in crimes ranging from providing support, attempting to fund or traveling to join terrorist groups abroad, or planning or assisting in plots here at home. This is a level of activity by U.S. residents inspired by foreign terrorist organizations never before seen. The 2015 numbers - up 180% from 2014 - are a result of a confluence of global trends, technological advances and the constant tide of terrorist messages and propaganda. In 2015 for the first time, nearly as many Americans were killed by domestic Islamic extremists as by white supremacists. And the spike in arrests and violence does not seem to be confined to 2015. In the first month of 2016, at least 6 U.S. residents were linked criminal activity motivated by Islamic extremist ideologies. Following on the heels of the record-breaking number of terror related arrests in 2015, these new arrests further underscore the persistent nature of the threat. Ongoing unrest in the Middle East, particularly in relation to the ongoing Syrian civil war, continued to provide opportunities for terrorist organizations to operate and gain strength. As in 2014, the majority of the U.S. residents linked to terror in 2015 supported the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as IS or ISIL), which is based in Syria and Iraq and has affiliates in a number of other countries including Egypt, Libya and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, ISIS and other terrorist groups continue to take advantage of technology to mobilize followers, spread their messages and expand their influence worldwide. The internet and social media sites in particular, remain a pivotal element of the modern radicalization process. Online social interactions facilitate the spread of extremist messages - making them available to almost anyone, virtually anywhere - and create a climate where susceptible individuals are simultaneously targeted by recruiters and are able to develop remote networks that reinforce their burgeoning extremist allegiances. Understanding the progression of U.S. residents engaged in activity motivated by Islamic extremist ideology can provide valuable insights into future security challenges. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2016. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 25, 2016 at: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/CR_4473_HomegrownExtremismReport-2009-2015_web2.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/CR_4473_HomegrownExtremismReport-2009-2015_web2.pdf Shelf Number: 138415 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremist Violence ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Brett, Julian Title: The Evaluation Study: Lessons learned from Danish and other international efforts on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in development contexts Summary: This evaluation study collates lessons being learned from Danish efforts and those of other development actors on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) that can inform evidence based policy making and increase shared understanding on CVE-related programming in development contexts. The study is based on the premise that CVE concerns policies and actions designed to prevent individuals from engaging in violence associated with radical political, social cultural and religious ideologies and groups. As such, it forms part of the broader response to countering terrorism. The study notes that, while violent extremism is clearly a global problem, it is developing countries that bear the brunt of its social and economic costs. In the countries most affected, it increases insecurity, has links to organised crime, lowers investment and increases the costs of economic activity, destroys infrastructure, and can cause significant human displacement and migration. The foreign fighter phenomenon, whereby nationals from one country join extremist movements in another, is a significant factor fuelling conflict. With many of these individuals coming from developing countries, preventing and mitigating radicalisation and violent extremism is becoming a development priority. The study provides an overview of current thinking on CVE and the key challenges being faced. The central feature of this is that radicalisation processes are individual and include a range of push, pull and enabling or facilitating factors. Push factors are the political, socio-economic and cultural conditions that favour the propagation of extremist ideologies and narratives. Pull factors are the personal rewards that embarking on an extremist cause may confer. These may include financial and other material benefits and social status. Enabling factors relate to the radicalisation process and include social networks and the activities of motivators who groom potential recruits. It follows that, to be successful, CVE initiatives need to address in a holistic way the particular set of factors affecting the individual or group identified as being at risk. In non-permissive environments, this is likely to be particularly challenging. Details: Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2015. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 29, 2016 at: http://tanacopenhagen.com/evaluation-study-on-cve/ Year: 2015 Country: Denmark URL: http://tanacopenhagen.com/evaluation-study-on-cve/ Shelf Number: 138466 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Smith, Brent L. Title: Identity and Framing Theory, Precursor Activity, and the Radicalization Process Summary: Research on terrorism prior to 2010 had been described as too descriptive and atheoretical. To partially address this deficiency, the current project is anchored theoretically and empirically in two of the most widely cited perspectives on social movements and the process of radicalization: role identity theory and framing theory (Snow and Machalek, 1983; Snow and McAdam, 2000; Snow, 2004; Stryker 1980). Drawing on these two overlapping perspectives, we contend that radicalization towards violence can be theorized as a process which entails a journey. Typically, this journey begins with a non- or less-radical identity and corresponding orientation, and moves toward a more radical identity and corresponding orientation. This process enhances the likelihood of employing targeted forms of violence because the prospect of desired change is seen as laying outside the realm of legitimate modes of challenge and expression within the targeted institutional arena. As implied, a key component of the process is the adoption or evolution of a radical identity. Five key concepts associated with the identity and framing perspectives are central to the analyses and findings: identity salience and pervasiveness, identity work, and diagnostic and prognostic framing. Identity salience is premised on the observation that identities are arrayed in a hierarchy, with those at the top, or most salient, in a given situation being most likely to be called on or invoked. Pervasiveness extends the notion of salience from one situation to multiple situations or encounters, such that the identity is in play in numerous situations. Identity work (Snow and Anderson 1987; Snow and McAdam 2000) encompasses a range of activities individuals and groups engage in that give meaning to themselves and others by presenting or attributing and sustaining identities congruent with individuals or group interests. Five types of identity work have been identified: (1) Engagement in group relevant demonstration acts or events, such as engaging in activities preparatory for the commission of violence; (2) arrangement and display of physical settings and props, such as flying or posting the confederate flag; (3) arrangement of appearance, such as engagement in cosmetic face work or body work; (4) selective association with other individuals and groups; and (5) identity talk, which involves not only the avowal and/or attribution of identities, but also talk relevant to framing. The two key framing concepts - diagnostic and prognostic framing - direct attention to the ways in which some issue or grievance is problematized and blame is attributed and to the call or plan for dealing with the problem. Details: Fayetteville, AR: Terrorism Research Center in Fulbright College, University of Arkansas, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 30, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249673.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249673.pdf Shelf Number: 138501 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Great Britain. Home Office. Secretary of State Title: Counter-Extremism Strategy Summary: 1. Life in our country is based on fundamental values that have evolved over centuries, values that are supported and shared by the overwhelming majority of the population and are underpinned by our most important local and national institutions. These values include the rule of law, democracy, individual liberty, and the mutual respect, tolerance and understanding of different faiths and beliefs. 2. All people living in Britain are free to practise a faith or to decide not to follow any faith at all. We are free to build our own churches, synagogues, temples and mosques and to worship freely. We are free to establish our own faith schools and give our children - boys and girls alike - the best education possible. 3. Our values are not exclusive to Britain, nor have they been arrived at by accident, or imposed from above. They have been shaped by our history. Our acceptance of the freedom of religious choice was born of religious conflict, which taught us that the alternative to tolerance is violence and bloodshed. Our support for democracy developed over centuries as a guard against the abuse of power. Our belief in equality followed a history in which we have seen injustice, misery and damage caused by discrimination on the basis of religion, race, gender, disability or sexual orientation. 4. These values are under attack from extremists operating at a pace and scale not before seen. We will meet this challenge with a new and more assertive approach to defeat extremists. We will challenge their ideology, and defend and promote the values that unite us, not just because we are proud of these values, but because they are the means by which we have made a diverse, multi-racial, multi-faith society succeed. Our society works because we have responsibilities as well as rights. We all have the freedom to live how we choose, but in return it is vital that we respect the choices made by others. 5. The greatest current challenge comes from the global rise of Islamist extremism. We see this in the violence of Al Qa'ida (AQ) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The appalling attack in Tunisia in June 2015 took the lives of 38 people, 30 of them British. More than 750 UK-linked individuals have travelled to take part in the Syrian conflict. Worryingly we have seen examples of women, children and families buying into ISIL's extremist narrative and travelling to live under their brutal regime. Islamist extremists have also inspired the overwhelming majority of over 40 terrorist plots which have been disrupted since the London bombings of 2005. 6. Islamist extremism is not the only threat, as seen by the vicious actions of a number of extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi groups. In 2013 Mohammed Saleem, an 82 year old British Muslim from Birmingham, was murdered by Pavlo Lapshyn, an extreme-right fanatic who went on to bomb mosques in Walsall, Wolverhampton and Tipton. In January 2015, Zack Davies attempted to murder Dr Sarandev Bhambra in a racially-motivated attack in a supermarket in North Wales, and was sentenced to life in prison. He had claimed the attack was 'revenge for Lee Rigby', and extreme-right publications were found at his home. The Government is determined that such violence, and the Islamophobia that underpins it, will be defeated and perpetrators brought to justice. Details: London: Home Office, 2015. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Cm 9148: Accessed March 31, 2015 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf Shelf Number: 138503 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Islamic State Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Hofmann, David Title: Warriors and Prophets: The Role of Charismatic Authority in the Radicalization Towards Violence and Strategic Operation of Terrorist Groups Summary: In the past four decades, there has been increased multi-disciplinary scholarly interest in the study of charismatic authority and charismatic leadership. However, there is little systematic theoretical and empirical examination of charismatic authority and charismatic leadership in the context of terrorism, despite widespread acknowledgement of the importance of charismatic leaders in the formation, operation, and demise of terrorist groups. This dissertation seeks to re-orient and stimulate future scholarship through an in-depth theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between charismatic authority, the radicalization towards violence, and strategic operation of terrorist groups. The introductory chapter grounds the subsequent research by providing working definitions of core concepts, reviewing the current literature on terrorist leadership, discussing methods to improve future analyses of terrorist leadership, before ending with a brief consideration of methods, data, and research questions. Chapter 2 is a critical examination of how the current terrorism literature misuses the social-scientific concepts of charisma and charismatic authority. After examining where and how the literature has fallen short, it provides a synthesis of the available multi-disciplinary social-scientific research on charismatic authority, identifies the three common ways in which the concept of charisma is commonly misused in terrorism studies, and explores several challenges and opportunities for future research. Building upon this foundational analysis, chapter 3 contributes to future research by presenting and justifying a theoretical framework for measuring the presence of charismatic authority in terrorist groups based upon Max Weber's seminal work on legitimate domination (herrschaft) and on theoretical insights drawn from the study of charismatic leadership in new religious movements. This framework is then applied to an illustrative case study of the relationship between the presence of charismatic authority and the radicalization towards violence within the far-right terrorist group 'The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord'. Chapter 4 applies the same theoretical framework to a quantitative analysis of the relationship between varying levels of the presence of charismatic authority, choice in operational tactics (e.g., weapon and target choices), and results of attack outcomes (e.g., success rates, lethality) within a sample of thirty international terrorist groups. The concluding chapter provides a synthetic summary of the findings, discusses the contributions of the dissertation to the literature, makes several policy-relevant suggestions, considers study limitations, and outlines avenues for future research. Details: Waterloo, ONT: University of Waterloo, 2015. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April 6, 2016 at: https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/9651/Hofmann_David.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/9651/Hofmann_David.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 138583 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed Title: The Islamic State's Global Propaganda Strategy Summary: This Research Paper aims to analyse in depth the global propaganda strategy of the so-called "Islamic State" (IS) by looking at the methods through which this grand strategy is carried out as well as the objectives that IS wants to achieve through it. The authors first discuss IS' growth model, explaining why global expansion and recruitment of foreign fighters are pivotal to IS success. Having in mind this critical role, the authors then explore the narratives and themes used by the group to mobilise foreign fighters and jihadists groups. Third, the paper analyses how IS deploys its narratives in those territories where it has established a foothold. Fourth, it outlines IS' direct engagement strategy and how it is used to facilitate allegiance of other jihadist groups. The final section of the paper offers a menu of policy options that stakeholders can implement to counter IS' global propaganda efforts. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-IS-Global-Propaganda-Strategy-March2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-IS-Global-Propaganda-Strategy-March2016.pdf Shelf Number: 138589 Keywords: Islamic State Jihadists Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Dodwell, Brian Title: The Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail Summary: This report contains an analysis of over 4,600 unique Islamic State personnel records that were produced by the group primarily between early 2013 and late 2014. The importance of this data for understanding the Islamic State and, in particular, the foreign fighter flow, cannot be overstated. To put it simply, it is the largest cache of primary source documents produced by the Islamic State available in the open-source as of this date. These particular documents were acquired by NBC News from an Islamic State defector and subsequently provided to the CTC (and other entities). This report provides a window into the organization's global workforce, revealing information about foreign fighters' countries of origin, citizenship, points of entry into Syria, marital status, skills and previous occupations, education levels, religious knowledge, fighting role preferences in the group, and previous jihadist experience. In addition to analyzing the data at the macro-level, the report also highlights numerous anecdotes of individual fighters. Taken together, the analysis in this report reveals an organization that is attempting to vet new members, manage talent effectively within the organization, and deal with an incredibly diverse pool of recruits. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2016. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 20, 2016 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-caliphates-global-workforce-an-inside-look-at-the-islamic-states-foreign-fighter-paper-trail Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-caliphates-global-workforce-an-inside-look-at-the-islamic-states-foreign-fighter-paper-trail Shelf Number: 138704 Keywords: Caliphates ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Robinson, Linda Title: Assessment of the Politico-Military Campaign to Counter ISIL and Options for Adaptation Summary: This report assesses the campaign against the Islamic State (ISIL), focusing on the military and political lines of effort. The capabilities and motivations of the various counter-ISIL forces on the battlefield are assessed, as well as the U.S.-led efforts to provide training, equipment, advice, and assistance, including air support. While the campaign has degraded ISIL by targeting leadership and retaking a portion of territory, achieving lasting defeat of ISIL will be elusive without local forces capable of holding territory. Successful conclusion of the campaign will require significantly increased effort on two fronts. First, more-comprehensive training, advising, and assisting will be required to create more-capable, coordinated indigenous forces of appropriate composition and enable them to regain and hold territory. Second, political agreements must be forged to resolve key drivers of conflict among Iraqis and Syrians. Without these elements, resurgent extremist violence is likely. Many factors complicate the prospects for success, including sectarian divisions in Iraq, Iranian support for Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, the Syrian civil war, and Russian intervention to support the besieged regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. However, the Syrian regime also lacks sufficient competent local forces and is heavily reliant on external militia support. The government in Iraq, led by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, has pledged decentralization efforts to address Sunni concerns, but lacks sufficient Shia support to enact them. This report offers recommendations for a more comprehensive advisory approach, emphasizing the political line of effort, and achieving synergy between the military and political efforts. Key Findings U.S. Efforts to Bolster Counter-ISIL Forces Have Achieved Limited Results - The advisory effort was circumscribed by location, unit, and function. Lack of advisers at the operational level in Iraq and lack of support to Syrian opposition fighters limited effectiveness of indigenous forces. - The training effort was also limited: Some 20,000 Iraqi army and Peshmerga forces were trained in 18 months, including 2,000 Iraqi special operations personnel. Efforts to arm and train Sunni tribes were halting. Anti-ISIL Forces Suffer from Capability Gaps and Lack of Coordination Among Disparate Forces - Iraqi's military crumbled after the 2014 ISIL offensive due to cumulative weaknesses. - Iraq's Counter Terrorism Service carried the brunt of the fighting, suffering extensive casualties and materiel losses. - Shia militias, some of them advised and supported by Iran, were not integrated with the overall military effort. Effective command and control of the overall effort was lacking. - In Syria, most territory was retaken by the Syrian Kurdish militia, and other efforts such as the New Syrian Forces were inadequate in numbers and capability. Coordination was also lacking among Syrian forces. Detailed Political Strategies to Resolve Underlying Conflicts Were Not Developed and Not Synchronized with the Military Effort for Maximum Effect - The Iraqi government under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi articulated proposals to address Sunni concerns, but insufficient Shia support was provided to implement them. U.S. senior-level engagement with Abadi was also limited. - No overarching Syria strategy was developed. Relying on Syrian Kurds has escalated tensions with Turkey dramatically and created concern among Syrian Arabs. Recommendations - More comprehensive advisory support from senior echelons through the brigade level to increase coordination of forces, morale, and leadership. - A long-term training and equipping effort will be required to create capable indigenous security forces that incorporate sufficient Sunnis. - The successful support to Iraq's Counter Terrorism Service provides a replicable model. - An unconventional warfare approach may regain Mosul and Raqqa from ISIL with less material damage by leveraging internal discontent and underground forces. - Syria's counter-ISIL effort cannot succeed in seizing and holding key terrain without Syrian Arabs; their support may require unified effort with the counter-Assad campaign. - Increased materiel aid to anti-Assad forces including tube-launched, optically tracked, wireless guided weapon systems and surface-to-air missiles may preserve the moderate opposition and create leverage in negotiating a transition under the Geneva terms. - The Abadi government and Shia parties should craft proposals with international support to resolve the political drivers of conflict in Iraq. Visible, high-level U.S. support to such detailed political proposals may include linkage with military support. - The United States should elevate its focus on advisory support to indigenous forces, not just eliminating ISIL leadership and resources. It should, above all, prioritize the political line of effort, backed by military measures. Syrian opposition fighters may become increasingly radicalized in the absence of greater U.S. commitment and coordination. U.S. allies have backed disparate opposition groups, increasing the fragmentation and ineffectiveness of the Syrian opposition. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1290.html Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1290.html Shelf Number: 138893 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorist

Author: Winter, Charlie Title: An Integrated Approach to Islamic State Recruitment Summary: Today, Jihadism is at once more globalised and closer to home than ever before. In seeking to explore how Islamic State has been able to attract tens of thousands of fighters from as many as 86 states across the world, the media limelight has shone brightly on stories like that of Australian Jake Bilardi, but nuanced understanding of recruitment is routinely sacrificed. Details: Barton, ACT, AUS: Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited, 2016. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report: Accessed May 26, 2016 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/an-integrated-approach-to-islamic-state-recruitment/SR88_IS-recruitment.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/an-integrated-approach-to-islamic-state-recruitment/SR88_IS-recruitment.pdf Shelf Number: 139221 Keywords: Islamic State Jihadism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Human Rights Watch Title: "We Feel We Are Cursed": Life under ISIS in Sirte, Libya Summary: In February 2015 the extremist armed group Islamic State (also known as ISIS) began taking over the Mediterranean port city of Sirte, Libya. By the following August ISIS had turned Sirte into its largest stronghold outside of Iraq and Syria. This report documents serious crimes committed by ISIS in Sirte including the executions of 49 people the group accused of "spying," "sorcery," and "insulting God." "We Feel We Are Cursed," based on research including interviews with 45 Libyans who lived under ISIS in Sirte, details how the group imposed its severe interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law) on all aspects of life. Meanwhile, ISIS has failed to provide basic necessities to the local population, diverting food, medicine, fuel, and cash, along with homes of residents who fled, to its fighters and functionaries. With war-wracked Libya's institutions in near-collapse, countries able to exercise criminal jurisdiction should take immediate steps to apprehend and prosecute those responsible for atrocities by ISIS and other parties. The International Criminal Court should prioritize an investigation of ongoing serious crimes in Libya as well. The United Nations Human Rights Council should appoint an independent expert to document serious, ongoing abuses in Libya. The Security Council should impose sanctions on those found responsible for serious crimes in Libya while ensuring appropriate due process. International parties have repeatedly failed to act on their promises to identify and punish the perpetrators of serious crimes in Libya. Continued failure to act will result in more horrific crimes by groups including ISIS. Details: New York: HRW, 2016. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 8, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/libya0516web_1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Libya URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/libya0516web_1.pdf Shelf Number: 139336 Keywords: Extremist Groups Human Rights Abuses ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorists

Author: Kessels, Eelco Title: Violent Extremism and Instability in the Greater Horn of Africa: An Examination of Drivers and Responses Summary: This report is part of a program implemented by the Global Center, supported by the U.S. Department of State, and aimed at understanding and strengthening capacities to prevent and counter violent extremism in the Greater Horn of Africa. It focuses on a subset of countries in the region - Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. In short, this report aims to - provide an easily accessible overview of the Greater Horn's regional and national trends and drivers of violent extremism and related sources of insecurity - identify relevant actors and describe their responses aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism, and - highlight entry points for developing holistic strategies on countering violent extremism (CVE) inclusive of governmental and civil society actors that promote good governance and community-based responses to violent extremism. Details: Goshen, IN: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 9, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/GCCS_VIOLENT-EXTREMISM_low_3.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/GCCS_VIOLENT-EXTREMISM_low_3.pdf Shelf Number: 139346 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Allan, Harriet Title: Drivers of Violent Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature Review Summary: Violent extremism is multi-factorial and extremely diverse: it cannot be predicted by one variable alone. For violent extremist movements to develop, and for individuals to join them, requires an alignment of situational, social/cultural, and individual factors. It is useful to conceptualise these factors in three levels, with situational factors working at the macro level (i.e. country or community-wide), social/cultural at the meso-level (i.e. affecting smaller communities or identity groups), and individual factors at the micro level. Interventions can also be conceptualised using a three-tier model, with development working at the macro level, countering violent extremism (CVE) at the meso-level, and law enforcement and specialist interventions at the micro level. While the effect of political factors - governance deficit, state failure, and grievances - is significant, social/psychological factors concerning group and individual identity are also recognised as important. Although the evidence is mixed, on balance the literature shows that blocked participation can create grievances which may be harnessed to promote extremist violence. Civil society may be crucial in countering extremism. However, under oppression some organisations may also be drawn to violent responses. Religion and ethnicity have been recognised as powerful expressions of individual and group identity. There is robust evidence that radicalisation is a social process and that identity is a key factor in why individuals become involved in violent movements. Psychological research is beginning to examine how identity formation can become 'maladaptive' and whether certain cognitive 'propensities' can combine to create a 'mindset' that presents a higher risk. Although most violent extremists are young men, there is little convincing research to suggest that ideals of masculinity and honour play a significant role in causing violent extremism. More generally, gender issues do not appear to be significant. Education has a minor and/or largely unsubstantiated influence, and there is little evidence that certain types of education (e.g. faith-based) increase the risk of radicalisation, and research shows that the problem of madrassa-based radicalisation has been significantly overstated. Indeed, some research suggests that religious training can be a protective factor. The findings on the relationship between education, employment, poverty and radicalisation are mixed. However, in a departure from earlier studies which identified the absence of any causal or statistical relationship between poverty and transnational terrorism, this study recognises the relevance of economic factors in the context of broad-based violent extremist groups. In conflict situations involving violent extremist groups (as opposed to terrorism directed against the West), socio-economic discrimination and marginalisation do appear to partly explain why extremist groups are able to recruit support in large numbers. However, because poverty may be a side-effect of some other cause, it is not possible to isolate it as a cause of violent extremism. In a number of contexts, extremist groups have proven able to deliver services through which they gain support and legitimacy. While the failure of the state to provide security and justice may not be a necessary factor in the development of violent extremism, failed and failing states are often breeding grounds for extremist activity. The perceived victimisation of fellow Muslims can be instrumentalised by leaders of Islamist violent extremist groups as a justification for extremist violence, although the use of a narrative of oppression to justify violence and recruit and motivate supporters is near-universal among violent extremist groups. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 9, 2016 at: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/Misc_Gov/Drivers_of_Radicalisation_Literature_Review.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/Misc_Gov/Drivers_of_Radicalisation_Literature_Review.pdf Shelf Number: 139347 Keywords: Extremist Groups Muslims Radical Groups Radicalism Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Hallowell, Beth Title: Mixed Messages: How the Media Covers "Violent Extremism" and What You Can Do About It Summary: Every day, the U.S. news consumer is bombarded with images of spectacular extremist violence and increasingly aggressive and bellicose rhetoric from politicians and pundits. This coverage warrants a close look, as public discourse sinks to new lows in justifying violence against entire racial and religious groups. In this public conversation, the stakes are high; lives are on the line. How is the media helping or hurting our public discussion about political violence? What are they covering when they cover extremism? Ninety percent of the time they also mention Islam, even when it's not part of the events covered, and three-quarters of the time journalists report on violent responses to conflict. And they also amplify voices promoting and stories depicting military intervention far more than peace building or nonviolent resistance to violent extremism - solutions to conflict that research has shown are more effective. How can the U.S. public be expected to do anything but support further military intervention in the Middle East and other Muslim-majority countries, given this framework for covering violent extremism? In Mixed Messages, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) shares the results of its original content analysis of three months of media coverage of extremism sampled from 20 U.S. news outlets. We sampled articles from 15 national media outlets as well as five major "influencer" outlets that reach a high-level audience of policymakers and government staff. Details: Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: http://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Mixed%20Messages_WEB.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Mixed%20Messages_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 139388 Keywords: Discrimination Extremist Groups Media Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Mercy Corps Title: Investing in Iraq's Peace: How Good Governance Can Diminish Support for Violent Extremism Summary: According to new Mercy Corps research, the success of armed groups in Iraq - such as the Islamic State (ISIS) - is rooted less in deep-seated sectarianism than in poor governance. Where the government is perceived to be unjust, support for non-state armed actors among marginalized groups is high. But support for groups like ISIS can shift quickly and dramatically when public perceptions of government institutions and services improve. Forging a just, peaceful future for Iraq will require a comprehensive good governance approach. Building on a series of nationwide public opinion surveys between 2013 and 2015, and in-depth interviews with Iraqi citizens, youth, internally displaced persons (IDPs), civil society leaders, government officials, and activists, this report finds that improving governance in Iraq will require new partnerships with civil society. The timing has never been better: civil society is gaining acceptance in Iraq and is increasingly seen as bridging the gap between citizens and government. But the clock is ticking. The rise of sectarian militias will likely present new challenges to the future of a cohesive state. Donor support for civil society and good governance in Iraq is waning. Meanwhile, popular goodwill toward the current government may diminish if meaningful reforms are not implemented. In popular demonstrations throughout the country, thousands of Iraqi youth have, in recent months, peacefully advocated for an end to sectarianism and corruption. Iraq must capitalize on this energy, or it risks antagonizing a new generation. Key findings 1. Poor governance that results in injustice, real or perceived, is a key driver of conflict: Iraq's instability is rooted in poor governance, not in ancient group rivalries. When marginalized groups begin to believe the government is going to be more responsive and fair, support for armed violence decreases. 2. While sectarianism is often incorrectly credited for being the main source of conflict, it is nonetheless a threat to future stability: As the violent conflict continues or escalates, sectarian divisions have the potential to increase as political opportunists-both domestic and foreign - stoke tensions to gain power. 3. Civil society is vital to improving governance and advancing reconciliation: Though civil society is playing a critical role bridging the gap between citizens and government, the key question is whether, in the face of rising expectations and frustrations, it can direct new energies into nonviolent change. 4. Iraqi youth, too often side-lined, are of vital importance to governance and civil society efforts: Iraq's political, social and economic future hinges on its youth. Building a peaceful future for Iraq will require empowering the country's youth and positively channeling their energies. Recommendations - Build a stronger cooperative relationship between civil society and government on key policy issues by formalizing relations with civil society actors and encouraging donors to commit multi-year investments in Iraqi civil society. - Improve the capacity of local actors to play an active role in good governance by engaging civil society partners more deeply in informing programs, and facilitating stronger relationships between youth activities and civil society. - Avert further conflict by ensuring governance investments are long-term and informed by local feedback, strengthening Iraq's Reconciliation Committee, and continuing to improve government responsiveness and accountability. Details: Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Investing%20in%20Iraqs%20Peace_Final%20Report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Iraq URL: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Investing%20in%20Iraqs%20Peace_Final%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 139390 Keywords: Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Dzhekova, Rositsa Title: Understanding Radicalisation: Review of Literature Summary: The phenomena of radicalisation today develop and change at high speed, with their extreme forms manifested globally. The destructive dimensions of (violent) Islamist or right-wing radicalisation have become dramatically visible in Europe posing serious challenges to European societies. This literature review presents key academic conceptualisations and debates on the phenomena of radicalisation that might lead to violence. It deals with three different forms of radicalisation, including Islamist radicalisation, right-wing as well as left-wing radicalisation. In addition, an overview is provided of current academic debates regarding the role of the internet in radicalisation processes. The review is intended to help social scientists who are entering the field of radicalisation studies navigate through the complexity of underlying processes and factors that lead different individuals or groups to adopt radical ideas and commit acts of violence. The review is particularly relevant for countries of Central and Eastern Europe where radicalisation remains understudied, although most countries in the region share histories of extremism and political radicalism. Details: Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2016. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 13, 2016 at: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17560 Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17560 Shelf Number: 139409 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Johnston, Patrick B. Title: Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005-2010 Summary: Foundations of the Islamic State: Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005-2010 draws from more than 140 recently declassified documents to present a comprehensive examination of the organization, territorial designs, management, personnel policies, and finances of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), both predecessors of the Islamic State. These records paint a clear picture of ISI practices and standard operating procedures. Leadership consciously designed the organization not just to fight but also to build an Islamic state governed by the laws dictated by its strict Islamist ideology. ISI was a vertically integrated organization with a central management structure and functional bureaus. It sought to replicate these structures at multiple lower geographic levels across territory. Each geographic unit had substantial autonomy to pursue the group's strategic objectives but was required to send frequent reports to the group's leadership; the central organization used these reports to inform decisions and provide strategic guidance. ISI paid its personnel a wage that would draw true believers rather than opportunists; trained and allocated its membership with an eye toward group effectiveness; raised revenues locally through diversified sources; and was able to maintain itself, albeit at much reduced strength, in the face of a withering counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy put in place by its opponents, starting in late 2006. An analysis of the Islamic State predecessor groups is more than a historical recounting. The lessons from examining the group's history are useful for setting expectations about the strengths and vulnerabilities of the Islamic State and its ability to combat its opponents, designing a coordinated and effective campaign against it, and understanding why it might be able to survive such an effort and sustain itself in the future, albeit perhaps at a lower level of threat. Defeating the Islamic State will require persistence. The record of counter-ISI operations from 2006 through 2010 shows that military action and political accommodation can work together to degrade the group substantially, if not defeat it. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 348p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1192.html Year: 2016 Country: Iraq URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1192.html Shelf Number: 139437 Keywords: ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Williams, Michael J. Title: Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based, Muslim-Led CVE Program Summary: This project represents the first ever evaluation of a CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) program in the United States. The evaluation will be conducted in Montgomery County, MD, in collaboration with the community-based, Muslim-led CVE program (The World Organization for Resource Development and Education), the Montgomery County Department of Police, and the Montgomery County Office of Community Partnerships. The first phase of the project will use a multi-method evaluation design to a) understand recruitment and retention practices of participants in a multi-faceted, U.S. community-based, Muslim-led CVE program, b) identify the outcomes of participation in that program, c) assess and explore community knowledge of risk factors associated with radicalization, and individuals' natural inclinations in response to those factors, and d) identify barriers to individual help-seeking and community-law enforcement collaborations in a CVE context. What will emerge from this phase is a set of working theories that clarify the relationships among these four subcomponents and lead to enhanced CVE programming and implementation. The second phase will develop survey instruments designed to measure quantifiably each of the Phase I subcomponents. Additionally, formalized curricula (i.e., educational materials and a manual for law enforcement) will be developed regarding a) awareness of risk factors of radicalization and civic-minded responses to them, and b) training for law enforcement officers regarding ways to build effective collaborations with local Islamic communities. Additionally, the CVE program will adjust its recruitment practices, based on 'lessons learned' from Phase I. The final phase of the project will assess the effectiveness of the CVE programs' adjusted (i.e., Phase II) recruitment practices. Additionally, the CVE programs' outcomes will be tested by comparing participant involvement groups (i.e. those who have never participated vs. participated once vs. participated multiple times). Details: Atlanta: Georgia State University, 2016. 167p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 12, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf Shelf Number: 139624 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Islamic Extremists Muslims Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: International Crisis Group Title: Political Conflict, Extremism and Criminal Justice in Bangladesh Summary: As the Awami League (AL) government's political rivalry with the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) reaches new heights, so has its repression. At the same time, a deeply politicised, dysfunctional criminal justice system is undermining rather than buttressing the rule of law. Heavy-handed measures are denting the government's legitimacy and, by provoking violent counter-responses, benefitting violent party wings and extremist groups alike. The government needs to recognise that it is in its interest to change course, lest it fail to either contain violent extremism or counter political threats. A key part of a more prudent course would be to de-politicise and strengthen all aspects of the criminal justice system, including the judiciary, so it can address the country's myriad law and order challenges and help stall a democratic collapse. The political conflict between the AL and BNP has resulted in high levels of violence and a brutal state response. The government's excesses against political opponents and critics include enforced disappearances, torture and extra-judicial killings. Police tasked with targeting the government's rivals and an overstretched justice system compelled to prosecute opposition leaders and activists now also face a renewed threat from violent extremists. The permissive legal environment, however, is creating opportunities for extremist outfits to regroup, manifested in the killings of secular bloggers and foreigners and attacks on sectarian and religious minorities in 2015. The government's reaction to rising extremism, including arrest and prosecution of several suspects without due process and transparency, is fuelling alienation that these groups can further exploit. Reconciling with the opposition and hence stabilising the state requires both political compromises and an end to the repressive use of law enforcement agencies and abuse of the courts. Politicising the police and using elite forces, particularly the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), to silence political dissent, are laying the seeds of future violence. By concentrating on targeting the opposition, the police are failing to curb criminality; the prisons are overburdened by the mass arrests of opposition leaders and activists; and the judiciary, perceived as partisan for trials and sentences based on political grounds, is losing credibility. The result is a justice system that swings between two extremes: woefully slow and dysfunctional for ordinary cases and speedy, undermining due process, in politically charged ones. Any effort to reform a dysfunctional criminal justice system, including by investing in training, equipping and otherwise modernising the police, prosecution and judiciary, will be insufficient unless it is also taken out of politics. Years of partisan recruitment, promotions and postings have polarised these institutions to the point that officials no longer conceal their allegiances. Partisanship tends to determine the kinds of complaints and cases that get filed and prioritised and even informs verdicts and sentences. The problems surrounding delivery of justice are further compounded by legal mechanisms to silence civil society and prevent media scrutiny and parallel processes that undermine due process in politically charged cases. The deeply flawed International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), established in 2010 to prosecute individuals responsible for atrocities committed during the 1971 liberation war, is an important example of the dangers of using rule of law institutions for political ends. Perceptions of injustice are creating opportunities for extremist groups and fuelling political conflict. The BNP and its Jamaat-e-Islami ally marked the anniversary of the disputed 2014 elections with indiscriminately violent strikes and traffic blockades, which were matched brutally by the state. The BNP now appears less willing to resort to violence to unseat the government; its decision to re-enter the political mainstream gives the government an opportunity it should exploit by urgently resuming dialogue with the opposition. To demonstrate sincerity and as a first step, it should end use of the rule of law institutions to target opponents and silence critics. Accepting legitimate avenues of participation and dissent would also help regain some lost legitimacy and the trust of citizens in the state's provision of both justice and security. So long as there is no independent court system to arbitrate disputes fairly, the parties are likely to continue taking those disputes to the streets, but a neutral judiciary could help defuse tensions by upholding fundamental principles and preventing executive excesses. The international community can help to promote political reconciliation by, in the U.S. and EU case, using economic levers to pressure Dhaka to respect civil and political rights, and in New Delhi's by using close ties to urge the AL to allow the opposition legitimate political expression and participation. There is no time to lose. If mainstream dissent remains closed, more and more government opponents may come to view violence and violent groups as their only recourse. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 277: Accessed July 25, 2016 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/277-political-conflict-extremism-and-criminal-justice-in-bangladesh.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Bangladesh URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/277-political-conflict-extremism-and-criminal-justice-in-bangladesh.pdf Shelf Number: 139829 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Political Violence Radical Groups Radicalization Violence Violent Extremists

Author: Mercy Corps Title: "Motivations and Empty Promises": Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth Summary: Boko Haram, one of the world's deadliest armed groups, is waging an insurgency in the name of creating an Islamic caliphate. This violent conflict in Nigeria's Northeast has killed nearly 17,000 people since 2009, displaced nearly 2.2 million people, devastated thousands of communities, and slowed the economy. New Mercy Corps research investigates key motives for youth to join Boko Haram, so that government actors, donors and civil society can design responsive programming to reduce youth participation in the violence. Through this research, Mercy Corps spoke directly to the youth involved to learn why youth join or were vulnerable to forced recruitment into Boko Haram. We spoke with 47 former members of Boko Haram in Nigeria's Borno, Yobe, and Gombe states, in addition to dozens of youth who did not join, family and friends of members, and community leaders. We found that in the midst of challenges, the local strategies to prevent violence and support youth exercised by so many communities can form a strong foundation for the future of youth and stability in Northeast Nigeria. Key Findings There is no demographic profile of a Boko Haram member. Members we spoke to came from diverse backgrounds. Some had jobs, and others did not. Some had attended secular school, others Islamic school, and others had dropped out. Influence from social and business peers is a key factor in recruitment. Almost all former members cited a friend, family member, or business colleague as a factor in their joining Boko Haram. Youth see in Boko Haram an opportunity to get ahead through business support. Many youth described either accepting loans prior to joining or joining with the hope of receiving loans or capital for their mostly small, informal businesses; loans fueled their economic ambitions in an atmosphere of high inequality. Broad frustrations with government created initial community acceptance of Boko Haram. Boko Haram took advantage of deep grievances around government inadequacies and security abuses to gain a foothold in communities. About half of former members said their communities at some time generally supported the group, hoping it would bring a change in government. Local counter-narratives on the hypocrisy of Boko Haram are working. Youth who resisted joining shared a narrative of Boko Haram as a corrupt, greedy organization focused on enriching its leaders. These messages are being crafted by local religious and traditional leaders. Key Recommendations Build trust in government by addressing the needs of conflict-affected youth and communities. Prepare for comprehensive reintegration of former members. Amplify local counter-narratives that already work to prevent recruitment into Boko Haram. Develop opportunities for youth and government officials to improve communities together. Facilitate connections to role models and support family dialogue on violent extremism. Help youth achieve their ambitions, starting with increasing their access to financial and business services. Details: Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 2, 2016 at: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises_Mercy%20Corps_Full%20Report_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria URL: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises_Mercy%20Corps_Full%20Report_0.pdf Shelf Number: 139949 Keywords: Boko Haram Extremist Groups Extremists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorists

Author: Veldhuis, Tinka M. Title: Designing Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes for Violent Extremist Offenders: A Realist Approach Summary: In this Research Paper, ICCT - The Hague Research Fellow Tinka Veldhuis makes an argument for a Realist approach to rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for inmates with a terrorist or extremist background. Accordingly, within the Realist framework, it is stressed that the outcomes of rehabilitation programmes should be understood as a product of the policy mechanisms and the context in which they are implemented. To maximise the likelihood of success it is important to make explicit the underlying assumptions about how the intervention should, given the unique context, contribute to achieving its objectives. This paper endeavours to highlight some of the key questions that need to be answered before and during the implementation of rehabilitation policies. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2012. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed September 13, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Veldhuis-Designing-Rehabilitation-Reintegration-Programmes-March-2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Veldhuis-Designing-Rehabilitation-Reintegration-Programmes-March-2012.pdf Shelf Number: 140257 Keywords: Extremists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorists Violent Offenders

Author: Sebastian, Sofia Title: Atrocity Prevention through Dialogue: Challenges in Dealing with Violent Extremist Organizations Summary: Dialogue with violent extremist groups is a controversial practice, even when used to prevent widespread violence or atrocities. Humanitarian dialogue may serve as a crisis-mitigation instrument, offering short-term relief and civilian protection. When the risk of atrocities is remote, political dialogue can be used for structural or upstream prevention aimed at conflict resolution or addressing community grievances. Though dialogue as a peacebuilding tool has potential in any stage of a conflict, it is ideally undertaken before widespread violence occurs. However, the conditions for successful atrocity prevention through dialogue with violent extremist groups are rarely in place. Summary Various forms of dialogue have traditionally been a central mechanism in the toolbox for atrocity prevention. The utility of this noncoercive peacebuilding practice merits reconsideration as violent extremist organizations (VEOs) increasingly embrace mass violence as a means to advance their objectives. If atrocities are imminent or ongoing, dialogue may serve as a crisis-mitigation instrument, with the potential of offering short-term humanitarian relief and civilian protection. When the risk of atrocities is remote, political dialogue can be used for structural or upstream prevention aimed at conflict resolution or addressing community grievances. Despite the broadening recognition of the need to engage extremist groups through dialogue when possible, controversy continues to surround this practice. The conditions for successful atrocity prevention through dialogue with VEOs are rarely in place. Those pursuing dialogue need to gradually build trust, conduct a thorough actor mapping, and reflect on their own role and preparedness to engage. Engaging extremists presents significant risks as well, including extremists' manipulation of the dialogue to buy time for planning atrocity campaigns. Efforts to engage VEOs directly through dialogue have been inconsistent and are handled with the utmost discretion. Restrictive legislative frameworks may limit the ability to exploit opportunities for atrocity prevention through dialogue with these groups. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 15, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR390-Atrocity-Prevention-through-Dialogue.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR390-Atrocity-Prevention-through-Dialogue.pdf Shelf Number: 147891 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Violence Violent Extremism

Author: Ali, Abdisaid M. Title: Islamist Extremism in East Africa Summary: The growth of Salafist ideology in East Africa has challenged long established norms of tolerance and interfaith cooperation in the region. This is an outcome of a combination of external and internal factors. This includes a decades-long effort by religious foundations in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to promulgate ultraconservative interpretations of Islam throughout East Africa's mosques, madrassas, and Muslim youth and cultural centers. Rooted within a particular Arab cultural identity, this ideology has fostered more exclusive and polarizing religious relations in the region, which has contributed to an increase in violent attacks. These tensions have been amplified by socioeconomic differences and often heavy-handed government responses that are perceived to punish entire communities for the actions of a few. Redressing these challenges will require sustained strategies to rebuild tolerance and solidarity domestically as well as curb the external influence of extremist ideology and actors. Highlights While Islamist extremism in East Africa is often associated with al Shabaab and Somalia, it has been expanding to varying degrees throughout the region. Militant Islamist ideology has emerged only relatively recently in the region-imported from the Arab world-challenging long-established norms of tolerance. Confronting Islamist extremism with heavy-handed or extrajudicial police actions is likely to backfire by inflaming real or perceived socioeconomic cleavages and exclusionist narratives used by violent extremist groups. Details: Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2016. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Security Brief, No. 32: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ASB32EN-Islamist-Extremism-in-East-Africa.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ASB32EN-Islamist-Extremism-in-East-Africa.pdf Shelf Number: 145573 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Islamist Extremism Radical Groups Violence Violent Extremism

Author: Canada. Public Safety Canada Title: 2016 Public Report on Terrorist Threat to Canada Summary: Threat Environment The principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremists who could be inspired to carry out an attack in Canada. Violent extremist ideologies espoused by terrorist groups like Daesh and al-Qaida continue to appeal to certain individuals in Canada. As in recent years, the Government of Canada has continued to monitor and respond to the threat of extremist travellers, that is, individuals who are suspected of travelling abroad to engage in terrorism-related activity. The phenomenon of extremist travellers - including those abroad, those who return, and even those prevented from travelling - poses a range of security concerns for Canada. As of the end of 2015, the Government was aware of approximately 180 individuals with a nexus to Canada who were abroad and who were suspected of engaging in terrorism-related activities. The Government was also aware of a further 60 extremist travelers who had returned to Canada. The National Terrorism Threat Level This Report, for the first time, includes a description of Canada's National Terrorism Threat Level system. The threat level has been unchanged since October 2014; it is MEDIUM, meaning a violent act of terrorism could occur in Canada. The threat level aims to ensure a consistent understanding across the Government of the general terrorism threat to Canada. The threat level serves as a tool for government officials, including those in law enforcement, to identify risks and vulnerabilities from threats and, in turn, determine appropriate responses to prevent or mitigate a violent act of terrorism. The Global Environment The threat environment has also evolved beyond Canada's borders. Daesh has continued to dominate the landscape in the Middle East, where other terrorist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Hizballah also operate. Elsewhere in the Middle East, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has taken advantage of the civil conflict in Yemen to capture territory there and strengthen itself. This past year also saw Daesh's expansion in Africa, and Boko Haram (now rebranded as an Daesh affiliate in West Africa) continues to pose a major threat to regional stability. In South and Southeast Asia, Daesh expansionism and entrenched regional groups shaped the threat environment. Emerging Issues This Report includes a feature on emerging issues in terrorism. These issues - the role of technology in terrorism, the participation of women in terrorist activities, and use of chemical weapons by terrorist organizations - have been widely discussed in the media over the past year. They represent only a fraction of many evolving issues that make terrorism such a complex problem. Responding to the Threat Since 2002, 20 individuals have been convicted of terrorism offences under the Criminal Code. Another 21 have been charged with terrorism-related offences (including 16 since January 2015) and are either awaiting trial or have warrants outstanding for their arrest. Canada is contributing in a robust way, with more than 60 other countries, to the Global Coalition to Counter Daesh. This includes military initiatives and efforts to stem the flow of "foreign terrorist fighters," cut off Daesh's funding sources, support stabilization, and expose and counter Daesh's ideology. More broadly, Canada has maintained a Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program as a key part of its terrorism prevention efforts. The Government of Canada's counter-terrorism efforts to address this evolving threat continue to be guided by the twin obligations to both keep Canadians safe and safeguard fundamental Canadian values and liberties. The Terrorist Threat to Canada In October 2014, Canada suffered two terrorist attacks by lone-actors who had been inspired by extremist ideologies and radicalized to the point of violence. The attacks, in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and Ottawa, left two Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel dead. More recently, the RCMP, working in close collaboration with domestic and international partners, took action in Strathroy, Ontario, to disrupt an imminent terrorist threat and ensure public safety. These incidents reminded Canadians that Canada is not immune to terrorism. Canada remains the target of direct threats by groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Daesh) and al-Qaida, and by individuals inspired by the violent extremist ideologies of these groups. The United States of America (U.S.) and Western Europe experienced multiple attacks in 2015. Some notable incidents included, in the U.S., attacks on police officers in Boston (June, 2015), military facilities in Chattanooga, Tennessee (July, 2015) and an office party in San Bernardino, California (December, 2015). European incidents included attacks on the offices of the magazine Charlie Hebdo and a grocery store in Paris (January, 2015), an attack on an Amsterdam-Paris train (August, 2015) and coordinated attacks directed by Daesh at several public spaces in Paris (November, 2015). In 2014 and 2015, Australia experienced three attacks - two targeting law enforcement officers in Melbourne and Sydney (September 2014, October 2015) and another targeting civilians in Sydney (December 2014). Terrorist incidents continue to occur with terrible regularity. In June 2016, 49 people were killed and 53 injured when a gunman, who may have been inspired by Daesh, opened fire at an Orlando, Florida night club. In July, 85 people were killed and hundreds more were injured when an attacker drove a truck through a crowd in Nice. There have been other attacks in Western Europe as well, for example, in Brussels, Belgium and in Rouen, France. In Turkey this past June, suicide bombers believed to be affiliated with Daesh struck Istanbul's international airport, killing 45 and injuring over 200. Globally, a few countries bear the heaviest burden of attacks and casualties, particularly during civil conflicts or where terrorist groups have taken part in insurgencies. The Global Terrorism Database for 2015 shows that terrorist activities continue to be highly concentrated. Five countries - Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Nigeria - sustained more than 55 per cent of all attacks that year, and five countries - Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria and Pakistan - sustained 74 per cent of all terrorism-related fatalities. This threat environment worldwide affects Canadians and Canadian interests. CAF personnel, government officials and private citizens are under constant threat in certain regions. In September 2015, two Canadians were kidnapped in the Philippines. Both were killed by their captors in the spring of this year. In January 2016, an al-Qaida-affiliated group based in Mali attacked a hotel in Burkina Faso, killing six Canadians. That same month, attackers linked to Daesh targeted a coffee shop in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing one Canadian. In June 2016, a Somali government minister with Canadian citizenship was killed in an al-Shabaab terrorist attack on a hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia. Also in June, 15 Nepalese security guards who protected the Embassy of Canada to Afghanistan in Kabul were killed when terrorists targeted the bus that was transporting them to work. Current Threats The Principal Threat The principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremists who could be inspired to carry out an attack. Violent extremist ideologies espoused by terrorist groups like Daesh and al-Qaida continue to appeal to certain individuals in Canada. Some individuals have engaged in terrorism-related activities such as promoting violence online, radicalizing peers, recruiting and fundraising. Others may consider travelling abroad to join a terrorist group or conducting terrorist attacks themselves. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 30, 2016 at: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-en.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-en.pdf Shelf Number: 140520 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Suicide Bombings Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Canada. Public Safety Canada Title: 2015-16 Evaluation of the Kanishka Project Research Initiative: Final Report Summary: Program evaluations support accountability to Parliament and Canadians by helping the Government of Canada credibly report on the results achieved with resources invested in programs. They also support deputy heads in managing for results by informing them about whether their programs are producing the expected outcomes efficiently and cost-effectively. Program evaluations support policy and program improvements by helping identify lessons learned and best practices. What we examined This evaluation examined the relevance and performance of the Kanishka Project Research Initiative, a $10-million, five-year initiative established in 2011, to address gaps in understanding of terrorism in Canada and the way it manifests itself in Canadian communities. The Initiative has several components, including a grants and contributions component that is designed to fund research studies and support direct engagement with researchers. Given that the Initiative includes a grants and contributions component, the evaluation assessed the extent to which the design, delivery and administration of this component of the Initiative conformed to the requirements of the Government of Canada Policy on Transfer Payments. Why it is important Terrorism is considered a threat to Canada's national interest and security. In recent years, the number of terrorist incidents has been increasing steadily, both in Canada and around the world. Many countries, including Canada, are facing radicalization to violence, particularly of youth. More than 180 Canadians are known to have gone abroad to take part in foreign armed conflicts. Preventing, detecting, denying terrorists the means and opportunity to carry out their activities and responding to these developments are among the Government of Canada's, and by extension, the Department of Public Safety's highest priorities. The Initiative plays an important role in creating networks across sectors, generating knowledge for decision-makers, and increasing Canadians' understanding of terrorism and counter-radicalization to violence, which is increasingly needed to contribute to building a safe and resilient Canada. What we found Relevance The raison d'etre of the Initiative was to invest in research on pressing questions to enable Canada to better understand what terrorism meant in the Canadian context and what could be done to support effective policies and programs to counter-terrorism and violent extremism in Canada. Despite its contribution to date, there is still a continued need for the Initiative to shed more light on these issues. The Initiative is well aligned with the federal government and PS's priorities, as ensuring the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad continues to be among the top priorities of the government. The emphasis on the need for further research communicated as part of the Government's commitment to create the Office of the Community Outreach and Counterradicalization attests to the relevance of the Initiative and ongoing need for similar activities. Performance To a large extent, the Initiative has contributed to the achievement of its expected outcomes: It has supported the creation of various networks and other mechanisms for ongoing dialogue across different sectors on terrorism and counter radicalization; through funding research studies and other mechanisms, the Initiative has facilitated the generation of knowledge and tools to ensure that Canadian policy and decision-makers, as well as frontline officers and other practitioners have access to more relevant and timely information to do their work; and researchers affiliated with the Initiative have more resources and support at their disposal to conduct research and to study the identified priority areas. The Department has put in place a robust governance framework to oversee the delivery of the Initiative. For the most part, the Initiative was delivered efficiently and economically. The design, delivery and administration of the grants and contribution components of the Initiative were found to generally conform to the requirements of Government of Canada Policy on Transfer Payments. Notwithstanding the above achievements, the evaluation identified a few opportunities for improvement. The following recommendations are provided in the spirit of continuous improvement. Recommendations The ADM of the Portfolio Affairs and Communications Branch and/or the future Senior Departmental Officer responsible for the Office for Community Outreach and Countering Radicalization to Violence should ensure that: 1. Kanishka-related research findings are better communicated to policy and decision makers and the general public. In collaboration with the Assistant Deputy Minister Corporate Management Branch ensure that: 2. funding recipients' reporting requirements are proportionate to their current risk profile. Management Response and Action Plan Management accepts all recommendations and will implement an action plan. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2016. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: 2016-06-28: Accessed September 30, 2016 at: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/vltn-knshk-2015-16/knshk-2015-16-en.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/vltn-knshk-2015-16/knshk-2015-16-en.pdf Shelf Number: 140524 Keywords: Counter-radicalization Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violence Violent Extremism

Author: Farah, Douglas Title: Islamist Cyber Networks in Spanish Speaking Latin America Summary: Despite significant concern among policy, law enforcement and intelligence communities in the United States (U.S.) over the possible spread of radical Islamist thought throughout the world as part of a global jihad movement, there has been little investigation into the growing cyber networks in Latin America that promote strong anti-Semitic and anti-U.S. messages. This paper offers an overview of that network, focusing on the structure of Shi'ite websites that promote not only religious conversion but are also supportive of Iran - a designated State-sponsor of terrorism - , its nuclear program, Hezbollah and the "D Bolivarian revolution" led by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his allies in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. There is also a smaller group of Sunni Muslim websites, mostly tied to the legacy organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of the Shi'ite websites are linked to each other consistently portray Israel as a Nazi State, and the United States as an imperialist war monger. The Palestinian issue is frequently juxtaposed with the anti-imperialist struggle that those states supporting Chavez' Bolivarian revolution claim to wage against the United States. Some of the Islamist websites claim thousands of new converts, but such claims are difficult to verify. Most of the websites visited touted the conversion of one or two individuals as significant victories and signs of progress, implying that there are few, if any, mass conversions. Details: Miami: Florida International University, Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 2011. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 6, 2016 at: http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20111013_ICN_Farah_Sept11.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Latin America URL: http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20111013_ICN_Farah_Sept11.pdf Shelf Number: 140597 Keywords: Cyber Networks Islamist Networks Law Enforcement Intelligence Radical Groups Radicalization Social Networks Terrorism

Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Home Affairs Committee Title: Radicalisation: the counter-narrative and identifying the tipping point Summary: Key Facts - 800 UK-linked fighters are estimated to have travelled to Syria and Iraq since the conflicts began in those countries. 50% of these foreign fighters are thought to have returned. - Terrorism-related arrests in the UK were 35% higher in 2015 than in 2010. - The UK's annual counter-terrorism policing budget has risen from L594 million in 2015-16 to L670 million for 2016-17. - The Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit has secured the removal of more than 120,000 pieces of terrorist-related content between 2010 and 2016. On average about 100 removal requests per day contain Syria-related content, which would amount to 36,500 requests per year. - The EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) made over 500 referrals in the first 16 weeks after it was established in July 2015, of which 90% were successfully removed. - Between mid-2015 and February 2016, Twitter had suspended over 125,000 accounts globally that were linked to terrorists. Google removed over 14 million videos globally in 2014 which related to all kinds of abuse. - Over 90% of Bangladeshi, Indian and Pakistani Muslims living in the UK think of themselves as British - a higher proportion than in other ethnic groups. Over 80% believe it is possible to maintain both British and other cultural/religious identities effectively. - Less than 0.5% of UK journalists are Muslim, compared to almost 5% of the national population. Details: London: House of Commons, 2016. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: HC 135: Accessed October 12, 2016 at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/135.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/135.pdf Shelf Number: 140678 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Acheson, Ian Title: Summary of main findings of the review of Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice Summary: 1. This summary provides an overview of the review led by Ian Acheson into Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice, namely its context, key findings and principal recommendations. 2. In September 2015 the then Secretary of State for Justice commissioned a departmental review, supported by external expertise, to:  assess the threat which Islamist Extremism (IE) and the radicalisation which sustains it pose to prisons and probation services; and  assess the capability of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) to manage that threat. 3. The review team submitted a detailed report of their findings and recommendations to the then Secretary of State on 17 March 2016. 4. Given the nature of its content, and implications for public safety and security, the review is in the form of a classified report to the then Secretary of State. The subject matter is complex, with significant policy implications. The main findings of the review have been summarised below. 5. The then Secretary of State welcomed the review as a vital element of the MoJ's overall approach to addressing the threat presented by extremism and radicalisation in prisons and probation. Its findings will inform future policy development and operational practice, about which more will be said in the coming months. Details: London: Ministry of Justice, 2016. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 15, 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/547032/acheson-review-summary-aug-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/547032/acheson-review-summary-aug-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 140760 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamist Extremists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) Title: Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Cities and the New Urban Agenda. 5th International Report Summary: The fifth edition of the International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety develops, from the urban perspective, various topics relevant to the current context in cities. As with previous editions of the Report, the first chapter is a constant of ICPC's International Reports, reviewing major trends in crime and in its prevention. The following two chapters address the relationship between the urban setting and the prevention of crime through two distinct lenses: the first gives a general overview of the issues and major trends facing cities; the second, in contrast, offers a comparative perspective, particularly in relation to national-local relationships in the Latin American context. The final three chapters address three fundamental topics on the prevention of urban crime: public transport, the prevention of drug-related crime, and the prevention of violent radicalization. Details: Ottawa: ICPC, 2016. 204p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2016 at: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/International_Report/CIPC_5th-IR_EN_17oct_Final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/International_Report/CIPC_5th-IR_EN_17oct_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 145994 Keywords: Crime Prevention Drug-Related Violence Extremist Groups Public Transport Radical Groups Radicalization Urban Areas and Crime

Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Radicalisation, De-radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review Summary: The 'radicalisation', 'de-radicalisation' and 'counter-radicalisation' are used widely, but the search for what exactly 'radicalisation' is, what causes it and how to 'de-radicalise' those who are considered radicals, violent extremists or terrorists has so far been a frustrating experience. The popularity of the concept of 'radicalisation' stands in no direct relationship to its actual explanatory power regarding the root causes of terrorism. In Europe, it was brought into the academic discussion after the bomb attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) by policymakers who coined the term 'violent radicalisation'. It has become a political shibboleth despite its lack of precision. Historical Roots and Definitions Based on an in-depth literature review, this paper seeks to explore key terms and the discourses surrounding them in greater detail. Much of the literature on radicalisation focuses on Islamist extremism and jihadist terrorism and this is also reflected in this Research Paper. Looking at the historical roots of radicalism, the subject is a relative one and has often been a force of progress. As such, its derivative, 'radicalisation' is not necessarily a synonym for terrorism. The paper proposes a distinction between radicalism and extremism. While both stand at some distance from mainstream political thinking, the first tends to be open-minded, while the second manifests a closed mind and a distinct willingness to use violence against civilians. A re-conceptualisation of radicalisation is proposed after a discussion of numerous academic and governmental definitions of radicalisation. The Two Sides of Radicalisation The paper also seeks to differentiate between terrorism and other forms of political violence - some worse and some less unacceptable than terrorism itself. It acknowledges that there are certain forms of violent resistance to political oppression that, while illegal under certain national laws, are accepted under international humanitarian law. For analytical purposes, political violence should be situated in the broader spectrum of political action - persuasive politics, pressure politics and violent politics - by those holding state power as well as non-state militant actors. With this in mind it should also be recognised that radicalisation is not necessarily a one-sided phenomenon, it is equally important to examine the role of state actors and their potential for radicalisation. The use of torture techniques and extra-judicial renditions in recent years, has been a drastic departure from democratic rule of law procedures and international human rights standards. These are indicative of the fact that in a polarised political situation not only non-state actors but also state actors can radicalise. Drivers of Radicalisation An exploration of the literature also confirms the pitfalls of profiling those individuals 'likely' to become terrorists. The current propensity to focus in the search for causes of radicalisation on 'vulnerable' young people has produced inconclusive results. The number of push and pull factors that can lead to radicalisation on this micro-level is very large - the same is true for the factors which can impact on de-radicalisation and disengagement. However, in the literature most findings are derived from small samples and few case studies, making comparison and generalisations problematic, and findings provisional. The paper pleads to look for roots of radicalisation beyond this micro-level and include a focus on the meso-level - the radical milieu - and the macro-level - the radicalisation of public opinion and party politics - to gain a better understanding of the dynamic processes driving escalation. The paper synthesises what we think we know about radicalisation and identifies those areas where our knowledge is 'thin'. Conclusions When it comes to de-radicalisation/dis-engagement and counter-radicalisation the paper concludes that it is difficult to identify what works and what does not work in general, or what is even counter-productive. Local context matters very much and academics and policy makers alike are increasingly recognising this fact. At this stage we still lack rigorous evaluations that allow us to determine the relative merits of various policies with a high degree of certainty. The lack of clarity and consensus with regard to many key concepts (terrorism, radicalisation, extremism, etc.) - ill-defined and yet taken for granted � still present an obstacle that needs to be overcome. The paper concludes with a set of findings and recommendations and identifies two major gaps in current counter-radicalisation efforts - one referring to the role of the media and the Internet and the other to the role of counter-narratives to those of jihadist terrorists. It identifies credibility and legitimacy as core ingredients of any political narrative hoping to catch the imagination of people at home and abroad. They are key resources in counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism. Governments need not be perfect before they can effectively engage in successful de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation efforts. However, they have, in the eyes of domestic and foreign publics, to be markedly better than extremist parties and terrorist organisations. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2013. 97p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper March 2013: Accessed October 21, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 130117 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization De-Radicalization Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Khalil, James Title: Qualitative Study on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Programming Under the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) Summary: While Kenya received global attention in September 2013 due to the attack at the Westgate shopping mall, this event represents just one of many violent incidents in the country over recent years, often considered to be in part a spill-over from instability in Somalia. The tensions in Coastal Kenya also take additional forms and are driven to a considerable degree by the perceived political and economic marginalisation of the region. Drawing upon professed historical injustices, the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) reportedly relies upon violence to promote independence, and has encouraged local residents to boycott elections. Tensions between Christians and Muslims are also pronounced on the Coast, particularly after the killing of prominent Muslim clerics such as Aboud Rogo. In this context fits the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) and its Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme. Since 2011 KTI has been operational in Eastleigh and its environs, and in 2012 it expanded to the Coastal regions of Lamu, Kilifi, Kwale, Malindi and Mombasa. The KTI programme was essentially a pilot of the new CVE concept, operating through flexible funding mechanisms that supported individuals, networks and organisations, often with small grants implemented over a short duration. The grants were designed to target the key ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors responsible for driving Violent Extremism (VE). As understood by KTI, the former ‘drive youth to join extremist movements,’ whereas the latter ‘attract youth towards extremism as an emotional struggle for purpose, direction and identity.’1 Examples of push factors may include, for instance, police harassment, elevated unemployment and racial profiling, whereas KTI’s identified pull factors included personal appeal of radical preachers and a radicalised religious environment. 2. THIS STUDY As part of the learning process during closedown, KTI engaged Integrity Research and Consultancy (Integrity) to undertake a qualitative study into its intervention. Following an introduction looking at the background, objectives and the study methods (Section 1), this report is structured loosely to mirror KTI’s lifecycle, sequentially focusing upon the research undertaken to inform the intervention (Section 2), programme design (Section 3), and the selection of grants (Section 4). This is followed by conclusions (Section 5), and a series of actionable recommendations designed to inform future CVE initiatives in Kenya and elsewhere (Section 6). The KTI Terms of Reference (TOR) largely advised our research methods, with a primary focus upon a review of KTI documentation being complemented by key informant interviews with KTI staff, grantees and other stakeholders, focus group discussions with grant beneficiaries, and grantee observations. Details: Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2014. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2016 at: https://www.integrityglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/KTI-End-of-Programme-Qualitative-Study-R.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Kenya URL: https://www.integrityglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/KTI-End-of-Programme-Qualitative-Study-R.pdf Shelf Number: 145395 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorist Violent Extremism

Author: Van Metre, Lauren Title: Community Resilience to Violent Extremism in Kenya Summary: Focusing on six urban neighborhoods in Kenya, this report explores how key resilience factors have prevented or countered violent extremist activity at the local level. It is based on a one-year, mixed-method study led by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and supported by Sahan Research. Summary - Over the years, Kenya has conveyed an idyllic public image of a peaceful society in a region of conflict-ridden states. A much more contested narrative of a violent past exists, however. - Despite initiatives related to Christian-Muslim conflicts in the 1990s, a new regional security threat emerged, mainly revolving around the activities of al-Shabaab. - Groups like al-Shabaab understand and use a combination of political realities, socioeconomic factors, and individual characteristics that render many vulnerable to recruitment. - Qualitative studies show a relationship between heavy-handed counterterrorism operations by security forces and radicalization of Kenya's Muslim population. - A paradox has emerged, where emphasis on winning the hearts and minds of target populations has collided with the dominance of hard military and security approaches to countering violent extremism. - The challenge with a concept like resilience to violence, which is both ambiguous and dynamic, is "for analytical purposes" to identify a concrete and measurable relationship. - Communities that prevent the emergence of violent conflict, or rebound more quickly after it, have everyday capacities to successfully harness against extremist violence. Communities with genuine associations with religious members from different groups experience less violent extremist activity. - Fluid religious and ethnic identities, which might lead to higher tolerance of and openness to members of other religions and tribal groups, do not explain community resilience to violent extremism. - Communities facing violent extremist threats need to develop resilience capacities and strategies. Without commensurate capacity and action, threats can overwhelm even highly resilient communities. - Heavy-handed security approaches not only increase the risk of violent extremist activity, they also undermine community resilience factors and relationships. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW122-Community-Resilience-to-Violent-Extremism-in-Kenya.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Kenya URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW122-Community-Resilience-to-Violent-Extremism-in-Kenya.pdf Shelf Number: 145392 Keywords: Communities and Violence Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Radical Groups Urban Areas Violence

Author: Green, Shannon N. Title: Turning Point: A New Comprehensive Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism Summary: The United States lost nearly 3,000 lives in the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. On that day, a problem that had been slowly festering and barely noticed in the West broke onto the world stage in a forceful and heart-wrenching way. Those events and many that would follow have prompted trillions of dollars to be poured into military, law enforcement, and intelligence operations. Yet the problem of violent extremism has grown more severe and urgent. Despite the many efforts to extinguish the flames of violence, new and powerful extremist movements have taken root. Terrorist groups around the world have used technology, the media, religious schools and mosques, and word of mouth to sell their twisted ideologies, justify their violence, and convince too many recruits that glory can be found in the mass murder of innocent civilians. The spread of extremist ideologies and increasingly frequent terrorist attacks are stoking anxiety and fear across the globe. According to a survey conducted by the Commission, people are willing to try just about anything to stop the bloodshed: from military action to stronger border controls and mandatory identification cards to relinquishing privacy and accepting constraints on speech. The increasing potency and reach of terrorist groups—and a sense that governments’ response to the threat has been inadequate—is creating deep political divisions and fueling support for populist solutions. There are no easy solutions to this problem. Neither troops nor police nor economic sanctions alone can address this threat. We cannot close our borders and hope that the problem goes away. And we cannot abandon our commitment to human rights and freedom of expression in an attempt to quell violent extremism. Diminishing the appeal of extremist ideologies will require a long-term, generational struggle. The United States and its allies must combat extremists' hostile and apocalyptic world view with the same level of commitment that we apply to dealing with its violent manifestations. We urgently need a new comprehensive strategy for countering violent extremism—one that is resolute, rests in soft and hard power, and galvanizes key allies and partners from government, civil society, and the private sector. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2016. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 2, 2016 at: https://www.csis.org/features/turning-point Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.csis.org/features/turning-point Shelf Number: 147863 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Weine, Stevan Title: Building Resilience to Violent Extremism Among Somali-Americans in Minneapolis-St. Paul Summary: This study asked members of the Somalia-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul to describe the challenges of living in a refugee community, how violent extremists try to exploit their condition for recruitment purposes, and what resources and strategies are needed to minimize their vulnerability. Using ethnographic methods, this study looked at the everyday lives of Somalia-American adolescent boys and young men in the context of their families and communities. It found opportunities for entering violent extremism as well as capacities for diminishing those opportunities. Based on empirical data and informed by relevant theory, it identified themes and built a model, Diminishing Opportunities for Violent Extremism (DOVE), which can help to inform prevention strategies for building community resilience to violent extremism in the Somalia-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul. No one risk factor explained involvement in violent extremism. Rather it was the interaction of multiple risk factors at the peer, family, community, global, state, and societal levels. These risk factors combined to create an opportunity structure for violent extremism with three levels of opportunity: 1) youth's unaccountable times and unobserved spaces; 2) the perceived social legitimacy of violent extremism; and 3) contact with recruiters or associates. Involvement in violent extremism depended on the presence of all three, with decreasing proportions of adolescent boys and young men exposed to the latter two. Efforts to increase resilience should involve strengthening protective resources or what are called opportunity-reducing capacities. Furthermore, family and youth, community, and government can help to strengthen protective resources at each of the three levels of opportunity. Priorities include diminishing: 1) youth's unaccountable times and unobserved spaces; 2) the perceived social legitimacy of violent extremism; and 3) the potential for contacts with terrorist recruiters or associates. Building community resilience to violent extremism should be approached through community collaboration and capacity building. Interventions may involve government, community, and families working collaboratively to improve each other's capacities. Shared goals could be to: 1) collaboratively strengthen families; 2) develop community support for families and youth; and 3) adopt new governmental strategies for community support and protection. One way to determine priority areas for prevention might include identifying protective resources with the greatest potential for addressing multiple risk factors. Collaborations between government, community, and families and youth can then be built to enhance these capacities. Based on the current study, promising preventive interventions in the Somalia-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul might include: 1) building a web-based resource that includes information and training about risks and safeguards for use by youth, parents, and community service providers; 2) providing Somali youth and young adults with opportunities for service in their community and humanitarian and peace work, thus creating alternative ways for youth to channel their passion for Somalia; and 3) providing logistical support and training to elders and critical voices in the community and on the web. Additional research is needed in communities under threat to show which acts of building resilience work with whom under what circumstances and why. One way to do this would be to collaborate with the community to develop, pilot, and evaluate a multilevel community resilience-based prevention strategy in Minneapolis-St. Paul based on the DOVE model. Another would be to use the DOVE model as a basis for assessing other communities targeted by violent extremists, in the United States and abroad, so as to refine the model and approaches that can reliably assess communities at risk and help to inform and prioritize prevention strategies Details: College Park, MD: START, 2012. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Final Report to Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Accessed December 10, 2016 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/Weine_BuildingResiliencetoViolentExtremism_SomaliAmericans.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/Weine_BuildingResiliencetoViolentExtremism_SomaliAmericans.pdf Shelf Number: 146042 Keywords: Extremist Groups Homeland Security Radical groups Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremism

Author: Whiteside, Craig Title: Lighting the Path: the Evolution of the Islamic State Media Enterprise (2003-2016) Summary: The media products of the revolutionary movement known as the Islamic State (also IS, ISIL, ISIS, Daesh) have received a significant amount of attention from analysts and journalists alike. While extremely helpful, most of this effort is focused at performing content analysis of fairly recent products. As part of the Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communication (CTSC) project's effort to better understand propaganda messaging in the 21st century, the author of this Research Paper examined primary documents and other media published by the Islamic State movement during its entire existence in order to develop a history of the media department since 2003. The framework for analysis focused on the interaction between key media leaders, the ever-expanding structure and institutions, and the process of innovation used to experiment with different media techniques in different phases of the group's evolution. Based on this history, the paper presents six observations about the media department and its role in the larger movement – in the hopes that this knowledge will be helpful in efforts to combat this particular group and its inevitable imitators in the future. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research paper: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Whiteside-Lighting-the-Path-the-Evolution-of-the-Islamic-State-Media-Enterprise-2003-2016-Nov2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Whiteside-Lighting-the-Path-the-Evolution-of-the-Islamic-State-Media-Enterprise-2003-2016-Nov2016.pdf Shelf Number: 144914 Keywords: Counter-terrorism ISIS Islamic State Media Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: United States Institute of Peace Title: The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, Al Qaeda, and Beyond Summary: The West failed to predict the emergence of al-Qaeda in new forms across the Middle East and North Africa. It was blindsided by the ISIS sweep across Syria and Iraq, which at least temporarily changed the map of the Middle East. Both movements have skillfully continued to evolve and proliferate — and surprise. What’s next? Twenty experts from think tanks and universities across the United States explore the world’s deadliest movements, their strategies, the future scenarios, and policy considerations. This report reflects their analysis and diverse views. his report is a collaboration by 20 experts on the Middle East, Islamic extremism, and jihadism who held a series of conferences between August and November 2016. "The Jihadi Threat" reflects the broad — and often diverse — views of the coauthors. Not every one agreed on all points, but the variety of findings, trend lines, and scenarios for the future covers the best thinking about the evolution of the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and their affiliates. The United States Institute of Peace was the primary sponsor of this initiative, with the backing of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Fifteen other think tanks and universities were represented in the Working Group on Extremism. The goal was always to reflect the widest expertise and the full spectrum of views. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf Shelf Number: 146146 Keywords: Al Qaeda Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Mulholland, Sean E. Title: Hate Source: White Supremacist Hate Groups and Hate Crime Summary: The relationship between hate group activity and hate crime is theoretically ambiguous. Hate groups may incite criminal behavior in support of their beliefs. On the other hand, hate groups may reduce hate crime by serving as a forum for members to verbally vent their frustrations or as protection from future biased violence. I find that the presence of an active white supremacist hate group chapter is associated with an 18.7 percent higher hate crime rate. White supremacist groups are not associated with the level of anti-white hate crimes committed by non-whites, nor do they form in expectation of future hate crimes by non-whites. Details: Munich: Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 2011. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: MPRA Paper No. 28861: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28861/1/MPRA_paper_28861.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28861/1/MPRA_paper_28861.pdf Shelf Number: 144917 Keywords: Extremist Groups Hate Crime Radical Groups White Supremacists

Author: Chome, Ngala Title: Violent Extremism and Clan Dynamics in Kenya Summary: Derived from interviews across three Kenyan counties, this report explores the relationships between resilience and risk to clan violence and violent extremism in the northeast region of the country. Summary Recent political and social developments in the northeast of Kenya are threatening to weaken communal resilience capacities to violent extremist activities. Somalia-based Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen continues to influence the politics of the region and has proved adept at exploiting community risk factors in gaining a foothold in the region. The relationship between violent extremism and clan-based conflict is complex and has no neat overlap. Extremist recruitment in northeast Kenya is not based on clan membership, but extremist actors can take advantage of the close ties across the Kenya-Somalia border and the porous nature of the border to operate in both countries. Factors driving clan-based conflict produce a fertile ground for violent extremism, but the two are correlated rather than causally related. To weaken the influence of clanism, al-Shabaab leaders are circulating a narrative of victimization and alienation that attempts to unify Somalis and Muslims against the Kenyan government and mainstream society. Al-Shabaab's success in convincing Kenyan Somalis to join its ranks is determined by the interplay of resilience and risk factors in Kenya's northeast. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW123-Violent-Extremism-And-Clan-Dynamics-In-Kenya.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Kenya URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW123-Violent-Extremism-And-Clan-Dynamics-In-Kenya.pdf Shelf Number: 140468 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Berger, J.M. Title: Making CVE Work: A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption Summary: One of the biggest barriers to designing a comprehensive Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme is defining its scope. This paper argues for a narrow approach, focusing on disengagement and the disruption of recruitment. The author develops a simplified model of radicalisation and the concurrent terrorist recruitment process, proposing concrete themes for disruptive intervention and messaging. After analysing case studies of disengagement, the author offers recommendations for specific action to accomplish CVE goals by disrupting recruitment processes and deploying targeted messaging within the framework of the correlated models. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed December 15, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/J.-M.-Berger-Making-CVE-Work-A-Focused-Approach-Based-on-Process-Disruption-.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/J.-M.-Berger-Making-CVE-Work-A-Focused-Approach-Based-on-Process-Disruption-.pdf Shelf Number: 146161 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremism

Author: Ahmadi, Belquis Title: Afghan Women and Violent Extremism: Colluding, Perpetrating, or Preventing? Summary: Summary • Women’s role in violent extremism has too often been simplified to a binary: either victim of the choices of men or deviant anomaly. • Women play a diverse range of roles in violent extremism in Afghanistan—as they do around the world—not only as peacebuilders but also as recruiters, sympathizers, perpetrators, and preventers. • Roles and motivations vary, but what is clear is that the construct of disempowered victims simply does not hold true for all women involved. • Women’s roles in violent extremism and the underlying reasons behind those roles need to be fully understood and appropriately reflected in policy and practice. • Women’s rights and place in society are central to the narratives of violent extremist groups, and these narratives are the terrain on which women in Afghanistan fight to establish their rights. • Women have the potential, whether through their own involvement or as family members of those who are involved, to counter radicalization dynamics. • Countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) programming needs to include women as specific target groups, be engendered more generally, and address the underlying issues of women’s status and agency. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of peace, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 396: Accessed December 16, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR396-Afghan-Women-and-Violent-Extremism.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR396-Afghan-Women-and-Violent-Extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 146123 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremists

Author: Owens, Kimberly B. Title: Beyond hate: countering violent extremism from the white power movement Summary: Counterterrorism efforts are a major focus for the homeland security enterprise. Throughout the world, however, efforts have largely focused on countering violent extremism from Islamist organizations. While Islamist terrorists have been responsible for more deaths in the United States, this research focuses on white power domestic terrorism. It considers successful methods from the United States and the United Kingdom (UK), but applies them to factions of the right-wing movement, rather than Salafi-jihadist groups. This research is a case study comparison of former right-wing leaders, both of whom were associated with planned domestic terror plots. Significantly, the research included participation of individuals formerly active within the politically motivated Ku Klux Klan, and the religiously motivated the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSA). It revealed a common anti-government theme between the vastly different groups, as well as the sociological underpinnings for participation in the Klan, within the theoretical framework of Social Identity Theory. While extremism is an unpleasant fact, perhaps violence can be mitigated, and having dialogue with those who once carried the torch of white power rhetoric may hold some answers, or provide a starting point for successful counterterrorism efforts. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 160p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed December 16, 2016 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38992/13Dec_Owens_Kimberly.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38992/13Dec_Owens_Kimberly.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 146134 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Homeland Security Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Bhulai, Rafia Title: Strengthening Regional Cooperation to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism in South Asia. What Role for Civil Society? Summary: Since 2011, the Global Center has worked with the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), with generous support from the government of Norway, to implement a process that engages civil society actors and experts in efforts to enhance regional cooperation in South Asia. This process, undertaken in partnership with the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore, included regular dialogue and engagement with nongovernmental actors in South Asia to foster deeper understanding of local and regional drivers of terrorism and violent extremism and to identify critical gaps, opportunities, and priorities for capacity-building support to address the threat. This assessment presents key outcomes of the multiyear civil society and experts process. It provides an overview of regional challenges and the efforts by the Global Center and CTED to identify key needs and priorities to inform responsive policies and programs to address the threat of terrorism and violent extremism in South Asia. A set of recommendations highlight practical ways that multilateral and regional organizations and national governments can work with civil society, experts, and practitioners to address this threat in the region. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 16, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016-12_Bhulai-Fink-South-Asia-CSE-Process.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Asia URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016-12_Bhulai-Fink-South-Asia-CSE-Process.pdf Shelf Number: 146118 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Intergovernmental Authority on Development Title: Al-Shabaab as a Transnational Security Threat Summary: Harakaat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiiin, Al-Qaeda's affiliate in the Horn of Africa, has long been perceived as a Somali organisation – albeit one that represents a security threat to the wider region. But since at least 2010, Al-Shabaab has aspired to become a truly regional organisation, with membership and horizons that transcend national borders. In 2010 the group staged its first major external operation, in Kampala, Uganda, and issued its first propaganda video in the Swahili language. Since then, Al- Shabaab has become active in no less than six countries of the region, striking five of them with terrorist attacks. Al-Shabaab is clearly no longer an exclusively Somali problem, and requires a concerted international response. This determined expansion of Al-Shabaab’s ambitions and operational reach is in large part the result of the strategic direction adopted by Al-Shabaab's former leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, and his successor, Ahmed Diiriye, who currently heads the movement. In late 2013, Godane re-organised Al-Shabaab's military wing to include two transnational units: one, the Jaysh Ayman, directed against Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, and another dedicated to operations against Ethiopia. While the latter formation has yet to mount an effective operation on Ethiopian soil, the Jaysh Ayman launched a series of cross-border attacks into Kenya in 2014 and, despite a Kenyan counter-offensive in late 2015, the group remains a serious threat to the country's national security. In 2013, Godane also gave instructions for Al-Shabaab’s special operations wing, the Amniyaad, to step up attacks against neighbouring countries, notably those contributing troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This resulted in a spate of attacks between 2013 and 2015 in Kenya that claimed over 350 lives, an attempted suicide bombing of a football match in Addis Ababa in October 2013, and the suicide bombing of a popular restaurant in Djibouti in May 2014. In October 2014, Al-Shabaab again attempted a suicide bombing in Addis Ababa, this time apparently targeting a busy shopping mall, but the plot was detected and foiled. Al-Shabaab-affiliated networks in Kenya also continued to plan terror attacks during this period, but less successfully than Jaysh Ayman. Al-Hijra, Al-Shabaab’s Kenyan affiliate, experienced growing pressure from the security services, and suffered a steady attrition of its leadership. As a result, Al-Hijra cadres withdrew from major hubs of activity in Nairobi and Mombasa, dispersing their radicalisation and recruitment efforts throughout the country – notably within the prison system. Al-Hijra operatives and recruits – including a growing proportion of women – continued to travel back and forth to Somalia, typically receiving training and instructions before returning to Kenya to engage in operations. Kenya also witnessed increasing activity among Al-Shabaab sympathisers, organising themselves spontaneously online via social media and mobile applications. While many of these individuals remain purely aspirational, some have gone on to plan operations, reaching out to members of Al-Shabaab or Al-Hijra for guidance and support. Others have sought advice concerning travel to Somalia or Syria. Confronted by the evolving threat, regional states are exploring ways to strengthen their common response to Al-Shabaab. AMISOM, whose forces are drawn mainly from IGAD countries, continues to support the efforts of the Somali Federal Government and emerging federal member states to confront Al-Shabaab militarily, steadily driving the jihadists out of the last remaining strongholds and helping to build the capacity of Somali security forces. Outside Somalia, IGAD Member States have devoted greater efforts to monitoring and disrupting Al-Shabaab activities within their borders. The Heads of Intelligence and Security Services (HISS) of the member countries of IGAD and the East African Community (EAC) met twice in 2015 to deepen security cooperation and harmonise efforts to fight terrorism and violent extremism. In August 2015, a two-day experts’ meeting in Djibouti took the first steps towards the establishment of a Centre of Excellence to Counter Violent Extremism for the IGAD region. In addition, the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) launched a new Transnational Security Threats (TST) Initiative to promote security cooperation between member states: the initiative under which this report has been commission and published. The report concludes with a series of recommendations for further action, including: • Enhanced security cooperation in countering Al-Shabaab, including a joint review to identify gaps, challenges, and opportunities in strengthening cooperation to combat Al-Shabaab, such as the types of information to be shared and the processes for doing so; more joint activities to confront Al- Shabaab; and inviting Tanzania to participate in any IGAD-led efforts to counter this threat. • Better understanding of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat and possible counter-measures, including appropriate Counter-IED (C-IED) strategies, enhanced technical capabilities for post-blast investigation and analysis, and improved information sharing within the region. • Adaptation to evolving patterns of radicalisation and recruitment, such as the shifting of extremist activities away from former hubs, such as Nairobi and Mombasa in Kenya, to new geographic areas; sensitisation and training of public officials, in order to help them identify and react appropriately to potential threats; enhance surveillance of terrorism suspects and networks inside the prison system and put in place appropriate responses; and undertake additional research and analysis into current trends of radicalisation and recruitment among young women, in order to formulate appropriate responses. Details: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP), 2016. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2016 at: http://www.igadssp.org/index.php/documentation/reports/igad-report-al-shabaab-as-a-transnational-security-threat?layout=table Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://www.igadssp.org/index.php/documentation/reports/igad-report-al-shabaab-as-a-transnational-security-threat?layout=table Shelf Number: 147782 Keywords: Al-Qaeda Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment

Author: Klausen, Jytte Title: Finding Online Extremists in Social Networks Summary: Online extremists in social networks pose a new form of threat to the general public. These extremists range from cyberbullies who harass innocent users to terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) that use social networks to recruit and incite violence. Currently social networks suspend the accounts of such extremists in response to user complaints. The challenge is that these extremist users simply create new accounts and continue their activities. In this work we present a new set of operational capabilities to deal with the threat posed by online extremists in social networks. Using data from several hundred thousand extremist accounts on Twitter, we develop a behavioral model for these users, in particular what their accounts look like and who they connect with. This model is used to identify new extremist accounts by predicting if they will be suspended for extremist activity. We also use this model to track existing extremist users as they create new accounts by identifying if two accounts belong to the same user. Finally, we present a model for searching the social network to efficiently find suspended users' new accounts based on a variant of the classic Polya's urn setup. We find a simple characterization of the optimal search policy for this model under fairly general conditions. Our urn model and main theoretical results generalize easily to search problems in other fields. Details: Unpublished paper, 2016. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 23, 2016 at: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3a42/19deb22b90f807cec920ade6470a7bd44c3b.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3a42/19deb22b90f807cec920ade6470a7bd44c3b.pdf Shelf Number: 147812 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremists Online Extremism Radical Groups Social Networks

Author: Jensen, Michael Title: Final Report: Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) Summary: The Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization (EADR) project uses a mixed-method, nested approach to explore a number of key research questions related to radicalization, including: • what are the demographic, background, and radicalization differences between and within the different ideological milieus? • are there important contextual, personal, ideological, or experiential differences between radicals who commit violent acts and those who do not? • is it possible to identify sufficient pathways to violent extremism? and; • are the causal mechanisms highlighted by extant theories of radicalization supported by empirical evidence? To address these questions, EADR researchers built the largest known database on individual radicalization in the United States: Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS). The database includes 147 variables covering demographic, background, group affiliation, and ideological information for 1,473 violent and non-violent extremists from across the ideological spectrum. The database was analyzed using comparative descriptive statistics and multivariate logistic regression techniques. Additionally, project researchers produced 56 life-course narratives of individuals who radicalized in the U.S., which were analyzed using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fs/QCA), a methodology that makes it possible to determine the causal conditions and pathways that are most salient for explaining radicalization to violence. EADR produced a number of findings that are relevant for domestic countering violent extremism (CVE) programs, law enforcement, criminal justice policy, and academic research. First, a descriptive comparison of individuals in the PIRUS data shows that with the exception of participation in pre-radicalization criminal activities, many regularly highlighted radicalization warning indicators, such as economic deprivation and low educational attainment, are not more common among extremists than they are for the general population. CVE programs designed to address feelings of relative deprivation may be ineffective in many cases. The results also indicate that it is important to consider age and gender when designing prevention and intervention programs as a part of domestic CVE efforts. Programs designed for juveniles and men may be ineffective for preventing radicalization among older individuals, who are especially prevalent among the far right and single-issue milieus, and women, who are found in large numbers on the far left. In addition to addressing issues of age and gender, intervention programs should look to take advantage of the comparatively long radicalization durations that exist across the ideological spectrum, which often last several months or years, and they should target the face-to-face and virtual social networks that mobilize lone and group-based extremists to act. Second, through a set of robust statistical models, the project identified a number of factors that indicate which extremists are most likely to engage in violent acts. All other things held constant, pre-radicalization criminal activity and post-radicalization clique membership are strongly associated with violent outcomes among radicalized individuals. To the extent that law-enforcement agencies and CVE programs prioritize potentially violent individuals over others when resources are constrained, this finding suggests that their focus should be placed on individuals with prior interactions with the criminal justice system and those who are known to associate with others holding extreme views. Other factors uncovered by this analysis suggest that individuals on the far right and those motivated by Salafi jihadist ideologies are more likely to engage in violence, while those with stable employment histories and those motivated by animal rights and environmental concerns are significantly less likely to do so. Lastly, EADR reveals that psychological, emotional, material, and group-based factors can combine in complex ways to produce many pathways to violent extremism. Social and behavioral indicators of radicalization are embedded in complex processes that unfold in non-linear ways. Using fs/QCA techniques, the project reveals that both a sense of community victimization and a radical shift in individuals’ cognitive frames are necessary conditions for radicalization to violent extremism. These necessary conditions combine with a host of other factors to produce eight sufficient pathways to violent extremism. Of these, the majority are driven by psychological and emotional vulnerabilities that stem from lost significance, personal trauma, and collective crises. These findings suggest that successful CVE programs and counter-narratives need to address feelings of community victimization in ways that challenge myths and misperceptions, but also acknowledge legitimate grievances. Programs that place an undue focus on particular communities are likely to be counterproductive by exasperating feelings of collective victimization. Successful programs, on the other hand, will be tailored to specific ideological groups and sub-groups, and will address the underlying psychological and emotional vulnerabilities that make individuals open to extremist narratives. The results of the EADR project lend good support to radicalization mechanisms that are based on personal and collective psychology. That said, our analysis failed to account for the radicalization pathways of 15 of 35 cases of violent extremism that were analyzed, which indicates that extant radicalization research does not account for all of the causal conditions that can contribute to radicalization processes. Future research efforts should focus on interviews with extremists and panel surveys of at-risk populations in order to identify these missing conditions. Doing so will also allow researchers to more closely chart how attitudinal and behavioral traits change over-time. The results of these efforts should be used to inform domestic CVE efforts, especially when it comes to program design and evaluation. CVE programs are only likely to succeed if they reflect an empirical understanding of the myriad causes of radicalization and its consequences. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2016. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 3, 2017 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_NIJ_EmpiricalAssessmentofDomesticRadicalizationFinalReport_Dec2016_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_NIJ_EmpiricalAssessmentofDomesticRadicalizationFinalReport_Dec2016_0.pdf Shelf Number: 145380 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorists

Author: Davis, Lynn E. Title: A Strategy to Counter ISIL as a Transregional Threat Summary: The debate in the past over counter-ISIL strategies has tended to focus on rather stark alternatives that are based on different ways to employ U.S. military forces: disengagement, containment, and aggressive rollback using combat forces. Our strategy seeks to broaden the focus to policies beyond the military dimension. Even though U.S. leverage is limited to affect the political situations in Iraq and Syria, the United States should focus on removing the underlying conditions sustaining ISIL and other violent jihadist groups, i.e., the lack of security, justice, and political representation. In addition, the United States needs to re-evaluate how to balance the aims of the counter-ISIL campaign with future territorial and political ambitions of the Kurds, given the risk of violence between Shia and Kurds in Iraq and Turkey and the YPG in Syria. In the absence of commitments on the part of the Kurds to limit their territorial ambitions, and to avoid fueling conflict across the region, the United States should be cautious in the ways it supports the YPG and peshmerga in its counter-ISIL military campaign. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Perspective: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE228.html Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE228.html Shelf Number: 145032 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Homeland Security ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorist

Author: Fajmonova, Veronika Title: Origin-group differences in the 2007 and 2011 Pew Polls of U.S. Muslims: Reactions to the War on Terrorism Summary: This study compared opinions relating to the war on terrorism for six origin-groups in the 2007 and 2011 Pew polls of U.S Muslims (each poll ~1000 participants). Origin-groups included Muslims born in Iran, Pakistan, other South Asian countries, Arab countries, and sub-Saharan African countries, as well as African-American Muslims. Opinions changed little from 2007 to 2011 except for a massive increase in presidential approval (Obama vs. Bush). In each origin-group, nearly half of respondents continued to believe the U.S. war on terrorism is not a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism, but approval of al-Qaida and suicide bombing in defense of Islam was less than ten percent. Within these general similarities two groups stood out. Iran-born were older and less religious than other groups but had opinions similar to other U.S. Muslims. African-American Muslims reported lower education and income than other groups and were generally most negative about living as Muslims in the United States. Experience of discrimination did not predict opinion of al-Qaida or suicide bombing, nor were converts more extreme. Discussion emphasizes the need to understand why many U.S. Muslims are negative toward the war on terrorism and why a very few persist in radical opinions approving al-Qaida and suicide bombing. Details: College Park, MD: START, 2017. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_ReactionsWaronTerrorism_Feb2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_ReactionsWaronTerrorism_Feb2017.pdf Shelf Number: 144825 Keywords: Al-Qaida Counter-Terrorism Muslims Radical Groups Suicide Bombings Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Frank, Cheryl Title: Preventing violent extremism: South Africa's place in the world Summary: The prevention of violent extremism (PVE) has become a priority for the global community. This policy brief examines the global environment in terms of policy and implementation frameworks, and explores South Africa’s position in this prevention context. Recommendations are made as to how South Africa should take PVE forward, based on the risks in evidence at the moment. Key points 1 South Africa is in a fortunate position at this early stage to implement PVE programmes before problems relating to violent extremism increase and become more complex. As a start, evidence-based and sustained prevention programmes should address known risks. 2 South Africa should generate empirical evidence to better understand the national and local dynamics that relate to violent extremism, and utilise information beyond what is available through its intelligence structures. 3 National legislation and policy should be updated to take account of international and national trends in violent extremism, including how these trends might evolve in the future. 4 South Africa should participate actively in international institutions and discussion forums as a means of both sharing its own experiences and learning lessons from other contexts. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief no. 95: Accessed February 13, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief95.pdf Year: 2016 Country: South Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief95.pdf Shelf Number: 140912 Keywords: Count-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Assanvo, William Title: Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram Summary: The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), established by the Lake Chad Basin countries to combat Boko Haram, still struggles to demonstrate its effectiveness. Observers also continue to question to what extent it is operational. Yet despite the numerous political, logistical, technical and financial challenges it has been facing, the MNJTF is gradually gaining ground. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue 10: Accessed February 17, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war19.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/war19.pdf Shelf Number: 146970 Keywords: Boko Haram Counter-Terrorism Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremists

Author: Institute of Race Relations Title: State intelligence agencies and the far right: A review of developments in Germany, Hungary and Austria Summary: Far-right and neo-Nazi violence – on the increase across Europe – is the subject of ongoing research by the Institute of Race Relations which releases today an interim report on the security services’ approach to the far Right in Austria, Hungary and Germany. This timely report, State intelligence agencies and the far Right: A review of developments in Germany, Hungary and Austria, is issued just two weeks before the largest trial on far-right extremism in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany opens in Munich. Beate Zschäpe, the sole surviving member of the National Socialist Underground and four co-defendants face charges relating to ten murders that took place between 2000 and 2007. Of the victims, shot in the head at close range, eight were Turkish or of Turkish origin, one was a Greek citizen, one a female German police officer. While the Munich trial is guaranteed international attention, the most significant trial on far-right extremism in eastern Europe in recent years has been ongoing since March 2011 at the Pest County High Court in Hungary, with barely any coverage. Four neo-Nazis face charges relating to the serial killing of six Roma and many other violent crimes. Austria faces its own neo-Nazi scandal too, since Nazi propaganda, sawn-off shotguns, machine guns and explosives were seized during a raid on the headquarters of the neo-Nazi criminal fraternity, Objekt 21 in January 2013. The IRR’s research into intelligence services’ methods suggests that far from clamping down on growing fascism, some of the tactics of security services are enhancing conditions for its growth. The report also reveals evidence of: a generalised failure to recognise the danger posed by the far Right; institutional racism and institutional negligence; a failure to interact with police murder investigations; a will to protect neo-Nazi informers at the expense of law enforcement. ‘There has systematic betrayal of minority communities’, concludes Liz Fekete, author of the report and Director of IRR. ‘The sad truth is that the families of the Roma in Hungary and those men of Turkish origin killed by the NSU in Germany carry permanent scars, the result of botched investigations that in some cases treated them not as grieving relatives but potential suspects. Given the harmonisation of so much of European police and security policies, I am seriously concerned that what has happened in Austria, Germany and Hungary could represent the European norm. On the evidence I have seen, BME communities cannot trust security services to protect them from the murderous violence of the far Right. A thorough audit of all European intelligence services’ programmes to counter far-Right violence is overdue.’ Details: London: Institute of Race Relations, 2013. 11p. Accessed February 28, 2017 at: http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ERP_BP6_State_intelligence.pdf Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper No. 6 Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: Shelf Number: 141106 Keywords: Extremist Groups Race Relations Radical Groups

Author: Fekete, Liz Title: Exit from White Supremacism: the accountability gap within Europe's de-radicalisation programmes Summary: In a timely report, the IRR cautions against the importation to the UK of Scandinavian-style Exit programmes for dealing with far-right extremists. It was one of the big news stories of October 2013 and something of a coup for 'counter-radicalisation', when Tommy Robinson and Kevin Carroll quit the EDL - and think-tank Quilliam claimed the credit for choreographing their exit. Ever since then, a head of steam has built up in favour of a UK deradicalisation programme for the far Right. But in Exit from White Supremacism: the accountability gap within Europe's de-radicalisation programmes, the IRR reveals the problems of such existing Exit programmes across Europe. The IRR suggests that: Considerable resources are being invested in Exit, but there has been scant evaluation of its methodology or statistical analysis of its vaunted success rate; There needs to be more critical evaluation of Exit's methods. Programmes, often run and designed by 'formers' ignore questions of political ideology and past racist activity, but focus instead on the social alienation and psychological problems of 'clients'; In Sweden, past failures and bitter controversies about lack of oversight within Exit have been airbrushed from the official record; In Norway, Exit practitioners have been accused of claiming credit for work done outside Exit, principally by dedicated police and youth workers; In Germany, victim support groups show concern that some 'formers' have been faking political conversion to reduce a sentence, secure probation or otherwise manipulate the security services which, in turn, has its own agenda of recruiting neo-Nazis to act as paid informants. One German 'former' who was helped by federal intelligence services to write a confessional account of his disengagement from the neo-Nazi scene, went on to become a leading light within the counter-jihadi movement. Liz Fekete, Director of the IRR and author of the report said today: 'After months of research into these Exit programmes, I am quite frankly baffled by the lack of official acknowledgement of its many manifest failures. I hope that this report will act as a wake-up call to all those hitherto seduced by the Exit brand that the total lack of transparency and accountability within Exit is not only unacceptable but potentially dangerous.' Details: London: Institute for Race Relations, 2014. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/ERP-Briefing-No-8-Exit.pdf: http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/ERP-Briefing-No-8-Exit.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/ERP-Briefing-No-8-Exit.pdf Shelf Number: 146688 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization Extremist Groups Extremists Radical Groups Radicals

Author: Ellis, B. Heidi Title: Understanding Pathways to and Away from Violent Radicalization among Resettled Somali Refugees Summary: The overall objective of the proposed project was to understand pathways to diverse outcomes among Somali immigrants: why do some embrace greater openness to violent extremism, while others with shared life histories move towards gangs, crime, or resilient outcomes such as civic engagement? To what degree do these outcomes overlap? In this project we empirically examined the principle of multi-finality, or pathways leading from a shared refugee experience to multiple outcomes. Understanding these different trajectories, and the factors that shape an individual's progress towards diverse outcomes, provides critical information to local and state government agencies as they respond to the potential threat of domestic radicalization. Somalis in North America offer a window into the remarkable potential that can be realized by refugees/immigrants despite experiences of severe adversity as well as the challenges some subgroups encounter when adjusting to life in a new country. Somalia has endured one of the longest and most brutal wars of the past 30 years. Civil war broke out in 1991 and the nation has existed in what has been described as a "perpetual anarchy" to this day (Agbiboa 2014). This enduring conflict has led to millions of Somalis being dispersed as refugees across the globe. As refugees with limited resources, many Somalis in North America are resettled in poor urban neighborhoods where they are visibly different, not only because of race or ethnicity but also because of dress, especially for women who wear a Muslim head covering. Somali refugees have also found themselves inserted into the unfamiliar black and white dichotomy that dominates American racial discourse (Kusow 2006). In this regard, though Somalis came to North America to escape the horrors of war, they often find themselves facing new problems, such as lack of jobs, loss of status, high levels of neighborhood violence, and racial and ethnic discrimination (Betancourt et al. 2014; Abdi 2015). In addition, the community has been plagued by violence. For example, in Minneapolis, MN, where the greatest number of Somali refugees in the US has settled, the community has faced gang violence and the threat of youth radicalizing simultaneously. In the two-year period between December 2007 and January 2010, eleven Somali American youth were killed in gang violence in the twin cities and twenty left to join Al-Shabaab (Yuen 2010). More recently, nine Somali youth have been arrested and have been sentenced or are awaiting sentences for their attempts to join (Yuen, Ibrahim, and Aslanian 2015;Yuen, Ibrahim, & Xaykaothao, 2016). While the number of Somali American youth joining these groups are small and while the majority of Somali Americans are law-abiding citizens, the terrorist groups' ability to recruit these youth and to convince some of them to engage in violent acts is concerning not only to policymakers and law enforcement but also to the Somali community's which fears losing more youth to violence or having the community reputation sullied by being associated with terrorism. While some of the social and cultural factors affecting Somalis are unique to that ethnic group, they also share experiences common to many immigrants - navigating identity development and duality as they move between home and host cultures, contending with discrimination as religious, racial and ethnic minorities, and striving to achieve their dreams while struggling to gain socioeconomic stability. Thus understanding their developmental trajectories may inform our understanding of other immigrant and refugee groups as well. Details: Boston: Boston Children’s Hospital and Harvard Medical School, 2016. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2017 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250415.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250415.pdf Shelf Number: 146650 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Refugees Somali Immigrants Terrorism Violent Radicalization

Author: Klausen, Jytte Title: The Role of Social Networks in the Evolution of Al Qaeda-Inspired Violent Extremism in the United States, 1990-2015 Summary: 1. Purpose of Study: This report analyses the networks and organizations that mobilize and direct Americans for jihadist action, or that raise money in the US for Hamas and Hezbollah. The study employs a quasi-experimental method using a control-case design, comparing the network structures of American terrorism offenders inspired by Hezbollah with those of Sunni extremist groups aligned with Al Qaeda, and in recent years ISIL. 2. The Problem: How and why do foreign terrorist organizations recruit Americans to their cause? Three answers have been proposed to this question:  Homegrown terrorism is a tactic developed by the foreign terrorist organization to further its strategic interest in attacking Western targets. Command and control is essential to all terrorist organizations.  Homegrown terrorism is essentially "leaderless". The root cause of militancy lies at home. US militants may declare allegiance to foreign terrorist organizations, but this is just a matter of aspiration.  Terrorist groups are comprised of leaders and foot soldiers, and tailor their operations to meet strategic goals, including, perhaps most importantly, keeping their numbers up. An emphasis on recruitment requires an open structure; fundraising requires centralized control over the flow of money; plotting attacks needs a covert and decentralized and covert organization. 2. Data and Methodology: The data were collected as part of the Western Jihadism Project (WJP), a database of Western nationals associated with terrorist plots related to Al Qaeda and aligned groups, including ISIL, from the early 1990s to the end of 2015.  Over the past twenty-five years, close to 800 residents or citizens of the U.S. have committed terrorism offenses inspired by one of the many Islamist terrorist groups that have been active in this country.Of these, about 560 may be described as "homegrown" terrorists: American citizens or residents who have been arrested or have died in incidents related to Al Qaeda and its many affiliates and successors. Foreigners who have attacked the United States, e.g. the September 11 hijackers, or have been brought to trial in the United States, are excluded from this estimate, and are not considered in this study.  Data were also collected on Americans convicted on charges related to Hamas and Hezbollah in order to assess differences in network organization that are related to the particular objectives of international terrorist groups operating in the United States. All data were collected from court records and other public documentation. Data collection procedures were designed to facilitate social network analysis through the comprehensive coding of information about communications and relationship between known terrorist offenders.  The study uses a method termed social network analysis (SNA). Developed by sociologists to study informal network dynamics, it has proved to be helpful in ascertaining structures, variations and patterns of change in terrorist organizations. 3. Key Findings: 2015 ended with a record number of arrests in the U.S. related to Salafi-jihadist inspired terrorism, the highest count since the 9/11 attacks. The 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings and the ability of home-based if not necessarily homegrown militants to carry out successful mass shooting attacks in 2015 and 2016 are further indications that the country faces a significant and growing threat from Americans who are inspired by the Salafi-jihadist ideology and who are guided by recruiters acting on behalf of foreign terrorist organizations.  Islamist terrorism in the United States has taken many different forms. These range from the pyramidal hierarchy of the Brooklyn-based cell in the 1990s to the family-based criminal fundraising schemes run by Hamas and Hezbollah and the recent decentralized pop-up cells of Americans who have become enamored of the Islamic State’s propaganda.  The 1993 Brooklyn-based cell was markedly hierarchical and typical for an enclave-based terrorist organization that combines proselytizing and recruitment with planning and mobilization for terrorism. It was therefore vulnerable to prosecution and suppression, and its legacy for jihadist terrorism in the Untied States was minimal. Only actors who escaped abroad were able to carry on.  Hamas and Hezbollah have used the United States as a base for raising funds, and occasionally as a safe harbor for important operatives. They retained the character of diaspora organizations focused on supporting organizations in the Middle East and eschewed domestic recruitment and mobilization for violent action in the United States. Highly centralized and vertical networks, they tend to organize around large-scale family-based fraud conspiracies involving siblings, parents and children, spouses, in-laws, uncles, cousins, and even more distant relatives. While the cells lacked broader connections within the United States, they were linked to the mother organizations in Lebanon or Gaza, often through nodes placed outside the United States.  The number of Americans who die abroad in connection with terrorist actions on behalf of foreign terrorist organizations has risen sharply in recent years. Homegrown American militants nearly always first want to go abroad to fight. Later, they may be turned around to carry out attacks at home—or if they are frustrated in their ambition to go abroad, choose to commit acts of terrorism at home. After the 9/11 attacks, jihadist recruitment in the United States recovered only slowly, facilitated by travel to Al Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, and a web-based proselytizing and recruitment strategy. In the last two years, travel to territories controlled by ISIL produced an uptick in deaths.  Recruitment networks funneling people abroad look very different from the networks of the past that were intent of organizing attacks at home. The Islamic State’s recruitment structure presents a classic pattern of what is known as a star network, i.e. a communication network in which all nodes are independently connected to one central unit, here the recruiters for the Islamic State. Flat, dispersed, and highly connected through the central hub, all traffic goes through the leadership based abroad. The peripheral nodes may be comprised of just one person linking up via a home computer or the node may be a pop-up cell of friends and family communicating with the central hub. But characteristically those on the periphery have little awareness of each other.  The new network structure associated with social media recruitment prioritizes recruitment over exercising control and command of violent plots. It is inaccurate to say that it exemplified “leaderless” terrorism as all information and action scripts run through the central hub of the network, comprised of recruiters and middle-men acting on behalf of the ISIL.  Jihadist recruitment has reached into small and mid-sized cities in every state of the country. The impact of online recruitment is evident in the diversity of American terrorism offenders, who today have come from forty different ethnicities and all races. In 2015 investigations related to the Islamic State were in progress in all fifty states. Given the extraordinary diversity of the American homegrown terrorism offenders, no common denominator and no common set of grievances, or even common motivations, can explain what makes a few individuals opt to join groups espousing violent jihad. 4. Inferences and Recommendations For Policy: Family members and spouses are often the first to know when a person is about to do something. American homegrown terrorists rebel against the nation and their parents, and against the American Muslim community. Establish a duty to report: State and federal laws should make it a duty to report suspicions about imminent criminal activity related to terrorism. The legal construction may mirror current rules regarding the obligation to report child abuse if the family member, teacher, or community member has “cause to believe” that a risk to the public exists. But what are bystanders supposed to see? There is a real risk that American Muslims will be unfairly stereotyped in the absence of a clearly formulated public education program that focus on signs of radicalization to violent extremism. Focus on community education: The growing involvement of converts and the diffusion of risk outside the metropolitan areas suggests a need to educate community leaders, teachers, prison wardens and social workers in the detection of the signs of dangerous radicalization. The number of Americans participating in lethal attacks abroad has increased. For this reason and because of the intimate connection between perpetrating an attack at home and going abroad—in whatever order— the expression of a desire to go abroad to fight for a jihadist organization should be treated as an immediate risk to homeland security. Disrupt and intercept travel to foreign terrorist organizations and insurgencies: Withdrawal of passports is one tool. Preventing the development of hidden communities of extremism should continue be a high priority. Radicalization takes place in online and offline networks and peer groups. Profile the networks: Social network analysis may provide a fuller picture of an individual’s risk profile if it is used to profile all contact points, ranging from social media networks to offline engagements with other militants. The focus should be on top-down suppression of the purveyors of extreme political violence rather than bottom-up elimination of militant social media activists. Many would-be terrorists are caught online. That does not mean that they radicalized online. Moreover, online data have proven of value to law enforcement. Suppress Internet Producers of Online Violent Extremism: Policy should focus on targeting and suppressing the recruiters rather than retail-level consumers of terrorist propaganda. Details: Final Report to the U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2017 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250416.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250416.pdf Shelf Number: 146964 Keywords: Al Qaeda Extremists Homegrown Terrorism Homeland Security ISIL Islam Radical Groups Social Networks Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Barrett, Richard Title: The Islamic State Summary: The self-styled Islamic State is an accident of history, emerging from multiple social, political and economic tensions in the Middle East and beyond. It has challenged the territorial divisions imposed on the region following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire by carving out for itself a large area of territory. But ultimately, its impact will flow as much from its challenge to established concepts of government, national sovereignty, and national identity. The Islamic State is most notable for the violence with which it asserts control, but its ruthless tactics will likely prevent the group from ruling effectively and building broader support beyond the front line fighters who protect its security and the authoritarian killers who patrol its streets. The Islamic State is a highly visible but clandestine organization. Despite the vast amount of publicity and analysis it has generated since 2011, verifiable facts concerning its leadership and structure remain few and far between. The picture is obscured by the misleading propaganda of the State itself and by the questionable accounts of people who claim to be familiar with it. It is a movement that has accelerated fast along the path from terrorism through insurgency towards proto-statehood, but it is also one that for all its bravado seems fearful that it could just as quickly be forced back underground. As a result, this paper relies on the group's own publications, the observations of defectors, and analysis by others who take an interest in its progress, despite the paucity of information. Nonetheless, The Soufan Group believes that enough is available to draw a useful picture of the evolution of the State, its structure and its operations, even though it may lack clarity and detail. The paper refers throughout to the organization as The Islamic State, being the name it uses to describe itself. The only alternative would be to call it by its Arabic acronym, commonly transliterated as Da'ish or Daesh (al Dawla al Islamiya fi al Iraq wa al Sham). Clearly, the use of its full name does not imply any endorsement or recognition of its self-description. Details: New York: Soufan Group, 2014. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2017 at: http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf Shelf Number: 141177 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Parker, Tony C. Title: Establishing a Deradicalization/Disengagement Model for America's Correctional Facilities: Recommendations for Countering Prison Radicalization Summary: Prison radicalization has been identified as a potentially significant threat to America's homeland security. When considering the inmate population currently housed within the Federal Bureau of Prisons with a terrorism nexus and the fact that 95 percent of our inmate population will return to our communities, the need for a proactive posture to prison radicalization becomes evident. Currently, the United States has no prison deradicalization program. This thesis provides a comparative analysis of two deradicalization/disengagement programs currently utilized in Singapore and Saudi Arabia. The analysis identifies externally valid data that provides the basis for recommendations for United States correctional policymakers in building a framework for a United States prison deradicalization model. This thesis also examines the current literature, relevant to prison radicalization and the prison environment that may promote prison radicalization. Through an analysis of these environmental elements, specific recommendations are made that attempt to counter the contributing factors, within the prison environment, that make the prison setting a fertile ground for radicalization. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 23, 2017 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32881/13Mar_Parker_Tony.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32881/13Mar_Parker_Tony.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 144858 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Deradicalization Extremism Homeland Security Prisoners Prisons Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Snair, Justin Title: Countering Violent Extremism Through Public Health Practice: Proceedings of a Workshop Summary: Countering violent extremism consists of various prevention and intervention approaches to increase the resilience of communities and individuals to radicalization toward violent extremism, to provide nonviolent avenues for expressing grievances, and to educate communities about the threat of recruitment and radicalization to violence. To explore the application of health approaches in community-level strategies to countering violent extremism and radicalization, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine held a public workshop in September 2016. Participants explored the evolving threat of violent extremism and radicalization within communities across America, traditional versus health-centered approaches to countering violent extremism and radicalization, and opportunities for cross-sector and interdisciplinary collaboration and learning among domestic and international stakeholders and organizations. This publication summarizes the presentations and discussions from the workshop. Details: Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2017. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 28, 2017 at: https://www.nap.edu/download/24638 Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.nap.edu/download/24638 Shelf Number: 141257 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Extremist Groups Public Health Radical Groups Terrorism Violence Prevention Violent Extremism

Author: Botha, Anneli Title: Understanding Nigerian citizens' perspectives on Boko Haram Summary: This monograph presents the findings of a study aimed at understanding Boko Haram from the perspective of ordinary Nigerian citizens. Using field and desktop research, the study analyses a cross section of perspectives on the political context of Boko Haram and the dynamics surrounding the group's existence. The study identifies complex factors, including financial incentives, that motivate individuals to join the group, and underscores the need for multifaceted and multi-layered responses. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Monograph Number 196: Accessed March 2, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/monograph196.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/monograph196.pdf Shelf Number: 141292 Keywords: Boko Haram Citizen Attitudes Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Terrorists

Author: Ewi, Martin Title: Money Talks: A key reason youths join Boko Haram Summary: This policy brief is an overview of key findings from a study aimed at understanding violent extremism in northern Nigeria, and identifying factors that are key in Boko Haram recruitment and membership. This analysis contributes to knowledge about the political and socio-economic preferences of the individuals involved in the group. This policy brief highlights one of the major findings of the study, namely the perception that financial incentives, not religion, are a key motivator for individuals who join Boko Haram. Recommendations The following recommendations could assist the Nigerian government in combating Boko Haram: 1 Promoting a common Nigerian identity that transcends ethnic, religious and geographic lines by reviewing school curricula and programmes to mainstream national identity. 2 Declare, but don't negotiate the terms of amnesty with Boko Haram: government should declare a blanket amnesty for low- and mid-level Boko Haram militants who may wish to give up arms. 3 Establishing a criminal tribunal to investigate and prosecute Boko Haram militants and others who bear the greatest responsibility for the group’s atrocities. 4 Preventing and combating sources of radicalisation by working with local communities and religious leaders to identify strategies for dissuading vulnerable individuals from turning to violent extremism Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Police Brief 98: Accessed march 2, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief98.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief98.pdf Shelf Number: 141293 Keywords: Boko Haram Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremism

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons Summary: This Handbook is one of a series of tools developed by UNODC to support Member States in the implementation of the rule of law and the development of criminal justice reform. It is designed to be used by prison managers and prison staff, in particular, but will also be relevant for other actors involved in the criminal justice system, such as policymakers, legislators and members of non-governmental organizations. It can be used in a variety of contexts, both as a reference document and as the basis for staff training. While some elements of the Handbook may not be achievable immediately in some jurisdictions, particularly in post-conflict situations, the Handbook provides national authorities with guidelines for the development of policies and protocols that meet international standards and good practice. This Handbook constitutes the first technical guidance tool to addresses the manifestation of radicalization to violence and violent extremism in prison settings at the level of the United Nations. It provides practical guidance on: • The management of violent extremist prisoners (prisoners who have embraced violent extremism) • Preventing the progression to violent extremism in prisons (prisoners who may be vulnerable to radicalization to violence) • Interventions aimed at disengaging violent extremist prisoners from violence and at facilitating their social reintegration upon release. Within these parts, the Handbook covers key prison management policies and mechanisms, such as the need for: overall prison conditions to be in line with international minimum standards; effective assessment and classification systems; physical, procedural and dynamic security; professional prison staff training; fair, humane and non-discriminatory treatment; preventing corruption; various categories of disengagement interventions involving experts from different disciplines; and social reintegration and post-release support. Overall, the Handbook advocates an approach aimed at strengthening these key components of prison management. Not only is such an approach explicitly called for in the international good practice documents, it also provides value by creating sustainable benefits for the entire prison system. The following considerations summarize the key principles underlying all recommendations made in the Handbook: • Adherence to fundamental rights, international standards, and good prison practice: It is crucial that any efforts in prison to address violent extremism must not lead to undermining human rights to which all persons, including violent extremist prisoners, are entitled. Under international human rights law, no exceptions or restrictions are permissible to the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Equally relevant is the protection of the right to hold an opinion and to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice,1 although certain manifestations may be subject to limitations, if strictly necessary and provided by law (e.g. for the protection of public order or the respect of others’ rights). At the same time, Member States should prohibit by law any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. • Relevance of overall prison conditions and prison management: Guidance on the management of violent extremist prisoners and the prevention of radicalization to violence in prisons must ensure that any proposed intervention is closely embedded in broader prison reform efforts. Stand-alone disengagement interventions, which are implemented in isolation of the broader prison context are unlikely to yield positive results, in particular if the latter fails to adhere to international standards and norms. Vulnerability to radicalization to violence is exacerbated in prisons that are overcrowded, understaffed, fail to provide basic services to prisoners, or are otherwise managed in a disorderly manner. • The importance of definitions and differentiation: This Handbook reiterates that prisoner radicalization, far from being a new phenomenon, is a very old issue which is not in itself a threat to the prison administration or society if not connected to violence. Not all radicalization is negative or a precursor to violent extremism. Only a very small number of radicals actually become violent extremists. Definitions and differentiation are important, therefore, when dealing with the sensitive topic of (violent) extremism and radicalization (to violence), in particular in order to differentiate between thought and action. • Specific challenges posed by violent extremist prisoners: The above notwithstanding, prison managers should not forget that while both violent extremists and other criminals may employ violence to attain specific goals, most violent extremists are motivated by ideological, religious, or political gain, and believe that they are fighting for a cause. This can have a significant impact on the way violent extremist prisoners should be managed, as this Handbook will set out. The focus of this Handbook is on adult male and female violent extremist prisoners. The specific issue of children alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having committed violent extremist offences will be dealt with in a separate UNODC publication, recognizing the different legal regime applicable to children deprived of their liberty. Collective disengagement from violent extremism is also not covered in this Handbook, as its focus is on the individual prisoner and interventions aimed at individual disengagement from violence. Groups may also abandon their use of violent methods, but the reasons for them doing so are not necessarily the same as when an individual disengages from violence. Details: New York: UNODC, 2016. 160p. Source: Internet Resource: Criminal Justice Handbook Series; Accessed March 2, 2017 at: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf Shelf Number: 141300 Keywords: Correctional Administration Extremist Groups Extremist Prisoners Extremists Prison Violence Radical Groups Radicalization

Author: Salifu, Uyo Title: Boko Haram and violent extremism: Perspectives from peacebuilders Summary: The atrocities unleashed by Boko Haram since 2009 have affected millions of people in Nigeria and the region as a whole. This policy brief presents the results of a field-based study on peacebuilders' perspectives of the drivers of violent extremism; and the underlying socio-economic and political factors that influence individuals to join Boko Haram. The study reveals that peacebuilders consider religious dynamics as the most influential factor in individuals' decision to join the terrorist group. As such, the study reveals that peacebuilders' views regarding the drivers of violent extremism are often markedly different to those expressed by former Boko Haram members themselves. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief 97: Accessed March 3, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief97.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief97.pdf Shelf Number: 141318 Keywords: Boko Haram Extremist Groups Peacebuilders Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed Title: Islamic State 2021: Possible Futures in North and West Africa Summary: The Islamic State (referred to in this report as ISIL) has seen its prospects in North and West Africa grow increasingly dim since early 2015. ISIL has experienced significant losses in North Africa in the past year, especially in Libya, which was once ISIL's most valuable territory outside of Syria and Iraq, and was home to the group’s unofficial African capital. Meanwhile, the Nigerian militant group popularly known as Boko Haram, which is ISIL's West Africa Province (ISWAP), has experienced major internal schisms, as different factions vie for resources, compete for the attention of ISIL's senior leadership, and renew longstanding personal, ideological and strategic disputes. But despite these setbacks, ISIL continues to pose a threat to North and West Africa, and is capable of mounting high-profile terrorist attacks in the region and beyond. Additionally, continued political instability and conflict in countries like Mali and Libya could undermine counter-ISIL efforts, and provide the group an opportunity to rebuild its networks and mount a resurgence. Indeed, two recent occurrences – the reemergence of ISIL in northern Mali and the group's temporary takeover of the town of Qandala in Puntland (a region in northeastern Somalia) – illustrate ISIL's ability to exploit ungoverned spaces and fragile states. It is possible that ISIL's global decline could also paradoxically help the group in North and West Africa, as state and non-state actors shift resources from combatting ISIL to other seemingly more urgent issues, giving ISIL the breathing room it needs to regenerate. Several factors will have a fundamental impact on ISIL’s future trajectory in North and West Africa: 1. The future of ISIL’s Sirte network: In order to survive and rebuild in North and West Africa, ISIL will likely need to preserve at least some of the militant infrastructure it developed during its year-plus in control of the Libyan city of Sirte. The Sirte network has been a key bridge between ISIL's Syria-Iraq leadership and its African allies, and ISIL has relied heavily on the Sirte network to maintain its patronage of its provinces (as ISIL refers to its affiliates) in the region. While ISIL has lost its foothold in Sirte, the group may be able to preserve some of the jihadist apparatus that had ruled and administered the city. 2. ISWAP's organizational dynamics: ISWAP's internal schisms threaten to cripple the group and weaken, if not sever, its ties to ISIL. The loss of its Nigerian province would be a major blow to ISIL's expansion efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa, and would further tarnish the group’s brand. Conversely, if ISWAP remains in ISIL's orbit, ISWAP could provide ISIL with a vehicle through which to expand its presence into other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Senegal and Mali. 3. The resilience of ISIL in northern Mali: ISIL's recent resurgence in northern Mali gives the group a new foothold at a time when it is struggling elsewhere in the region, and across the globe. But ISIL's presence in Mali remains tenuous, as both regional and French security forces, as well as rival al-Qaeda militants, will likely target ISIL. 4. Political stability in North Africa: ISIL's prospects in North Africa hinge to a considerable extent on the future of the region's politics, especially in Libya. Ongoing tensions between rival political and armed factions in Libya continue to threaten to escalate into a high-intensity civil conflict, with destabilizing effects for the rest of the region. Spillover from Libya would test Tunisia's already fragile young democracy. Algeria’s political future is similarly uncertain, given the lack of a clear successor to the ailing president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Political turmoil could provide ISIL with the opening it needs to rebuild its flagging networks. Details: Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2017. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/022017_DGR_ISIL_Report.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Africa URL: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/022017_DGR_ISIL_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 141325 Keywords: Extremist Groups ISIL Islamic State Radical Groups Radical Violence Terrorism Terrorists

Author: International Crisis Group Title: Nigeria: Women and the Boko Haram Insurgency Summary: Boko Haram's rise and insurgency have dramatically changed the lives of thousands of women and girls, often casting them voluntarily or by force into new roles outside the domestic sphere. Some joined to escape their social conditions; others were abducted and enslaved. Seven years of war have caused gender-specific suffering. While men have disproportionally been killed, women are an overwhelming majority among the estimated 1.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the North East. As former wives, slaves or fighters, many bear the stigma of association with the insurgents and are barred from reintroduction into their communities, in part because the lines between militant, sympathiser and forced accomplice are blurred. Although Boko Haram faces strong pushback, it remains capable of launching attacks and conducting multiple suicide bombings. Understanding how women experience the conflict, not only as victims but also as actors, needs to directly inform policies and programs to tackle the roots of the insurgency and strategies for curbing it, as well as facilitate women’s contribution to lasting peace. Since its emergence in 2002, Boko Haram has paid particular attention to women in rhetoric and actions, partly because of the intense debate surrounding their role in society in the North East. Among other revivalist Islamic movements, the sect called for tighter restrictions on them in some areas of life but also promoted their access to Islamic education and offered financial empowerment. With patriarchy, poverty, corruption, early marriage and illiteracy long thwarting their life chances, some women saw an opportunity in Boko Haram to advance their freedoms or reduce their hardship. Many valued the religious and moral anchoring. Thereafter, Boko Haram began to abduct women and girls for both political and pragmatic ends, including to protest the arrest of female members and relatives of some leaders. The seizure of more than 200 schoolgirls near Chibok in 2014 was a much publicised spike in a wider trend. The group took Christian and later Muslim females to hurt communities that opposed it, as a politically symbolic imposition of its will and as assets. By awarding “wives” to fighters, it attracted male recruits and incentivised combatants. Because women were not considered a threat, female followers and forced conscripts could initially circulate in government-controlled areas more easily, as spies, messengers, recruiters and smugglers. For the same reason, from mid-2014, Boko Haram turned to female suicide bombers. Increasingly pressed for manpower, it also trained women to fight. As vigilante militia members, including with the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), hundreds of women help security forces, particularly to frisk females at checkpoints, gather information and identify suspects, and also sometimes to fight Boko Haram. Others work in non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and women’s associations or care privately for war victims. In some cases, the war has opened opportunities for women’s activism, illustrated by the establishment of several new women-led NGOs in Maiduguri and the Nigerian involvement in the Bring Back Our Girls international campaign. Boko Haram attacks, the military’s persecution of suspects and its strategy of emptying contested areas have forced over a million women and girls to flee homes. Some suspected supporters are in detention. Hundreds of thousands of females are in government camps where food is scarce and healthcare dismal; in unofficial camps, the situation can be even worse. Separated from husbands and sons conscripted or killed by Boko Haram or arrested by security forces, many women are now fully responsible for their families’ protection and economic wellbeing. Harsh treatment of IDPs in camps and detention centres could undermine military gains. If corruption in aid delivery and abuses persist, communities may harbour grievances that could lead them to reject state authority. Meanwhile, the stigma carried by women and girls known or suspected to have been Boko Haram members risks leaving them and their children isolated and alienated, generating new frustration and resistance of the kind that gave rise to Boko Haram. How gender dynamics play a part in fuelling the Boko Haram insurgency should be a clear warning that women’s integration into decision-making processes at all levels is critical to a durable peace. Countering the sect and rebuilding a peaceful society in the North East requires the government and its international partners to tackle gender discrimination, better protect women and girls affected by the violence and support women's economic and social reintegration, as well as enhance their role in building sustainable peace. In the short term, reunification of families should be a priority. In the longer term, improvements and gender balance in accessing education, in both state schools and upgraded Quranic schools, is vital. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Report No. 242: Accessed march 8, 2017 at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/242-nigeria-women-and-the-boko-haram%20Insurgency.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria URL: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/242-nigeria-women-and-the-boko-haram%20Insurgency.pdf Shelf Number: 141379 Keywords: Boko Haram Female Terrorists Jihadists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violence Against Women, Girls

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts Summary: Why GAO Did This Study - Violent extremism - generally defined as ideologically, religious, or politically - motivated acts of violence - has been perpetrated in the United States by white supremacists, anti-government groups, and radical Islamist entities, among others. In 2011, the U.S. government developed a national strategy and SIP for CVE aimed at providing information and resources to communities. In 2016, an interagency CVE Task Force led by DHS and DOJ was created to coordinate CVE efforts. GAO was asked to review domestic federal CVE efforts. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS, DOJ, and other key stakeholders tasked with CVE in the United States have implemented the 2011 SIP and (2) the federal government has developed a strategy to implement CVE activities, and the CVE Task Force has assessed progress. GAO assessed the status of activities in the 2011 SIP; interviewed officials from agencies leading CVE efforts and a non-generalizable group of community-based entities selected from cities with CVE frameworks; and compared Task Force activities to selected best practices for multi-agency efforts. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS and DOJ direct the CVE Task Force to (1) develop a cohesive strategy with measurable outcomes and (2) establish a process to assess the overall progress of CVE efforts. DHS and DOJ concurred with both recommendations and DHS described the CVE Task Force's planned actions for implementation. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2017. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-17-300: Accessed April 6, 2017 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf Shelf Number: 144734 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Schomerus, Mareike Title: Countering violent extremism: Topic guide Summary: Definitions and concepts There is no consensus on what violent extremism is and how best to prevent or counter it. The term 'violent extremism' has become a catch-all for a number of phenomena, and there is considerable variation in how terminology is used. Radicalism, terrorism, and violent extremism are often used interchangeably, even though they describe different processes. The term violent extremism conflates belief and use of force. Critics also see the use of 'extremist' as always politically motivated: it can be used to denounce those that threaten the political status quo. Its use to describe primarily Islamist groups has obscured the fact that extremist beliefs and support for violence are found across different cultures, religions, and political situations. More attention is now being paid to, for example, right-wing or left-wing violent extremism. The breadth of definitions and debate may offer an opportunity for more creative policy and programme engagement. However, it can also encourage ad hoc policymaking. What we know about violent extremism Rigorous empirical research that would allow conclusive statements on violent extremism is rare, so extremist violence tends to be explained through untested theories. Political interests may also inform an explanation or definition. Causes of violent extremism are often divided into 'push' and 'pull' factors. This overlooks links between them, however, and can lead to over-generalisation. 'Individual' and 'community' factors are more useful categories - though still interconnected. Factors at the individual level include:  Personal relationships: These are important in spreading or reinforcing extremist ideas, and a radicalising peer group can provide a sense of belonging.  Beliefs, values and convictions: Extremist beliefs can be religious, spiritual, moral, or political and tend to express the conviction that a group, a way of life, or a political system needs to be challenged or destroyed. The perception of being denied recognition at a collective and personal level is considered critical.  Manipulation: Manipulation by extremist groups happens in a complex interplay of identity formation and other enabling factors. Whether there is a causal relationship between access to information (including to social media) and extremism is under-researched. This also challenges counter-approaches that use media strategies.  Trauma and humiliation: How emotions of humiliation and betrayal result in the reproduction of violence is a topic in urgent need of research. Factors at the community level include:  History and narratives: Legacies of oppression, subjugation, and interference by dominant powers matter. Sharing an oppression narrative with a community can create a sense of belonging in a marginalised situation.  Rejection of an external system: Externally imposed or international systems that are associated with injustice and humiliation can create resistance that can turn violent.  Governance: Poor/unjust governance can promote acceptance of an extremist group. Failure of a government to deliver services may enable violent extremists to establish safe havens.  Business and crime: Commercial interests can drive violent behaviour. Some extremist groups act as credit institutions where no others are available.  Marginalisation and lack of choices: Violence can be seen as a way of gaining more choices, an audible political voice, or a stronger economic position. Those who join violent extremist groups come from diverse backgrounds and arrive via different paths. Violent extremism is not the consequence of a long-term political or religious 'maturation'. There is no straightforward link between violent extremism and religious faith or specific practices. Many of those radicalising have only a faint grasp of the holy texts of the religion they are purportedly defending. This highlights that a belief - which can be a strong driver of violence - is not to be equated with a religious faith based on the interpretation of scriptures. A large-scale public opinion survey in Pakistan found neither religious practice nor support for political Islam was related to support for violent extremist groups. A direct link between education and specific attitudes has not been established: lack of education does not cause extremist views. Neither radicalisation nor state collapse necessarily leads to violent extremism. Some scholars argue that in a situation of collapse it is in fact more difficult for extremist ideologies to gain traction. Violent extremism involves local, regional and international dimensions, so strategies to tackle it are needed at different levels. Details: Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2017. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 12, 2017 at: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CVE.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CVE.pdf Shelf Number: 144892 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Kosovo Centre for Security Studies Title: Strategy on prevention of violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism from 2015 to 2020 Summary: Violent extremism and radicalism leading to terrorism emerged as global, regional and national threat in a new form during the XXI century. The nature of such threat continues to evolve in the globalized world. Extremisms and terrorism have found ways to exploit rapid changes over the recent years, whereby persons and capital can move across the borders with much more ease, and ideas may be exchanged immediately via internet. Therefore, due to globalism, a crisis which in the past was a local crisis, such as internal wars, poverty, unemployment, social instability, and low education level, are now transformed into international security risks. Therefore, weaknesses in these areas represent opportunities for extremists to spread their views, recruit members and supporters, and spread their war against secular states into new battlefields. Kosovo during the recent years is facing similar threat as majority of European countries, in particularly the radicalization of the youth, who are recruited to take part in sectarian and religious conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere. The main risk that Kosovo faces is the return of such fighters with radical beliefs and with an interest to harm Kosovo as a state with a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society and with a secular government. As seen in various examples in Europe, radicalized individuals may perform acts of extreme violence even against the people and the government of their own country; therefore we cannot exclude the risk that Kosovo may be a target of such terrorist attack. Also the national radical extremist groups of Albanian and Serbian origin that oppose the existing boundaries and government may be a potential source of terrorist activity. Government of the Republic of Kosovo is responsible for ensuring the protection and security of its inhabitants, together with the protection of their rights to freedom of opinion and religion. In this regard, the Government is determined to draft a strategy that will address, in a responsible manner, the security risk posed by radicalization and extremism, while observing the rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, which determines that "no one shall be discriminated against on grounds of race, colour, gender, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, relation to any community, property, economic and social condition, sexual orientation, birth, disability or other personal status". As a member of the family of democratic countries, the Republic of Kosovo is aware of its role and responsibilities towards regional and global security. The successful fulfilment of such responsibilities requires a comprehensive strategic platform that takes into account the transnational challenges of violent radicalism and extremism that lead to terrorism, and the important role of regional cooperation in addressing such threat. Strategic objectives determined under this strategic document aims to address the push and pull factors that influence the radicalization of the population, with special emphasis on the youth. Through achieving four strategic objectives: Early identification - of causes, factors and target groups; Prevention - of violent extremism and radicalization; Intervention - with the purpose of preventing the threat arising from violent radicalism; and De-radicalization and reintegration - of radicalized persons, and specific objectives/measures contained thereof, the Government of the Republic of Kosovo aims to prevent and reduce the risk of violent radicalism and extremism The Action Plan, which is part of this strategy, through its strategic objectives and specific activities aims, inter alia, to increase the awareness among institutions and the citizens regarding the risks posed by violent radicalism and extremism. In addition to raising awareness, specific actions in addressing such push and pull factors are included within strategic and specific factors of this strategy. The implementation of such strategic objectives and specific measures shall be conducted in line with European and global initiatives for combating violent extremism and radicalism. The Government of the Republic of Kosovo is committed through this Strategy to contribute to the implementation of the conclusions from the Washington Summit on the war against violent extremism. The Summit concluded that it is necessary to join and coordinate efforts in preventing extremism and to safeguard religious tolerance worldwide, particularly in the countries affected by violent extremism. Furthermore, during this year, the Council of Europe adopted the Action Plan 2015-2017 on fighting violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism, which contains two objectives and a number of activities in this regard. Prevention and the combat of violent extremism shall contribute in the integration process of Republic of Kosovo into Euro-Atlantic mechanisms; therefore the implementation of this strategy shall be one of the key priorities of the Republic of Kosovo during the medium-term period. Details: Prishtina: The Centre, 2015. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2017 at: http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/STRATEGY_ON_PREVENTION_OF_VIOLENT_EXTREMISM_AND_RADICALISATION_LEADING_TO_TERRORISM_2015-2020.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Republic of Kosovo URL: http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/STRATEGY_ON_PREVENTION_OF_VIOLENT_EXTREMISM_AND_RADICALISATION_LEADING_TO_TERRORISM_2015-2020.pdf Shelf Number: 145351 Keywords: De-radicalization Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Swedberg, Jeffrey Title: Mid-Term Evaluation of USAID's Counter-Extremism Programming in Africa Summary: Based on a review of quantitative and qualitative information and data from the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), it can be concluded that USAID-s Niger, Chad and Mali programs have had some positive impact - most strikingly on lower-level programmatic goals such as civic engagement and listenership for USAID-sponsored radio. Results on higher-level goals, measured through surveys on attitudes towards extremism, were also positive in the aggregate but less dramatic. Despite this empirical evidence of program impact, implementation of the TSTCP has coincided with a worsening of the terrorist threat in parts of the Sahel, indicating a continued need for counter-extremism programming. Background - In 2010, USAID's Bureau for Africa commissioned AMEX International and its subcontractor, the QED Group LLC, to conduct a mid-term evaluation of USAID's counterextremism-programming in Africa, focusing on the TSCTP. The evaluation team was composed of Team Leader Jeffrey Swedberg (QED Group LLC) and Peace and Security Specialist Steven A. Smith (AMEX consultant). The Sahel has been a concern to USG policy makers for several years as a possible staging area for violent extremists. These fears are becoming more pronounced as Mauritania, Niger and Mali have all experienced a worrisome uptick in kidnappings and killings of foreigners, while Chad continues to be plagued by chronic instability. To counter extremist forces in the Sahel, USAID has worked for the past five years in concert with the Departments of Defense and State on the TSCTP. The USG's interagency strategy is aimed at defeating terrorist organizations and their ability to gain recruits by (a) strengthening regional counter-terrorism capabilities; (b) enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security forces; (c) promoting good governance; (d) discrediting terrorist ideology; and (e) reinforcing bilateral military ties. USAID implements the non-military portions of this partnership in cooperation with State and Defense. USAID's current TSCTP activities include: a regional multi-sector Peace for Development (PDEV) program in Niger and Chad (and in Mauritania until activities were suspended), implemented by the Academy for Educational Development (AED); and community development activities in Mali, implemented by multiple partners. For USAID, the program seeks to provide tangible benefits to populations, particularly youth, at risk for recruitment by violent extremist (VE) organizations and communities in at-risk regions through youth employment and outreach programs, vocational skills training, and community development and media activities. The program also gathers beneficiaries from different communities, ethnic groups, and countries together through outreach events on topics related to religion and tolerance. Methodology - The evaluators developed qualitative information (focus groups and key informant interviews) and quantitative data (surveys), and conducted an in-depth review of literature and past reports. Utilizing a quasi-experimental design, this impact evaluation analyzed survey data to determine if treatment populations in Niger, Chad and Mali, where TSCTP programming was present, had more favorable responses to the survey questionnaire than comparison populations in areas where less TSCTP programming had been present. In all, the evaluators analyzed the results of 1,064 surveys administered in five treatment and four comparison clusters across three countries. The evaluators used the same survey mechanism in both Niger and Chad, and a slightly different version in Mali. The questions for the surveys were chosen from previous questionnaires that had been administered in these countries before, allowing for comparison with baseline data. These - source surveys included the 2009 PDEV Baseline Survey for Niger and Chad; the Afrobarometer for Mali; and the Public Attitudes in the Sahel 2007-2008 survey commissioned by AFRICOM for all three countries. The survey questions were designed so that the most favorable answer to each question would be coded as a -- with the least favorable answer coded as a .... This system allows comparability of analysis of questions or groupings of questions, which are averaged to produce a score on the 1-5 Likert Scale . In order to measure these results, the evaluation team surveyed households identified as ―treatment‖ clusters, and -comparison clusters.‖ The survey was administered by trained enumerators in the local language of the community. Survey Results - While results from this quasi-experimental survey design cannot be considered definitive proof of impact, the findings are consistent with existing literature on the TSTCP. According to the surveys, the program appears to be having modest yet significant impact across all three countries. The graphic on the following page (Figure 1) highlights the differences on the survey questions shared in all three countries covered by this evaluation - The differences between treatment and comparison areas, when shown on a one to five scale, are modest - an average of 5.67% in aggregate in favor of the treatment clusters. However, the impact appears mostly consistent across countries. The biggest impact for all three countries came on the survey question regarding whether respondents listen to TSCTP-sponsored peace and tolerance radio. Since residents of all treatment and comparison clusters were in broadcast range of these radio signals, data indicates that complementary TSCTP programming, such as governance, youth, micro-enterprise, religious outreach and education, significantly boosts listener-ship. Scores on whether respondents -participate in decision-making - , a governance indicator, indicate significant results for Mali, where there has been a long-standing governance program, as well as for Chad where governance and civil society has been a focus of PDEV and its predecessor program. The level of - satisfaction with services, -- a key socio-economic indicator, shows marginal but positive results across the countries. The aggregated AFRICOM cultural questions - measuring respondents' views on the degree to which they were against Al Qaeda; against violence in the name of Islam; their opinion of the United States; whether they approved of working with West to combat terrorism; and felt that the U.S. was fighting terrorism not Islam - measure progress on the hardest goals to achieve, and are arguably the most important indicators for demonstrating TSCTP's long-term impact. Predictably, the differences between treatment and comparison areas are the smallest on the cultural/attitudinal questions. However, the relatively better results for Chad and Niger over Mali may indicate the value of having a holistic TSTCP program, in which programs directed at the various drivers of VE are more intensively coordinated but less integrated with other USAID programming. Details: Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2011. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacr583.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacr583.pdf Shelf Number: 145465 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremism

Author: Buchanan-Clarke, Stephan Title: Violent extremism in Africa: Public opinion from the Sahel, Lake Chad, and the Horn Summary: Over the past two decades, the threat posed by violent extremist groups that espouse fundamentalist religious narratives has grown substantially across Africa (Hallowanger, 2014). The colonial era and the undemocratic rule that characterized many post-independence governments generated anti-Western and jihadist movements across the Middle East and the wider Islamic world (Moore, 2016). These movements advocate conservative religious rule as a cure for modern societies' social ills. By the 1990s, these ideologies had begun to spread to Africa, where porous borders, poor security apparatuses, weak governance, corruption, ethnic divisions, and high youth unemployment created conditions under which violent extremist groups thrived (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2014). In Nigeria and Somalia, for example, violent extremist organisations began as ethnically homogenous movements with purely domestic concerns - the overthrow of their respective governments. Over time they have evolved toward more ambitious political goals and established an active presence in neighbouring states. These groups generally favour border regions due to lower levels of government presence and security, which facilitate illicit networks and vulnerable border communities. Such a situation challenges not only the internal stability of many countries, but also the stability of the broader region. Moreover, links between national and international jihadist groups have increased over the past decade. In 2012, al Shabaab declared allegiance to al Qaeda, but there has been recent infighting over whether to shift this allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In early 2015, the Nigerian group Boko Haram publicly declared allegiance to ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Guardian, 2015). These international networks not only help these groups with material and operational support, but also build their credibility within the broader jihadist movement, thereby facilitating international recruitment (CNN, 2015). Security-led approaches have largely failed to contain the geographic footprint of violent extremists in sub-Saharan Africa. This has prompted the emergence of more development-oriented approaches, such as countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) initiatives, which seek to address root political and socioeconomic causes of extremism (Zeiger & Aly, 2015). In the past two years, both the United States and the European Union have officially outlined their approaches to CVE. 1 Several initiatives have also emerged on the African continent, including Nigeria's Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism (NACTEST). These development-oriented approaches place emphasis on the environments in which violent extremism thrives. Public opinion research offers insight into violent extremism's impact on ordinary citizens by presenting their perceptions, attitudes, and policy preferences. It also allows researchers to identify areas and populations in which possible drivers of extremism, such as low levels of social cohesion or high levels of distrust toward the state, are present. Afrobarometer's Round 6 surveys in 2014/2015 asked security-related questions in several countries that have experienced growth in violent extremism in recent years. This paper provides exploratory analysis of new opinion data from three of sub-Saharan Africa's regional "hotspots" of extremist activity, which are home to some of the continent's most prolific groups: 1. Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region (Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria) 2. Ansar Dine, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al Mourabitoun (among others) in the Sahel region (Mali). 3. Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa (Kenya and Uganda). Afrobarometer survey data suggest that security-related issues are a top priority for citizens of countries that have experienced high levels of extremist activity. Public trust in security forces varies widely by country; trust is generally lower in the police than in the army. Public approval of government counter-extremist efforts ranged from about four in 10 in Nigeria and Kenya to three-fourths or more in Mali, Cameroon, Niger, and Uganda. Support for strengthening military responses and capabilities was high in all countries in which the question was asked. Among citizens' perceptions of what motivates people to join extremist groups, personal gain was a far more common response than religious beliefs. While the exploratory analysis presented here must be considered in light of changes in government and of evolving extremist and counter-extremist strategies, it suggests the value of tracking and expanding insights into citizens' perceptions and attitudes related to violent extremism. Details: Afrobarometer, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/r6-afropaperno32-violent-extremism-in-ss-africa-en.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/r6-afropaperno32-violent-extremism-in-ss-africa-en.pdf Shelf Number: 145467 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Fenstermacher, Laurie Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies Summary: It has now been five years since the events of the "Arab Spring," and initial optimism about lasting democratic reforms and an era of lessened tensions has been replaced by fear and skepticism. Many countries are now experiencing greater instability and violence than before. The vestiges of Al Qaeda in Iraq have morphed into the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (or the Levant)-ISIS or ISIL, sweeping through Iraq and Syria and leaving behind much death and destruction. The growth of violent extremism initiated by Al Qaeda and its radical interpretation of the Islamic ideology is continuing. ISIL's deft manipulation of social media to compel and mobilize individuals to act out violently is both remarkable and frightening. Research reveals important factors to consider as well as questions to ask when developing policies and strategies to counter violent extremism (CVE): 1. Are the CVE goals achievable? 2. Do we have the right balance between security and development/stabilization? Do we have the right balance between strategies to take violent extremists off the streets and those aimed at preventing extremists from becoming violent in the first place? 3. Do we understand why some strategies have failed to deliver significant reductions in extremist violence? Do we understand the potential unintended consequences of strategies (e.g., use of targeted killings, treatment in prison, etc.)? 4. Are we failing in execution of strategies-by not partnering enough or following when we should lead/leading when we should follow? Have we implemented strategies through smart partnerships-"whole of government" partnerships, partnerships with other countries, partnerships with the private sector, partnering with organizations and communities, etc.? 5. Are we failing to communicate effectively? Do we really seek to understand those with whom we are communicating? Should others be doing the communicating at times? Are our actions consistent with our words? Like most utopian movements, ISIL is riding the winds of change. It will be increasingly difficult for them to recruit new members as the focus shifts from expansion/change to maintenance/status quo. Consequently, the best solution to countering ISIL may be to take an approach that will minimize the potential for unintended outcomes. A "whack a mole" strategy may result in further metastasis of violent extremism. It is imperative to avoid unwittingly serving as the "common enemy" and thus igniting a much larger, sectarian conflict. Queen Rania recently said, "What the extremists want is to divide our world along fault lines of religion and culture...this is about all of us coming together to defend our way of life." Likewise, keeping the conversation at the "binary," Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force, 2015. 202p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 15, 2017 at: https://info.publicintelligence.net/ARL-CounteringViolentExtremism.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://info.publicintelligence.net/ARL-CounteringViolentExtremism.pdf Shelf Number: 145473 Keywords: Al Qaeda Counter-Terrorism Countering-Extremism Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence Title: Women and Violent Radicalization: Research Report Summary: Highlights - Women are victims of all forms of violent radicalism, but can also be participants, or active accomplices, of violence in the name of an ideology. - Pursuant to the mandate in the 2015-2018 Government Action Plan, Radicalization in Quebec: Act, Prevent, Detect and Live Together, the Secretariat a la condition feminine (SCF) and the Conseil du statut de la femme (CSF) were asked to collaborate in defining the angle and scope of the present study, whose purpose is to document the differentiated radicalization factors among women and men in Quebec. The CSF and SCF also drew on the expertise of the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV) for empirical information. - Radicalization leading to violence is a complex process whereby people adopt a system of extreme beliefs and a willingness to use, encourage or facilitate violence, to promote an ideology, political project or cause as a means of social transformation. - Throughout history, women have been involved in violent radicalism, whether during the French Revolution, in extreme left-wing or right-wing movements, nationalist groups like the Tamil Tigers, or revolutionary groups like the FARC in Colombia. The violent radicalization of women is not a new phenomenon. - Despite the historical presence of women in violent extremist movements, and episodes of political violence perpetrated by them, violent radicalism is a marginal phenomenon among women in comparison to men. - Often viewed through the distorting lens of gender stereotypes and a presumption of passivity, women who join radical groups, or who engage directly in political violence, should not be thought of exclusively as victims, since they are also active participants. To understand their choices, we must explore the particular paths they have taken. The scholarly literature and most media reports have long seen radical women as manipulated and subservient to men, who are seen as the "true" drivers and actors of violent radical movements. - The current phenomenon of women involved with jihadist groups in Syria rarely escapes the interpretive grid by which radicalized young Western women become little more than stereotypes, naive, manipulated, controlled by romantic urges, dependent on the men who have indoctrinated them. That approach reduces a complex phenomenon to a caricatural explanation, denying women any form of agency. It also contributes to the belief that women who are recent immigrants are by definition more submissive toward men than women who are not. In contrast, a postcolonial approach avoids this simplistic, erroneous view of immigrant women by considering the perspective of those directly concerned. Details: Montreal: Conseil du statut de la femme, 2016. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 17, 2017 at: https://www.csf.gouv.qc.ca/wp-content/uploads/radicalisation_recherche_anglais.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://www.csf.gouv.qc.ca/wp-content/uploads/radicalisation_recherche_anglais.pdf Shelf Number: 145556 Keywords: Extremist Groups Immigrant Women Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Radicalisation Awareness Network Title: Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Exit Strategies Summary: This approach involves setting up de-radicalisation or disengagement programmes aimed at reintegrating violent extremists (de-radicalisation), or at least dissuading them from violence (disengagement). Even after the very best of prevention efforts, some individuals still go on to become (violent) extremists. While en route to that stage, they may fall under the responsibility of security services/police, and - in some cases - of judicial and prison services. However, there will (most likely) come a day when the individual - perhaps after finishing a prison sentence, or when he or she is tired of the movement or is pushed by loved ones to change - needs to be re-integrated into society. For successful re-integration into society it is important to offer de-radicalisation or disengagement programmes to prisoners charged with violent extremist offences . But "Exit" programmes should not only be offered to individuals who have faced imprisonment. Ideally, imprisonment should be prevented by offering this kind of programmes before the individual undertakes illegal activities. These programmes might therefore be targeted towards individuals in different advanced stages of the radicalisation process: from those that have strong views and legitimise the use of violence, those aligned with extremist groups but who have not yet undertaken violent extremist activities, to those that have themselves executed violent extremist or even terrorist attacks. Details: Brussels: European Commission, 2017. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2017 at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/exit_strategies_en.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/exit_strategies_en.pdf Shelf Number: 145563 Keywords: De-radicalization Extremism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Radicalisation Awareness Network Title: Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Family support Summary: This approach aims to support families vulnerable to and dealing with radicalisation and violent extremism. The role of families in the process or radicalisation has become central to the debate on the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism. Many believe that one of the keys to stopping the process at an early stage lies behind the door of the family home. Proponents of this approach believe that building resilience and creating awareness for parents and other family members will mean that young people are better protected from extremist influences. In reality, families may be both helpful and harmful in radicalisation processes. A distinction should be made between families' intentions and their behaviour. Family members may sometimes do more harm than good because they are unsure how to talk to a relative who they may fear is becoming radicalised. Family members may also explicitly encourage a relative to take an extremist path, as they believe this is the right direction. Families can however also be the key to creating a safety net and be instrumental in helping someone leave an extremist movement and mind-set. Each scenario and family's involvement will be different and requires tailored solutions. Although we talk about families as a whole, the dynamics within families and the roles of each family member will impact radicalisation processes differently. It is therefore important to understand who constitutes the family? Who is part of this group or network of people that considers itself a family? This may differ quite substantially across different cultural backgrounds. Honorary culture within families might also play an important role in both directions. Once there is an understanding as to who is part of the family, dynamics between these individuals can be observed and analysed. For this to happen, a family's cooperation is of utmost importance. Without a family's commitment it will be very difficult for 'outsiders', whether police, family counsellors, social workers or other actors, to build trust and help build resilient family engagement. A family's connection to the wider environment (other families, the community they are part of, institutions) is also a crucial element in family support. Details: Brussels: European Commission, 2017. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2017 at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/family_support_en.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/family_support_en.pdf Shelf Number: 145567 Keywords: De-radicalization Extremism Family Engagement Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence Title: Radicalization leading to violence in Quebec schools: issues and perspectives Summary: Violent radicalization, in and of itself, is not a new phenomenon. Throughout history, movements have called upon their followers to use violence in defence of an ideology or cause, whether for religious, social, political or other motives. However, the current context is one of growing activity by violent radical movements that, although extremely diverse in terms of their ideologies and motivations, all eat away at the Promise of Togetherness and pose a direct threat to our collective security. Quebec has not been spared in the emergence and proliferation of radicalization leading to violence, which is how it came about that in 2015 several young Quebecers left for Syria to join extremist groups on the ground there. College de Maisonneuve has been hit especially hard by this state of affairs; it was at the instigation of the college that the CPRLV undertook the present study to document the situation, produce a cross-sectional analysis and propose recommandations. The report explores the following broad topics: - Explaining radicalization leading to violence linked to jihadism and the situation in Syria - Placing Quebec in context with regard to this phenomenon - Understanding the radicalization of some students from College de Maisonneuve and other young people receiving counselling from the CPRLV - Identifying strategies for preventing radicalization leading to violence in Quebec schools. The different recommendations generated by this analysis (and presented at the end of the rapport) are directed not only at College de Maisonneuve, schools and government agencies but also at ordinary citizens affected by the question who would like to engage in a helpful and proactive manner with those around them. Details: Montreal: The Centre, 2016. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 19, 2017 at: https://info-radical.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/rapport-cprlv.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://info-radical.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/rapport-cprlv.pdf Shelf Number: 145633 Keywords: Extremism Radical Extremist Radical Groups Radicalization Schools Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremism

Author: Feldstein, Michelle Title: Into the Fold: Evaluating Different Countries' Programs to De-Radicalize Islamist Extremists and Islamist Terrorists Summary: Countries all over the world, including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bangladesh, Egypt, Malaysia, Singapore, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and others currently run or have run programs intended to de-radicalize Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists. Many countries, including Yemen, Singapore, and Denmark, initiated these programs following the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Although all de-radicalization programs share the common goal of re-integrating former Islamist extremists or Islamist terrorists back into society, each country's efforts have emphasized different approaches more than others, and have had varying degrees of success. This paper first explores whether the presence or absence of certain factors that may be conducive to success, such as political stability, have contributed to less Islamist terrorist attacks in each country. The second chapter, using the same characteristics that may be conducive to success, examines how a state's level of repression affects that country's level of success in de-radicalizing Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists. Thirdly, this paper evaluates how religious characteristics, including a state's official religion, affect whether states focus their de-radicalization efforts more on religious reeducation or on social re-integration. The first chapter reveals that as the success ranking of each country's de-radicalization program increases, so too does the number of Islamist terrorist attacks, revealing a strong relationship. For the second chapter, as a country's level of state repression increases, the success ranking of de-radicalization programs increase, although there is not a strong relationship. Lastly, the third chapter reveals that the greater the percentage of Muslims per total population a country has, the more a country's de-radicalization efforts focus on religious re-education; countries with official religions are less likely to focus their de-radicalization efforts on religious re-education; and countries with greater restrictions on adherents of the majority religion who do not align with the state's religious interpretation are less likely to focus on religious re-education. However, all 3 relationships are not strong. Although de-radicalization of Islamist extremists and Islamist terrorists-as a practice and concept-is still in its infancy, this paper can guide policymakers considering such programs to determine a mix of approaches appropriate to their own country context. Details: Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2015. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed May 23, 2017 at: https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/38083/FELDSTEIN-THESIS-2015.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/38083/FELDSTEIN-THESIS-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 145667 Keywords: De-radicalization Islamist Terrorist Muslims Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Title: Preventing violent extremism through education: A guide for policy-makers Summary: Over the past years, the number of reported attacks perpetrated by violent extremist groups has risen. As we witness tragedies on all continents, we understand that violent extremism knows no boundaries and affects every society. Young people are, however, most at risk. They are the main targets of recruitment strategies and fall victim to extremist violence. This phenomenon alerts us to the risk of losing a generation of youth to despair and disengagement. In the face of such threats, there is no single solution. Security responses are important, but not sufficient, and will not tackle the many underlying conditions that breed violent extremism and drive youth to join violent extremist groups. We need soft power, such as education. In particular, we need relevant, inclusive and equitable quality education. This is the sine qua non to effective action and requires countries to simultaneously implement short, medium and long-term responses. To assist countries in their efforts, UNESCO has developed this publication Preventing violent extremism through education: A guide for policy-makers. The Guide also responds to the decision of UNESCO's Executive Board at its 197th session (197 EX/Dec46) through which Member States acknowledged the importance of preventing violent extremism through education and requested that UNESCO assist them in this endeavour. Together with the Teachers' Guide on the Prevention of Violent Extremism produced by UNESCO, this Guide offers technical guidance for education professionals (policy-makers, teachers and various education stakeholders) on how to address the concrete challenges posed by violent extremism within each society. The Guide particularly aims to help policy-makers within ministries of education to prioritize, plan and implement effective preventive actions. Details: Paris: UNESCO, 2017. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2017 at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002477/247764e.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002477/247764e.pdf Shelf Number: 145803 Keywords: Crime Prevention Educational Programs Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorist Recruitment Violence Prevention Violent Extremism

Author: Cachalia, Raeesah Cassim Title: Violent extremism in South Africa: Assessing the current threat Summary: Transnational extremist groups are expanding their networks across the globe. South Africa has been linked to al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda and, more recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, with 60-100 South Africans estimated to have joined the group. The country also has a history of violent extremism stemming from domestic grievances that remain prevalent. Based on interviews with 40 stakeholders, this brief examines the threat that violent extremism poses to South Africa and the government's response to this challenge. Recent years have shown the threat of violent extremism to be increasingly fluid in nature, and this development has challenged states to review their approach to the issue. While South Africa has not experienced a terrorist attack in over a decade, it is not immune to the global challenges posed by violent extremism. In the years following the 9/11 attacks in the United States (US), several allegations have emerged linking South Africa to international extremist organisations, along with incidents suggesting that South Africa has served as an operational base for individuals connected to extremist groups abroad. In addition, terror alerts issued by the US Diplomatic Mission to South Africa over the last two years have caused concern over potential attacks in the country. In 2014 the reach of international extremism became evident when reports emerged of South Africans travelling to the Middle East to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). South Africa has also faced local extremist threats, with the last known plot thwarted in 2012 when a far-right group planned an attack on the African National Congress' National Conference in Manguang. Collectively, these events have raised a number of questions around violent extremism in South Africa and the state's capacity to respond. While the threats previously posed by domestic extremist groups have diminished, new concerns have emerged relating to international extremist groups. This policy brief provides an overview of South Africa's post-apartheid experience of violent extremism and assesses the threat that violent extremism currently poses to the country. It also provides a brief overview of government responses to the challenge and highlights emerging concerns for violent extremism in South Africa. This policy brief examines preventing violent extremism as it relates to South Africa as an actor in the global community. This is one of a series of three focusing on violent extremism and South Africa. Details: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief, 2017: Accessed May 27, 2017 at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ISS_Africa-sareport7.pdf Year: 2017 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ISS_Africa-sareport7.pdf Shelf Number: 145835 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Carroll, Jacinta Title: Manchester Arena bombing, 22 May 2017 Summary: On 22 March 2017, 52-year-old Khalid Masood (born Adrian Elms, with multiple AKAs) drove a hire car onto London's Westminster Bridge, mounted the vehicle onto the pavement and accelerated into pedestrians. Masood then drove the vehicle around permanent bollards at the end of the bridge before remounting the pavement and crashing the car. Masood abandoned the vehicle and proceeded on foot into the Houses of Parliament complex. The attack lasted 82 seconds and resulted in six deaths, including Masood's, and 49 people injured. This CT Quick Look paper highlights the key issues and assesses the relevance for affected stakeholders and Australia. It provides recommendations for government. Details: Barton, ACT: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2017. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: CT Quick Look: Accessed June 2, 2017 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/westminster-attack,-london,-22-march-2017/ASPI-CT-Quick-Look-6-Westminster.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/westminster-attack,-london,-22-march-2017/ASPI-CT-Quick-Look-6-Westminster.pdf Shelf Number: 145842 Keywords: Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Bondokji, Neven Title: Understanding Radicalisation: A Literature Review of Models and Drivers Summary: Interest in the drivers of, and models to explain, the processes of radicalisation has increased exponentially since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Attention has focused on the West Asia North Africa (WANA) region due to the expansion and reach of armed radical groups, manifesting in acts of violence both domestically and aboard. Within the radicalisation debate, scholars and practitioners have wrestled to understand the ideologies that inspire the members of self-described 'Islamic' armed groups and other causal drivers, be they social, economic, or reactionary. While this has contributed to a diversity of literature on violent radicalism, terrorism, and extremism, there is little academic consensus let alone empirical studies to validate existing theories. This paper seeks to synthesise current knowledge on the drivers of radicalisation. It examines literature on radicalisation in the WANA region, Western states, Central Asia, and Africa. Because the aim is to understand these phenomena in relation to those joining Daesh (also known as ISIS, IS, ISIL), al-Nusra (generally considered al-Qaeda's Syrian branch), and their affiliates, the analysis focuses on radicalisation at the level of the individual, not radical organisations. The paper is divided into six sections. The first defines radicalisation. The second and third sections discuss the typologies of radicals and extant radicalisation models with particular emphasis on the factors that affect individuals. The fourth section examines the literature on political, socio-economic, social, and cultural drivers of radicalisation. It then identifies knowledge gaps and weaknesses in the existing literature, and makes suggestions on the development of a more reliable empirical evidence base on violent radicalisation. The principal findings are that radicalisation is a personal process that starts with grievances and perceived injustices concerning political or social contexts, the subsequent identity crisis and, lastly, the search for purpose that follows. Moreover, radicalisation should be understood in the context of 'push' and 'pull' factors. Such factors include those of a political, economic, and ideological nature, as well as psycho-social drivers, such as a search for adventure, status, and belonging. Radicalisation also develops within supporting social environments that include family influence and narratives of victimhood. These insights are important for the development of targeted and workable policy interventions to counter the growth of violent extremism. However greater empirical evidence is necessary, particularly geared towards capturing the family dynamics at work in the radicalisation process, the role of women and female preachers, the causal relations between single factors, and driver confluence. The key challenge is limited access to radical individuals and those who have participated in violence. Until this can be overcome, a comprehensive understanding of their motives will be difficult, thus limiting the development of effective policies and programs to counter violent extremism. Details: Amman, Jordan: WANA Institute, Royal Scientific Society, 2016. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2017 at: http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Understanding%20Radicalisation%20-%20A%20Literature%20Review%20of%20Models%20and%20Drivers_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Understanding%20Radicalisation%20-%20A%20Literature%20Review%20of%20Models%20and%20Drivers_0.pdf Shelf Number: 145934 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremism

Author: United States Agency for International Development Title: The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency: Putting Principles into Practice Summary: This policy on The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency is the first of its kind produced by USAID. Its purpose is to provide a policy framework that USAID can use to improve the effectiveness of its development tools in responding to violent extremism and insurgency, as well as its capacity to interact constructively with its interagency and other partners in these challenging environments. The policy will also help USAID focus more tightly on capacity building and sustainability which are critical to our long-term security and development goals. The policy defines terms necessary for a shared understanding within USAID of these challenges and differentiates at a general level between a development response to violent extremism and a development response to insurgency. At the same time, it acknowledges that each situation is different and that these terms and the development response will need to be defined and understood in their particular context and guided by U.S. foreign policy. Building on a growing knowledge base, the policy identifies those factors, or drivers, that can favor the rise of violent extremism or insurgency as well as those that can influence the radicalization of individuals. Broadly speaking, these include structural "push" factors, including high levels of social marginalization and fragmentation; poorly governed or ungoverned areas; government repression and human rights violations; endemic corruption and elite impunity; and cultural threat perceptions. Simultaneously, "pull" factors that have a direct influence on individual level radicalization and recruitment include access to material resources, social status and respect from peers; a sense of belonging, adventure, and self--esteem or personal empowerment that individuals and groups that have long viewed themselves as victimized and marginalized can derive from the feeling that they are making history; and the prospect of achieving glory and fame. The policy identifies what USAID has learned strategically and programmatically about the role of development assistance to counter these drivers and affect a country's development. In the context of the U.S. Global Development Policy and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) on enhancing civilian power, the policy identifies ways that USAID can work with its interagency partners and amplify the development voice within the USG. It also emphasizes the importance of local partnership with committed stakeholders and enhanced engagement with bilateral counterparts and multilateral institutions. The policy affirms the importance of the development discipline to, and USAID's distinct and critical role in, addressing these critical national security and development challenges. This includes USAID's focus on sustainability and building ownership and capacity at all levels. If applied correctly, a development response can serve as an effective tool to address these issues. Details: Washington, DC: USAID, 2011. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2016 at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacs400.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacs400.pdf Shelf Number: 145940 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Shtuni, Adrian Title: Dynamics of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo Summary: What started in 2011 as a popular uprising against the Syrian regime escalated in the five years that followed into an intractable sectarian war that has engulfed both Syria and Iraq, drawn in a suite of regional actors and world powers, and attracted an unprecedented number of volunteer combatants from more than a hundred countries. Although so-called foreign fighters have been a common feature of conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya and Dagestan, Iraq, and most recently in Ukraine, their flow to Syria and Iraq is the largest influx of its kind in recent history. More than 36,500 individuals, including at least 6,600 from Western countries, are estimated to have traveled to the conflict theater since 2012, mostly to join designated terrorist organizations operating in the region. Not long after the bloody secessionist wars that brought about the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the Western Balkans became a prime source of foreign fighters for the Syrian conflict. More than a thousand nationals of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are estimated to have traveled to the battlefields of Syria and Iraq since 2012. The significance of this number becomes apparent in the context of the combined population across these small countries of less than nineteen million. Rates of mobilization relative to the population size - particularly in Kosovo but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia - are far higher than in western European countries most afflicted by the phenomenon. Now that the flow of those traveling to the conflict theater has subsided - for a variety of reasons - and about 37 percent of all Kosovan nationals estimated to have traveled to Syria and Iraq have returned home, the task of understanding the dynamics of their radicalization has become even more critical. This is not only in regard to managing the security challenge associated with their return but also to adopting effective strategies for their rehabilitation and reintegration into society. This report explores the dynamics of radicalization and violent extremism in Kosovo, focusing on the flow of foreign fighters as the most prominent symptom of a multifaceted religious militancy problem facing the country. It is important to emphasize from the outset that though the number of foreign fighters in itself represents a quasi-insignificant minority of the Kosovan society, it also constitutes merely a fraction of an extensive network of like-minded militants, supporters, and enablers who not only openly share the same ideology but are also actively engaged in its dissemination and recruitment efforts through physical and virtual social networks. This report shines some light on that less well-understood part of the supply chain of violent extremism. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 10, 2017 at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR397-Dynamics-of-Radicalization-and-Violent-Extremism-in-Kosovo.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Republic of Kosovo URL: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR397-Dynamics-of-Radicalization-and-Violent-Extremism-in-Kosovo.pdf Shelf Number: 146019 Keywords: Foreign Fighters Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Teich, Sarah Title: Islamic Radicalization in Belgium Summary: Belgium has become a major hotbed for radicalization in Europe. At least 380 Belgians have travelled to Syria as foreign fighters, giving Belgium the largest number of jihadists per capita at 33.9 fighters per one million residents. Radicalized Belgian Muslims are significantly involved not only in terrorist attacks in Belgium, but throughout Europe. What has caused Belgium to become this fertile a ground for Islamic radicalization? This paper points to the low levels of employment, high levels of discrimination, low educational achievement, poor integration, and inconsistent governmental funding pervasive among the Belgian Muslim community. These poor demographic realities of the Belgian Muslim community might be significant in providing a fertile ground for radical Islamic parties and organizations to influence and recruit. This paper analyzes Islamic radicalization in Belgium. The first part of this paper examines Belgian-Muslim demographics, including population, integration, political participation, and organization. Then, Belgian Islamic radicalization is examined through the theoretical frameworks of both McCauley and Moskalenko and Social Movement Theory. To conclude, this paper considers governmental responses and recommendations for future preventative actions. Details: Herzliya: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 19, 2017 at: https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/ICT-IRI-Belgium-Teich-Feb-16.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Belgium URL: https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/ICT-IRI-Belgium-Teich-Feb-16.pdf Shelf Number: 146257 Keywords: Muslims Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Terrorists

Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West Summary: "What is coming is tougher and worse for the worshippers of the Cross and their helpers", the so-called Islamic State declared in its statement taking credit for the May 22, 2017 bombing of a crowded Manchester, England arena. Among the victims were scores of children and their parents - callously derided in the IS claim as "polytheists" and "Crusaders" attending "a profligate concert". Seven children perished, including an eight-year-old girl. It is worthwhile to recall that only a few years ago the end of terrorism was being heralded with the killing of bin Laden and advent of the Arab Spring. As one pundit then reassuringly pleaded, "So, can we all take a deep breath, stop cowering in fear of an impending caliphate, and put [the] problem of Islamic terrorism in perspective?". Today, there is indeed a very different perspective on this ongoing and, as some analysts believe, worsening threat: shaped not only by this most recent tragedy but by the events of the past two years that have seen a succession of attacks linked to IS convulse the West. Within the span of four weeks last summer, for instance, persons pledging or professing some allegiance to the IS were responsible for four terrorist incidents in three European countries that claimed the lives of more than 120 persons. It is too soon to tell whether the Manchester attack will prove to be a harbinger of another summer of tragedy and terrorism. But we now fortunately have a better understanding of this campaign along with an ability to anticipate the future evolution of the jihadist terrorist threat to the West as a result of the publication of Fear Thy Neighbor. Written by Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone and Eva Entenmann, this report sheds important light on the historical record and characteristics of jihadist attacks against the West between 2014 and 2017. Among the study's most revealing findings is the United States' own prominence in this pantheon of Islamist terrorist attacks in the West as the country targeted most frequently after France - and with the second highest number of casualties. The report also incisively assesses the role of women and persons with criminal backgrounds in this campaign; the involvement of converts; and, most importantly the exact nature and dimensions of the ties between the attackers and the IS. The emergence of "radicalization hubs" in abetting or facilitating these heinous acts of violence is perhaps this work's single most important conclusion. Fear Thy Neighbor is an invaluable resource that will be of great use to scholars, students, governmental agencies, non-governmental and community organizations, and the media. It presents a sober and compelling depiction of this threat and the measures needed to counter it. Details: Milano, IT, Ledizioni LediPublishing, 2017. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 21, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FearThyNeighbor-RadicalizationandJihadistAttacksintheWest.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FearThyNeighbor-RadicalizationandJihadistAttacksintheWest.pdf Shelf Number: 146333 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Islamic State Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Police Executive Research Forum Title: Building Interdisciplinary Partnerships to Prevent Violent Extremism Summary: On June 17, 2015, nine people were shot and killed in Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. The shooter, 21-year-old Dylann Roof, reportedly hoped that his act of violence would spark a race war. In November 2015, Robert Dear left three people dead and four wounded after he opened fire on a Planned Parenthood facility in Colorado Springs, Colorado. At a court appearance following his arrest, Dear referred to himself as a "warrior for the babies." Two weeks later, 14 people were killed and 22 wounded in a terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California. The assailants, a married couple named Syed Riawan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, were self-identified supporters of the Islamic State (ISIL). Malik even proclaimed her loyalty to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi on Facebook as their attack was under way. Acts of violence inspired by extremist ideologies are a real threat with which communities across the country are increasingly contending. In the wake of each of these attacks, our nation and others have been left to grapple with why they occurred and how they can be prevented. Increasingly, solutions for addressing these types of attacks have been found in partnerships among various types of government service providers-such as between the police and health and human services departments - as well as between government service providers and members of the community. The aims of these partnerships are to strengthen social cohesion within the community and to provide assistance to community members at risk of radicalization to violent extremism, diverting them from the path to violence. Violent extremism is not a problem that law enforcement agencies can solve through arrests and prosecutions alone. At a 2015 National Institute of Justice conference, called "Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Canada, the U.K., and the U.S.," researchers identified issues with identity, a desire for belonging, past trauma, personal connections to violent extremists and extremist narratives, and mental illness among some of the potential risk factors for radicalizing to violence. These are issues that police can address more effectively in cooperation with community leaders, social service providers, and other non-law enforcement stakeholders. To explore these issues, on September 18, 2015, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and the Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) held a forum on Building Interdisciplinary Partnerships to Prevent Violent Extremism. This forum, which took place in Minneapolis in partnership with the Hennepin County Sheriff's Office, the Minneapolis Police Department, and the Saint Paul Police Department, brought together police leaders and community partners from across the country to share their recommendations for how to build successful partnerships to prevent violent extremism. Details: Washington, DC: PERF, 2017. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2017 at: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0829-pub.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0829-pub.pdf Shelf Number: 146441 Keywords: Extremist Groups Police-Community Partnerships Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Dzhekova, Rositsa Title: Situational Assessment of Extremist Trends Summary: Violent extremism is one of the major challenges Europe is currently facing. The threat is both external as well as internal as indicated by the rise in home-grown Islamist terrorists, as well as of nationalistic and anti-immigrant movements and far-right aggression. An accurate picture of the spread, nature and trends in the extremist and terrorist activity and actors is paramount to formulating strategic policy approaches and effectively allocating available resources. This publication provides a methodological framework for the establishment of a viable mechanism for monitoring and assessment of the state and developments over time in extremist acts and actors on the national level. The situational assessment is an instrument for systematic collection and analysis of statistical data, open source data and intelligence information pertaining to extremist actors and activities, for the purposes of developing regular situational reports of the spread, nature and trends in extremism and violent radicalisms. Following the application of the situational assessment tool, the publication presents main findings on extremist trends and monitoring capacities in three countries from Central and Southeast Europe: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Greece. Details: Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2017. 86p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 1, 2017 at: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17917 Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17917 Shelf Number: 146495 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Rushchenko, Julia Title: Converts to Islam and Home Grown Jihadism Summary: Security officials and those leading counter-extremism efforts must place greater emphasis on the dangers posed by recent converts to Islam, according to a new report published today. "Converts to Islam and Home Grown Jihadism" analyses the ways in which the process of religious conversion intersects with radicalisation. The report finds that: Though the vast majority of converts to Islam are peaceful and law-abiding, they are over-represented among foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, and have been responsible for a range of major terrorist attacks. When taken together with other aggravating factors such as possession of a criminal record, paternal absence, and exposure to the messages of radical preachers, the process of conversion can indicate a vulnerability to extremism. Ultra-conservative Salafi groups have proven more adept at proselytising activities, and the Islamic State (IS) has worked to ensure that its message is capable of being embraced by followers from a diverse array of backgrounds. This helps to explain the tendency of some converts to favour ultra-conservative versions of Islam. The appeal of radical Islam as an ideology can extend well beyond communities historically associated with Islam. This should be taken into consideration by officials devising counter-radicalisation programmes and implementing the Prevent strategy. More attention should be paid to conversions to Islam that take place in the context of prisons and probation services, with a particular focus on juvenile offender establishments and high security prisons. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2017. 45o, Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2017 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HJS-Converts-to-Islam-Report.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HJS-Converts-to-Islam-Report.pdf Shelf Number: 148052 Keywords: Homeland Security Islam Jihadists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorists

Author: Davis, Thomas J. Title: Now is the time for CVE-2. Updating and implementing a revised U.S. national strategy to counter violent extremism Summary: The United States (U.S.) national strategy countering violent extremism (CVE) has yet to be updated and currently does not provide the necessary national framework to best combat self-radicalization and violent extremism (VE) in the United States. If people subscribe that the need for an updated strategy is evident, then the question is What are the necessary and effective components of the national U.S. CVE strategy that best prevent self-radicalization and VE in the United States? This research examined the concepts and strategies surrounding extremism and self-radicalization in the U.S., the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia. Through this analysis, multiple findings and recommendations were made. One such finding was the identification of overarching elements that, if implemented, would increase the effectiveness and applicability of the U.S. CVE strategy. These elements include: 1) identifying the federal agency in charge of administering the U.S. CVE strategy, 2) developing a more robust and actionable national CVE framework, 3) refocusing the federal government on support and not local engagement of CVE, 4) requiring all CVE related terms be defined in every document, and 5) requiring regular evaluations and updates of the U.S. CVE strategy. The details of these and other findings are contained in this thesis. Details: Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. 206p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed November 18, 2017 at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/43901/14Sep_Davis_Tom.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/43901/14Sep_Davis_Tom.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 148264 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Group Homeland Security Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Eerten, Jan-Jaap van Title: Developing a social media response to radicalization The role of counter-narratives in prevention of radicalization and de-radicalization Summary: Radical groups thrive by spreading their message. They have increasingly used social media to spread their propaganda and promote their extremist narratives. Including on websites such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. In this study, the main question that we investigate is to what extent it is possible to use counter-narrative programs via social media to de-radicalize individuals or prevent violent extremism. We focus on violent radicalization connected to SalafiJihadism. Due to the political and societal context in which this project was initiated, NCTV and WODC were interested in this specific form of radicalization. The method we used consisted of a literature study, interviews (n=8) and three focus groups (n=6, n=7 and n=8) with people with different expertise and backgrounds (including academics, field workers, social media students and a former radical. In this study, narratives are conceptualized as strategically constructed storylines that are projected and nurtured through (online) strategic communication activities by state and non-state actors in attempts to shape how target audiences feel about or understand events or issues, and ultimately, guide their behavior in a manner that is conducive to their aims and goals. We conceptualize counter-narratives as strategically constructed storylines that are projected and nurtured through strategic communication (or messaging) activities with the intention to undermine the appeal of extremist narratives of violent extremist groups. Narratives have been projected by radical groups through a wide range of social media, including YouTube, Twitter and Facebook. For counter-narratives on social media, we identify three domains: (1) countermessaging (e.g., activities that challenge extremist narratives head on); (2) alternative messaging (e.g., activities that aim to provide a positive alternative to extremist narratives); and (3) strategic communication by the government (e.g., activities that provide insight in what the government is doing). A central outcome of our analysis is that to the extent that people have become more radical and strongly identify with an extremist ideology or group, they are less likely to be persuaded by any counter-narrative campaign. In general, it's challenging to persuade people with strong convictions through (online) campaigning. They are typically not very receptive to messages that aim to change their views. However, it will be very difficult to challenge people with extremist attitudes. They may not pay attention to these messages or even may adopt a stronger attitude in the other direction than intended as a reaction to this persuasive attempt. Thus, we argue that counter-narrative campaigns may be most useful for prevention purposes. They could perhaps focus on those that appear to be sensitive to extremist views and information - to the extent that they can be identified meaningfully. In addition, we have raised the question whether or not such counter narrative efforts may have some effect for the individuals from radical groups who show a glimpse of doubt about their group. For such individuals, a counter-narrative message may fall on fertile grounds and a seed may be planted, although this is highly speculative at the moment and more research is needed to support this notion. A sound starting point for designing a counter-narrative campaign is research. One should develop a sound understanding of (the context of) 'the problem', underlying determinants, where communication can potentially contribute to a solution. Here it is advisable to consider relevant theories and insights about radicalization and attitude and behavioral change. Beyond borrowing from existing theory, program planners do well to develop a sound theory of change that explicates how campaign efforts are expected to lead to the desired result. In addition, the audience should be carefully defined and segmented on the bases of meaningful variables. This requires thorough audience research. Campaigns targeting an overly broad and general target audience run the risk of being ineffective and may be counterproductive. It is therefore recommendable to focus on narrow, specific audience segments. In addition to studying the audience, it is important to develop an in-depth understanding of the extremist narratives one aims to counter. When deciding upon which elements of, for example, the Salafi-Jihadi narrative one aims to counter, we argue it is also important to consider why members of the target audience in question may be attracted to these narratives. Radicalizing individuals that are looking for extremist content may have different motives. Different motives of radical people may request different alternative or counter-narrative content. Some may be drawn to an extremist ideology. However, there are a variety of other reasons that may motivate people, such as the need for group-membership and camaraderie, a search for meaning, the need for excitement and adventure. As suggested, it is important to clarify the desired outcome, and the steps towards that outcome. Relatedly, at the outset of a campaign, goals and objectives should be delineated that clearly specify which change one aims to achieve. Well-defined objectives are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound. Running an effective social media effort also requires adequate resources (time, finances, people) which should be assessed at the outset of a program. It is also important to give consideration to potential partners. Involving partners from within local communities in campaign development and delivery may benefit a campaign effort. Control over the message is not strictly assured when it is released on social media. Of course, it is still important to give consideration to the content of the message. As put forward earlier, to the extent that this is possible, it may be fruitful to consider the different motives of radical people. Besides content, it is important to think about different aspects of the message. Messages that use the narrative format have the advantage of using subtle ways to influence people and may overcome various forms of resistance. In addition, double-sided messages (in which one side is being discredited) and messages with a strong emotional appeal may prove to be particularly persuasive. In terms of sources, it is clear that they need to be perceived as credible by the audience in order to function as trustworthy messengers. Commonly mentioned candidates are former extremists, victims of violence, peers and family, as well as key members of communities and civil society actors. The potential of the government to serve as a credible source might be limited. Among other things, the government often suffers from a say-do gap in the eyes of relevant target audiences. Yet, which messenger will in fact effective will depend on the context, the target audience, and the message one wants to relay. Also, it should be noted that source is a murky entity in social media environments. For instance, processes of information transfer may obscure the original source of a message or make it difficult to interpret who the source is. Some researchers also maintain that social media environments complicate traditional insights about credibility indicators. In terms of selected channels, obviously they should be frequently utilized by the audience one intends to reach. Using multiple channels is argued to be beneficial. Importantly, social media may not be appropriate in all circumstances, and linking online with offline activities is suggested to be particularly effective. In terms of message dissemination, one may join already on-going 'conversations'. Also, it may be beneficial to partner up with people and organizations that have already established a strong social media presence and are popular among the target audience. In some cases, it may also be useful to ask established online (news) outlets to share the message. Furthermore, it may be important to create opportunities for audience engagement. One should also give consideration to aspects such as timing and volume. Finally, we argue it is important to assess the potential risks, challenges and limitations when developing a communication strategy. These might include losing control of the message, counter-campaigns, threats to safety and well-being of messengers, and multi-tier approval processes that hamper campaign efforts, as well as the notorious difficulty of demonstrating the effect of counter-narrative efforts. Generally speaking, it is not easy to establish an effect of a policy or measure in counter violent extremism (CVE). For the potential effectiveness of a counter-narrative campaign, it is important to distinguish between a formative evaluation, a process evaluation and a summative evaluation. Specifically tailored at online interventions, we argue that a combination of awareness (e.g., reach and views) and engagement metrics (e.g., likes, shares, comments and emoji responses) can provide some insight into the extent to which a counter-narrative campaign achieved its desired effect. More traditional research techniques such as interviews and focus groups can give insight in the reception of online materials (thus useful in the formative phase), but can also provide input in the interpretation of quantitative data in the summative evaluation phase. Experiments (either offline or online) offer insight in the cause-and-effect-relationship, while "netnography" makes use of data usually obtained from observations of people in their regular social media environments. Sentiment and content analyses are methods to distract the overall evaluation towards a counter-narrative campaign as well as the specific narratives that were put forward in a particular online community. Finally, social network analyses may give insight into the structure of a group and potentially how this might change over time, although the use of this technique in this field has not yet been fully established. Government actors are not well-suited to act as a counter-narrative producer or messenger. They tend to lack credibility as effective messengers with relevant target audiences. In part, because they are perceived to suffer from a say-do gap, which means their actions and words do not always match in the view of the audience. However, they still can still their part. First, governments can fruitfully engage in streamlining their own strategic communications in terms of explaining their own actions locally and in an international context. Second, the government can play a valuable role by facilitating grassroots and civil society actors best placed to act as counter-narrative messengers. They can do so by establishing an infrastructure to support these initiatives and by sponsoring such efforts (providing help, expertise or financial support) as well as. Yet, they should be cautious, as government endorsement or support for such initiatives may act as a 'kiss of death' and undermine them. Thirdly, they could stimulate thorough monitoring and evaluation, as there is only limited evidence for the effectiveness of counter-narrative efforts. Finally, government efforts could focus on supporting the development of programs in the area of strengthening digital literacy and critical consumption skills In terms of limitations of the current study, in our analysis, we have focused only on counter-narratives with respect to the Jihadi ideology. As such, it is not possible to generalize these findings to other groups (e.g., extreme right wings groups). Furthermore, due to the fact that there is hardly any strong empirical research available, we had to base some of our analysis on the general literature on persuasion and communication campaigns, as well as some "grey literature" (e.g., policy papers, working papers, and recommendations). This undermines the options to draw strong conclusions from the current analysis, as one might question the extent to which it is possible to generalize from the general field of persuasion to the specific field of online counternarratives. We conclude that, although presenting online counter-narratives appears to be intuitively an appealing strategy to employ, our analysis shows that this may not be an ideal option to deradicalize people. It might be more fruitful to use counter-narratives in a prevention context, in which people's minds are still open enough to register and process the information presented. Alternatively, it might be possible to explore the options to expose known individuals (e.g., a convicted prisoner) with specific counter-narratives, but ideally not in an online context, but an offline context, in order to directly monitor the reactions of the individuals. Details: Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam - Department of Psychology/Department of Political Science, 2017. 152p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2017 at: https://english.wodc.nl/binaries/2607_Volledige_Tekst_tcm29-286136.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Netherlands URL: https://english.wodc.nl/binaries/2607_Volledige_Tekst_tcm29-286136.pdf Shelf Number: 148510 Keywords: Counter-radicalization Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Singh, Jasjit Title: The Idea, Context, Framing and Realities of 'Sikh Radicalisation' in Britain Summary: The report examines the context and reality of Sikh activism in the UK. It draws on Dr Singh's earlier work on religious and cultural transmission among young British Sikhs, Sikh diasporas, religious movements/communities and the state in UK South Asian disaporas. Bringing together evidence from historic and contemporary media sources, academic literature, social media, internet discussion forums, ethnographic fieldwork and a series of semi-structured interviews, the report answers the following questions: FRAMING SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN: Which incidents have taken place in Britain involving Sikhs including protests and flashpoints and how have these impacted on the discourse around Sikhs in Britain? NARRATIVES AND ISSUES: Which narratives and issues are relevant in encouraging Sikhs in Britain to participate in these protests and incidents? Are there specific political / religious narratives and how are these linked to cultural issues? THE TRANSMISSION OF NARRATIVES: How are these narratives transmitted? How are Sikh organisations / institutions involved? TYPES OF SIKH ACTIVISM: Are there different types of Sikh activism and what are the key issues of focus? THE IMPACT OF SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN: What is the impact of Sikh activism on the British public? The report also maps events and incidents of Sikh political violence, highlighting how Sikh activism in Britain fundamentally changed following the events of 1984. In June 1984 Operation Bluestar saw the Indian forces storming the Harmandir Sahib (often referred to as the Golden Temple). In November the same year, Sikh bodyguards assassinated the Indian Prime Minister, triggering a wave of violence against Sikhs across India. These events remain traumatic issues for many Sikhs in Britain. Since then most incidents of Sikh violence have occurred against other Sikhs for doctrinal, personal or political reasons. The report concludes that Sikhs in Britain do not pose a security threat as there is no conflict with 'the West'. In terms of integration, the main threat of violence is from the exploitation of inter-community and/or intra-community tensions and any resulting vigilantism. Details: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Lancaster: 2017. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 4, 2017 at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/sikh-radicalisation-full-report/ Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/sikh-radicalisation-full-report/ Shelf Number: 148691 Keywords: Extremists Homeland Security Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Lee, Benjamin Title: Ideological Transmission II: Peers, Education and Prisons Summary: Peers, education and prisons is the second of three literature reviews on ideological transmission. The first review dealt with the ideological influence of the family on young people. The third review will deal with transmission by and through political and religious organisations. This second review focuses on secondary socialisation, and considers ideological transmission within social groups (peers), centred on educational settings, including schools, universities and university societies, and prisons. The research questions that inform these reports are as follows: How is political and religious ideology (beliefs, values, attitudes, and embodied practices) passed on between and across generations and to newcomers? Who is responsible for ideological transmission? Where and when does ideological transmission take place? How do these issues apply to the transmission of extremist and terrorist ideologies? These questions are addressed across three stages of the research review, with findings summarised in the final report. In research on families, the focus on intergenerational transmission and socialisation is well developed (see Ideological Transmission I: Families), but that is not the case in research on friendship and other peer networks. This report has revealed that there is little work that concentrates explicitly on ideological transmission between peers. Studies have focused predominantly on behaviours, relationships and to a lesser extent influences, with relatively little consideration of ideas, values and beliefs or their connection to action. Details: Lancaster, UK: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, 2017. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 4, 2017 at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/peers-education-prisons/ Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/peers-education-prisons/ Shelf Number: 148692 Keywords: Extremists Homeland Security Peer Influence Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: London Assembly. Police and Crime Committee Title: Preventing extremism in London Summary: Preventing individuals from participating in, or supporting, the kinds of extremism that harm individuals and communities is crucial to our safety and security. Extremism, particularly violent extremism, is one of the most serious challenges facing society today. It has the potential to not only manifest itself in physical attacks on people and places, but to isolate individuals and create a breakdown in relationships between communities. Our investigation focused on the implementation of the Government's Prevent Strategy in London. The Strategy-and more recently its Counter-Extremism Strategy-sets out how it intends to help public sector bodies and communities dissuade individuals from engaging in extremism. Throughout our work, one thing stood out to us: that the risk of being drawn into extremist activity is a vulnerability in the same way that some are at risk of exploitation by others. Engaging the person at risk, and all those around them, in an open and honest way is vital to success. Only by being candid about the issues, open about how they are being tackled, and by delivering a strong and positive message, can efforts to prevent extremism be expected to make a difference. The context: the challenges in preventing extremism Instances of violent extremism are sadly not new. However, there has in recent years been a step change in the volume, range, and pace of extremist activity. The nature of the threat from extremist groups is now not only from large scale coordinated attacks, but increasingly from lone individuals inspired and encouraged to carry out attacks in the UK. The violent extremism promoted and carried out by supporters of the so called Islamic State (ISIL) poses the biggest current threat to UK security. But while there will be different priorities at different times, depending on the nature of the threat, it is important that the agenda covers all forms of extremism. For example, London has-and continues to-experience the impact of far right-wing extremism. Examples include the 1999 nail-bomb attacks in Soho, and a neo-Nazi demonstration in June 2015. Extremist groups establish a narrative that is used to encourage people to support them. We heard that attempts to deliver a strong counter-narrative- one that rebuts the claims made by an extremist group and tells a different story-to date have been poor. It was suggested that the current emphasis on de-radicalisation has reduced the focus on developing a broader counternarrative. While this is understandable and necessary, it needs to be in addition to strong preventive work, and both elements need to be funded in a proper way. The internet has opened up new ways to promote extremism. It has also made it more difficult to identify, monitor, and support those at risk. The Met's Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit removes around 1,000 items of material from a range of extremist groups from the internet each week, and this is a trend that is continuing. Engaged and computer-savvy parents and families are critical to addressing the risk present online in their homes, but education for parents and families on managing risk and on their own IT skills needs to improve. The policy: the Government's Prevent Strategy The Government's approach to tackling extremism is set out in its Prevent Strategy. The strategy commits to challenging extremist ideas that can be used to legitimise terrorism, and to intervene to stop people moving towards terrorist-related activity. All local authorities, the police, and the wider public sector are expected to support efforts to prevent extremism. But recently, greater emphasis has been placed on public services through the introduction of a statutory duty for Prevent. This places an obligation on sectors to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, and as a minimum, organisations should demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in their area. It is hard to measure the impact of the Government's approach to preventing extremism. It was suggested to us that the real success of Prevent is achieved through public confidence and through the confidence and buy-in of public services and institutions. The Prevent Strategy has, however, had a troubled history and the feedback we received suggests that neither of these elements is being fully achieved at the moment. Definitions of extremism and radicalisation are highly debated. Each can be defined in different ways and can exist in different forms, and broad definitions could risk labelling some of the more moderate voices as extremist. The Government's increased focus on non-violent extremism, for example, has raised questions with academics and communities. It has also raised questions about the approach that public services need to take when delivering Prevent. The implications of the Government's definition for issues such as freedom of speech and open debate need further consideration, and we recognise that the debate is ongoing. What is meant by extremism, and the types of behaviour considered extreme, is a fundamental concern that communities have with the Government's approach. It needs to get the right balance in both the eyes of communities and public services. Details: London: The Assembly, 2015. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2018 at: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/preventing_extremism_in_london_report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/preventing_extremism_in_london_report.pdf Shelf Number: 149033 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Institute for Economics and Peace Title: Global Terrorism Index 2017: Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism Summary: This is the fifth edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). The report provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 17 years in covering the period from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2016. The GTI is produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) and is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Data for the GTD is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START); a Department of Homeland Security Centre of Excellence led by the University of Maryland. The GTD is considered to be the most comprehensive global dataset on terrorist activity and has now codified over 170,000 terrorist incidents. The 2017 GTI report highlights a turning point in the fight against radical Islamist extremism. The main positive finding shows a global decline in the number of deaths from terrorist attacks to 25,673 people, which is a 22 per cent improvement from the peak in 2014. Terrorism has fallen significantly in the epicentres of Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nigeria, which are four of the five countries most affected by terrorism. The ten countries with the largest improvements experienced 7,348 fewer deaths while the 10 countries with the largest deteriorations experienced only 1,389 terrorism deaths. This highlights the strength of the positive trend with the number of people killed by terrorism decreasing for the second successive year. The largest improvement occurred in Nigeria where terrorism deaths attributed to Boko Haram decreased by 80 per cent in 2016. However, counteracting this, was the number of terrorism deaths attributed to ISIL, which increased by 49 per cent in 2016. The majority of these deaths occurred in Iraq, which accounted for 40 per cent of the increase. ISIL has suffered major battlefield defeats and in sign of its desperation has increased the number of suicide attacks and terrorist attacks on civilians. The group has now been pushed out of most of Iraq and at time of writing no longer controls any major urban centres in the country. However, while the global numbers of deaths and attacks improved in 2016, other trends are disturbing. More countries experienced at least one death from terrorism. This is more than at any time in the past 17 years and reflects an increase from 65 countries in 2015 to 77 in 2016. Two out of every three countries in the Index, or 106 nations, experienced at least one terrorist attack. This is an increase from 95 attacks in the prior year and resulted in the overall global GTI score deteriorating by four per cent since 2015. Aside from the increase in terrorism in Iraq, which is related to ISIL's tactics to delay its defeat, the next largest increases were much smaller. These smaller increases occurred in South Sudan, Turkey, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo although it should be noted that the majority of Turkey's terrorism is not related to ISIL. The major battlefield defeats of ISIL in Iraq and Syria in the 18 months prior to June 2017 signalled the beginning of the end of the group's long term territorial ambitions and military strength. As the group has lost territory, it has also suffered a significant loss of revenue, which is estimated to have declined threefold between 2015 and 2016. This decline in revenue is likely to continue throughout the remainder of 2017 and into 2018. Due to its territorial losses, the group has a dramatically smaller revenue base from tax collections with much of its oil deposits also either lost or destroyed. As its battlefield losses have intensified, many foreign and domestic fighters have deserted and sought to return to their countries of origin. These developments fundamentally undermine the group's ability to recruit based on its existing marketing strategy and brand, which has been partly centred on an image of invincibility. More troubling, is the potential for many hardened fighters and leaders to leave Iraq and Syria to join new radical permutations of ISIL or existing ISIL affiliates in other countries. This has contributed to a continuation of last year's trend of an expansion of ISIL expanded activities into other countries. However while the number of countries that suffered an ISIL directed attack increased from 11 in 2015 to 15 in 2016, six fewer countries suffered an attack from an ISIL affiliated group. The major challenge facing post-conflict Iraq will be whether the government can build a more inclusive society and address the grievances that have fuelled sectarian violence and terrorist activity. There still remain large supplies of small arms and weapons as well as many former combatants and radicalised individuals. The decline of Boko Haram following interventions from the Multinational Joint Task Force has contributed to an 80 per cent fall in the number of deaths caused by the group in 2016. Consequently there were substantial improvements in the GTI ranking of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad. This coincided with the splintering of the group into three separate groups although Nigeria will likely continue to face challenges as 13 separate groups undertook attacks in 2016. This includes attacks in the Niger Delta, as well as by Fulani extremists in the Middle Belt. The picture in Afghanistan is more complex. While the Taliban reduced their use of terrorist tactics in 2016, especially against civilians, the group stepped up their conventional armed conflict with the government. The Taliban was responsible for nearly 18,000 battle-related deaths in 2016, which is nearly 700 more than in 2015. This is the most since the war commenced in 2001. Consequently, the group expanded its direct territorial control and as of April 2017 controlled at least 11 per cent of the country and contested at least 29 per cent of Afghanistan's 398 districts. In Europe and other developed countries, ISIL's activity was the main driver for a continuation of a negative trend. The year 2016 was the most deadly for terrorism for OECD member countries since 1988; although this analysis excludes the September 11 attacks. However, ISIL's diminishing capacity has coincided with positive trends in the first half of 2017 with the number of deaths dropping to 82 compared to 265 deaths in 2016; although this analysis excludes Turkey and Israel. Since 2014, 75 per cent of terrorist deaths in OECD countries have been ISIL directed or inspired. Associated with this trend was a change in terrorist tactics used in OECD countries. Since 2014, there has been a general shift towards simpler attacks against non-traditional and softer civilian targets. ISIL inspired attacks also increased to 68 in 2016 from 32 in 2015. A greater number of attacks were foiled by security services with half of the attacks using bombs and explosives thwarted. Two years ago, only a third of these types of attacks were foiled by security services. These more sophisticated types of attacks involve more people and planning, and therefore are more likely to be detected. Less sophisticated attacks that can be executed at lower cost can be more difficult to detect. It should be noted the 2016 levels of terrorism in OECD counties is not without precedence. Since 1970 there have been nearly 10,000 deaths from terrorism in OECD countries, excluding Turkey and Israel, with 58 per cent of these deaths occurring prior to 2000. ISIL is only the fourth most deadly group and accounts for 4.7 per cent of terrorist deaths in OECD countries since 1970. Separatist groups such as Irish separatists (IRA) and Basque nationalists (ETA) have killed over 2,450 people since 1970, accounting for 26 per cent of the total deaths from terrorism since 1970. The 2017 report highlights how terrorism remains unevenly spread throughout the world. Central America and the Caribbean continues to be the least affected region. There were only 12 deaths recorded in 2016, which accounts for less than 0.4 per cent of all terrorism deaths. Meanwhile, 94 per cent of all terrorist deaths are located in the Middle-East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. When examining the drivers of terrorism the presence of armed conflict, political violence by governments, political exclusion and group grievances remain critical factors. The analysis finds that 99 per cent of all deaths over the last 17 years has been in countries that are either in conflict or have high levels of political terror. Political terror involves extrajudicial killings, torture and imprisonment without trial. This shows that the great majority of terrorism is used as a tactic within an armed conflict or against repressive political regimes. It also demonstrates the risks of political crackdowns and counterterrorism actions that can exacerbate existing grievances and the drivers of extremism and terrorism. Both Egypt and Turkey recorded substantially higher levels of terrorism following government crackdowns. The global economic impact of terrorism in 2016 was slightly lower than 2015 although it still cost the global economy US$84 billion. While this is a significant number in its own right, it is important to note that the economic impact of terrorism is small compared to other major forms of violence. This amount is only one per cent of the total global economic impact of violence, which reached $14.3 trillion in 2016. However, the figures for terrorism are conservative as they do not account for the indirect impacts on business, investment and the costs associated with security agencies in countering terrorism. As a result, terrorism is one of the few categories of violence where the costs associated with containment likely exceed its consequential costs. However, while the economic impact of terrorism is small it is still critical to contain it as it has the potential to spread quickly and with major social ramifications. Details: New York: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018. 120p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2018 at: http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf Shelf Number: 149443 Keywords: Extremist Groups Lone Wolf Terrorists Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Sheikh, Sanah Title: Literature review of attitudes towards violent extremism amongst Muslim communities in the UK Summary: The Office of Public Management (OPM) has been commissioned by the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) to conduct a literature review that provides a better understanding of the perceptions of, and attitudes towards, violent extremism. The specific objectives of the review are to provide an overview of evidence on: - what Muslim communities' attitudes are towards violent extremism; - what Muslim communities understand by 'violent extremism' and how this understanding is shaped; - the reasons given for supporting or condemning violent extremism; - any patterns of change in attitudes over the last decade, and reasons for this change; and - how attitudes relate to behaviour towards violent extremism. The literature search, review and synthesis were informed by good practice guidelines issued by government agencies1 and universities. 2,3 These have been developed with the specific aim of synthesising diverse material to inform the evidence-based policy and practice movement within the UK. The search was conducted in partnership with search specialist, Alan Gomersall, Deputy Director of the Centre for Evidence-Based Policy and Practice (CEBPP). The review as conducted over a number of stages and literature was identified from a number of sources including database searches, expert and prevent lead consultation, website searches and OPM and CLG collected literature. After a rigorous sifting process, 36 items were included for review. The review found that there is a lack of clarity around the terminology used to describe violent extremism and 'support' for it. Additionally, there are also some limitations to the methods utilized in the material reviewed, and hence the data generated. Methodological weaknesses and a lack of detail around certain aspects of the methods used meant that it was difficult to assess the representativeness and significance of findings. This is the case, for example, for a number of polls and surveys, 4 which have been quoted extensively in this report. In the case of these studies, there is a lack of explanation about the methodology used, including the construction of the sample. Additionally, the purpose of these studies is to conduct a snap shot of public attitudes, rather than a more rigorous research study of the attitudes and beliefs in the Muslim community. Caution should therefore be used when interpreting findings. Details: London: Great Britain, Office for Public Management, Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010. 93p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 20, 2018 at: https://lemosandcrane.co.uk/resources/Violent%20extremism%202.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://lemosandcrane.co.uk/resources/Violent%20extremism%202.pdf Shelf Number: 118589 Keywords: Extremist Groups Muslims Public Attitudes Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Malik, Nikita Title: Terror in the Dark: How Terrorists Use Encryption Summary: Terrorists and extremists are increasingly moving their activities online - and areas of the web have become a safe haven for Islamic State to plot its next attacks, according to a report published today by the Henry Jackson Society. Terror in The Dark: How Terrorists use Encryption, the Darknet and Cryptocurrencies shows how those planning to commit terrorist atrocities are using extremist networks on the 'Darknet' to indoctrinate sympathisers, create a reservoir of propaganda, evade detection and fundraise. It calls for urgent action by government and the policing and security services to step up intelligence gathering and action to counter online extremist activity. The report shows how terrorists are: Using encrypted apps such as Telegram to hide, communicate and plan attacks. Drawing interested sympathisers from the 'surface' world of the web into the Darknet in order to recruit and indoctrinate new supporters. Building up reservoirs of propaganda - saving it from deletion by the security services or tech companies and removing it as potential evidence for use by law enforcement. Using cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin to fundraise, taking advantage of the anonymity they offer. Following the five terror attacks on British soil in 2017, the Government has dedicated more time and funds to the combating of online extremism. However, the report makes a strong case for more attention to be paid to the Darknet, as terrorists mask their actions and intentions unchallenged on a currently anarchic platform. The report recommends: That tech companies should create a self-regulatory system to remove and audit extremist content - and release public annual reports outlining their efforts, including stats on content flagged by users, the outcome of companies' investigations and areas for improvement. That there should be a new internet regulatory body appointed by government, with the role of scrutinising tech companies' efforts to remove extremist content - with the potential for fines if companies consistently fail to take down offending material. More resources for the Joint Terrorism Action Centre to build up intelligence on the Darknet. Social media companies should work with law enforcement to ensure that extremist material is not lost when it is deleted, but is archived - to ensure that we understand extremists' patterns of behaviour online and retain evidence. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2018. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 11, 2018 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terror-in-the-Dark.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Terror-in-the-Dark.pdf Shelf Number: 149759 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Dark Net De-Radicalization Islamic State Jihad Media Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Baldo, Suliman Title: Radical Intolerance: Sudan's Religious Oppression and Embrace of Extremist Groups Summary: The Obama and Trump administrations, in temporarily and then permanently lifting comprehensive sanctions on Sudan, cited improvements in the Sudanese government's counterterrorism and its broader humanitarian and human rights record. But a closer look reveals these claims to be very problematic, with major implications for the next stage of dialogue and policy between the United States and Sudan. Now that the comprehensive sanctions have been lifted, it is essential that the United States pivot rapidly and aggressively to the relationship's next phase, which should focus on creating leverage in support of American counterterrorism interests and much more fundamental reforms that could change the nature of the authoritarian, kleptocratic Sudanese state and better secure the rights of Christians, minority Muslims, war-affected Sudanese people, and others who have been victimized by this regime for nearly 30 years. Khartoum's track record raises critical questions about its role and true interests as a counterterrorism partner. Top U.S. policymakers who chart the next phase of engagement with Sudan should account for this as they engage in anticipated discussions about remaining sanctions, a significant shift in bilateral relations, terminating Sudan's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, and forgiving Sudan's debt, estimated to have mushroomed to $50 billion.[i] Sudan's intolerant regime has a long-established tradition of religious persecution that continues today despite its bid for normalized ties with the United States and the rest of the world. It also has maintained long relationships with active extremist groups. This record suggests Sudan may be an untrustworthy partner in the bid to push back against religious extremism that is gaining momentum in the region and is essential for combatting international terrorism. The next phase of the policy effort should therefore focus on more structural changes in Sudan to address these core problems that continue to be central to the Sudanese regime: links to extremists and deep discrimination against religious minorities. Details: Washington, DC: Enough Project, 2017. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 30, 2018 at: https://enoughproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/SudanReligiousFreedom_Enough_Dec2017_final.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Sudan URL: https://enoughproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/SudanReligiousFreedom_Enough_Dec2017_final.pdf Shelf Number: 149962 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Zenn, Jacob Title: Boko Haram Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa's Enduring Insurgency Summary: In a conflict that has no easy answers and no solutions in sight, Boko Haram is already and will remain one of Africa's enduring insurgencies. In order to better understand Boko Haram now and in the future, this report, edited by Jacob Zenn, challenges some key misconceptions about the insurgency and provides new analyses and insights based on many exclusive primary source materials and datasets. To provide these unique insights, several authors with on-the-ground experience contribute to six areas that are increasingly important but under-researched about Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa: - Ideology (Abdulbasit Kassim) - Gender (Elizabeth Pearson) - Leadership (Atta Barkindo) - Counterinsurgency (Idayat Hassan and Zacharias Pieri) - Regional dynamics (Omar Mahmoud) - Terrorist networks (Jacob Zenn) It is hoped that these analyses of 'Africa's enduring insurgency' will be useful to counterterrorism practitioners, humanitarian organizations, and academia and will assist in understanding and, ultimately, mitigating and resolving the conflict. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism center at West Point, 2018. 144p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 23, 2018 at: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/05/Boko-Haram-Beyond-the-Headlines.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/05/Boko-Haram-Beyond-the-Headlines.pdf Shelf Number: 150341 Keywords: Boko Haram Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Institute for Integrated Transitions Title: The Limits of Punishment: Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism Summary: The Limits of Punishment is a research project led by the United Nations University's Centre for Policy Research, in partnership with the Institute for Integrated Transitions, and supported by the UK Department for International Development. It seeks to understand if, when and how transitional justice, in combination with other conflict resolution tools, can contribute to transitions away from conflict in settings affected by major jihadist groups. Specifically, it aims to answer two questions: 1. What are the effects of current approaches toward punishment and leniency for individuals accused of association with jihadist groups in fragile and conflict-affected states? 2. What factors should policymakers consider in designing alternative and complementary strategies leveraging transitional justice tools to better contribute to sustainable transitions away from conflict? To answer the first question, the project undertook three fieldwork-based case studies that assessed nationally-led approaches to handling individuals accused of having been associated with: al Shabaab in Somalia; Boko Haram in Nigeria; and the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq. The case studies look at a broad range of formal and informal mechanisms of punishment and leniency. These include, inter alia: amnesties; prosecutions; traditional justice; and disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration (DDR), rehabilitation, and similar programs that, in practice, offer some individuals alternatives to criminal justice. The case studies demonstrate the risks of excessively heavy-handed and at times indiscriminate approaches that penalise broad sectors of local populations accused of association with these groups, and assess the quality and limitations of existing leniency programs for such individuals. To answer the second question, the Institute for Integrated Transitions' Law and Peace Practice Group - a group of leading transitional justice experts - analysed the empirical evidence of the case studies in light of broader lessons learned from decades of international practice in the field of transitional justice. On this basis, the Group developed a framework to assist national policymakers and practitioners - as well as their international partners - in applying transitional justice tools as part of a broader strategy to resolve conflicts involving groups deemed violent extremist. The framework offers a range of approaches toward effectively balancing leniency and accountability, that can be tailored to conflict settings marked by violent extremism. Details: Tokyo: United Nations University, 2018. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 29, 2018 at: http://ifit-transitions.org/resources/publications/major-publications-briefings/the-limits-of-punishment-transitional-justice-and-violent-extremism/final-the-limits-of-punishment-01062018.pdf/view Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://ifit-transitions.org/resources/publications/major-publications-briefings/the-limits-of-punishment-transitional-justice-and-violent-extremism/final-the-limits-of-punishment-01062018.pdf/view Shelf Number: 150732 Keywords: Conflict Resolution Extremist Groups Jihadists Punishment Radical Groups Terrorists Transitional Justice Violent Extremism

Author: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) Title: Dispositif d'intervention sur la radicalisation violente en milieu ouvert : identification des difficultes et des besoins des professionnels des SPIP, aide a l'adaptation des pratiques Summary: The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) carried out a research-action over 18 months in collaboration with the French Penitentiary Administration (DAP) in order to develop an intervention response for individuals who have been radicalized or are in the process of radicalization within the Penitentiary Services for Integration and Probation (SPIP) within the probation system. This project was developed in three pilot sites: Grenoble, Lyon and Nice. This "intervention response" is understood as a set of actions and initiatives implemented at the institutional level to counter violent radicalization, namely: - A decision-making support system in the process of identifying and reporting individuals who have been or are being radicalized. For this purpose, the following products were developed by the research-action: - An Identification and Reporting Protocol for individuals who have initiated a process of radicalization leading to violence, and - A Semi-Structured Interview Guide for the Identification of individuals who have initiated a process of radicalization leading to violence. - A support system for individuals who are at risk or are already radicalized. For this component, three different actions were developed: - Two collective actions, one of which is primary-secondary prevention (Vivre Ensemble) and the other is secondary-tertiary prevention (CODE), as well as - An individual program for the prevention of recidivism (Accordeon). This research-action is a world first. Never has a project of such magnitude been implemented within the probation system. Violent radicalization although very popular remains very difficult to apprehend. This is the reason why this research-action is quite unique considering its very great ambition that is to think of and create identification and support procedures and methods. This Report is aiming to present the work achieved from July 4, 2016 to December 31, 2017, by pilot research units (mainly professionals of the Ministry of Justice and the ICPC) in the framework of the project: "Intervention response to violent radicalization within the probation system: identifying the challenges and the needs of the SPIPs professionals, and support to adapt practices". This report describes the methodology used, developed products, the results of the process evaluation and the impact of this approach as well as the actions implemented. Details: Montreal: The Centre, 2018. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 3, 2018 at: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/2018/Rapport_final_RAMO__Copie_securisee_.pdf Year: 2018 Country: France URL: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/2018/Rapport_final_RAMO__Copie_securisee_.pdf Shelf Number: 150761 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Prisoners Probationers Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Akkerman, Tjitske Title: The Impact of Populist Radical-Right Parties on Immigration Policy Agendas: A Look at the Netherlands Summary: In the run-up to the 2017 Dutch parliamentary elections, the radical-right, anti-immigration Party for Freedom (PVV) and the center-right People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) were locked in fierce competition. Immigration and integration, core issues for the PVV and its controversial leader, Geert Wilders, were at the heart of the debate. In the end, the VVD beat out its radical-right opponent, earning the most votes and leading some commentators to proclaim the election a victory for mainstream liberal democratic values. Yet direct influence, in the form of winning elections and entering office, is not the only way to exert political power and shape policy outcomes, as this report makes clear. In many Western European countries, radical-right parties such as the PVV have successfully influenced policymaking indirectly by putting pressure on other parties to advance stricter migration policy proposals in order to compete for votes. Details: Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2018. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2018 at: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/populist-radical-right-parties-immigration-netherlands Year: 2018 Country: Netherlands URL: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/populist-radical-right-parties-immigration-netherlands Shelf Number: 150819 Keywords: Immigrants Immigration Policy Radical Groups

Author: Mahmood, Omar S. Title: Responses to Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Region: Policies, Cooperation and Livelihoods Summary: This report, produced by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), is the second in a two-part study examining current dynamics with regards to violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the Lake Chad region (Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger). The first report examined factionalism within the Boko Haram movement, while the second report profiles current responses and challenges. The Lake Chad region is characterised by a number of factors which make it conducive to the presence of non-state actors. No single factor explains the emergence and rise of Boko Haram in the region, but understanding the overall context is important to understanding the movement itself. Chief among the factors enabling the rise of Boko Haram include a limited state presence and poor governance, underdevelopment and unemployment, environmental pressures enhanced by the receding waters of Lake Chad and desertification, and a deep history of Islamic conservatism. While those factors describe the shared overall context in which Boko Haram has operated and thrived, responses have differed across the region. The development of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has played an instrumental role in terms of coordinating military action, but cooperation has generally been restricted to this sphere, and largely amounts to joint military operations around border locations. Yet, positive signs of increased military cooperation have begun to appear. In addition, Nigerian security forces have undertaken a number of internal offensives, though it is unclear to what degree the security apparatus has considered the split within Boko Haram and adjusted its operating methods accordingly. Rather, it appears that the focus initially centered on Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and its leader Abubakar Shekau, instead of Islamic State West Africa (ISIS-WA), although a more equitable balance in terms of operational targeting has emerged lately. In Cameroon, the country second most affected by militant activity, the response has involved the mobilisation of security actors at all levels, which has also provided a chance for the government to reorganise and deepen its presence in border communities that were previously neglected. Non-military responses have largely been ad-hoc and suffer from limited coordination across the region, although the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) is attempting to change that. Nonetheless, some key challenges have emerged in regards to this aspect. This report highlights a few areas of concern, beginning with the need to balance security considerations with restrictions on local livelihoods. Given the precarious nature of livelihoods in the Lake Chad region, especially for those displaced, civilians can be threatened by the unintended effects of government or military policies. Restrictions on aspects like movement, transport, or the engagement in certain trades, while taken with security in mind, ultimately increase dependency and forestall the ability of the region to get back on its feet. Vigilante organisations were present throughout the Lake Chad region prior to the Boko Haram crisis, but they have taken on an increased importance in response to it. Yet many questions remain as to their future, especially given the expectations of vigilante members themselves, considering their contribution and the sacrifices endured. The gap in state presence made the reliance on vigilantes necessary, but that same gap in terms of state services will still have to be overcome to ensure the vigilantes remain productive members of society. Over the past few years, a significant number of former combatants have defected from both factions of Boko Haram. However, reintegration is a challenging aspect, which countries in the region have handled differently. The needs of local communities must be taken into account for any re-integration project to succeed, and this aspect will be a key test for the region's ability to move on from a violent chapter in its history. Finally, many parts of the Lake Chad region, especially Nigeria's Borno state, have been devastated by the conflict. Reconstruction efforts are underway but are increasingly intersecting with politics ahead of Nigeria's general and state elections in early 2019. National, state, and local leaders must not allow this to disrupt plans for sustainable solutions in favour of more expedient but ultimately cosmetic adjustments, which may have political benefits but do little with regards to long-term recovery. The response to the Boko Haram crisis is a key test for countries in the region to ensure that they can collectively recover from the destruction of the past few years, but also more pertinently provide for their citizens. As schisms within Boko Haram have led to a development of a faction that prioritises a new relationship with civilians (ISIS-WA), regional governments must do everything they can to ensure their response outpaces that of the militants and succeeds in re-invigorating the social compact between citizen and government in the Lake Chad region, thereby diminishing the long-term appeal of Islamist militancy as an alternative. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2018. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 6, 2018 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-1.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2018-07-06-research-report-1.pdf Shelf Number: 151026 Keywords: Boko Haram Extremist Violence Extremists Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism Vigilantism Violent Extremism

Author: Schain, Martin A. Title: Shifting Tides: Radical-Right Populism and Immigration Policy in Europe and the United States Summary: Recent elections in Europe and the United States have seen a rise in support for candidates touting populist radical-right policies, particularly in the area of immigration and asylum. While these platforms vary from country to country, they are often imbued with a sense of exclusive nationalism, distrust of elites, and desire to tighten borders and cut immigration. The politicians who espouse these positions have seen mixed electoral results, but whether in office or in the opposition, they have played a pronounced role in reshaping policy agendas, public discourse, and the priorities of more mainstream political actors. This Transatlantic Council on Migration report examines the (re-)emergence of radical-right populism in countries across Western Europe and in the United States. Taking a comparative approach, it highlights some of the similarities and key differences in the factors driving its support and in its impact on political systems and immigration policymaking. "It is striking," the author notes, "that the United States-a country without a dedicated populist radical-right party-has under the Trump administration seen the implementation of immigration policies more strongly inspired by this ideology than many enacted in Europe." In many countries, more established political actors have attempted (with often limited success) to curb support for populist radical-right opponents, whether by banding together to exclude them from government or co-opting elements of their platforms. Other strategies centered around addressing the economic and social concerns that underpin this support, this analysis concludes, may prove more effective. Details: Washington, DC: Transatlantic Council on Immigration, 2018. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 16, 2018 at: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/radical-right-immigration-europe-united-states Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/radical-right-immigration-europe-united-states Shelf Number: 151149 Keywords: Asylum Seekers Immigration Policy Immmigrants Radical Groups

Author: Nemr, Christina Title: It Takes A Village: An Action Agenda on the Role of Civil Society in the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Those Associated With and Affected by Violent Extremism Summary: This report examines the role of civil society organisation (CSOs) in the rehabilitation and reintegration of those associated with and affected by violent extremism. It builds on the work conducted by ICCT and the Global Center on Cooperative Security, together with four subregional partners over the past two-and-a-half years in Africa and South-East Asia. The project aimed to first understand how CSOs work within their communities and with their governments to support the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders, victims of violence, and affected communities. It then supported the work of select CSOs by facilitating small grants to bolster existing efforts or pilot innovative approaches. The findings and lessons learned from the project have culminated in the development of this action agenda, which provides policy and programmatic recommendations for stakeholders working on rehabilitation and reintegration and the role of CSOs in supporting that process. The project focused on three regions: the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal); the Greater Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda); and Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines). While each region has its own rich experiences and unique challenges, there are overarching lessons that emerged-lessons that are applicable to a variety of rehabilitation and reintegration contexts. The action agenda therefore is not divided by region but, rather, by themes and the audiences to whom the recommendations are directed. Overall, the report consists of six guiding principles and 10 recommendations targeted to a range of audiences. Each guiding principle and recommendation is followed by examples that illustrate the ways a recommendation has been put into practice or offer suggestions for implementing a given recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2018. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 31, 2018 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GC_It-Takes-a-Village_WEB.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/GC_It-Takes-a-Village_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 151328 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Countering Violent Extremism Radical Groups Terrorist Rehabilitation Terrorists Violent Extremism Violent Extremists

Author: U.S. Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States Title: Preventing Extremism in Fragile States: A New Approach Summary: Despite our success protecting America's homeland, extremism is spreading. Since 9/11, the number of terrorist attacks worldwide per year has increased five-fold. As long as this continues, the United States will remain vulnerable to terrorism while extremism contributes to chaos, conflict, and coercion that drains U.S. resources, weakens our allies, and provides openings for our competitors. We need a new strategy to prevent extremism in fragile states. If we can mitigate the underlying conditions that allow extremism to emerge and spread in these states, the United States will be closer to breaking out of the costly cycle of perpetual crisis response, pushing back against the growing threat of extremism, and positioning itself effectively for strategic engagement with its competitors. Recent successes in the fight against the Islamic State makes this a unique opportunity to focus on prevention. We must move from defeating terrorists, to preventing extremism. Established in response to a request from the U.S. Congress in 2017, the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States has developed a new strategy that represents the insightful and bipartisan foreign policy thinking of fifteen leading former policymakers, legislators, and other experts on how to empower fragile states to resist extremism on their own. Executive Summary -- We need a new strategy to prevent the spread of extremism, which threatens our homeland, our strategic interests, and our values. Our current focus on counterterrorism is necessary, but neither sufficient nor cost-effective. Congress has charged this Task Force with developing a new approach, one that will get ahead of the problem. We need a new strategy because, despite our success protecting the homeland, terrorism is spreading. Worldwide, annual terrorist attacks have increased five-fold since 2001. The number of self-professed Salafi-jihadist fighters has more than tripled and they are now present in nineteen countries in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Near East. We need a new strategy because the costs of our current approach are unsustainable. Over the last eighteen years, ten thousand Americans have lost their lives and fifty thousand have been wounded fighting this threat, at an estimated cost of $5.9 trillion to U.S. taxpayers. We need a new strategy because terrorism is not the only threat we face. Terrorism is a symptom, but extremism - an ideology calling for the imposition of a totalitarian order intent on destroying free societies like ours-is the disease. Extremism both preys on fragile states and contributes to chaos, conflict, and coercion that kills innocents, drains U.S. resources, forecloses future market opportunities, weakens our allies, and provides openings for our competitors. To reduce our expenditure of blood and treasure, protect against future threats, and preserve American leadership and values in contested parts of the world, we must not only respond to terrorism but also strive to prevent extremism from taking root in the first place. This does not mean seeking to stop all violence or to rebuild nations in vulnerable regions of the world. Instead, it means recognizing that even modest preventive investments-if they are strategic, coordinated, and well-timed-can reduce the risk that extremists will exploit fragile states. The objective of a preventive approach should be to strengthen societies that are vulnerable to extremism so they can become self-reliant, better able to resist this scourge, and protect their hard-earned economic and security gains. This imperative for prevention is not new. Back in 2004, the 9/11 Commission argued that counter-terrorism and homeland security must be coupled with "a preventive strategy that is as much, or more, political as it is military." That call has not been answered. And so the threat continues to rise, the costs mount, and the need for a preventive strategy grows more compelling. Progress has undoubtedly been made since 9/11. The U.S. government has a better understanding of what works. There is bipartisan agreement in Congress that a new approach is needed. However, the United States cannot-nor should it-carry this burden alone. U.S. leadership is needed to catalyze international donors to support preventing extremism. And the international community-both donor countries and multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank-are increasingly willing to engage these problems with us, including through the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. But challenges persist. There is still insufficient prioritization, coordination, or agreement on what to do, both within the U.S. government and across the international community. Our Task Force offers three recommendations to build on emerging opportunities and overcome persistent hurdles to preventing extremism effectively. First, there must be a new effort to unite around a joint strategy aimed at preventing the underlying causes of extremism. The United States should adopt a shared framework for strategic prevention that recognizes that extremism is a political and ideological problem. The framework should also identify building partnerships with leaders, civil society, and private sector actors in fragile states who are committed to governing accountability as the best approach to preventing extremism. Extremists' attempts to, in the Middle East and Africa, establish an absolutist state ruled by a rigid, twisted, and false interpretation of Islam resonate only in societies where the existing state has failed its people. The antidote to extremist ideology, therefore, must be political. But inclusive institutions, accountable governments, and civic participation cannot be imposed from the outside. What the United States can do is identify, encourage, and build partnerships with leaders in fragile states including nationally and locally, in government and civil society with women, youth, and the private sector who are committed to rebuilding trust in their states and societies. However, bitter experience teaches that where such leaders are lacking, the United States stands little chance of furthering its long-term interests. In such cases, it must seek to seize opportunities where possible and always mitigate the risk that its engagement, or that of other actors, could do more harm than good. Second, to ensure that agencies have the resources, processes, and authorities they need to operationalize this shared framework, the Congress and the Executive Branch should launch a Strategic Prevention Initiative to align all U.S. policy instruments, from bilateral assistance to diplomatic engagement, in support of prevention. The Initiative should set out the roles and responsibilities of each department for undertaking prevention. Its principal objective should be to promote long-term coordination between agencies in fragile states. It should grant policymakers new authorities to implement a preventive strategy. In particular, because local conditions and needs differ widely, it is important that U.S. diplomats and development professionals on the ground in fragile states be given direct responsibility, flexibility, and funding to experiment with and develop effective and tailored solutions. However, the United States neither can nor should prevent extremism by itself. It is not the only country with a vested interest in doing so and can build more effective partnerships with fragile states if other countries cooperate. Thus, our Task Force calls on the United States to establish a Partnership Development Fund, a new international platform for donors and the private sector to pool their resources and coordinate their activities in support of prevention. This would ensure that the work being done by the United States as part of the Strategic Prevention Initiative is matched by other international donors working jointly toward the same goals. It would create a mechanism for other countries to share the burden and incentivize an enterprise-driven approach. A single, unified source of assistance might also entice fragile states that would otherwise look elsewhere for help. A preventive strategy will not stop every terrorist attack. It will take time to produce results. It will require us to recognize the limits of our influence and work hard to leverage our resources more effectively. And it is not something that we can implement alone-our international partners should do their fair share. But it offers our best hope. Neither open-ended military operations, nor indefinite foreign assistance, nor retrenchment offers a better alternative. Through targeted, evidence-based, strategic investments where the risks are the highest, our interests the greatest, and our partners the most willing, prevention provides a cost-effective means to slow, contain, and eventually roll back the spread of extremism. The United States needs to enable fragile states and societies to take the lead in averting future extremist threats. If we succeed, our children and grandchildren will live in a more peaceful world. Details: Washington, DC: USIP, 2019. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2019 at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/preventing-extremism-fragile-states-new-approach Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/preventing-extremism-fragile-states-new-approach Shelf Number: 154816 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremism Homeland Security Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Busher, Joel Title: The Internal Brakes on Violent Escalation: A Descriptive Typology Summary: Why do some 'extremists' or 'extremist groups' choose not to engage in violence, or only in particular forms of violence? Why is it that even in deeply violent groups there are often thresholds of violence that members rarely if ever cross? The basic premise of this project is to look at the 'internal brakes' on violent escalation: the intra-group mechanisms through which group members themselves contribute to establish and maintain parameters on their own violence. Such internal brakes are often evident in detailed accounts of decision-making within groups that use or flirt with violence, yet they are rarely examined systematically. The aim of this project was to develop a descriptive typology of the internal brakes on violent escalation that could provide a basis for more systematic analysis of such brakes. The authors used three very different case studies to construct, test and refine the typology: the transnational and UK jihadi scene from 2005 to 2016; the British extreme right during the 1990s, and the animal liberation movement in the UK from the mid-1970s until the early 2000s. The typology -- The typology is based around five underlying logics on which the internal brakes identified in this project operate: Brake 1 - strategic logic: Identification of non- or less violent strategies of action as being as or more effective than more violent alternatives. Brake 2 - moral logic: Construction of moral norms and evaluations that inhibit certain forms of violence and the emotional impulses towards violence. Brake 3 - logic of ego maintenance: Self-identification as a group that is either nonviolent or uses only limited forms of violence. Brake 4 - logic of out-group definition: Boundary softening in relation to putative out-groups such as opponents, opponents' perceived supporters, the general public or state actors. Brake 5� - organisational logic: Organisational developments that either (a) alter the moral and strategic equations in favour of non- or limited violence, (b) institutionalise less violent collective identities and/or processes of boundary softening, and/or (c) reduce the likelihood of unplanned violence. A number of issues require careful attention if this typology is to be used, as intended, to support evaluation of the threats from and opportunities to inhibit, escalation towards violence, and it is clear that the typology cannot be use as a straightforward 'checklist'. However, in recent years a growing number of academics have begun to highlight the need for a more detailed understanding of the processes of non- or limited escalation. This typology provides an important step in that direction. Details: Lancaster, UK: Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), 2019. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 12, 2019 at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/internal-brakes-full-report/ Year: 2019 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/internal-brakes-full-report/ Shelf Number: 154902 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Hofman, Joanna, ed. Title: Evaluating Interventions that prevent or counter violent extremism: A practical guide Summary: This document provides an overview of data collection methods and evaluation designs suitable for evaluating interventions and programmes designed to prevent and counter violent extremism and radicalisation (PCVE). This collection helps to inform decision-making about the evaluation methods or designs which are most suitable to answer specific information needs, and which are most appropriate given the context in which an evaluation of PCVE work takes place in. This collection has been developed with the PCVE context in mind and with the aim of tailoring descriptions of methods to specific characteristics of work in this field. While the list of methods included in this collection is not exhaustive, the ones presented were selected based on the breadth of data collection and analysis they cover, as well as on their appropriateness for PCVE programmes and interventions. Where real-life examples of the use of the methods featured in this collection for PCVE evaluations were identified, these have been included to illustrate when and how these methods can be effectively applied. This document also provides a comprehensive discussion of ethical considerations in PCVE evaluation from a broad perspective, as well as in the application of specific evaluation methods. Offering a wealth of resources, examples and further reading, this document is a valuable guide for those who want to enhance their PCVE evaluation toolbox. Details: Cambridge, UK: Rand Europe, 173p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 17, 2019 at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2094.html Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2094.html Shelf Number: 155448 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Koehler, Daniel Title: Violence and Terrorism from the Far-Right: Policy Options to Counter an Elusive Threat Summary: Extreme right-wing violence and terrorism are a growing threat to Western societies. This form of political violence is also quite elusive and differs from others (e.g. jihadist violence) in some key characteristics. Since the September 11 attacks, policy makers, law enforcement and intelligence agencies as well as researchers have focused most of their attention on Islamic extremist violence and terrorism. This has led to an imbalance in the understanding of other threats, especially from the far-right, and adequate ways to counter it. This paper, using Germany as a main case study, argues that far-right violence has a potential risk of being misunderstood and under-classified, thus creating the perception among victims of that violence that democratic countries "are blind on the right side". This erosion of trust in the rule of law and the monopoly of force is one goal of extreme right-wing terrorists. Specific recommendations to improve countering the threat posed by the far-right are avoiding double standards in dealing with political violence at all costs, swift and efficient appropriate legal actions against extreme right perpetrators of violence, an increase in funding for research about right-wing terrorism, a possible refinement of the legal definition of "terrorism" and a discussion about its relationship with hate crimes, as well as wide scale support for countering violent extremism (CVE) and deradicalisation programs targeting the far-right. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2019. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2019 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Koehler-Violence-and-Terrorism-from-the-Far-Right-February-2019.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Germany URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Koehler-Violence-and-Terrorism-from-the-Far-Right-February-2019.pdf Shelf Number: 155701 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Shanahan, Rodger Title: Radical Islamist Groups in the Modern Age: A Case Study of Hizbullah Summary: The emergence of al-Qa'ida has focused the attention of the West on the threat caused by radical Islamist groups. Hizbullah, or the Party of God, represents another radical Islamist group that has demonstrated the ability to organise itself in a manner that allows it to operate effectively on both the military and socio-political level. Its military success was instrumental in forcing an Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2000. Unlike many other radical Islamist groups however, Hizbullah plays a significant role in the formal political institutions of Lebanon. This paper examines the environment in which the party operates, the structure and ideological basis of the organisation, as well as the reasons for its success and the limitations it faces within Lebanon. It demonstrates that, despite its colourful rhetoric, the party is a largely pragmatic organisation and that, while it has been a very successful Islamist movement, it faces significant practical limitations in advancing its cause further. Details: Canberra: Australian National University. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2003. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper No. 376: Accessed June 7, 2019 at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/34069/062003_376_RadicalIslam.pdf Year: 2003 Country: Lebanon URL: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/34069/062003_376_RadicalIslam.pdf Shelf Number: 156320 Keywords: al-Quaida Hizballah Islam Radical Groups Terrorism